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ABSTRACT
This dissertation seeks to explain variation in political liberalization among three
post-communist Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. These
countries share several common political outcomes such as the dominance o f the executive
and a high degree o f statism. Yet they also witnessed significant variation in political
liberalization within a short period o f time after their independence in 1991. The fact that
these countries share several common political, socioeconomic, cultural, and historical
features makes the rise o f this political variance more intriguing than the rise o f the above,
however, salient, common political outcomes among them within few years o f their
independence. An intriguing question arises here: Why these countries which share several
common features experienced significant variation in political liberalization within few year
o f their independence? This study seeks to answer this question—a question which has
been glaringly ignored in the recent scholarly political literature on Central Asia.
In order to explain variation in political liberalization among these countries, this
study emphasizes three variables: a) Russian minority; b) elite structure; and c) political
orientation and strategic behavior o f political leadership. It argues that these countries
show systematic variation in these three variables which account for variation in political
liberalization among them. Each o f these explanatory variables is important in its own
right and produces a significant separate effect on political liberalization. This study also
makes a bold claim that this theoretical scheme helps explain not only variation in political
liberalization among them but also aberrations in the political liberalization processes
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within them. It further argues that influences other than these three variables produce, if at
all, only short-lived relaxation o f political restrictions in the republics.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The objective o f this study is to understand and explain variation in political
liberalization among the three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan. O f course, these Central Asian republics share several common political
features such as the dominance o f the executive, secularism,1 and a high degree o f
statism. Yet they also witnessed many important different political outcomes within a
short period of time after their independence in 1991. Although they share many
authoritarian features, the fact that they have been variously described with epithets such
as "an oasis of democracy in an authoritarian desert," "enlightened authoritarianism," and
"the rule of old prince" clearly suggests the rise of important political differences among
them in the post-independence period.2
The fact that these countries share several common cultural, socioeconomic,
political, and historical features makes the rise of important different political outcomes
among them more intriguing than the rise of the above, however salient, common
political outcomes within few years o f their independence. An intriguing and important
question that arises here and needs to be answered is why these countries which share
several common features experienced important different political outcomes within a few
years of their independence.
This study seeks to answer this question. However, this study is not intended to
examine all the political dimensions along which these republics vary. This study has

1
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rather a modest objective in sight. It seeks to account for variation in the most important
political dimension— political liberalization. W e believe that the most pronounced
different political outcome among these countries has thus far appeared in the area o f
political liberalization and that this political variance is significant enough to warrant an
explanation.
A number o f reasons account for our choice o f political liberalization in the study
of emergent dissim ilar patterns of post-communist politics in Central Asia. First, political
liberalization is a worth studying subject in its own right. The importance o f political
liberalization as a precursor to the democratization process with its attendant
consequences for nondemocratic societies is well-documented in the recent literature on
regime change. It not only provides a very useful and convenient means o f capturing
some o f the very real differences that exist in the organization and conduct o f politics in
developing countries, but also serves a base point from which progress o f these countries
toward an enduring political alternative such as democratic rule could be charted, let
alone its importance for groups and individuals caught in the middle o f coercive rule and
democratic regim e.3
Second, the study o f political liberalization will enhance the comparability o f our
cases with other developing countries in general and the Muslim countries in particular.
Let alone certain monarchical and other authoritarian societies in the Middle East which
are trying to introduce political reforms and are increasingly being studied from the
political liberalization perspective (Mufti 1999; Robinson 1998), some Islamic scholars
who reject the concept o f liberal democracy as incompatible with the Islamic political

2
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system accept that under an Islamic regime individuals and groups enjoy certain political
and civil rights which can be lumped together under the rubric of political liberalization
(Maududi 1992, 22nd edition; 1993 16th edition).
Thud, an adequate understanding of political processes in the Central Asian
countries cannot be gained without studying the question of political liberalization
because it constitutes the core o f the post-communist transition politics in these countries.
The importance o f political liberalization for sociopolitical forces further increases
because o f its close connection with the post-communist economic transition underway
in these countries and the consequent question o f the access of these forces to economic
resources being distributed under this transition.
Fourth, political liberalization is also worth studying for its future relevance to
the politics o f these countries. Because these countries are far from becoming
consolidated democracies, the question of political inclusion and exclusion with its
attendant enormous consequences for political forces in these countries will continue to
be at the core o f their politics for the foreseeable future. In addition, because these
countries have powerful ethnic minorities, this question will continue to affect their
relations with external powers affiliated with such minorities. Thus, we can safely expect
political liberalization to stay with us in one way or another until these Central Asian
countries decisively move either toward genuine democracy or toward some other
enduring political alternative.4 If the political liberalization process is bound to critically
affect the future o f Central Asian societies, an investigation of this process today can
provide a solid background for the study of these societies tomorrow.

3
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IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
This study has both theoretical and empirical importance. Theoretically, this study
will contribute to the scholarly efforts aimed at building theory about the post-communist
polities

where

little

democratization

has

occurred.3 Our

information

about

post-communist politics in societies where outright authoritarian and semi-democratic
regimes are emerging is extremely deficient. And it is difficult to formulate a reliable set
of propositions about post-communist political processes in such societies. This study is
intended to generate theoretical propositions about post-communist politics, redressing
the lack of theory-grounded explanations of the emerging patterns of post-communist
politics in these societies. In addition, the focus on the Central Asian countries will help
broaden the empirical scope o f the recent theoretical research efforts which paid more
attention to post-communist polities in Eastern Europe and European parts of the former
Soviet Union than to those in Central Asia. W ithout incorporating those post-communist
regions which have not been focus of these research efforts, we can not be sure whether
political processes unfolding in such regions such as Central Asia support or undermine
theoretical insights o f the several bodies o f post-communist literature developed mostly
from the study o f the East European countries, the Baltic republics, and Russia.
This study will also contribute to the efforts aimed at understanding where and
why certain countries, which begin their independence at the same point in time and
share several common socioeconomic, cultural and political characteristics, experience
important different political outcomes within a short span of time (Collier 1982). In
addition, in the absence of mutually exclusive typologies o f political regime types and

4
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subtypes and in the absence of prior theory and a well-developed typology of political
regimes in the post-communist world, this study is expected to contribute, though
indirectly, to the refinement o f typologies of political regime types and subtypes.6
The lack o f an adequate theoretical and comparative analysis in the existing
literature on Central Asia further underscores the importance o f this study. Before
Central Asia became independent in 1991, most studies o f the region were historical,
descriptive and configurative in nature.7 Only few studies were o f comparative nature.8
This situation continued in the post-independence period. After independence more
emphasis has been given to geopolitical questions than to sociocultural and political
processes

within the Central Asian republics.9 Most studies which deal with

sociopolitical processes in Central Asia are configurative and descriptive, offering little
theoretical explanation o f such processes. The few comparative studies done so far focus
mostly on similarities among the regional countries (Hunter 1996; Lipvosky 1996;
Clement 1994). Some o f them even recognize the development o f these republics along
different political paths (Motyle 1997:53; Hunter 1996:xviii, 40; Kangas 1994; Chavin
1994:161; Halbach 1992). However, sufficient systematic attention has not been paid to
studying and explaining these differences. This assertion is supported by a recent
comparative study which lamented the lack o f an adequate theoretical explanation o f
significant variation in political openness among these republics (CSCE, March 1998:3942). We hope that this study will help remove this theoretical confusion among students
of the Central Asian region.

5
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The empirical importance o f this study is evident from the vantage point that we
have very little hard evidence about Central Asia. Despite scholarly attempts to study
Central Asia in the post-communist era, it is still not among the widely studied areas, and
there is no extensive range o f hard evidence about it. Writers are trying to fill the gap
in our information and knowledge about Central Asia. However, specialists are still
deeply divided on how to characterize the Central Asian societies. It is fair to say that
the Central Asian societies are still poorly understood and serious research is greatly
hampered by the lack o f reliable objective information. The existing studies o f Central
Asia provide only small amount o f hard evidence on that region. This situation seems to
have led many scholars to make rash and wrong judgments and predictions about the
region.10 This study is hoped to generate not only hypotheses and propositions about
post-communist politics but also empirical evidence about one o f the most neglected but
increasingly important areas in the post-communist world.
This study is also hoped to benefit a variety o f people and groups, governmental
and nongovernmental, interested in Central Asia in one way or another. More
specifically, this study will serve a double purpose: 1) For a general student and a
specialist o f Central Asia, this study will offer sound information and source material for
further study o f a

relatively obscure but increasingly

important area in the

post-communist world; and 2) for individuals and groups with economic, sociopolitical,
and cultural stakes in Central Asia, this study will provide diversity of information to
draw on in their dealing with Central Asia and help them avoid rash and wrong
judgements and policies about that region.

6
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PREVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT
A full description o f our theoretical argument is offered in Chapter 1. In this
section we will briefly summarize the main findings o f this study. We hope that this
exercise will help prepare and guide the reader through our theoretical and empirical
arguments. It is one o f the arguments of this study that our countries began to experience
differential rates o f political openness in the wake o f the Gorbachev reform program in
the pre-independence period and that this variance became more pronounced in the post
independence period. We further argue that the same set o f factors can adequately
account for differential rates o f political openness among these republics in the pre- and
post-independence periods.
In order to explain variation in political liberalization among our countries, we
emphasize three factors: the Russian minority, elite structure, and political leadership.
We argue in this study that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan show systematic
variation in these three variables which

produce variation in political liberalization

among them. Each o f our explanatory variables is important in its own right and
produces a significant separate effect on political liberalization. We further argue that till
now influences other than these three variables are found to produce, if at all, only short
lived relaxation o f political restrictions in these republics.
Our first explanatory variable is a compound variable which involves focus on the
proportional size, the level o f politicization, and resourcefulness o f the ethnic Russian
minority in each republic. We find a positive impact o f the large ethnic Russian minority
in proportion to the titular nationality on political liberalization. The relatively large

7
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Russian minority is more likely to be politicized, defend its own causes rather than to
leave them to the governments of these countries and command considerable resources,
including the support o f their coethnics, both the people and authorities, in Russia. The
relatively large size o f politicized Russian minority means a reduced support base for the
ruling elites (whose chief political opponents come from their own titular nationality),
wider opposition to them, and higher costs o f its repression, including inter-ethnic
instability and the potential Russian intervention with serious consequences for their rule.
All such considerations considerably constrain authoritarian impulses and contribute to
relaxation o f political control in republics with a relatively large size o f the ethnic
Russian minority.
The second variable that we emphasize is elite structure. The character o f elite
structure in these republics is defined by the internal unity and cohesiveness o f the oldregime elites who include leaders of the (former) republican communist party, members
of the parliament, important members o f momenklatura, state functionaries, and heads
of public enterprises in the pre- and post-independence period.

The two basic elite

structure types, consolidated and fragmented (or dispersed), emerged in these countries
in the pre- and post-independence periods. We find that the consolidated elite structure
has a negative impact on political liberalization in these countries. Such elite structure
means that the support base o f the old-regime elites is intact and that they have more
freedom of action with their full access to power resources which they can readily use
to crush opposition forces without paying enormous costs.

8
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On the contrary, the dispersed elite structure has a positive impact on political
liberalization in these countries. It is so because the fragmented elite structure is
indicative o f the dispersion o f political resources, the rise of multiple power centers, a
narrow support base for the ruling elites, their isolation from important sources o f
support, a reduction in the clientelist networks available to them, their need for societal
allies, and a reduction in their capacity to thoroughly control and repress society with
impunity. In addition, because certain disgruntled elites with their intact access to
traditional sources o f support may be tempted to take up arms to defend their causes and
protect themselves against excessive government repression, the fragmented elite
structure increases the risk o f civil war along tribal, ethnic, and regional lines and
therefore the risk o f Russian intervention—a prospect which the governing elites very
much like to avoid because of its potential serious consequences for their own power
position, let alone for their societies. Thus, the dispersed elite structure considerably
complicates the use o f indiscriminate repression o f independent political forces and
contributes to the expansion o f independent political space in these republics.
The logic o f our theoretical argument has thus far been structural. We recognize
that it has certain limitations. The large Russian minority and fragmented elite structure
act as powerful constraints on the authoritarian impulses in the Central Asian republics,
but they can not be shown to clearly determine a full range of variations in political
liberalization among these countries. They account for the broad variance in the general
direction o f the political liberalization process in our countries, but they can not
adequately answer a number o f specific questions. For instance, why does the political

9
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liberalization process experience aberrations in a republic when the above two causal
factors rem ain constant? Why do ruling elites in these republics relax some activities but
not others? And why do they some times tolerate the same independent political activity
which they otherwise repress? These and other similar questions remained unanswered
if we confine our theoretical argument to the above two structural explanatory variables.
Therefore, we expand our theoretical argument and incorporate in it another explanatory
variable, political leadership, in order to provide an adequate explanation of variation in
political liberalization among the Central Asian countries. In this way, our theoretical
argument is both structural and voluntaristic in nature.
The incorporation o f the political leadership variable is based on the assumption
that political leaders are not simply forced by broad structural conditions into a
predetermined direction, but rather they generally possess certain amount of autonomy,
retain initiative, and mediate the gross impact o f such conditions on the political process.
In other words, even under powerful constraints produced by structural conditions they
generally have a significant range of options in making political choices and decisions.
Their actions tend to have cumulative effect which can increase or decrease the level o f
political liberalization in a republic. In addition, political leaders exhibit certain central
political tendencies which are assumed to influence political liberalization. If these
assertions are correct, then variations in political orientations o f the political leadership
of the Central Asian republics and their concrete actions will help explain variation in
political liberalization among them.

10
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In this study, political leadership refers to the presidents in charge o f the postcommunist transition process in these republics. In this study, we focus on two aspects
o f political leadership, its views about political liberalization and concrete actions related
to it. We find that the political leaders o f these countries differ in their views about
political liberalization. More specifically, they differ about whether, how and when
political liberalization can be introduced in their societies. Some Central Asian political
leaders doubt the readiness o f their societies for political liberalization, its compatibility
with their political culture, and refer to its adverse consequences for their societies.
While others have a more favorable view o f political liberalization and its consequences
for their societies. Political leaders with benign view o f political liberalization are more
likely to relax political control and to be responsive to the constraints of structural
conditions—the Russian minority and fragmented elite structure— than the political
leaders with ambivalent and negative views of political liberalization and its consequences
for their rule and societies.
In addition to the political leaders’ view of political liberalization, we focus on
their concrete political actions and find them relevant to the study o f variation in political
liberalization among our countries. Because there is no necessary connection between one
class o f actions and political liberalization and because actions o f political leaders are o f
fluid nature,

it becomes more or less an empirical question to investigate whether a

concrete action of political leadership produces a positive o r negative impact on political
liberalization in a republic.

11
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We observe systematic variation across our countries in three variables, the
Russian minority, elite structure, and political leadership. Kazakhstan has the largest
ethnic Russian minority, followed by Kyrgyzstan; Uzbekistan has relatively small Russian
minority (see Tables 1 and 2). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan both passed into the post
communist transition phase with fragmented elite structures. Uzbekistan emerged out o f
the transition phase with a consolidated elite structure which by and large remained intact
in the post-independence period. Kyrgyz leadership exhibits very favorable views about
political liberalization. Kazakh leadership exhibits moderately negative views about
political liberalization. And Uzbek leadership has very negative views about political
liberalization and its consequences for Uzbek society.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan show considerable variation in political
liberalization (see Table 7). The systematic variation across our countries in the three
explanatory variables yields the following ranking. Kyrgyzstan scores higher in political
liberalization than Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Barring few minor aberrations since mid1994, the political liberalization process in Kyrgyzstan recorded sustained progress in
almost all the areas o f political liberalization in the post-independence period.
Although Kazakhstan’s record on political liberalization is modest in comparison
to Kyrgyzstan, it is far better than that of Uzbekistan. In other words, Kazakhstan has
a mixed record o f political liberalization. After independence, it witnessed an overall
improvement in the pre-independence level o f political liberalization and sizable
independent political space became available to Kazakh society. Yet repression o f

12
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independent political forces remained a serious problem in Kazakh society in the post
independence period.
Both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have a relatively large ethnic Russian minority
and fragmented elite structure but differ in the level of political liberalization. Kazakhstan
ranks lower than Kyrgyzstan on the political liberalization scale. The moderately negative
views of Kazakh leadership about political liberalization and the presence and demands
o f secessionist elements o f the Russian minority (which provides Kazakh authorities an
easy excuse to repress certain unwanted opposition forces in the name o f inter-ethnic
harmony and security and territorial integrity o f the republic) explain the overall mixed
record of political liberalization and its lower rank than that o f Kyrgyzstan on the
political liberalization scale in the post-independence period.
Uzbekistan which scores low on all the three factors conducive to political
liberalization has by all accounts made little or no movement toward political
liberalization in the post-independence period. Tactics aside, no tolerated independent
political activity existed in the republic in the post-communist era. In fact, in the absence
o f effective constraints, Uzbek authorities unhesitatingly unleashed indiscriminate
repression and have been able to drive individual and organized opposition forces into
exile or into underground and semi-underground positions in the post-independence
period.

THE CASE FOR SELECTION OF CASES
The decision to study variation in political liberalization among three out of five
Central Asian republics is not arbitrary. Quite the contrary. In fact, the three republics,
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are selected, and the two republics, Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan are dropped, for important reasons.
As already mentioned, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are distinctly
located at three different points on the political liberalization scale (see Table 7).
Kyrgyzstan represents the best case o f political liberalization in Central Asia. Because
o f its relatively low ranking on socioeconomic factors commonly associated with political
democracy, the fact that Kyrgyzstan, a small republic, surpasses the two most important
republics in the region, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in almost all areas o f political
liberalization makes it an interesting and intriguing case study. Uzbekistan, the most
populous republic in the region, is one of the worst cases o f political liberalization in the
region. And, Kazakhstan, the second most populous but the largest republic in terms o f
area in Central Asia, represents a middle case of political liberalization, falling between
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Hence, the study o f the political liberalization process in
these three countries can capture the maximum range o f variation the Central Asian
region has thus far experienced in political openness in the post-communist era. In other
words, we can correctly identify and adequately explain the highest and the lowest points
on the political liberalization scale o f Central Asia through our study of the political
liberalization process in three rather than five Central Asian republics.
The reason for dropping Tajikistan from this study is that it is an abnormal case
for the study o f a subject like political liberalization. M ore precisely, it is a highly
volatile country tom apart by a bloody civil war since 1992 between regional factions o f
different political orientations and ideological colors. These factions, especially the

14

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

communist forces, readily seek help from hardened criminals in order to eliminate their
opponents (Khazanov 1995:127). The massive involvement of external forces, including
the Russian and Uzbek troops, in this war has further compounded the political scene in
the republic. This war has thus far claimed more than 50,000 lives and produced large
refugee waves, creating an abnormal situation for the study of political liberalization. In
other words, such situation makes it very hard to document empirical evidence on
political liberalization and affix the blame for violations o f civil and political rights of
people.
The decision to drop Turkmenistan is based on the fact that there is no meaningful
variation in political liberalization between

Uzbekistan and the former.

Both

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are located at the same point on the authoritarian scale.
Both have experienced the rise of the most repressive regimes in Central Asia.11 We can
save space and avoid duplication by dropping Turkmenistan—a country far less important
than Uzbekistan—without affecting our conclusions.
This study will cover the period from the independence o f the Central Asian states
in 1991 to 1997. This cut-off date is not chosen on the basis of hard and fast rules. As
is the case with running themes, we primarily chose this cut-off line for research
purposes. In other words, we need to terminate our research on some point in order to
make it manageable. However, the fact that discernible political patterns have emerged
in Central Asia by 1997 also influenced our decision to choose it as the cut-off date for
our research.
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ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is divided into six chapters, including this chapter. Chapter 2 clarifies
definitional issues, provides a literature review o f approaches to political liberalization,
discusses inadequacy o f these approaches to the study o f variation in political
liberalization among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and builds a theoretical
framework to explain this political variance. The next three detailed chapters are devoted
to the three countries. In these chapters we will apply the theoretical framework
developed in Chapter 2 to three republics. The location o f each republic on the political
liberalization scale is discussed in a single chapter. In other words, we shall examine the
impact of our three independent variables on political liberalization in each country
chapter. Each country chapter serves as an important frame o f reference for chapter 6.
The sixth chapter makes an overall comparison o f our cases and matches our empirical
findings to our theoretical expectations. Also, this chapter provides the summary
conclusions of this study, and looks at prospects for the future evolution o f these
countries along the dimension of political liberalization.

NOTES
1. Lipvosky views secularism as a sine quo non for the preservation of the Central Asian
ruling elites’ power in the post-communist era (Lipvosky 1996:212).
2. Kyrgyzstan has been variously characterized "as an oasis of democracy in an
authoritarian desert" (CSCE, March 1998:17), as "enlightened proto-authoritarianism"
(Rumer 1996:74), and the Switzerland o f Central Asia (Kubicek 1997:643-4). Karimov
has been described as "old prince" (Carlisle 1995:197).
3. These points are borrowed from Conteh-Morgan (Conteh-Morgan 1997:6-7).
4. All the Central Asian ruling elites claim that the current nondemocratic regimes are
temporary arrangements and that they intend to move toward genuine democracy as the
conditions are ripe for such a move.
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5. In the recent post-communist transition literature the democratizing polities in the
former communist world received far greater scholarly attention than those in which
outright authoritarian and pseudo-democratic regimes emerged (McFaul 1993; Rozman
1993; Ekiert 1991; Korosenyi 1991).
6. For partial efforts to develop typologies of political regime types and subtypes see
Lijphart 1968; Linz 1975; Park 1977; and Gasiorowski 1990.
7. These studies include Allworth (1973), Akiner (1994), Carlisle (1991), Critchlow
(1991).
8. These studies include Fierman (1991).
9. Major works which focused on geopolitical question include Mandelbaum (1994),
Malik (1994), Olcott (1994a), Rubinstein (1994), and Menon (1995).
10. Brzezinski predicted ethnic and border conflicts in the region. He also considered
inter-ethnic conflicts as inevitable part o f the process of exodus of several millions
Russians who live in the Central Asian countries (Rumer 1996:13). Rumer rightly
observes that none o f such dire predictions has thus far come to pass (Rumer 1996:13).
Wimbush and Broxup predicted Islamic revolution (Rezun 1992:130).
11. For an excellent synopsis o f the characteristics o f despotic states o f Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan, see Olcott (1995:218).
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CHAPTER 2
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA
A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION
INTRODUCTION
After their independence in 1991, the Central Asian republics experienced several
similar and dissimilar important political outcomes.

The notable common political

outcomes include the rise o f presidential ism, dominance o f the chief executive,
secularism, and a high degree o f statism. The most pronounced different political
outcome has so far appeared in the area o f political liberalization.1 The fact that these
republics witnessed significant variation in political liberalization within a few years o f
their independence is more intriguing than the emergence o f the above, however salient,
common political outcomes because they share several common socioeconomic, political,
cultural, and historical features. This variance has been ignored in both bodies o f
literature, the recent theoretical literature on the post-communist transition and the
comparative empirical literature on Central Asia. Although there are several bodies o f
theoretical literature that for almost half a century have informed studies o f the various
aspects o f political liberalization, without a detailed and systematic study o f the political
liberalization process in the Central Asian countries we can not be sure whether any and
which body o f the existing theoretical literature can best explain variation these countries
experienced in political liberalization within few years of their independence.
This study is an attempt to redress this academic lacuna in a systematic manner.
And the purpose o f this chapter is to prepare a theoretical base for such an effort and to
immerse the reader in its theoretical argument. This chapter intends to accomplish five
18
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things.

First, it seeks to define and discuss our dependent variable, political

liberalization, in order to provide focus to this study. Second, it will review major
theoretical approaches, which have informed numerous studies o f the political
liberalization process in many parts o f the world over the past several decades, to show
the richness of theoretical literature one can draw on to study the question o f political
liberalization. Third, we will briefly critique these approaches to demonstrate that
although most theoretical approaches help us understand the overall low level o f political
openness and democratization in the Central Asian countries, no single approach on its
own can adequately explain the significant variance they experienced after independence
in the area of political liberalization. However, we will also show that some theoretical
approaches are more relevant than others to our concern and that we can increase their
explanatory power for our inquiry if we modify their original arguments. Fourth, we will
build our own theoretical model which draws on certain existing theoretical approaches
but modifies their original arguments in order to adequately account for variation in
political liberalization among the three Central Asian countries. The selection o f such
theoretical approaches and modification o f their original argument were dictated by the
detailed case studies. In other words, our theoretical model derives from the detailed
study o f our countries. Finally, we will briefly present our empirical argument, showing
how our independent variables vary across our countries and whether they produce
expected results.
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DEFINITION OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
The comparative politics literature has not been consistent in the use o f political
liberalization. It has been defined in different ways. The purpose here is not to expose
inadequacies o f various existing definitions of this term in order to develop an exhaustive
definition of political liberalization, but rather to develop a working definition which
could provide focus to this study.
One can find three broad conceptualizations of political liberalization in the
existing literature on political regime change.

One group o f regime analysts uses

political liberalization and democratization interchangeably (Conteh-Morgan 1997).2
According to another perspective, political liberalization is more broad and inclusive than
democratization. Arguing that democratization may accommodate nonliberal beliefs and
practices within a constitutional order which more or less satisfies the procedural
requirements o f political democracy,3 advocates of this perspective conceptualize
political liberalization as encompassing not only a democratic constitutional order but also
a change in political culture of society leading to the adoption o f liberal and civic beliefs
and practices (Cotton 1991:312). Still another group of scholars conjoins political
liberalization and democratization as two related but not synonymous phenomena.
According to this perspective, political liberalization can exist without democratization.
However, advocates o f this viewpoint differ over the specific components o f political
liberalization (O ’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:7; Kaufman 1986:92-99; Przeworski
1991:51-99).4
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Building on the conceptualization in which political liberalization can exist without
democratization,5 this study views political liberalization as a process of loosening
political restrictions, and restoration o f political rights and those civil rights (such as
freedom of speech) which have political bearings under an authoritarian regime.6 At the
more concrete level, political liberalization involves a decrease in repression, the
corresponding decline o f fear of repression in society, and the extent of freedom
available to political forces for voicing individual and/or collective dissent, for interest
articulation and representation, and for waging a political struggle through individual
or/and collective efforts to modify the rules o f the political game. In short, political
liberalization refers to opening and loosening o f the prevailing coercive political regime.
VARIOUS T H E O R E T IC A L APPROACHES T O P O L IT IC A L LIBERA LIZA TIO N
The study o f political liberalization received a great deal o f scholarly attention
over the past two decades.7 In several communist and noncommunist countries around
the world, the breakdown o f various communist and authoritarian regimes during this
period began with the process o f political liberalization. Thus, it was logical for regime
analysts to focus on political liberalization in order to fully understand and explain the
unraveling of old regimes and the rise of new ones. In addition to provoking scholarly
debates on various aspects o f political regime change, this sustained scholarly endeavor
produced an insightful body o f literature on political liberalization.8
STRUCTURALIST APPRO ACHES
One can find in the existing literature several different theoretical approaches to
the study o f political liberalization.

Modernization theory is one o f the leading
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theoretical approaches to the question o f why an authoritarian regime liberalizes its
restrictive practices and/or is ultimately replaced by a democratic one. In most of the
early modernization theoretical literature, the question o f political liberalization was
addressed as part o f a general process o f political development, and democracy was
viewed as the final stage of such process. A host o f socioeconomic factors associated
with capitalist economic development were believed to facilitate this evolutionary
process. These socioeconomic factors include higher levels o f per capita income,
urbanization, literacy, education, and mass media exposure. As modernization theory
postulates, because a wealthy, industrialized economy is associated with higher levels of
these factors, an evolutionary, inexorable process o f transition toward democracy is set
in motion in nondemocratic countries as their economies develop (Lem er 1958; Lipset
1959, 1994; Deutsch 1961).’
A number o f reasons have been offered for the positive correlation between
capitalist economic development and the regime transition toward democracy in
nondemocratic polities.10 However, the most common line of argum ent is that as
countries develop, their economic and social structures become complex, the politically
relevant strata o f the population expand, the demands for governmental services and
political participation multiply,

new autonomous social and political groups arise,

organize, and begin to resist dictatorial forms o f control. As a result, the system can no
longer be effectively and efficiently run by an authoritarian regime. In addition, capitalist
economic development produces a class structure which is conducive to democratization.
It produces a middle class (Lipset 1959 and 1994), bourgeoisie (Moore 1966),11 and
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working class (Therbom 1977; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Stephens
1993:438)12 that stand up against the coercive state, provide resources for autonomous
societal groups, and seek access to national political process. In short, industrial
capitalism increases economic benefits for the masses; it spreads authority and democratic
aspirations among various societal groups, intensifying demands for the political benefits
of democracy (Dahl 1989; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994:903); and its promotes civic
cultural attitudes conducive to democratization (Huntington 1991:69). Thus, the above
development-related socioeconomic factors generate growing social pressures and
conditions which facilitate the relaxation o f political restrictions under an authoritarian
regime and its ultimate replacement with a democratic regime.
In spite of a continued scholarly effort to reconfirm it (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck
1994), the basic notion that capitalist economic development is a requisite to democratic
development continued to remain suspect in certain academic quarters (Przeworski and
Limongi 1997). However, after having gone out o f fashion as a dominant grand theory
due to a variety of reasons, modernization theory has made a strong comeback and has
been used to explain the breakdown of authoritarian regimes in the communist and
noncommunist world over the past two decades (Pye 1990).
In 1990, Lucian Pye used modernization theory to account for the political
liberalization

and democratization processes

underway

in the communist and

noncommunist countries around the world. He claimed that the key factors responsible
for what he called "the crisis o f authoritarianism" and "great transformation"13 over the
past decade were all those critical variables the early modernization and political
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development theorists had identified as conducive to political liberalization and
democratization. More specifically, he emphasized the vulnerability of the authoritarian
regimes to the pressures created "by the increasingly significant flows of international
trade, finance, and communication; by the effects o f contemporary science and
technology; and by all the other development-related socioeconomic factors lumped under
the rubric o f m odernization." Because the authoritarian regimes are the most vulnerable
to these pressures, they are therefore being seriously undermined and, as a result, are
liberalizing their practices (Pye 1990). It is, however, important to note that he does not
view political liberalization as a necessary outcome, but rather as one o f the policy
measures an authoritarian regime may adopt in response to these pressures.14
Another body o f literature that explains political regime variation in economic
terms is produced by the Marxist authors. According to these authors, throughout human
history each mode o f production produced an appropriate political form that furthered the
interests of economically dominant class. The capitalist mode o f production produced,
as the argument runs, political democracy as an instrument o f exploitation and repression
of labor by the dom inant class, the bourgeoisie. According to the Marxist perspective,
the bourgeoisie uses democratic mechanisms to capture the state from the traditional
power elites (Arat: 1988:21), to arbitrate disputes among its members, and to decide
periodically which o f its members are to repress and crush the working classes (Femia
1993:47-51). Hence, the modernization and Marxist perspectives both assign causal
significance to socioeconomic factors, though they differ on how these factors operate.
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Another set o f socioeconomic factors that is thought to facilitate the political
liberalization and democratization processes relates to social structural conditions of
society. These conditions include a relative equality (in terms of social and economic
status) among individuals and social groups, a dispersion o f the means o f violent coercion
in society, cultural homogeneity,13 an array of relatively autonomous social classes
(such as feudal, aristocracy, in addition to ones discussed above) and groups (such as
regional groups, occupational groups, and ethnic and religious groups), cohesiveness of
elites, and other cross-cutting cleavages (Dahl 1971, 1982; Lijphart 1977; M uller 1988;
Huntington 1984).
The most common argument offered to establish a connection between social
structure and the political liberalization and democratization process refers to the
widespread dispersion o f power and other political resources in a society in such way that
no single, unified group could monopolize them. According to this argument, a relatively
even distribution o f power in society increases the cost o f repression and violence, which
in turn increases the likelihood that the government will tolerate an opposition, creating
the most favorable conditions for competitive politics (Dahl 1971:48-51).
The above social structural conditions informed the theoretical and analytical
frameworks o f a number o f scholars who sought to explain the wave o f liberalizations
and democratizations which swept through the communist and noncommunist countries
over the past two decades. However, most o f these frameworks emphasized the role of
autonomous social groups lumped under the rubric o f civil society (Schmitter 1986:6-8;
Kaufman 1986:92; Lewin 1988; Huntington 1991:72-85; Lipset 1994:12-14).16 The rise
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(or a change in the orientation)17 o f such autonomous social formations is said to be
supportive o f a strong civil society capable o f creating favorable conditions for political
liberalization and eventual democratization o f public and political life (Schmitter 1986:68; Kaufman 1986:91-93; Huntington 1984:203). More specifically, a strong civil society
is capable o f escaping subordination to state authority, resisting and countervailing the
state, articulating its demands (including ethical concerns) long repressed or ignored by
the authoritarian rulers or accommodated to their needs, publicly acting in the defense
o f its legitimate interests, and becoming a support base for the institutionalized political
parties

which

are

viewed as

a

necessary condition for a

modern political

democracy(Lipset 1994:12-14; Arato 1991:198, 203-204; Gellner 1991:50; Schmitter
1986:6-8; O ’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:49).18 In addition, state power is constrained;
and the cost o f repression exceeds the cost o f toleration, providing the basis for political
liberalization, for increased societal control o f the state, and for eventual democratization
o f public and political life (Schmitter 1986:6-7; Kaufman 1986:92; Huntington
1984:203).
Another group of scholars who focus on social structural conditions used the
cohesiveness o f elite structure as a variable to study the recent regime change. Many
scholars find that the erosion o f internal unity and cohesiveness o f ruling elites was
critical to the recent wave o f regime change and related phenomena around the world
(Stepan 1986, 1988; Huntington, 1991, 1991-92; Easter 1997). According to some
scholars, the erosion o f the elite unity which could occur for many reasons, including
policy differences, leads one faction o f elites to activate and enlist societal support in
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order to strengthen its own position vis-a-vis the rival faction, precipitating a situation
conducive to political liberalization (Stepan 1986, 1988).
Another body o f literature focuses on political culture19 o f both the elite and the
masses to account for the rise of political regime. According to the political cultural
theory, every political system is embedded in a particular political culture (Almond
1956:396). The political cultural values found to be compatible with and conducive to
political democracy include tolerance, interpersonal trust, egalitarianism, nationalpolitical identity,20 empathy,21 and a willingness to compromise, accommodate,
cooperate, and associate (Almond and Verba 1963, 1980; Huntington 1984:209;
Huntington and Dominguez 1975:32; Dahl 1971, 1989; Diamond 1993). Political cultural
theorists weave dense and complex relationships between these values and democracy.
However, according to the most common line o f argument, the above cultural traits
produce flexible and negotiable political objectives, mediate and attenuate political
conflict, balance cleavage and conflict with the need of consensus, and promote
participatory atmosphere—all favorable conditions for democratic development (Diamond
1993:10). Some political cultural theorists emphasize the importance of a democratic
culture of the political elites and activists (Dahl 1989:260-1), while others emphasize the
importance o f a democratic culture o f the masses, too (Diamond 1993).
More often than not, political culture is viewed as an intervening variable which
influences and guides rather than predetermines political structures and political behavior
(Eckstein 1988; Laitin 1988:589-591; Almond 1988; Brown 1989; Dahl 1971; Ellis and
Colye 1994:2-3; Inglehart 1997).22 In other words, most scholars view political culture
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both as cause and effect, although they differ on the sources of political cultural
change.23 Because the erosion or the breakdown in congruence between political culture
and political regime will trigger political change (Huntington and Dominguez 1975:17),
one can safely extrapolate that an authoritarian regime is likely to open up and relax its
practices when the political cultural values supportive o f democracy will begin to take
root in society. According to many scholars, the explanation o f the recent political
liberalization and democratization process which swept through the communist and
noncommunist countries over the past two decades partly lies in their political cultures
which, for several reasons,24 experienced many important changes both at the elite level
and the mass level. The most prominent political cultural changes include the loss o f faith
in the efficacy o f authoritarian rule, the loss o f faith in the many long-sustaining myths
about an all-seeing leadership and planning, the widespread aversion to social and
political violence perpetrated in the name o f both reactionary and socialist/communist
ideologies, and the rise and transformation o f most political, social, and cultural forces
who publicly recognize the virtue o f ideological tolerance, appreciate the higher
ideological prestige o f democracy, and attribute high intrinsic value to its establishment
and consolidation (Silva 1998:85-87; O ’Donnell 1986:15-17; Diamond 1993; Brown
1989; Reinsinger et al. 1994:185; Lapidus 1989; Bahry 1993).
In addition to the above socioeconomic and cultural factors, some scholars assign
causal significance to political institutions in their explanation o f political outcomes,
including political regim e variation (Huntington 1965, 1968; Thelen and Steinmo 1992).
Huntington is credited for innovating the institutional approach to study regime change.
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According to him, the most critical explanatory variable in the study o f regime change
is the level o f political institutionalization22 of a national society. Although his variant
of the institutional perspective is a critique o f the modernization approach for its
assumption o f a more or less linear relationship between economic modernization and
democracy, Huntington concedes that economic development and social mobilization are
responsible for expanded political participation. However, he argues that the degree of
political institutionalization, not economic modernization, o f a society will determine
whether this situation will evolve into stable democratic regime or degenerate into
praetorian regime. According to his argument, political institutions with a high level of
institutionalization socialize and induct the newly mobilized political actors into the
prevailing political channels, procedures, and norms.

The smooth socialization and

induction into the national political process is conducive to the rise o f stable democracy.
On the other hand, political institutions with a low level of institutionalization are unable
to handle the increased political participation and other societal demands and pressures.
As a result, demonstrations, strikes, riots, and violence engulf polities, giving rise to
praetorianism o f which military rule is the usual form (Huntington 1965, 1968;
Huntington and Dominguez 1975).
The implication o f the above argument for political liberalization is that it occurs
under both high and low levels o f political institutionalization. Although certain features
of political liberalization such as interest articulation, rallies, demonstrations, and
sometimes even group formation do appear in societies with a low level of political
institutionalization, political liberalization of this sort is o f temporary nature with
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virtually little possibility o f evolving into a stable democratic regime as it quickly gives
way to praetorian and repressive regime. The gradual political liberalization process
introduced in societies with a high level o f political institutionalization is more likely to
prolong and mature into stable democracy.
Another variant of the institutional perspective recognizes the causal importance
of political institutionalization for political liberalization but argues that its impact on
political liberalization is mediated by the type o f political regime in power. Some
scholars argue that because o f the temporary nature o f military-led authoritarian regimes
whose declared goal has almost always been to prepare the way for a return to a civilian
rule are less likely to institutionalize themselves than the civilian-led authoritarian
regimes (Rouquie 1986:108-109; Linz 1973:234-5). As a result o f their temporary nature
and a consequent void in their political institutionalization, military-led authoritarian
regimes are more likely to permit the ptomised political liberalization than the civilianled authoritarian regimes (Gasiorowski 1995) which often seek to institutionalize
themselves as enduring political alternatives.
In addition to the above structural factors which reside within national societies,
some scholars focus on international influences to explain why an authoritarian regime
liberalizes its practices and moves in a democratic direction (Huntington 1984, 1991;
Whitehead 1986; Pye 1990; Case 1993; Abrahamsen 1997; Bratton and Walle 1994:453).
The international factors that are thought to be conducive to democratic development
include colonial rule,36 foreign occupation and direct imposition o f democratic rule by
the occupation power, efforts and influence of powerful democratic states,27 the decline
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or withdrawal of the influence of an authoritarian hegemon, demonstration effect of
successful democratization on other countries,28 the end o f the cold war, and
international financial institutions.29 Some scholars attribute authoritarian regimes in the
Third World countries to their economic dependence and their peripheral position in the
world economic system (Chirot 1977; O ’Donnell 1979; Jackson etal. 1978; Cardoso and
Faletto 1979; Portes 1976; Frank 1969; Bollen 1983; Wallerstein 1974), implying that
political repression will end when these countries will throw off shackles o f economic
dependence and peripheral position in the capitalist world system through socialist or/and
nationalist revolution.30 However, some scholars argue that in certain conditions
political democracy is possible to arise in economically dependent countries. According
to O ’Donnell, in the easy phase of ISI, a native bourgeoisie and working class come
together to challenge the political and economic hegemony of the export-oriented
oligarchy and provide a base of support for populist democratic regime (O ’Donnell
1973).31
Although advocates of many structural approaches present a large body of
empirical evidence in support of their claims (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Ingiehart
1990; Bollen 1983),32 some scholars argue that the structural explanations that focus
only on the above enduring structural factors are inherently inadequate and problematic
because they ignore two important sets of causal factors, concrete historical situations and
political actors, and therefor cannot fully explain political regime variation (Gasiorowski
1995).
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HISTORICAL SITUATION-ORIENTED APPROACHES
The first set o f causal factors ignored by the structural theories o f regime change
involves immediate concrete historical situations that consist o f quite momentous
contemporary events such as economic crisis, war, and other political crises (Huntington
1991; Gasiorowski 199S; Remmer 1990). Some scholars argue that such immediate
concrete historical situations set off the political liberalization and democratization
process in authoritarian societies. A number o f studies have argued that international debt
crisis, inflation, recession and defeat in war produce legitimacy crisis for authoritarian
regimes, cause splits within the ruling bloc (prompting its reform-oriented members to
court civil and political society in order to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the
conservative members), and trigger the breakdown of such regimes (Huntington 1991:59;
Epstein 1984; Richards 1986; Markoff and Bretta 1990; Remmer 1990; Gasiorowski
1995). According to Huntington, both rapid economic growth and economic recession
produce various crises that weaken authoritarian regime and provide the context for
political regime changes (Huntington 1991:59).
In spite o f their emphasis on immediate concrete historical situations, some o f
these authors concede that the political liberalization and democratization process is more
likely to be set o ff "when triggering events occur in conjunction with certain structural
factors that act as background conditions that magnify the effect o f these events on
regime change" (Gasiorowski 1995). According to the recent scholarship on regime
change over the past two decades, the background conditions which magnified the effects
of

immediate concrete

historical situations on the political
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liberalization and

democratization process around the world include the active international efforts to
promote democratic development, the decline o f the influence o f authoritarian states such
as the former Soviet Union, widespread changes in political culture o f authoritarian
societies, new positive attitudes toward democracy among influential societal groups such
as business, military elite, certain sections of the ruling alliance, and intellectuals, and
the end of the cold war (Remmer 1990; Huntington 1984, 1991; Abrahamsen 1997).
PROCESS-O RIEN TED A PPR O A C H ES
The second set of causal factors ignored in the structural explanation o f political
regime variation relates to the strategic behavior of important political actors and the
consequent sequences o f events (Rustow 1970; Przeworski 1991; Gasiorowski 199S;
Kitschelt 1992). In fact, some scholars even reject the claim o f structural approaches
that the structural conditions determine regime change. At most the structural factors, in
the opinion of these scholars, constrain what "is possible under a concrete historical
situation" (Przeworski 1986:48).

These scholars offer alternative, process-oriented

explanations33 which focus on the contingent factors such as the sequence o f events, the
internal power struggles among the ruling elites, and the strategic behavior of the
important political actors (Rustow 1970; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986;
Przeworski 1986, 1991; Di Palma 1990; Young 1992: Stepan 1988; Casper and Taylor
1996).
Assumptions o f rational choice approach and game theory provide foundations for
most process-oriented models o f political regime variation (Collier and Norden 1992;
Casper and Taylor 19%). The common claim of these models is that the explanation of
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political regime variation lies not in the structural factors but in political choices and
decisions that political actors make, and the preferences and strategies they adopt in their
political struggles. In contrast to the structural approaches which hold political actors’
preferences constant, focus on changing structural factors claiming that these factors
determine regime change, and assume that political actors face extremely narrow choices,
process approaches emphasize the contingency of actions, preferences, strategies o f
political actors, and political outcomes. As process-oriented authors argue, political
actors can shape the context in which other actors make choices, can manipulate "their
own and their adversaries’ cognitive and normative frames" and that choices o f political
actors depend on "a continuous redefinition” of their "perceptions o f preferences and
constraints” (Kitschelt 1992). By "deliberate and lasting compromises o f core disputes
among" themselves, national elites can achieve "consensual unity” or "elite settlement”
which produces political stability and increasingly leads to political openness and to stable
democratic regimes (Higley and Burton, 1989, 1998).
In short, the process-oriented authors emphasize the contingency of individual
choices, strategies, and political outcomes and suggest that such contingent factors may
bring about regime change which no political actor anticipated or desired at the outset
(Kitschelt 1992; Collier and Norden 1992; Casper and Taylor 1996). Thus, according to
process-driven explanations, human actions and consequent sequences o f events, not the
structural conditions, bring about political regime changes.
A number o f process-oriented scholars argue that some sequences of events are
more likely than others to facilitate the shift from an authoritarian regime to a more open
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and competitive regime (Rustow 1970; Dahl 1971:33). These scholars have tried to
identify certain specific historical-political processes, sequences o f events and phases, and
crises which facilitate this shift. According to Rustow, "the dynamic process o f
democratization itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle" that
"is likely to begin as the result of the emergence o f a new elite that arouses a depressed
and previously leaderless social group into concerted action." He argues that what
concludes this protracted political struggle is a deliberate decision of important political
actors to accept diversity in unity, and to institutionalize democratic procedures (Rustow
1970:352-358). Dahl identifies three paths from authoritarianism to democracy, although
he admits that almost an infinite number o f paths can be invented. He prefers the
sequence in which political liberalization precedes mass participation. He argues that
under political pressures of oligarchical elites a closed hegemonic regime liberalizes its
practices and allows for contestation between these elites, and then competitive
oligarchies will evolve into inclusive political regimes (Dahl 1971:7-8,33-47).
Although process-oriented scholars assign causal significance to human actions,
some of them appreciate that "the strategic behavior of political actors (is) embedded in
concrete historical situations" (Przeworski 1986:47) and that certain background
conditions such as national unity (Rustow 1970) and the existence of nation-state (Linz
and Stepan 1996; Huntington 1991) are important for human actions to set off the
democratization process.
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ELECTIVE AND INTEGRATIVE APPROACHES
Instead o f offering exclusively structural explanation or process explanation of
regime change, a number o f scholars draw insights from both types o f explanations (Dahl
1971; Huntington 1991). In fact, some scholars argue that structural and process-oriented
approaches are not mutually exclusive (Collier and Norden 1992; Kitschelt 1992).
Kitschelt believes that structuralist and process-driven analyses do not directly compete
with each other but focus on different objects o f explanations with different research
methods and comparative designs. He thinks that structuralist approaches are good at
explaining the general causes o f regime breakdown and the consolidation o f new ones.
Process approaches best explain, in his opinion, "the timing o f breakdown and transition
as well as specific trial-and-error process of searching for a new viable regim e." In his
view, these two types o f approaches "represent only strands within the structuralist
camp" (Kitschelt 1992:1028-1029). Yashar also makes more or less similar arguments.
He regrets the fact that in pursuit o f methodological purity and analytical clarity, scholars
have neglected the simple point that structuralist and process-oriented approaches address
different questions. He rather suggests an integrative approach to study questions of
political liberalization and democratization. The integrative approach he suggests
emphasizes to focus on "historically constructed conditions that have undergirded
authoritarianism and the actors that have set out to overcome them ." He argues that
structures "provide constraints within which and against which actors maneuver."
However, at times, actors challenge the very structures in place, facilitating political
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outcomes, including political liberalization and democratization, which even they had not
hoped for (Yashar 1997:2-3).

A CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING THEORETICAL APPROACHES
The above theoretical approaches broaden our overall understanding o f a host o f
factors related to political liberalization. The results o f the past research on political
liberalization and democratization are in many ways impressive. Some theoretical
approaches still inform much o f the academic discussion on political liberalization.
However, the fact that a large body of empirical evidence is available to support the
plausibility o f these approaches confronts us with the problem o f overdetermination. In
other words, we have multiple plausible theoretical approaches to study political
liberalization. The multiplicity o f plausible approaches also implies that each approach
is applicable to, at least, a few cases, but no single approach can necessarily explain
every case o f political liberalization.
Because these approaches seem plausible and their assumptions sound partly true,
each of them seems potentially useful in thinking about political liberalization. Although
these approaches are worth keeping in mind when explaining the overall tenuous
democratization process in our countries, none o f them seems by itself to adequately
account for the significant variation they experienced in political liberalization in the
post-independence periods. A number of scholars have used some of the above
approaches to study the post-communist politics in Central Asia.34 However, few studies
have tried to examine and explain variation in political liberalization among the regional
countries in the post-independence era. Such studies relate a large number of explanatory
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variables to this variation without a careful and systematic analysis. The explanatory
variables used in such studies to explain variation in political liberalization among these
countries include the historical and cultural legacies such as nomadic versus sedentary
and strong versus weak Islamic traditions, Asian mentality, the continuity o f Soviet
institutions (including the change of ruling elites), the strength of opposition and the level
of threat to ruling elites, numerical strength o f minorities (especially the Russian
minority), and the fear o f inter-ethnic conflict, various external pressures, the impact of
the Tajik conflict, and the varied policy responses of ruling elites which reflect their
priorities and capacities in meeting the challenges in the post-communist era (Matveeva
1999; CSCE 1998:40-2).35 Some of these variables seem to vary across our countries
and can potentially explain the political variance, but their true explanatory power has
not been explored in a systematic fashion. However, most of the above variables seem
to have little or no explanatory power36 and have already been correctly and
systematically dismissed in serious analyses (CSCE 1998:40-2; DeWeese:

1994;

Shahrani:1991).
In fact, it is unwise for us to assume that this variation is overdetermined. In
other words, we can not employ all the existing theoretical approaches to explain this
variation. Therefore, we need to exercise great care in selecting approach(es) in order
to offer an adequate theoretical explanation o f variation in political liberalization among
our countries. Because there are multiple plausible theoretical approaches to explain this
political variance in Central Asia, our choice o f the relevant explanatory variables must
be dictated by the empirical evidence. In other words, the post-communist political scene
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in our countries must dictate the selection o f relevant approaches to explain the variance
these countries experienced in the area of political liberalization in the post-independence
period.
A careful examination of the post-communist political scene in Central Asia
sufficiently illustrates that some approaches are o f little or no help in explaining the
variance in political liberalization among our countries. It is so because the variables
these approaches use to study political liberalization in other cases either do not exist37
in our countries or do not produce expected results or produce more or less similar
effects in each o f them and therefore do not explain the political variance that exists
among them. More precisely, approaches which use socioeconomic factors associated
with capitalist economic development, dependency situation, foreign domination, political
culture, inherited political institutionalization, class structure, tribal social structure, and
other historical legacies explain little or no variance in political openness among our
three Central Asian countries.
This critique is by no means intended to refute these approaches.

Rather, we

wish to emphasize their limitations in explaining the significant variation in political
liberalization among our countries. O f course, the robust finding o f many cross-national
studies—a positive correlation between capitalist development and democracy—is hard
to dismiss. The overall low level of capitalist development o f our countries (see Tables
4 and 6) can account for the lack of democratic rule among them. However, it can not
explain the significant variation in political liberalization among them because the way
they rank on socioeconomic factors associated with capitalist development does not
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produce expected results. On some factors our countries show quite similar trends. On
others they differ, but their differences in most cases are quite small. For instance, all
the three countries have more than 90% literacy rate; Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan show
quite similar trends on urban population, labor force by occupation, and GDP by sector
(agriculture, industry, and services). Kazakhstan outscores both on these factors (see
Tables 4 and 6). However, the results are not in the expected directions. Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan remarkable differ in the level o f political liberalization. Kazakhstan scores
lower than Kyrgyzstan on the political liberalization scale, although it scores higher than
Uzbekistan on this scale. Likewise, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan show similar trends on
the GNP per capita but outscores Kyrgyzstan in this regard (see Table 6). However, both
scores lower than Kyrgyzstan on the political liberalization scale—a result contrary to the
modernization theoretical expectations. In short, the limitations o f these approaches
become more obvious when asked to explain why Kyrgyzstan, a country with the least
propitious socioeconomic conditions and which many students o f the region viewed as
the most ill-prepared republic o f all the former Soviet republics for a democratic
transition due to its historical legacies (Huskey 1997:243), consistently surpassed both
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in all areas of political liberalization in the pre- and post
independence periods.
Likewise, besides socioeconomic variables associated with economic development
and considered to set in motion the democratic process (with political liberalization being
part o f it), other variables listed above do not vary across our countries in a way as to
cause the significant political variance that exists among them. In other words, the
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Central Asian countries share, broadly speaking, social and historical experiences,
including their tribal, Muslim, Czarist, and communists pasts (Khazanov 1995:115), their
dependent position in the world capitalist system, including their relationship with the
Soviet center in the Soviet period (Khazanov 1995:115; Gleason 1991), class structure
and tribal social structure. Because our countries have very more o r less similar trends
on these variables, we can not use them to explain the significant variation among them.
Hence, approaches which incorporate these factors can be safely ignored.
This assertion is also true o f the political cultural approach. The Central Asian
countries share the main sources o f political culture, including historical tradition and
experience (Brown 1989:19; Laitin 1988; O ’Donnell 1986:15-18; Huntington and
Dominguez 1975:15), indoctrination (Eckstein 1988: Taylor 1989:135; Gibson 1996:955)
and modernization experiences (Lipset 1994; Inglehart 1988, 1990). W e have no
persuasive reason to expect significant variation in their political cultural values.
Preliminary evidence collected through a survey of political cultural habits and attitudes
o f the people in two of the three countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, shows
remarkable similarities in their political cultures. If fact, differences in their attitudes
toward different political systems are quite small (see Tables 10 and 11; Lubin 1995a;
Pilon 1998). Consequently, we can not expect that such small differences would causes
the significant political variance that exists among our countries. Although some scholars
did refer to some small and insignificant differences in the political cultural values among
and within these countries, they did not use them to explain the rise o f significant
differences in political liberalization among them (Huskey 1997).38 And that is precisely
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the point we wish to emphasize in this critique. In fact, political cultural approach can
not even explain aberrations in the political liberalization process within our countries,
let alone among them.
In addition, in the light o f the recent information on the popular attitudes, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to explain not only significant variation in political
liberalization among these countries, but also the rise o f despotic regimes in Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan. Contrary to the common view (promoted by the Central Asian ruling
elites and their supporters and some Western observers) that the Central Asian political
cultures are not suitable for political democracy, the recent evidence shows that the
Central Asian populations "are supportive o f democratic rights, while generally
dissatisfied with their own governments’ performance in defending these rights, and are
hopeful for progress without recourse to violence. " This evidence which was gathered
through surveys conducted in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in late
1996 further makes it clear that the Central Asians "today exhibit a fairly widespread
desire to participate in the political life of their nations" (Pilon: 1998:90).
The preceding discussion suggests that we need to look elsewhere to find relevant
variables to adequately address the question o f variation in political liberalization among
our countries in the post-independence period.
Approaches which appear to be more relevant to the focus o f our inquiry are
those which emphasize ethnic pluralism (and concomitant consequence o f dispersion o f
political resources in a society), varied elite structure, and political leadership. As already
mentioned, a body o f comparative politics literature postulates that ethnic pluralism can
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push a society in a democratic direction under certain conditions. The most emphasized
conditions under which ethnic heterogeneity can set o ff the political liberalization and
democratization process include a multiple balance o f power achieved through the
existence o f more than two resourceful ethnic groups and the desire o f the ethnic leaders
(supported by a sufficient number of their followers) to cooperate with each other for a
variety of reasons, including national unity, independence, peace, stability, and formation
of a coalition government. In other words, ethnic pluralism characterized by a multiple
balance of power prevents any single unified ethnic group from even approaching a
monopoly o f political resources and forces ethnic leaders and their followers to master
the art of conciliation and coalition formation in order to achieve their objectives. And
this, in turn, helps promote political liberalization in multi-ethnic societies (Dahl
1971:113-123, 1996:178; Lijphart 1977; Huntington 1984:205; Kothari 1971).
In its existing form, this approach pays little o r no attention to the support which
ethnic minorities in an authoritarian state receive from external sources and its impact
on political liberalization. This situation exists in other areas o f the world, too, but is
more acute in the Central Asian context. A number o f scholars emphasize the relevance
of ethnic pluralism, especially the Russian minority, to the building of the post-Soviet
polity in Central Asia. Beissinger is one of such scholars. In fact, in 1991, he predicted
that ethnic pluralism in Central Asia would greatly influence the post-Soviet politics in
Central Asia (Beissinger 1991:31). Khazanov later elaborated on the theme and referred
to the Russian minority’s identification with Russia as an important factor contributing
to its political activism and consequently fanning inter-ethnic competition in Kazakhstan
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(Khazanov 1995:115-73). However, he also does not clearly show the relevance of this
identification and inter-ethnic competition to the democratization process in the Central
Asian region. The Central Asian cases amply show that if an outside powerful ethnic
patron identifies with and extends support to its coethnics living in an authoritarian
society, it is likely to contribute to their strength and politicization, protect them from
excessive

repression

o f their authoritarian rulers,39and

help

promote

political

liberalization in such society.
In many countries around the world, there are powerful ethnic minorities which
adopt a democratic posture in order to enlist international support for their causes. One
obvious response the authoritarian rulers o f the multi-ethnic countries with such powerful
minorities may adopt in response to persistent international pressure is to relax political
restrictions and accommodate certain concerns of such minorities.40 In most instances,
the international support for the democratic concerns o f such minorities comes from
democratic states. However, in the Central Asian republics, the Russian minority that
once enjoyed the status o f a dominant group under the communist rule now finds it
advantageous to defend its privileges in democratic terms and draws support for its civil
and political rights and other causes from Russia, a country with little or no manifest
interest in democratic promotion around the world. In other words, authoritarian rulers
are likely to liberalize their practices when their powerful minorities enlist the external
support o f a powerful (especially a contiguous country with ethnic ties with such
minorities) for their democratic causes, even if this powerful country has little or no
demonstrated commitment to democratic promotion. Authorities o f such powerful country
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more often than not use democratic rhetoric as the least expensive but effective strategy
to preserve the privileges of their co-ethnics in an authoritarian country. Thus, the
explanatory power of a model based on ethnic pluralism greatly increases if we
incorporate such external support as a factor contributing to the politicization and
resourcefulness of an ethnic minority.
Another theoretical scheme that appears to be relevant to our inquiry is the one
which incorporates elite structure as an explanatory variable in the study o f political
liberalization. More specifically, promising for our inquiry is the extent to which the elite
structure in an authoritarian society is cohesive or fragmented. In many studies o f the
recent regime change around the world, a number of scholars have found a fragmented
elite structure to be a favorable condition for political liberalization. As already
mentioned, some factions of ruling elites may promote autonomous societal forces and
enlist their support in an effort to enhance their own position vis-a-vis their political
rivals within the ruling circles. This situation helps expand independent political space
in an authoritarian society.
This theoretical scheme needs modification and further development in order to
be applicable to the Central Asian context. In its existing form, it focuses on national
elites and their modern support bases, including political parties and various social
classes. However, it pays inadequate attention to the national elites’ traditional support
bases, such as family, tribe, and clan, etc. If elite structure is a relevant category to
study political liberalization in Central Asia, then the focus on these support bases is
important because the Central Asian elites heavily rely on them in their political struggle.
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In addition, those who used elite structure as an analytic category to study the postcommunist political life in the former Soviet republics, including our countries, saw no
variance, contrary to the fact, in elite structure in our countries and, hence were led to
emphasize common political outcomes among them (Easter 1997). We believe that this
is a mistaken view o f elite structure in Central Asia. W e find that our countries
considerably vary in elite structure and we expect that varied elite structure in them can
help explain variation in political liberalization among them.
The third approach which we find relevant to our inquiry focuses on political
leaders. As already noted, process-oriented approaches assume that political actors are
not merely forced by structural conditions to make pre-determined choices; but rather
they prove innovative in overcoming such conditions and/or maneuver their way out of
their constraints, producing intended and unintended consequences. A number of factors
related to political leaders, including their interests, preferences, political ideas, political
and economic strategies, actions, and sequence of actions, etc., are believed to influence
political outcomes.
We intend to draw on this approach in our effort to build a model to explain
variation in political liberalization among our countries. However, unlike many processoriented explanations which assume that political outcomes are influenced by rationally
self-interested political leaders who seek total control of the state (Malloy 1987:237), we
do not intend to impute any interests to them. Not only it is hard to conclusively show
which interests political leaders are pursuing at a particular point in time and which
interests are prompting them to take certain actions but the focus on interests also creates
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other problems.

If we assume that all the Central Asian leaders, as rationally self-

interested political actors, seek total control of the state and/or seek to perpetuate their
rule, then the focus on their interests can not help explain why their countries vary in
political liberalization. In other words, in order to explain variation that exists among
these countries, we need to focus on dimensions along which these political leader vary
and which produce different political outcomes in spite o f their common interests. Thus,
instead o f focusing on their interests, we will focus on two aspects, political orientations
and strategic behavior (including concrete actions) o f political leaders.
This scheme raises a conceptual problem which needs clarification. The danger
in this scheme is that it is vulnerable to criticism on account of involving a cause-effect
relationship between political orientations and actions o f leaders. More precisely, critics
can argue that how political leaders act is influenced by their ideas about political and
socioeconomic matters, and the relative merit of different available options. In our case,
this criticism means that acts o f the Central Asian leaders which we are treating as an
independent variable in our scheme may, in effect, be an aspect of political liberalization,
our dependent variable. This is a legitimate concern which must be addressed before we
proceed further in our inquiry.
We know that a number o f scholars refuse to reduce political beliefs and ideas to
mere epiphenomena; they rather treat them as relatively independent, though not as
uncaused primary, variables in the explanation o f democratic outcomes (Dahl 1989:26061). Can actions o f political leaders be put in the same category? In the comparative
politics literature, political actions and strategic behavior of political leaders are treated,
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just like political beliefs, ideas, and ideologies of leaders, as relatively independent,
though not uncaused primary, variables in the explanation o f political outcomes,
including the rise and demise of democratic regimes (Stepan 1988; Diamond, Linz, and
Lipset 1990). Political actions and strategic behavior of political leaders may not always
be determined by their ideas and views. A number o f other factors, including the force
of events and emotion, can also cause the leaders to take actions and make strategic
choices which may assume their own momentum and autonomy and produce
consequences which no one intends and anticipates. In addition, a political leader may
take an action which is not in accordance with his central political tendencies, ideas, and
beliefs. In other words, at times political actions of political leaders can not be
reasonably and consistently linked to their political orientations.
Conscious o f this conceptual confusion surrounding our scheme, we will focus on
such political actions which are either inconsistent with central political tendencies o f the
Central Asian leaders but produced consequences consistent with their political
orientations o r are o f such nature that they can not be characterized as pro- and anti
democratic actions. Two examples will illustrate this point. The ban on the republican
communist party in the immediate post-independence period by the president o f
Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, a reformist leader who later legalized it, falls in the former
category o f actions. The decisions o f Sultan Nazarbayev, the Kazakh president, to quit
the republican communist party and not to join any political party in the wake o f the
August 1991 abortive coup fall in the second category of actions.
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A more detailed discussion o f these examples and their impact on political
liberalization in both the countries is presented below. Here, it will suffice to point out
that the Central Asian political leaders differ in their views about political liberalization,
and they also took certain concrete actions which influenced political liberalization in one
way or another. We assume that variation in their political orientations will help explain
the variation in political liberalization among their countries. And different concrete
actions which these political leaders took at different times will not only help explain
variation in political liberalization among our countries but also aberrations in the
political liberalization process within them.
Building on the preceding promising theoretical schemes, an effort is made in the
next section to lay out a theoretical framework to adequately explain variation that exists
among the three Central Asian republics.

POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA: A THEORETICAL MODEL
The dependent variable in this study is political liberalization. The theoretical
framework we developed to study political liberalization in post-communist Central Asia
contains three independent variables. These independent variables are: a) the size of the
Russian minority in proportion to the titular nationality; b) elite structure; and c) political
leadership (see Figure 1).
The dependent variable is shown at the top and independent variables on the left
side of Figure 1. Each row on the table depicts the impact o f a particular independent
variable on our dependent variable. We have decomposed our dependent variable into
high/moderate/low trichotomy and two independent variables, Russian minority and elite
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structure, into large/small and high/low dichotomies, and third independent variable,
political leadership, into reformist/cautious reformist/anti-reformist trichotomy, showing
causal relationship between dependent and independent variables in an oversimplified
manner for the convenience of the reader. In fact, this format enables us to show to the
reader in a very simple way whether an independent variable has any effect on the
dependent variable and whether this effect is positive or negative.
Our first independent variable is the size o f the Russian minority in proportion
to the titular ethnic group in each of the three Central Asia republics, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Although all the three republics house the Russian minority,
they vary in its size relative to the size of the titular nationality (see Tables 1 and 2). One
o f the assumptions o f our theoretical model is that a large Russian minority constitutes
a favorable condition for political liberalization in the Central Asian republics. This study
hypothesizes a positive impact o f a large Russian minority on political liberalization in
post-communist Central Asia, for the following reasons.
First, elites and governments in power in each o f the Central Asian republics
under study are identified with the titular ethnic group. Most transition policies these
elites pursue are tailored to address the concerns o f the titular ethnic group. As a result,
the Russian minority, like other nontitular ethnic minorities, is alienated from these elites
and their ethnonationalist policies. Since both the ruling elites and the main opposition
forces trying to displace them come from the same titular ethnic group, the sheer large
size of the alienated Russian minority means that the elites and governments in power
have a reduced social base to draw support from in their political struggle and, hence,
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there are less aggressive in the use o f repression in such struggle. In addition, if the
Russian minority strives to advance its own agenda, it means wider opposition to the
ruling elites and higher cost involved in its repression. And, if it champions causes with
democratic trappings without challenging the sovereignty and territorial integrity o f a
republic, it makes it harder for the rulers o f these republics to find reasonable excuses
to unleash widespread repression and justify it, especially to the Russian authorities who
have publicly avowed to use force, if necessary, to protect the Russian-speaking
population living in the ’near abroad’.
Second, what makes the Russian minority a favorable condition for political
liberalization in Central Asian societies is its resourcefulness. The Russian minority’s
resourcefulness stems from both endogenous and exogenous factors. The former include
the numerical strength, higher and specialized education, technical skills, professional
status, and economic conditions o f the Russian minority. The latter include the Russian
government’s political, material, and moral support.
As compared to its proportion, the Russian-speaking population outnumbers the
titular nationality in higher and specialized education and consequently in the makeup of
the technological elite and skilled industrial workforce.41 This fact helps the Russian
minority become a very resourceful social group. In addition to the above factors, the
Russian government’s support to the Russian minority also contributes to its
resourcefulness and hence effectively protects it from outright repression in societies with
a relatively large Russian minority.
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W e expect that a large Russian minority is likely to attract more

Russian

government’s support than a small Russian minority. The reasons for this expectation
include: a) the active and much-publicized involvement o f large Russian minorities in
politics to preserve their privileges; b) the potential loss o f the credibility o f Russia’s
pronounced commitment to protect the rights o f the Russian minorities in the former
Soviet republics if they are subjected to an outright repression; and c) greater chances
of winning concessions for them from the governments o f the form er Soviet republics
with relatively large Russian minorities.
On the one hand, the Russian m inority’s resourcefulness resulting from both
internal and external factors helps it in its survival as an effective social group and in its
struggle against both the titular nationality and the government. And, on the other hand,
it discourages the Central Asian authorities from subjecting it to outright and
indiscriminate repression, which could potentially set off massive Russian outmigration,
depriving the republic o f skilled manpower, with an adverse impact on the already fragile
transition economy.
In addition, in view of the explicit Russian commitment to use all available
means, including force, to protect the Russian minorities in the form er Soviet republics,
the high level o f Russian support to these Russian minorities serves as a clear signal to
the Central Asian ruling elites that Russia is serious in its commitment. In view of the
dependence o f the Central Asian republics on Russia, the presence o f Russian troops on
their soil, and the potential Russian capability and willingness to make and break the
governments in the region (as the Tajik case illustrates), the Russian government’s
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support to the Russian minority weighs heavily in the calculations o f the ruling elites and
generates lot o f pressure on them, prompting them to accommodate the sociopolitical and
cultural concerns o f this group. In other words, this pressure prompts them to provide
independent political space to the Russian minority and, hence, to other autonomous
opposition forces.
If the ruling elites spare the resourceful (and politicized) Russian minority but use
excessive force against the opposition forces o f the titular nationality, they risk
undermining their nationalist credentials with potentially adverse consequences for their
rule—a prospect they would like to avoid. As a consequence, the ruling elites in
republics with a relatively large size of the politicized and resourceful Russian minority
are constrained in the excessive use o f force against both the titular opposition groups
and nontitular groups and are likely to relax political restrictions and provide political
space to independent opposition forces.
Third, the large size and resourcefulness o f the Russian minority induce its
members to organize, put up an active defense o f their interests, and make demands on
the state. The titular opposition forces and the Russian minority are allies in the post
communist era in the sense that both are opposed to the ruling elites for their respective,
although often mutually conflicting, concerns. This situation is conducive to political
liberalization because the government has a large size of opposition to deal with and finds
it increasingly difficult to silence it through outright repressive methods.
A large, resourceful, and politicized Russian minority contributes to political
liberalization yet in another way. More often than not the Russian minority and titular
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nationality operate and interact with each other in the political arena in a competitive
manner. The politicized Russian minority and the titular ethnic group are involved in an
interactive relationship. They often make mutually exclusive demands on the state. The
ruling elites often find it difficult to reconcile these conflicting demands. The action taken
by one group to achieve its objectives activates the other, and so on and so forth. This
interactive relationship sets

in motion a chain o f pressures,

counterpressures,

mobilization, and countermobilization, galvanizing the political arena in the republics
with large Russian minorities. In other words, the volume o f autonomous political
activity greatly increases. As a result, the ruling elites often find it advantageous to offer
limited political liberalization rather than paying the enormous cost required to suppress
all this autonomous political activity and risk other political eventualities, including civil
war and the reaction o f the Russian government.
Conversely, if the Russian minority is small in proportion to the titular ethnic
group, it is less likely to engage in an independent political struggle to promote its
interests for fear o f antagonizing the incumbent authority, let alone the titular majority,
with little or no chance of substantive achievement. It is more likely to depend on and
cooperate with the government in power to ensure its security and welfare. In such a
case, the incumbent authority rather than the ethnic Russian minority is more likely to
receive the Russian government’s encouragement and support for the protection of the
interests of this minority. We assume this situation to be prejudicial to political
liberalization as it strengthens the ruling elites against the opposition forces and builds
no pressure on them to tolerate independent political activity and liberalize their
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authoritarian practices. The above discussion leads us to expect that the republics with
relatively large Russian minorities will score higher on political liberalization than those
with smaller Russian minorities.
Can we expect the same results in Estonia and Latvia which each houses a large
Russian minority in proportion to the titular nationality (see Table 1)? In other words,
does the large Russian minority constitute a conducive factor for political liberalization
in these republics the way it does in the Central Asian republics? Is Russia as effective
in pressurizing these republics on the question o f the Russian diaspora as it is in the case
o f the Central Asian republics housing large Russian minorities? According to a common
impression which seems to have developed due to the situation in the early phase o f their
independence, the presence o f large Russian minorities undermines rather than advances
the political liberalization process because the nationalizing Baltic republics exclude them
from the political processes. This is a mistaken view.
According to the Freedom House rating, both Estonia and Latvia have
increasingly become free countries since their independence (see Table 8). Also, the
Russian diaspora in these republics can engage in most independent political activities
which can be lumped together under the rubric o f political liberalization. In fact, the
Russian population o f these republics is found resisting their nationalizing policies
through periodic strikes and demonstrations (Smith and Wilson 1997). In addition, the
Russian population (especially citizens) o f these republics can form organized political
parties to pursue its interests (Laitin 1998). In fact, what is at stake in these republics is
not the question o f political liberalization (as is clear from the fact that the Russian
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population can engage in such political activities without being subjected to repression),
but rather the question o f citizenship (Laitin 1998) which, according O ’Donnell and
Schmitter (1986), falls under the rubric of democratization. In Central Asia, it is not the
question of citizenship because the Russian population there has been granted citizenship;
it is rather the question o f their freedom to exercise this and other civil and political
rights lumped under the rubric of political liberalization.
Russia is less effective in winning concessions from the Baltic republics than the
Central Asian republics on the question of citizenship for their Russian population. In
fact, Russia can exercise more effective pressure on the Central Asian republics than the
Baltic republics to protect their Russian population from repressive measures for two
important reasons. First, Russia has withdrawn troops from the Baltic republics but not
from the Central Asian republics. Russian troops still guard the latter’s borders and have
the capability to depose and instal governments in these republics. Tajikistan is a case
in point. The presence o f Russian troops effectively protects the Russian minority from
excessive repression in Central Asia. Second, the cost o f Russian military action in behalf
of the Russian minority in the Baltic republics is potentially far greater than in the
Central Asian republics. It is so because the W estern industrialized countries are likely
to react more sharply in the case of the former than the latter. This is clear to the Central
Asian republics with a large, politically active Russian minority, discouraging them from
unleashing indiscriminate repression in society.
The second independent variable in our model is elite structure. In this study,
elite structure refers to a patterned set of relationships that developed among elites o f the
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old regime. The leaders of the republican communist party, important members of
nomenklatura, members of the parliament, state functionaries, heads o f public
enterprises, and other important figures (such as tribal and clan leaders) under the
tutelage of the republican communist leadership comprise this elite. In this study, we will
focus on the structure o f old-regime elites as they passed from the breakdown phase into
the post-communist transition phase. The character o f the structure of old-regime elites
is defined by their internal unity and cohesiveness and the extent to which they retain
access to their public and nonpublic power resources.42 On the basis of this definition,
we can identify two basic elite structure types— consolidated and fragmented (or
dispersed)—that emerged in Central Asia in the post-Soviet era.
A consolidated elite structure means that old regime elites pass into the post
communist transition phase structurally intact. The consolidated old regime elites
maintain their internal unity and cohesiveness and retain access to power resources. They
do not suffer major defections. Above all, they are unified in keeping new political actors
out of the national political process and exhibit a remarkable consensus on the pace and
direction o f the post-communist transition.

All o f this means that unified elites have

more freedom o f action in controlling independent political activity.
In contrast, a fragmented elite structure means that the old-regime elites
experience serious internal fragmentation during the regime breakdown and transition
phases. The fragmented old-regime elites join different groups and alliances and often
adopt conflicting political agendas. Although some old-regime elites may remain in
power, many suffer the loss o f power positions and public (and in certain cases
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nonpublic) power resources. When they are fragmented, most old-regime elites face real
political competitors in their struggle for power resources in the post-communist era—a
beneficial situation for political liberalization.
Drawing on the prevailing scholarly argument that elite structure influences
regime change,43 this study hypothesizes that variation in the structure o f the old-regime
elites helps explain variation in political liberalization among the Central Asian republics
in the post-Soviet era. This study expects a positive effect o f the fragmented elite
structure on political liberalization. It is so because this type o f elite structure is
indicative o f a narrow support base of the ruling regime. It undermines a government’s
capacity to control and repress society because o f the defection of its important allies,
its isolation from important sources o f support, a reduction in the clientelist networks
available to the ruling elites, and the rise o f broad movements and challenges from above
and from below. If the elite structure is fragmented, opposition forces become stronger
and are able to resist restrictions on their political activities. The above conditions
produced by a Augmented elite structure facilitate the decisions o f the ruling elites to
provide political space for autonomous opposition activities.
The fragmented elite structure facilitates political liberalization in our countries
yet in another way. That is, fragmented elites of the old regime tend to draw support
from their old connections, including those located in Russia, which contributes to their
strength and prove an effective shield against indiscriminate and outright repression. If
such old connections include the Russian government’s support, it effectively discourages
the elites in power to eliminate their former comrades (and present political opponents)
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from the national political process through indiscriminate repressive measures. In other
words, the ruling elites can impose certain restrictions on their political opponents, but
can not unleash widespread repression to completely eliminate them without the risk of
prohibitive costs.
In addition to the above conditions, another factor that figures most prominently
in the decision o f the ruling elites to tolerate independent political activity is the specter
o f civil war. If the ruling elites unleash excessive and indiscriminate repression against
their opponents, civil war becomes a real possibility under a fragmented elite structure
because fragmented elites with traditional sources o f support (such as tribal, clan, ethnic,
and regional) at their disposal can be tempted to use them to defend themselves against
the government repression. The Tajik civil war is a case in point. The civil war increases
the risk of Russian intervention and the removal o f the ruling elites from their power
positions. Again, the Tajik case illustrates the point, and serves as a lesson to the ruling
elites in other republics.

The above discussion leads us to expect greater political

liberalization in the Central Asian republics where a fragmented elite structure has
emerged.
Our theoretical argument has thus far been structural. We are confident that the
above two structural independent variables can adequately account for the broad variance
in the general direction o f the political liberalization process in the post-communist
Central Asian republics. However, they have their own limitations. Although the large
Russian minority and a fragmented elite structure considerably constrain authoritarian
impulses in our countries, but they can not be shown to clearly determine a full range
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of variations among and aberrations in the political liberalization process within them.
If we confine our focus to these two variables, we can not adequately answer certain
specific questions related to the political liberalization process in Central Asia. For
instance, why does the political liberalization process shift back and forth in a republic
when the above two explanatory variables remain constant?

In other words, what

explains aberrations in the political liberalization process within a country?

Why do

ruling elites relax restrictions in some areas o f political liberalization but not in others?
And why do they some times tolerate the same independent political activity which they
otherwise repress?

In view of the fact that the above two variables experience no

change, what explains the timing o f certain political liberalization-related developments?
And why are some societal groups included in political liberalization and others excluded
from it?
The above two structural independent variables cannot adequately address these
questions. In order to provide satisfactory answers to these and other similar questions,
we expand our theoretical argument and introduce the third independent variable, political
leadership, in our model. In this study, political leadership refers to the incumbent
presidential leaderships in charge o f the post-communist transition process in our
countries. O f course, these incumbent presidents put together teams o f their own
choosing. These teams often share their political approach and assist them in directing
this transition. We will focus on two aspects o f political leadership, its views about
political liberalization and its concrete actions and strategic behavior. In this respect, the
logic o f our theoretical argument is both structural and voluntaristic.
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The assumption o f this study is that political leaders are not simply forced by
broad structural conditions into a predetermined direction; but rather they have central
political orientations which influence political outcomes; they generally retain initiative;
they mediate the gross impact of structural conditions on the political process; and their
actions may produce outcomes which no one intended or anticipated.
The central political tendencies o f political leaders are likely to magnify or
weaken situational stimuli for a particular course o f action. In other words, if political
leadership is reformist, it will react favorably even to weak situational press for a
reformist course o f action, and vice versa. If political leadership is anti-reformist, it will
forcefully resist pressures conducive to political liberalization. Even under powerful
constraints o f structural conditions a significant range o f options is available to political
leaders to make political choices and take actions. The choices they make and the actions
they take tend to have cumulative effect which can increase or decrease the level of
political liberalization in a republic. One set o f decisions and actions taken at one point
in time, practically and effectively, if not theoretically, rule out another set o f decisions
and actions down the road. Hence, if a decision conducive to political liberalization is
taken at one point in time, it is likely to facilitate other decisions and actions which may
further deepen the political liberalization process. If these assertions are correct, then
variations in political orientations o f the political leadership of the Central Asian
republics and their concrete actions will help explain variation in political liberalization
among them.
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Our focus on the central tendencies of the Central Asian leaders is very much in
line with the serious analyses o f the region. After the abortive coup against Gorbachev,
serious scholars like Beissinger could foresee that "the varied ideological colors o f the
elites who were left in power at the time of the Union’s collapse will have an enormous
impact on subsequent politics in the area, including the complication o f efforts to
construct a post-Soviet community." He also referred to the significant variation in
ideological colors o f the Central Asian leaders (Bessinger 1991:31, 35). However, his
recommendation to focus on the political orientations o f the incumbent political
leaderships was largely ignored in the subsequent analyses o f the post-communist politics
in the region.
We concur with Beissinger that the Central Asian political leaders differ in their
views about political liberalization. More specifically, they differ about whether, how and
when political liberalization can be introduced in their societies. Some Central Asian
political leaders outrightly reject political democracy as unsuitable for their societies. In
fact, they believe that political democracy is not compatible with the political culture o f
their societies. Others, especially moderate reformist leaders, doubt the readiness o f their
societies for political reforms. In addition, they enumerate a number o f adverse
consequences o f for the their societies during the transition period. However, they
manipulate and moderate rather than forcefully resist pro-reform pressures. Still others
have a more favorable view o f political liberalization and its consequences for their
societies. Political leaders with benign view of political liberalization are more likely to
relax political control and to be more responsive to even weak constraints o f structural
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conditions than the political leaders with negative views about political liberalization and
its consequences for their rule and societies.
The choices the political leaders make and the actions they take may o r may not
be in accordance with their central political orientations. We assume that political leaders
are innovative and at times take actions which are contrary to their central political
tendencies. However, these actions do influence the political liberalization process in one
way or another. Because actions o f political leaders are o f fluid nature, it becomes more
or less an empirical question to investigate whether a concrete action o f political
leadership produces a positive or negative impact on political liberalization in a republic.
Because leaders take different (and at times inconsistent) actions, we assume that
variations in their concrete actions will help us explain not only variation in political
liberalization among our countries but also aberrations in the political liberalization
process within them.

THE EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT
As Figure 1 shows, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan score higher than Uzbekistan on
political liberalization—a conclusion supported by the Freedom House rating o f these
countries on political and civil rights index (see Table 7). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
both have large Russian minorities in proportion to their titular nationalities. Preliminary
evidence also shows that these minorities receive the Russian government’s help in their
struggles to defend their political, civil, and cultural rights.
In addition, the elite structure in both countries is fragmented. In Kyrgyzstan,
the communist party suffered serious splits even before independence. A reformist group
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of communist party members was formed within the Kyrgyz parliament in 1990. This
group entered into an alliance with a group o f independent members o f the parliament
and proved critical in the victory of reform-oriented Askar Akayev in the October 1990
parliamentary election for president. This situation continued in the post-independence
period.
In Kazakhstan, the republican communist party lost its monopoly over access to
power resources. It also suffered splits. A number of its members left the party to join
other political formations and/or operate independently. One section of the republican
communist party not only opposed the Kazakh president but it also had to face other
political competitors in the post-Soviet period. In fact, Nazarbayev helped transform not
only a section o f the communist party into a new political formation but also helped
create two more political parties which now rival the communist party. Thus, the large,
resourceful, and politicized Russian minority, and a fragmented elite structure help
explain why Kazakhstan scores higher on political liberalization than Uzbekistan.
However, these factors can not explain why Kazakhstan scores lower on political
liberalization than Kyrgyzstan which also have a relatively large Russian minority and
a fragmented elite structure. In order to explain the mixed record o f Kazakhstan on
political liberalization, we need to turn to the political orientations o f the Kazakh
leadership and its certain concrete actions which increased and/or decreased the level of
political liberalization in the republic.
In contrast to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan scores quite low on
political liberalization. The small Russian minority, little or no Russian government’s
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support to it, and a consolidated elite structure are responsible for the low level of
political liberalization in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, the consolidated elite structure was
put in place before independence. The Uzbek elites closed their ranks partly in reaction
to the center-sponsored purges o f nomenklatura involved in alleged widespread
corruption. After independence, the communist party suffered few defections and was
successfully transformed into a new ruling party headed by the Uzbek President, Islam
Karimov. These factors produced a low level of political liberalization in Uzbekistan.
The leadership o f Akayev played an important role in promoting political
liberalization in his republic. Even before independence, he, unlike other Central Asian
leaders, was enthusiastic supporter o f the Gorbachev reform. His pro-reform political
orientations persisted in the post-independence period. In addition, he relied on more than
one political party and group for his support. Hence, by entering into alliance with old
as well as new political actors, Akayev expanded political space available to society.
Like Akayev, Nazarbayev collaborates with more than one political group,
producing almost similar consequences for political liberalization. Certain actions o f the
political leaders are responsible for greater political liberalization in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan. However, due to his ambivalent views about political liberalization and its
consequences for his society and the presence and demands o f secessionist elements
among the Russian minority (which provide him a more or less safe pretext to repress
certain unwanted opposition elements) explain why Kazakhstan lags behind Kyrgyzstan
in political liberalization.
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The political leadership in Uzbekistan is anything but reformist.

Before

independence, it showed rhetorical solidarity with the central leadership on political
reform, but systematically subverted its implementation when it belatedly made its way
to Uzbekistan in the late 1980s. After independence, the Uzbek leaders made no secret
of their quite negative views o f the center-sponsored political reform program and their
determination to roll it back. Immediately after independence, they doubted the readiness
of their society for political reforms—a position which remained unchanged thereafter.
In the absence o f structural constraints, the Uzbek leaders had more freedom o f action
to conduct the post-communist transition in accordance with their central political
tendencies and designs. As a result, tactics aside which produce(d) short-lived moments
of political openness, there exists no tolerated independent political activity in the post
communist Uzbekistan.
NOTES
1. The state-sponsored ethno-nation building is another important area in which the three
Central Asian republics significantly differ.
2. Conteh-Morgan conceptualize democratization as a transitional stage on a continuum
starting with authoritarian rule to democratic governance. He argues that it can be seen
unfolding in countries instituting multiparty systems, national conferences on political
reforms, holding free and fair competitive elections, establishing mechanisms to ensure
participation at all levels o f politics, and creating responsible leadership and civil liberties
(Conteh-Morgan 199S:6). This conceptualization implies that political liberalization will
ultimately mature into political democracy. Lee views political liberalization as a
necessary condition for democratization; however, he is opposed to reducing
democratization to political liberalization (Lee 1993:351-356).
3. Cotton argues that political cultural approach suggests the possibility o f
accommodating illiberal beliefs and practices rooted in political culture o f societies within
constitutional arrangements (Cotton 1991).
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4. For a representative work, see O ’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986).
O'Donnell and Schmitter conceptualize political liberalization as a process o f redefining,
extending and making certain rights effective that protect both individuals and social
groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties. The list of
individual and group rights which they identify elevate their conceptualization o f political
liberalization to an ideal-type which they concede has probably never been totally and
unconditionally observed in any country and that its content has changed over time
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:7). Kaufman (1986) and Martin (1986) offer rather a
conservative conceptualization of political liberalization. Their conceptualization of
political liberalization under an authoritarian regime includes features which according
to O ’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and Przeworski (1991) are the features of
democratization. These features refer to the authoritarian regime’s experimentation with
guided and controlled democracy. In other words, during the political liberalization
process the authoritarian regime may adopt formal democratic institutions but these
institutions are often without democratic content.
5. This study views democratization as process o f transforming a non-democratic state
into a democratic state. As Huntington proposes, democratization involves three things:
a) the end o f a non-democratic regime; b) the establishment o f a democratic regime; and
c) the consolidation of the democratic regime (Huntington 1991:35). Huntington believes
that "Modern democracy is not simply democracy o f village, the tribe, or the city-state;
it is democracy o f nation-state and its emergence is associated with the development o f
the nation-state" (Huntington 1991:13). Linz and Stepan (1996) share this view.
However, unlike Huntington and Linz and Stepan, Ambrose believes that groups and
communities, in addition to states, can also be transformed into democratic entities
(Ambrose 1995:19).
6. The troublesome aspects o f the conceptualization o f political liberalization offered by
O ’Donnell and Schmitter are that it puts equal emphasis on civil as well as political
society and includes conditions (such as the protection o f individuals and groups from
arbitrary acts o f parties other than the state) which perhaps no state will ever be able to
satisfy. M oreover, it establishes a link between political liberalization, law and order
situation in a country and the state capability to deal with it. However, theoretically as
well as practically, it is possible that a country has a democratic regime, but is suffering
from internal social and political strife. India is just one example. According to our
conceptualization, political liberalization is primarily related to the extent o f political
space an authoritarian regime makes available to society.
7. Before the breakdown o f authoritarian regimes over the past two decades, political
liberalization was seldom studied as a separate subject o f political inquiry. While it has
always been a presumption o f the evolutionary model o f political development outlined
by modernization theorists that political liberalization would occur (and ultimately mature
into consolidated political democracy) in nondemocratic countries when they would begin
to attain a higher level o f socioeconomic development, it was only after the recent regime
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change that regime analysts systematically studied political liberalization (O’Donnell,
Schmitter and Whitehead 1986).
8. As already mentioned, the question o f political liberalization has been around for quite
some time. One o f the interesting debates the recent regime change has provoked is
focused on the question o f how to compare various aspects o f recent political regime
change, including the question o f political liberalization, in the communist and
noncommunist world. Some scholars find it appropriate to examine the post-communist
transitions with the analytical categories developed from the study of regime change in
the noncommunist world (Karl and Schmitter 1991; Schmitter and Karl 1994; Hasegawa
1992). Others argue that the post-communist transition is a unique phenomenon which
is fundamentally different from the post-authoritarian transition. They insist on
developing new analytical categories in order to properly study the post-communist
transition (Ekiert 199). Both groups use a number o f theoretical schemes to explain the
beginning of political liberalization under authoritarian and communist regimes. In this
chapter, we shall discuss various approaches both groups use to study political
liberalization.
9. The thesis that economic development has a positive correlation with democracy has
generated an enormous amount o f research. There is a long list o f scholarly studies that
subsequently reconfirmed this empirical connection. For representative work, see
Coleman (1960), Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979, 1983), Huntington (1984, 1991), Lipset,
Seong, and Torres (1993), Diamond (1992), Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1988:xxi),
Waisman (1992:140-55), and Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994).
10. In addition to these effects, a wealthy, industrial economy, as the argument runs,
lessens the tensions o f political conflict and facilitates accommodation and compromise
in the political arena by offering alternative opportunities and abundant economic
resources to unsuccessful political leaders (Huntington 1984:199). For an excellent
synopsis of the reasons for the positive correlation between democracy and economic
development, see Huntington (1984), and Przeworski and Limongi (1997).
11. Marx is believed to be among the first scholars to identify the bourgeoisie as the
major force responsible for the rise o f democracy. According to him, the capitalist class
uses democratic mechanisms to capture the state from the traditional power elites (Arat
1988:21).
12. Therborn argues that although the rise of market economy and the middle class have
eroded state power and enlarged human rights, it was the working class, especially in the
capitalist world, that championed the rights of political parties and the expansion o f
suffrage (Therborn 1977). John Stephens observes that capitalist development causes
democratization "because it is associated with a transformation o f the class structure
strengthening the working class" (Stephens 1993:438).
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13. He uses the two terms, "the authoritarian crisis” and "great transformation,” with
reference to the transition process underway in the nondemocratic countries in the
communist and noncommunist world. The term "the crisis o f authoritarian" is used to
refer to the grand failure o f dictatorial rule "to deliver on its promises of purposeful
efficiency," the state-initiated "liberalization practices," and the democratization process
underway in the nondemocratic communist and noncommunist countries. The "great
transformation", a term he borrows from Karl Polanyi (1944), refers to the process in
which "transnational forces involving a dynamic world economy and revolutions in
technology and information are compelling authoritarian governments to open up their
economies" as well as political system (Pye 1990).
14. In addition to political liberalization, other common possibilities include: a)
democratization— "decisive transitions from autocratic rule toward democracy" (Pye
1990:5; Huntington 1991:59); b) an abrupt overthrow o f a dictatorial regime; and c)
increased repression (Pye 1990:5; Huntington 1991:59). Other scholars also refer to
some of these possibilities in their analyses of regime transition (Linz 1978:35;
Huntington 1984:212-14, 1991:110-63; Share and Mainwaring 1986:177-79).
15. Huntington is o f the view that under certain conditions, ethnic, racial and religious
diversity may facilitate the development of at least limited forms of democracy.
However, he asserts that "In most cases of communal pluralism, democracy can operate
only on a consociational rather than a majoritarian basis." And he believes that such
democracy "often break(s) down as a result of social mobilization that undermines the
power of elites or as a result of the intrusion of external political and military forces."
(Huntington 1984:205). Dahl also believes that a heterogeneous country can experience
competitive politics if "it is not segmented into strong and distinctive subcultures; or if
it so segmented, its leaders have succeeded in creating a consociational arrangement for
managing subcultural conflicts" (Dahl 1996:178).
16. A number o f social groups ranging from religious associations such as the Catholic
Church (Huntington 1991:72-85) to middle-sector groups such as salaried class and small
local producers (Kaufman 1986:90-93) to environmental and cultural groups (Butterfield
and Weigle 1991) to a host o f other voluntary associations (Schmitter 1986:6-8) are
thought to have played a critical role in the democratization process in the world over
the past two decades. Schmitter believes that in addition to autonomous social formations,
"independent territorial communities, especially town and cities" greatly facilitated the
recent democratization process around the world (Schmitter 1986:6). Moshe Lewin is
believed to be first to introduce and emphasize the importance o f the concept o f civil
society to the study o f politics in the Soviet Union. He is o f the view that modernization
slowly expanded civil society which in turn is responsible for perestroika and glasnost
(Lewin 1974, 1988). Arato differs with Lewin’s notion o f a slowly and expanding civil
society in the Soviet Union. He rather argues that independent social movements and
initiatives did not arise in the pre-Gorbachev period. He also rejects the notion that
modernization is responsible for the rise o f civil society which facilitated perestroika and
glasnost. He rather refers to "the self-constitution o f civil society in independent
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movements and initiatives" and the role o f the state (the reform-oriented Gorbachev team)
in providing opportunity structure for the beginning o f self-organization. He also
suggests the possibility o f the republic level administrative structures contributing to the
rise and politicization o f independent social movements and initiatives (Arato 1991-202,
212).
17. A change in the orientation of the already existing social groups can facilitate the
initiation o f the political liberalization and democratization process in a country.
Huntington believes that the pro-democracy change which occurred in the Catholic
Church played a significant role in undermining authoritarianism (Huntington 1991:7285). In a sim ilar fashion, Kaufman finds that the defection o f the middle-sector groups
from an authoritarian coalition and their support to anti-regime coalition forces greatly
facilitated the political liberalization process in many South American countries (Kaufman
1986:91-93).
18. O ’Donnell and Schmitter are o f the view that the resurrection of civil society begins
after some political liberalization has been introduced in a country (O ’Donnell and
Schmitter 1986:48). In other words, civil society can help expand and deepen political
liberalization, but cannot be the cause of it. The assumption underlying this position is
that authoritarian rule destroys autonomous political spaces and is able to orient most of
its subjects toward the pursuit o f exclusively private goals (O’Donnell and Schmitter
1986:48). In other words, no autonomous grass-root organizations exist before political
liberalization. In spite o f its merits, this view does not capture the reality in many
countries including Pakistan where autonomous social organizations such as religious
formations existed before different authoritarian regimes liberalized their practices. And
such formations pursued goals with explicit political implications. One o f such goals was
the demand for the introduction of an Islamic system in the country.
19. Political culture has been defined in different ways. According to Huntington and
Dominguez (1975:15), political culture "consists o f empirical beliefs about expressive
political symbols and values and other orientations o f the members of the society toward
political objects" (Huntington and Dominguez 1975:15). Larry Diamond defines political
culture as "a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and
evaluations abut the political system o f its country, and the role of the self in that
system" (Diamond 1993:7-8). Sidney Verba defines political culture as a "system of
empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which
political action takes place” (Verba 1965:513). Some scholars went beyond this subjective
and psychological definition of political culture to include behavior ( Tucker 1987:3-6;
White 1984:62). According to Archie Brown, despite some important differences
between ideology and political culture, "the substance o f one can impinge upon and
intertwine with the other" (Brown 1989:2).
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20. Huntington and Dominguez believe that "The most crucial political belief for political
modernization is...the extent to which individuals consider themselves unambiguous
members o f a given nation" (Huntington and Dominguez 1975:32).
21. For Daniel Lerner, empathy is the capacity o f a person to see himself in his other
fellows’ situation (Lerner 1958:49-50).
22. The crude version o f the political cultural theory sees in political culture a causal
determinism. According to the crude political culture theory, political culture o f a society
is relatively impervious to change, and it more or less predetermines both political
structures and political behavior. Howard Wiarda (1974) is often criticized for such a
rude political cultural theory. Pye is also criticized for his explanation o f Asian political
development through a political cultural perspective which "approaches the deterministic
model in several basic assumption" (Diamond 1993:9). For a critical review o f the crude
version o f the political cultural theory, see Diamond (1993). Although the assumptions
Diamond (1993) found in Pye’s work approach the deterministic model, Pye at other
places recognizes the malleability of political culture: "A political culture is the product
of both the collective history o f a political system and the life histories o f the individuals
who currently make up the system; and thus it is rooted equally in public events and
private experiences" (Pye 1965:8).
23. There are three broad sources o f political culture: a) historical tradition and
experience (Brown 1989:19; Laitin 1988; O ’Donnell 1986:15-18; Huntington and
Dominguez 1975:15); b) indoctrination (or artifice) (Eckstein 1988; Taylor 1989:135;
Gibson 1996:955); and c) modernization (Lipset 1994).
24. The much-cited sources o f these political cultural changes include the painful
experience o f social conflict (i.e., strikes, protest rallies, street violence, and shortage
of food and consumer goods) prior to the rise o f authoritarian regime, the painful
experience o f bloody military coups, the "unusually repressive and socially regressive"
authoritarian regimes, the failed economic policies o f such regimes, the destruction o f
the myth about the inevitability and irreversibility o f the socialist process, generational
gap, intellectual debates (especially in the USSR), and modernization (O’Donnell 1986;
Silva 1998; Diamond 1993).
25. Huntington defines institutionalization as a "process by which organizations and
procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington 1965:394).
26. This is more true o f the British and American colonial rule than o f other colonial
powers. As Huntington reported, as o f 1983, no former colony o f France, Belgium, and
the Netherlands was a democracy (Huntington 1984:206). However, some former British
colonies, as Myron W einer observes, existed with a continuous democratic experience
(Weiner 1987). The two prominent examples are Sri Lanka and India.
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27. Kitschelt considers the focus on international efforts to promote democracy as a
process approach to the study o f political regime (Kitschelt 1992).
28. Huntington argues that demonstration effects are increasingly possible because o f the
almost instantaneous transmission o f information about significant political events around
the world. The successful democratization demonstrates to other societies that leaders and
groups have an ability to end an authoritarian regime; that it could be done; that how it
can be done; and that how and what dangers could be avoided (Huntington 1991:33,
100).
29. During the cold war, the Soviet Union and the United States supported all kinds of
countries to secure allies. Once it was over, it caused a substantive reduction in
resources available to authoritarian regimes. In addition, aid donors announced that aid
would be available to those who undertake political reforms (Abrahamsen 1997:130-131).
30. In fact, dependency and world system theorists concede that independent economic
development is conducive to a humane political regime. However, they argue that
economic development and peripheral position in the world economic system distort most
of the usual consequences o f socioeconomic development associated with the rise of
political democracy. The common argument offered to establish a connection between
economic dependence and lack o f democracy focuses on the relationship between the
elites in the periphery and the elite in the core. The former are said to maintain
authoritarian regime with the support o f the latter. This support is thought to hinder the
processes associated with socioeconomic development that contribute to democratic
development. Contrary to the assumption of modernization theorists that industrial class
will challenge authoritarian regimes, in the dependent countries this class becomes a vital
part o f the system of domination. Thus, the core and noncore elites resist the pressure
of the working class for more political and economic rights. An end to this situation will
bring about an end to political repression in the Third World countries (Cardoso and
Faletto 1979; Frank 1969; Portes 1976; Chirot 1977; O’Donnell 1979; Bollen 1983;
Evans 1979).
31. Cardoso, on the other hand, believes that although there is a certain "elective
affinity" between the structures produced by associated-dependent development and the
centralization of power, but because the political form (the regime) is distinct from the
pact o f domination (an alliance o f hegemonic classes) which gives the State its social
base, the same style of associated-dependent development is "consistent with democratic
regime" (Cardoso 1989 :301, 310-311).
32. In his cross-national study o f relationship between world system position, dependency
and democracy, Bollen finds "support for the belief that different positions in the world
system are associated with different levels o f political democracy even after controlling
economic development" (Bollen 1983:477). However, Muller’s cross-national study does
not support Bollen’s position (Muller 1985).
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33. Some scholars argue that the structural and process-driven approaches are not
mutually exclusive (Collier and Norden 1992). Kitschelt believes that "structuralist and
process-oriented analyses do not directly compete with each other but focus on different
objects of explanations with different research methods and comparative designs." He
thinks that structuralist approaches are good at explaining "the general causes o f regime
breakdown and the consolidation o f new regimes. Process approaches m ay explain the
timing o f breakdown and transition as well as specific trial-and-error process o f searching
for a new viable regime." In his view, the "two currents represent only strands within
the structuralist camp" (Kitschelt 1992:1028-1029).
34. The approaches used toward these ends include modernization theory (Bohr in Rezun
1992, p. 129), cultural theory (Huskey 1997), social structural approaches focusing on
various cleavages along ethnic, regional, tribal, and religious lines (Huskey 1997), and
dependency approach (Huskey 1997).
35. Lately, Anna Matveeva tried to explain the emergent political differences in Central
Asia. According to her, "political diversification" in the Central Asian region is the result
of the different "policy responses adopted by the leaderships" to constraints produced by
fundamental structural elements related to the demise of the comm unist order. These
different policy responses reflect the leaderships’ "varying priorities and capacities in
meeting the challenges o f the new e ra .” The challenges and concerns (o r "fundamental
structural elements" she referred to here as the true factors shaping the post-communist
political order in Central Asia are the challenges and concerns o f both the elites and the
masses in the post-communist era. These include the need to construct new power
relations, nation-building, the presence o f minorities and the possibility o f inter-ethnic
conflict, division o f society along regional, tribal, or clan lines, and econom ic transition
(Matveeva 1999:24-6).
36. In this category, we can include the historical and cultural legacies, the continuity
of Soviet institutions, the Tajik civil war, the powerful opposition and the gravity o f
threat to the incumbent ruling elites, and Asian mentality.
37. For example, feudal and industrial classes do not exist in these republics.
38. Huskey referred to differences in political culture that exist in different parts of
Kyrgyzstan, but he did not explain aberrations in the political liberalization process
within Kyrgyzstan as well as variation among the regional countries in political
liberalization (Huskey 1997).
39. The Kosovo crisis is the best example o f an ethnic minority can enlist international
support, including military intervention, for its democratic rights.
40. This point is taken from Whitehead (Whitehead 1986:8-9).
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41. According to one estimate, approximately three times more Russian-speakers are
employed in industry than members of the titular nationality. The same is true o f the
makeup o f the technological elite (Current Digest Press, no. 17, 1993:12). The
importance o f this workforce can be partly judged from the fact that students o f the
region have described the outmigration o f the Russian-speakers as "brain drain" (Olcott,
1997:213).
42. This definition is borrowed from Gerald Easter (Easter 1997:187-88). However, I
believe that his position that a consolidated structure o f old- regime elites prevailed in
all the post-communist Central Asian republics is incorrect. In fact, even if we use his
criteria to characterize elite structures in these republics, a cursory look would
sufficiently expose structural variations o f old-regime elites in these republics. It is
interesting that he characterizes elite structure in Russia as reformed, but that in
Kyrgyzstan as consolidated. A careful examination will fully reveal that elite structures
in both the countries are similar in many respects. Both countries have reform-oriented
presidents, reform-oriented administrative teams under the leadership o f the chief
executives,
reformed former communist elites in power position, the hardcore
communist elites out o f high public offices, power struggle between the chief executives
and the legislatures, alliances between reformed former communist elites and new
political actors, etc,.
43. Many scholars used elite structure to explain political outcomes , including political
regime changes (Huntington 1991-92; Higley and Burton 1989; Stepan 1986, 1988) and
variation in institutional choices in the post-communist world (Easter 1997).
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CHAPTER 3
UZBEKISTAN
THE RISE OF A POST-COMMUNIST AUTHORITARIAN
POLITICAL ORDER
INTRODUCTION
On August 31, 1991, the Republic o f Uzbekistan, one of the 15 Soviet
republics, declared independence. After independence, Uzbek ruling elites publicly
expressed their resolve to continue the transition process the central authorities had
initiated under the rubrics o f perestroika and glasnost in the pre-independence period.
However, as o f 1997, the post-communist transition process in Uzbekistan made little
meaningful progress toward the expressed goals o f democracy and a free market
economy. In fact, as Uzbek ruling elites set out to handle without central dictates the
unprecedented and monumental task o f the post-communist transition, gradual
reformism became the most authoritative slogan for them. According to their
approach, gradual economic transition was to precede gradual political transition.
The Uzbek government has so far handled the economic transition in an erratic
way. Presidential decrees have been regularly issued as quick fixes to complex
economic problems such as liberalization o f prices, inflation, unemployment, and
privatization. Still, the overall economic transition has proceeded at a slow pace.
Although the state still controls most o f the economic activity in the country, it does
allow Uzbek society to engage in some sort o f autonomous economic activity. The
same, however, can not be said o f the political transition.
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As compared to economic space, political space available to Uzbek society is
much more restricted. In fact, the political transition witnessed fewer aberrations and
erratic shifts than the economic transition. In other words, after independence, the
Uzbek leadership has consistently refused to introduce even gradual but genuine
political reforms. It has rather established political structures and procedures which
are democratic in appearance but not in content. Since independence, barring few
tactical and short-lived pro-reform moves and periods of limited political openness,
genuine political liberalization has never been tried in Uzbekistan. In fact, Uzbek
authorities have relentlessly and successfully sought to repress all forms o f political
dissent, muzzle the independent print media, and establish compliant political
structures, including sociopolitical groups, in the post-independence period. It is no
exaggeration that if we keep in view its record on political liberalization in the preindependence and immediate post-independence periods, Uzbekistan experienced
deliberalization rather than liberalization in many respects in the post-1991
presidential election period.
This chapter is devoted to the in-depth study o f the level o f political
liberalization which Uzbekistan achieved in the post-independence period. The indepth study of the post-independence political liberalization process in the republic
will involve a systematic examination o f the empirical evidence and its
correspondence with the expectations o f our theoretical model. In other words, we
will study the extent to which our independent variables produced the expected
outcomes in Uzbekistan. Before we examine the empirical data on political
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liberalization, we will first discuss the extent to which our independent variables hold
in the republic. A concise discussion in this regard will be useful for interpreting the
empirical evidence and for assessing its correspondence with our theoretical
expectations. The next section of the chapter is devoted to the study of the late
introduction of glasnost in Uzbekistan and its restricted impact on Uzbek politics. The
ongoing political transition in Uzbekistan is rooted in the center-sponsored political
reform initiatives in the pre-independence period. The study o f the pre-independence
reform measures will provide us a proper background to comparatively understand the
current post-communist political transition in that country. We will then focus on the
first phase of limited political openness in the immediate post-independence period
and examine its relationship with the short-lived intra-elite power struggle. This phase
lasts until the December 1991 presidential election. The remaining chapter will focus
on the long spell o f thorough repression o f independent political activity and
independent mass media outlets. In addition, we will also examine the second brief
period of limited political openness during 1995-96, followed by a new wave o f
repression. In the last pan, we shall discuss the sham competitive electoral process
and its exclusive openness to the pro-government individuals and political formations.
Main findings of the chapter will be summarized in the conclusion.

A SMALL AND POLITICALLY INACTIVE RUSSIAN MINORITY
At the time o f independence, Uzbekistan was home to almost two million
ethnic Russians,1 who made up 8.3% o f its total population and 34% of the
population of the capital city, Tashkent (see Table 1 and 3). The size of ethnic
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Russians in proportion to the titular Uzbeks, who make up 71 % o f the total
population (Table 2), is not only small, it is also in constant decline, primarily due to
Russian out-migration. According to the 19% estimates, Russians dropped to 5.6%
and Uzbeks increased their share o f the total population to 76.6% (see Table 2).
Although Russian out-migration began in 1990, it did not gain an alarming momentum
until after the breakup o f the Soviet Union. After the breakup of the Soviet Union,
ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan lost once and for all their previous status as the
dominant sociopolitical group and consequently their out-migration gained an
unprecedented momentum. According to one source, the number o f Russians desiring
to leave Uzbekistan increased from 25% in 1991 to 75% in 19% (Olcott 19% :543;
Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press No. 28, 19%: 19).
In addition to suffering a constant decline in their relative size, ethnic Russians
are among the least politically active ethnic groups in Uzbekistan. Ethnic Russians do
not have any vocal and effective sociopolitical association o f their own to promote
their interests in Uzbekistan in the post-independence period.2 In fact, most Russians
in Uzbekistan do not pursue a political course o f action to redress their grievances.
Also, they keep away from the intra-Uzbek political struggle for fear o f reprisals from
both the government and opposition forces. Those Russians who are active in Uzbek
politics are small in number. The political survival and well-being o f such activists
are tied to their membership in the ruling party and an open alliance with Uzbek
ruling elites.
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Instead o f entering into an open alliance with Uzbek ruling elites, most ethnic
Russians extend their passive support to them .3 They extend such support in the
belief that, as compared to other viable alternatives such as nationalist and Islamic
governments, the incumbent Uzbek government is the best available guarantee for the
protection o f their interests in the post-Soviet period. There is a common impression
among the Russian population o f Uzbekistan that "were it not for Karimov, the
Russians would be fleeing" the republic (BBC, June 12, 1993). As a consequence,
this population is supporting rather than opposing his government and authoritarian
policies.
Given their enormous economic, educational, and professional resources, and
the reservoir o f support from their co-ethnics in Russia, ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan
could have generated effective pressure on the Uzbek government for greater political
liberalization had they directed these resources toward that end. Their survival
strategies in the post-Soviet period, namely migration and passive support for the
incumbent Uzbek government, work to the advantage of the latter, which would have
paid a greater price to suppress the largest and most resourceful ethnic minority in the
country if the Russian minority had been politically active to promote its interests in
Uzbekistan. Also, the current role o f the Russian minority serves Uzbek ruling elites
from another vantage point. On the one hand, they use its protection and maintenance
of inter-ethnic harmony as pretexts to restrict political space for Uzbek society,
including its Russian element. On the other hand, they use the current passive role o f
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their Russian minority as proof o f the absence of an ethnic, especially Russian,
problem and as proof of the effectiveness o f their repressive measures.
Thus, the migration trends among ethnic Russians, the absence of effective and
vocal Russian sociopolitical associations committed to the advancement of their
interests, and their active and passive support for Uzbek ruling elites hardly build any
pressure for political liberalization in the republic in the post-independence period;
rather, these factors facilitate the Uzbek rulers’ efforts to curb autonomous political
activity in their society. The above factors also undermine another factor with
enormous potential for promoting political liberalization in Uzbekistan: Russia’s
support for ethnic Russian minority.
In the post-Soviet period, Russia was expected for several reasons to support
the Russian minority in Uzbekistan. These reasons include the explicit commitment of
the Russian authorities to protect the rights of ethnic Russians living in the ’Near
Abroad’ with all possible means, including the use o f force if necessary, the unique
position that Russia occupies in Central Asia, the overall repressive political situation
in Uzbekistan, the enormous magnitude o f and potential for Russian exodus from
there, and the serious socioeconomic and political consequences this exodus would
have for Russia. Although Russia sought to persuade and pressure Uzbekistan on
behalf of the Russian minority, its efforts have thus far produced nothing more than
empty declarations. The failure o f its initial modest efforts did not prompt Russia to
pursue a m ore aggressive approach toward Uzbekistan. It appears instead to have
accepted the failure o f its policies. In fact, the absence o f Russian activism in
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Uzbekistan and the consequent Uzbek denial o f the existence o f a Russian problem led
the Russian authorities to concede that the problem o f the Russian population in that
republic "is past its peak" (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press No. 31, 1995:20-1).
In addition, the Russian perception of its geopolitical interests and sources o f threats
to these interests in Central Asia obliged Russia to avoid an aggressive approach
toward Uzbekistan.
The breakup o f the Soviet Union has unleashed new political forces in the
former Soviet space. The potential rise of nationalist-democratic and Islamic forces
into power in Central Asia is viewed in Moscow as an ominous development for
several reasons, including the welfare of ethnic Russians in that region. The
importance o f close cooperation and willingness o f the incumbent Uzbek government
to combat these forces increased its value for the Russian authorities. The Uzbek
government and its policies appeared to the Russian authorities as the best available
guarantee, as compared to other viable nationalist-democratic and Islamic political
alternatives, for the protection of the Russian population o f Uzbekistan. As a
consequence, they downplayed the cause of ethnic Russians in the republic and ended
up supporting the Uzbek government against Uzbek opposition forces. That the Uzbek
dissidents living in Russia have been harassed and arrested by both the Uzbek and
Russian secret services and police is an unmistakable show o f Russian support to the
Uzbek government in its efforts to suppress opposition forces (Khazanov 1995:151;
Russian Press Digest, November 11, 1993).4 This situation strengthened the Uzbek
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government but undermined the prospects for greater political liberalization in Uzbek
society.

REMARKABLE UNITY OF UZBEK RULING ELITES
Uzbekistan is one the two countries (Turkmenistan being the other) in Central
Asia in which ruling elites o f the Soviet era showed remarkable unity in the postSoviet period. Barring a few cases of individual splits, the elite structure in
Uzbekistan has so far remained intact. The remarkable unity among Uzbek ruling
elites developed and solidified during the Soviet period, for several reasons. These
reasons include the development of a multifaceted network o f relationships as part o f
the survival strategy o f the indigenous population under Soviet rule, the rise o f Uzbek
nationalism vis-a-vis the center much earlier than in other Central Asian republics
(Critchlow 1991), and various policies such as emphatic pursuit o f nativization o f
cadres and affirmative action sanctioning preferential treatment to the indigenous
nomenklatura.
Before independence, Uzbek elites demonstrated their unity and cohesiveness
on several occasions. The most vivid display o f this unity occurred during the 1983
infamous cotton affair, a scandal of widespread political corruption in Uzbekistan
cotton procurement agencies. In addition to eliminating corruption, the central
authorities used the cotton affair to rid echelons o f power in Uzbekistan of the longsecure elites. The central authorities carried out massive arrests and purges following
the exposure o f the cotton affair. Some local kingpins even received death sentences.
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However, the central anti-corruption campaign backfired. Uzbek elites
progressively hardened and united to resist the center’s anti-corruption campaign and
scheme to replace them with non-Uzbek cadres in the party and government
apparatus. For all practical purposes, the center called off its anti-corruption campaign
in early 1989 in large part due to the determined and united resistance o f Uzbek
elites. After the center called off its anti-corruption drive, Uzbek elites under the
leadership of Islam Karimov rejected the central version o f the cotton scandal,
protested against injustices done to innocent people during the investigation, and
sanctioned a quiet rehabilitation o f those cadres who had lost their positions in the
massive purges. This rehabilitation policy gained momentum as the center
progressively lost control over developments in the republics. The overall protective
conduct o f Uzbek elites, which enabled thousands of compromised cadres to smoothly
weather the cotton affair, could not have failed to promote and solidify among the
Uzbek cadres feelings o f gratitude and bonds o f loyalty toward each other in general
and the leadership in particular.
The renewed unity enabled Uzbek ruling elites to develop concerted responses
to other developments before independence. These developments included the question
of sovereignty, the August 1991 abortive coup in Moscow, the termination o f the
Uzbek communist party’s organizational and ideological ties with the CPSU following
the coup, and the independence o f Uzbekistan.
In the post-independence period, the cohesiveness o f Uzbek ruling elites did
not suffer any major blow. In the immediate post-independence era, there were only
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odd cases of dissent within the ruling party and government apparatus which could not
shake consolidated elite structure to its foundation. Although Uzbek elites closed
ranks for national causes and for preservation o f their power position in Uzbek
politics, this unity did not mean an unchallenged position for Karimov. In fact, after
independence there were still prominent former communist figures who had
considerable clout in Uzbek politics. In September 1991, almost two hundred
members of the Uzbek parliament signed a letter o f protest against the increasingly
dictatorial position of Karimov. Vice President Shukrulla Mirsadov reportedly
masterminded this protest letter after he gathered support from certain forces in
Moscow during his visit in early September 1991 (Olcott 1993a: 57; Fierman
1997:378, 404; Russian Press Digest October 29, 1991).
Karimov responded to his critics in parliament and avoided a showdown with
them at the time. This episode showed the vulnerability o f the Uzbek elite structure to
fragmentation and the controversial position of Karimov within the ruling party. In
case the elite structure suffered fragmentation, there was enormous potential for a
grand alliance among opposition forces, disgruntled members of the revamped Uzbek
communist party, and their supporters in Moscow against Karimov’s rule. It would
have been very difficult for him to move against such an alliance.
This challenge, however, did not develop into an enduring position, and his
challengers did not form a solid and resourceful bloc o f prominent political figures
within the ruling party and government apparatus. Thus, the Uzbek elite structure
survived the most serious threat o f disintegration in the immediate post-independence
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period. As it became clear that the Uzbek elites structure was solid enough to sustain
such threats, Karimov unhesitatingly moved after the 1991 presidential election to deal
his critics and rivals within the party and government apparatus with a heavy hand. In
the post-1991 presidential election period, he was able to purge his potential
challengers, including Mirsadov, without seriously damaging the internal integrity of
the elite structure.3 The ouster o f Mirsadov and other dissenting voices within the
party, parliament, and the executive branch o f government without any uproar and
serious crack within the Uzbek elite structure demonstrated two things. First, unity
among Uzbek ruling elites is solid and not easily eroded. Second, this unity has
involved the recognition and acceptance o f Karimov as the unchallenged primary actor
in Uzbek politics.
Since the ouster of Mirsadov and other dissenters, the party and parliament
members have faithfully avoided criticism o f Karimov and his transition policies,
allowing him to single-handedly direct the course o f the post-communist transition.
The Uzbek parliament has quietly accepted the advisory role, approving presidential
decrees by a unanimous vote. O f course, these decrees include measures which are
aimed at eliminating the potential political rivals o f Karimov and his ruling party, the
People’s Democratic Party.
This above discussion makes it clear that the former communist cadres have so
far remained united under the leadership o f Karimov, with their full access to the
state resources and control over distribution o f benefits in Uzbek society. And this
situation offers little optimism for a relaxation o f political controls in Uzbekistan.
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ANTI-REFORMIST UZBEK POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Before independence, the successive Uzbek communist political leaders,
including Karimov, who came to power during the center-sponsored reform program
were anything but reformist. While they endorsed the cultural, social, and ecological
issues which the rising informal sociopolitical groups championed in the pre
independence period, they continued to condemn the techniques o f such groups, the
character o f their leaders, and the chaos they were allegedly creating in the republic.
The Uzbek communist leaders also took practical measures, including the use o f
force, to restrict their activities and to prevent them from becoming a legitimate force
in Uzbek politics (Fierman 1997:368-377).
As compared to his two predecessors, Usmankhoajaev and Nishanov, Karimov
increasingly became candid in expressing his anti-reformist views. After the center
lost power vis-a-vis the republics in 1991, he made no secret of his hostile attitude
toward independent political activity and his readiness to use force to curb it. He
urged the central leadership "to make the party truly democratic and democratize in
parallel the entire power structure in the country" (Tass, April 16, 1991), because this
decentralization process was bound to give him more latitude in governing Uzbek
society. However, the Uzbek leader opposed the idea o f uniformly incorporating non
communist sociopolitical forces in the democratization process for several reasons,
including the deterioration o f order and the immaturity of the Soviet people in many
parts o f the country (BBC, June 3, 1991).
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Assessing the center-sponsored political reform program in June 1991, the
Uzbek leader regretted that the democratization process was getting out o f control. He
accused the rising autonomous sociopolitical groups, especially in Uzbekistan, of
doing politics of rallies, creating inter-ethnic tension, and committing pogroms and
arson, and advocated to give up the interests of a small number activists o f such
groups in order to protect the interests of the majority which, in his view, was not
interested in the negative politics o f the former. He lamented that such groups were
acting as a negative opposition which was busy in defending the interests of
individuals striving for power. He advised them to become a constructive opposition
which should cooperate constructively with the ruling forces and at the same time
should defend convictions, policies, and decisions which correspond to the group
rather personal interests (BBC, June 3, 1991).
The Uzbek leader advocated a quite conservative approach to introduce the
democratization process in the country. According to his opinion, before taking
practical measures to introduce "comprehensive democracy” in society, "one should
think about whether this democracy is governable or not, whether you control the
processes, or the processes will control you." He insisted that the establishment and
maintenance o f order and discipline should take precedence over the inclusion of non
communist sociopolitical forces in the democratization process because "There is no
democracy without order." In addition, he emphasized the evolutionary nature o f
democracy and its close relationship with the political awareness and political culture
of the masses. Because democracy has certain stages which must correspond to the
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political awareness and political culture of the masses and because the Soviet
republics considerably varied in these dimensions, the Uzbek leader viewed it unwise
to implement an identical form o f political reform program in various parts o f the
country. The most unsuitable republics for the introduction of the center-sponsored
political reform program were, in the eyes o f Karimov, the Central Asian republics
whose masses respect authority rather than democratic spirit (BBC, June 3, 1991).
His anti-reformist views o f the pre-independence period left no doubt that
Uzbek society would witness little genuine political reform, at least for the
foreseeable future, if Karimov had a free hand to decide the fate o f the
democratization process underway in his republic. The fate of political reforms in
Uzbekistan in the post-independence period remarkably corresponded to his anti
reformist views o f the pre-independence period. In other words, Uzbek society
witnessed little genuine political liberalization in the post-independence period.
After Uzbekistan declared independence in August 1991, Karimov was free to
rule without Moscow’s dictates. However, he appeared to have no clear blueprints of
his own to deal with the post-communist transition because soon after independence
he expressed apparently quite contradictory views about the political future o f Uzbek
society. For instance, the Uzbek leader made it clear in an interview in September
1991 that his republic was not yet ready for democracy and a market economy.
However, in the same interview, he alluded to the possibility of holding presidential
and parliamentary elections. He also promised a law that "will provide for a multi-
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party system" (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 37, 1991:16; The Associated
Press, September 17, 1991).
O f course, there were signs in the immediate post-independence period that the
Uzbek leader was in the process o f refining his ideas, views, and strategies about the
future o f Uzbek society. However, a close examination o f his views and the occasions
on which they were expressed makes it clear that Karimov was consistent in terms of
expressing different views for different purposes and audiences. The purpose o f his
pro-democracy statements was to address international concerns (The Associated
Press, February 16, 1992; BBC March 11, 1992). He continued to express his
customary rhetorical commitment to democracy mostly on diplomatic occasions but
made no political concessions to Uzbek society. For instance, with James Baker, the
US Secretary o f State, on his side in Uzbekistan in January 1992, Karimov told
reporters that "Uzbekistan is prepared to build an open society where there will be no
dictates of a single party" (The Associated Press, February 16, 1992).6 However,
such statements have no correspondence, whatsoever, with his actions in the post
independence period.
As compared to his sporadic pro-democracy statements mostly issued for
diplomatic consumption, Karimov has been more consistent in expressing his anti
reformist views. His anti-reformist statements have been primarily aimed at the
domestic audience and have so far remarkably corresponded to his actions in the post
independence era.
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As views of the Uzbek leader crystallized over time and he began to express
them in a consistent manner in the post-independence period, it became clear that
independence brought no notable change in his pre-independence anti-reformist views;
rather, he became more vocal in expressing them in the post-independence period. In
other words, his views about the priority o f stability and economic issues over
political reform, the need for constructive rather than negative opposition forces, the
destructive consequences o f the indiscriminate inclusion o f non-communist forces in
the democratization process, the evolutionary nature o f democracy, and the
authoritarian political culture of Uzbek society remained unchanged (BBC, June 12,
1993).7
In addition, after independence, Karimov openly began to say that Western
democracy was unsuitable for Uzbekistan. He plainly told foreign reporters; "It is not
necessary for us to adopt Western democracy spiritually alien to us. W e shall have
our own, national democracy which will help Uzbekistan become one o f the leading
countries o f the world" (Khazanov 1995:143). After independence, the Uzbek leader
was attracted toward the Turkish, the Chinese, and the South Korean models all of
which contained a strong authoritarian element (The Associated Press, September 17,
1991; The Independent, December 21, 1991:8).® He soon gave up the pretence o f
following other models in favor o f his own model of development which was no less
authoritarian. His model was inspired by "the Code o f the medieval despot Timur"
(Khazanov 1995:144).
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In fact, the Uzbek leader was o f firm belief that the transition period needed
an iron hand in order "to prevent bloodshed and confrontation and to preserve ethnic
and civil concord, peace and stability in our region. It is necessary for democracy’s
progress" (BBC, February 18, 1993; Russian Press Digest, February 12, 1993). He
admitted that his activities were somewhat authoritarian, but justified them by citing
the need o f a strong executive and central authority during the transition (BBC,
February 18, 1993). In addition, he also de-emphasized the role o f parliament in the
transitional period. In one of his interviews, Karimov plainly stated: "I am for a
strong executive, not something amorphous called here and there a parliamentary
democracy. This is in a transitional period, I believe, an impermissible luxury” (BBC,
June 12, 1993). He envisioned a gradual and slow change in Uzbek society.
Affirming that he would bring about political change in his republic "from the top
down amid order and discipline" (The Washington Post, September 16, 1991:A18),
the Uzbek leader perceived the Uzbek opposition forces as a negative phenomenon
which constituted the most serious threat to order and discipline, and thus to political
reform, because they engage in the protest politics to advance personal interests of
individual political leaders. In addition, he was critical o f Uzbek opposition forces
because they offered no constructive alternative and because o f their efforts to oppose
"the man in power" rather than to fight for the cause and ideas they profess (BBC,
June 12, 1993). In his address to the parliament in August 1996, he complained that
so far he has not seen a constructive and genuinely democratic opposition in
Uzbekistan (CSCE, March 1997:4), implying that the existing Uzbek opposition
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forces are unfit to have an access to the political process. Thus his views about how
and when authoritarian polities should democratize and his assessment o f the
prevailing circumstances in Uzbekistan rendered the inclusion of the whole Uzbek
society in the political liberalization process a remote possibility in the post
independence period.
The above discussion of the extent to which our three explanatory variables
hold in Uzbekistan offers little optimism for political liberalization in that country. In
other words, the small Russian minority in proportion to the titular ethnic group,
remarkable unity o f Uzbek elites, and anti-reformism o f the Uzbek political leadership
lead us to expect low level o f political liberalization in Uzbekistan. Because these
variables saw little change in the extent to which they held in Uzbekistan in the preand post-independence periods, we expect low level o f political liberalization in both
the periods. However, the main difference between the two periods is the role the
central authorities played in influencing the reform process in the republic. This role
is present in the pre-independence period but absent in the post-independence period.
Whatever political openness was available to Uzbek society in the pre-independence
can be attributed to this role. However, at the same time, a small and politically
inactive Russian minority, cohesive elite structure, and anti-reformist orientation o f
the Uzbek leadership militated against the deepening o f glasnost in Uzbekistan.

LATE AND RESTRICTED GLASNOST IN UZBEKISTAN
Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet president, began to introduce economic and
political reforms after he assumed power in March 1985. His political reforms under
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the rubric o f glasnost made their way to some Soviet republics much earlier than to
others. Uzbekistan witnessed the late arrival o f the center-sponsored political reforms.
In fact, the Gorbachev reform initiatives were not only delayed in Uzbekistan but they
also had little meaningful impact on Uzbek politics, for several reasons.
Gorbachev shared with his predecessors the view o f Islam as a troublesome
and reactionary force. He feared that Islam would undermine his reform initiatives.
He also attributed the alleged widespread corruption in the Central Asian republics in
general and Uzbekistan in particular to Islamic culture (Olcott, 1990a:375).9 Thus,
despite his professed commitment to widespread openness, including religious
tolerance, Gorbachev endorsed an all-out attack on religion in Central Asia. In a
secret resolution in 1986, the CPSU also declared Islam as an obstacle to
socioeconomic development in the country (Khazanov 1995:131). The central and
local press carried articles condemning Islam and Islamic practices as obstacles to the
development o f society (BBC, July 13, 1985). The Uzbek communist party affirmed
and decided upon a plan of action in 1986 to combat religious influences in Uzbek
society. As o f 1988, when political openness had made significant progress in other
areas, the Uzbek communist party under the leadership o f Rafiq Nishanov was still
engaged in Islam-bashing in Uzbekistan (Olcott, 1990a:375; Haghayeghi 1995:47-55).
Such an attack attested to the selective practice o f glasnost and made the Central
Asian peoples skeptical of glasnost and o f the intentions o f the central authorities,
discouraging them from all sorts o f active participation in the political process in the
republic.
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The continued anti-corruption campaign and massive purges, which followed
the exposure o f the infamous ’cotton affair’ after the death o f Brezhnev further added
to this skepticism, which in turn checked the rise of informal groups and a
reform-oriented alliance o f the communist elites in Uzbekistan. The anti-corruption
campaign and massive purges created a national anger and united the Uzbek
communist elites in their resistance against the center. Under this atmosphere, the
reform-oriented group was difficult to form within the Uzbek communist party. Once
united in common cause against the center, the members o f the Uzbek ruling elites
who had democratic tendencies were unlikely to break ranks with their national
comrades, identify themselves with and support the Moscow-sponsored reform
initiatives.
The proliferation o f informal groups was not a welcome prospect for the
central authorities during the anti-corruption campaign. In fact, they had a very
negative view o f the Uzbek informal groups. One Soviet official observed that there
was "a far-reaching shadow headquarter o f opponents of perestroika" which was
exploiting informal groups for its sinister purposes (Critchlow 1991:146). The Soviet
authorities suspected that the local informal groups were associates o f the corrupt
Uzbek officials. The central authorities also blamed the Uzbek informal groups for
exploiting extremely sensitive national issues and pushing Uzbek society in an
anti-Soviet direction (Critchlow 1991:146-7).
The above Soviet perception o f the local informal groups suited the Uzbek
leaders who were least interested in, and rather resisted, the full scale implementation
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of political reforms in their republic. The Uzbek communist leadership was, in fact,
skeptical about the merits of glasnost. It was not viewed as a panacea for the
problems o f Uzbek society. In addition, the Uzbek communist elites were unlikely to
fully identify themselves with the center-sponsored reform initiatives after their
humiliation in the anti-corruption campaign.
The Uzbek leadership resisted the full scale implementation o f glasnost for the
obvious reason o f the potential arrival o f new rivals on the Uzbek political scene and
the fear of losing power to them. This partly explains why the Uzbek ruling elites
graciously tolerated informal groups with local agendas and limited following, but
were not ready to tolerate the growth of those groups with national agendas which
could potentially challenge and discredit the incumbent Uzbek communist leadership.
Thus, the interests o f the central and Uzbek authorities coincided on the question of
formation and operation o f independent social and political groups in Uzbekistan. This
situation partly explains why the central authorities took little or no notice of the lack
of progress in the implementation o f their much trumpeted policy of political openness
in that republic.
Uzbek society itself is partly responsible for the late arrival o f glasnost. If the
central authorities were not pushing political reforms in Uzbekistan as they were
doing elsewhere, and if the local authorities were skeptical about its merits, the
people of that republic were also not willing (and politically not conscious o f the
need) to precipitously engage themselves in bold political adventures. In fact, with the
decades of absolute repression under Soviet rule in the background, it was natural for
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Uzbek society to be slow and cautious in its response to the policy o f glasnost. This
fact was not lost on those Uzbek democratically-oriented individuals who tried to
awaken Uzbek society from the deep social and political slumbemess and encourage
its "active participation in social and political life” (Guardian, October 25, 1990:9) in
order to end the communist rule in the republic.10
However, as glasnost began to bring about sea changes in the political arenas
of other communist societies, Uzbek society could not remain unaffected. In fact,
once these sea changes appeared and were tolerated in other communist societies, it
became difficult for the central and local authorities to isolate Uzbek society from
their effect. Over time, the Uzbek intelligentsia began to trust Gorbachev’s intentions,
appreciate the scope o f glasnost and respond to it in a number o f ways. The Uzbek
people began to organize themselves into informal groups, associations and
movements. These formations began to make demands on the authorities and
undertake actions, including protests and demonstrations, to accomplish them.
Despite the fact that the Uzbek leadership was averse to independent social and
political formations, they tolerated these groups without considering them capable of
making any positive contribution to the welfare o f the Uzbek society. Most informal
associations and movements pursued local agendas with limited followings. However,
some associations and movements championed a wide variety o f causes, including
causes of national and political importance. For instance, much of the program of the
Birlik movement, which was organized in November 1988, focused on social,
economic and ecological issues but it also included more sensitive issues such as
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human rights, status o f the Uzbek language, and sovereignty and ultimately
independence o f the republic (Haghayeghi 1995:66-67; Fierman, 1997:367; The
Independent (London), May 28, 1990:6). Another organization, Islam and
Democracy, pursued the goal of cleansing Islam in the Soviet Union. The pursuit of
this stated goal, however, soon brought it into an open conflict with the official
clerical establishment in Uzbekistan (Haghayeghi 1995:85).11
Associations such as Birlik and Islam and Democracy with national agendas
posed a real challenge to the monopoly o f the Uzbek ruling elites over politics in
general and national interest articulation in particular. As compared to the Uzbek
communist leadership’s negative view o f glasnost, such informal groups fully
supported the reform initiatives and viewed the petitions, demonstrations and rallies as
appropriate forms o f participation (Fierman, 1997:367). True to their word, but to the
chagrin o f the Uzbek authorities, these associations staged protest rallies to voice their
concerns and demands. These protest rallies were first organized in Tashkent in
December 1988 and later in other cities o f Uzbekistan in support o f Uzbek language
and culture. Birlik’s leaders addressed these rallies with and without official
permission.
The Uzbek communist party under Rafiq Nishanov adopted diverse, manifold
and shifting responses to these informal groups and their challenges. The initial
attitude o f the Uzbek authorities toward important informal groups was that o f denial
and dismissal. Their formation was tolerated and even certain concessions were made
to them. However, the Uzbek authorities denied them official recognition, considering
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them incapable o f playing a positive role in the conduct o f Uzbek politics. Birlik and
certain other opposition groups were the favorite targets o f condemnation in internal
party reviews, party conference reports, and the republic’s press.12 In addition to
internal party reports, the party news media also attacked the techniques and the
character o f the Birlik leadership. In fact, the Uzbek communist party leadership was
averse to the politics o f demonstrations, and Birlik was quite good in that.
The Uzbek authorities during the Nishanov era created various hurdles for
informal groups like Birlik, but refrained from using frequent and excessive brutal
force to curb the formation and activities of these groups. Even the unauthorized
meetings, demonstrations and rallies Birlik and other informal groups organized in
support o f their demands were often tolerated.13 The leadership o f Birlik and other
informal groups were also permitted access, though limited, to the republic’s press.
For instance, a favorable review o f the poetry o f Muhammad Solih, a Birlik leader,
was published by a literary magazine at a time when he was under venomous attack in
the main news media. He was also permitted to publish his defense in the republic’s
press (Fierman, 1997:368, 402). At about the same time, Nihsanov’s policy toward
the informal groups further changed for the better. His administration put on a
friendly outward face toward the opposition groups. It publicly admitted that the
informal groups can play a constructive role in solving the social and political
problems o f Uzbek society. Lending credence to its claim, the Uzbek communist
leadership sent Birlik and religious leaders to the Fergana Valley to control riots there
in early June 1989.
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Building on the shift that occurred toward the end o f the Nishanov era, the
Uzbek communist party further softened its attitude toward the informal groups and
their agenda after Islam Karimov came into power in June 1989. The main purpose
behind this shift was to dissuade the emerging opposition forces from politics of
protest rallies and to disarm them o f such issues which they could use to potentially
arouse the masses. Making a distinction between those who pursued their agendas in a
peaceful manner and those who preferred protest politics and brought the masses into
the streets, the Uzbek authorities granted the so-called the law-abiding leaders positive
recognition and permitted them greater freedom to promote their ideas (Fierman,
1997:369). However, they adopted a shifting policy toward those who often brought
the masses into the streets in support of their demands.
Initially, the Uzbek communist party under the new leadership of Karimov
pursued a flexible approach, encompassing almost all the important informal groups
and trying to dissuade them from street politics, essentially through negotiations and
concessions. However, it later sought to control, undermine, and repress those
individual leaders and informal organizations who continued to hold protest rallies and
refused to operate within prescribed parameters. This second approach will be
discussed in detail later in the chapter. Here, we focus on the first approach which
granted the informal groups more breathing space than they had during the Nishanov
era.
One o f the most salient features o f this approach was that the Karimov
administration appropriated most o f the popular issues on the agenda o f most of the
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important informal organizations. This appropriation was to serve the important
purpose of controlling protest politics. In fact, this move could potentially end the
monopoly of individual leaders and informal organizations over certain popular issues
and disarm them o f the issues they exploited to organize protest rallies. In short, this
move sent a clear message that the informal groups and masses need not resort to
protest politics and confront the Uzbek authorities because the latter also supported
their causes: rather, they should become a constructive opposition and cooperate with
the Uzbek authorities in pursuit o f these causes.
Over time the Karimov government moved beyond the sheer adoption o f the
opposition groups’ agenda. It further changed its policy toward them. It permitted the
state-controlled mass media to debate very sensitive issues such as Uzbekistan’s
relations with the center, sovereignty, pre-communist history, and ecological and
other social problems o f the republic. Also, a dialogue began between the Uzbek
authorities andkhe informal groups (CSCE, March 1997:1). This change was, in fact,
concomitant with the increasingly positive attitude o f the central authorities toward
informal groups and with the Uzbek authorities’ public recognition that informal
groups were capable o f playing a positive role in Uzbek politics. Karimov publicly
spoke of the informal groups as "a natural and objective" development in the
democratic evolution and an "indicator o f the politicization" o f Uzbek society.
Recognizing past mistakes, including the attitude of denial, which the Uzbek
communist party committed in its approach toward the informal groups and
movements, Ktuimov emphasized the change in the party policy from "total

100

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

non-recognition to constructive dialogue" with these forces. The republic press
published favorable accounts o f the initial contacts between the Uzbek authorities and
leaders of the informal organizations with the "hope for fruitful cooperation in the
very near future" (Fierman, 1997:369).
O f course, there were still many serious restrictions in place: yet, after the
opposition-government dialogue, independent political space expanded for the
opposition groups. They were relatively free to function, hold meetings, recruit
supporters and occasionally issue publications to articulate and communicate their
views to the Uzbek people (CSCE, March 1997:1-3). In addition, the Uzbek
authorities opened up new opportunities for the participation of certain informal
groups in the electoral process. In the Fall of 1989, they announced multi-candidate
elections for the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, to be held in February 1990. Despite
numerous restrictions, this campaign afforded the informal groups an opportunity to
expand their base and articulate and promote their agendas. Ignoring the calls o f some
groups for a boycott, most informal groups participated in the elections and a number
of nonparty candidates defeated the party nominees (OSCE Digest, April 1990:3).
Developments o f this sort had been hard to conceive o f in the past. In this sense, they
signified the growing tolerance o f the republican communist party of the emerging
political competitors. This fact held the promise for more political openness for
Uzbek society in the future.
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RETRENCHMENT OF GLASNOST UNDER KARIMOV BEFORE
INDEPENDENCE
As events unfolded, the prom ise of more political openness turned out to be a
false promise. Over time, it became clear that the Uzbek authorities would accept the
expansion o f political space at the pace and for groups of their own choosing. In
February 1990, the Uzbek authorities introduced a restrictive legal measure which
dealt with associations in Uzbekistan. This measure focused on many things relating
to associations, including rules concerning the creation of associations, their efforts to
gather support, their funding, their access to mass media institutions, and their right
to establish such institutions. The law also specified penalties for a wide variety of
violations of these rules by associations and their leaders. This measure was very
vague and amenable to varying official interpretations. The Uzbek authorities
effectively used these loose measures and their varying interpretations to arrest the
growth o f the so-called extremist political formations like Birlik and Islamic
Republican Party (IRP).
As the 1990 election campaign proceeded, it became clear to the authorities
that certain groups would campaign and contest elections in a manner contrary to their
preferences. This was an unpalatable and potentially dangerous situation for the
Uzbek ruling elites. In reaction, they began to shrink the political space available,
especially to the so-called noncooperative and extremist individual leaders and
organized groups. In its October 1989 resolution "On Measures for the Stabilization
of Social-Political Situation in the Republic,” the Uzbek Supreme Soviet lashed out at
those who championed human rights and the politics of unsanctioned rallies and other
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acts o f extremism. The Supreme Soviet authorized the security forces to use clubs,
handcuffs, and other special devices to keep civil peace. The opposition forces were
reminded that the offer of cooperation did not extend to those who resorted to the
politics o f protest rallies (Fierman, 1997:370).
Uzbek rulers began to carry out their threats prior to the parliamentary
elections. Although they created obstacles for almost all the informal groups in the
electoral process and manipulated electoral procedures to preserve the power position
of the Uzbek communist party, opportunities for the so-called extremist groups were
particularly restricted, and some even faced outright exclusion from the electoral
process. Uzbek rulers created numerous obstacles against their participation in the
nomination process. Their nomination meetings were often blocked and their
organizers discredited. Their several requests to hold election rallies were turned
down.
O f course, the 1990 parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan were, as some
observers noted, "more democratic than the Soviet variety", but they "left very little
room for opposition forces to organize and promote their candidates" (Fierman.
1997:371). It was reflected in the foregone election results. One-third of the seats won
by the Uzbek communist party members were uncontested (OSCE Digest, April
1990:3). Most nonparty members who won their seats reportedly had the blessings of
the Uzbek authorities. Nonparty winners who were suspected to have enjoyed the
official blessings included Muhammad Solih, a Birlik leader.14
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The Uzbek authorities used both cooptive and coercive methods to emaciate
the opposition. In addition to encouraging splits among the opposition ranks and
creating associations sympathetic to them, the Uzbek authorities tried to coopt
individual opposition activists (Guardian, October 25, 1990:9).13 The most common
method the Uzbek authorities readily used to take care of the inconvenient individual
opposition leaders and groups was coercion and intimidation.
in order to sound law-abiding, the Uzbek authorities, once they decided to
pursue an aggressive approach toward inconvenient opposition groups and independent
media outlets, began to lay down the legal foundations for restrictive and repressive
conditions for them. Soon after the 1990 parliamentary elections, the Presidium o f the
new Uzbek Supreme Soviet decided to ban public rallies until the social-political
situation was stabilized. On paper, the opposition could hold sanctioned public
meetings in closed locations. However, in practice, most groups which the Uzbek
authorities viewed as non-cooperative and extremist were unable to hold such
meetings. The leaders o f these groups became targets o f official criticism and their
attempts to organize public rallies were thwarted by all means necessary, including
the use of force.16
In February 1991, the Uzbek Supreme Soviet passed a law which made it a
criminal offense to insult the honor and dignity o f the president and other top officials
of the republic. This law specified the heavy penalty of six years o f imprisonment for
repeat offenders and those who use the mass media. The law also authorized the
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closure of a mass media institution that was found to be guilty o f repeated infractions
in this regard.
As the Uzbek authorities increasingly became aggressive toward the opposition
forces in the wake o f the 1990 elections, opposition groups like Birlik began to use
foreign media, especially the Russian media, to criticize the authoritarian tendencies
o f Karimov. After the Russian press and electronic media began to publish and
broadcast Uzbek opposition’s criticism of the Uzbek leadership in general and after
the IRP tried to hold its founding congress in particular, the Uzbek authorities took
practical measures to restrict the access of informal groups and the access o f the
masses to independent foreign media outlets (Russian Press Digest, May 7, 1991;
BBC, August 3, 1991).17
After the center-sponsored reform program increasingly deepened in response
to the profound the economic crisis in the country and many republics, including
Uzbekistan, declared sovereignty with the due consent o f the center,18 the Uzbek
authorities became less and less sensitive to the political reform program o f the
central authorities— who were increasingly becoming preoccupied with the future of
the union than with the political reform program. A small and cooperative Russian
minority and cohesive elite structure rendered it less expensive for Uzbek ruling elites
to deal with the opposition forces in an aggressive way and to shape Uzbek society
according to their own political vision.
The opposition forces recognized this fact. In response to this reality and the
growing repression o f the Uzbek authorities, Birlik, which was once accused o f being
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a radical nationalist movement, began to enter into alliances with national level
democratic and republican level Russian-oriented movements in order to protect itself
from repression (Russian Press Digest, May 7, 1991; BBC, August 28, 1991).19
However, to the dismay o f opposition forces, such alliances proved less than effective
in protecting them from repression, for several reasons.
First, because such alliances were involved with so many issues in many
republics, they could not remain focused on Uzbekistan only and. hence did not
consistently generate enormous pressure effective enough to discourage the Uzbek
authorities from unleashing repression against the opposition in the republic.
Second, such alliances were formed at the time when the Uzbek leadership
backed by a cohesive republican communist party was increasingly becoming
autonomous and therefore could weather the occasional uproar and criticism of the
autonomous forces working at the national level. In fact, the Uzbek communist party,
unlike the Kazakh and Kyrgyz communist parties, did not experience any split due to
the center-sponsored reform program and/or inter-ethnic violence. As a result,
throughout the glasnost period, it remained united and was able to resist pro-reform
pressure.
Third, the Russian-oriented group, Intersoyuz, in Uzbekistan was too
insignificant and weak to matter. Because most Russian residents in Uzbekistan were
not politicized and thousands were migrating from Uzbekistan during the period 199091, the Intersoyuz leadership was unlikely to be able to deter repression through
mobilizing large segment o f the Russian minority in Uzbekistan and/or through
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persuading the central and Russian authorities to exert enormous pressure on Uzbek
authorities. Perhaps this partly explains why Intersoyuz could not play a significant
oppositional role in the republic. As a result, the opposition's maneuvers to escape the
increased repression through such alliances before independence came to naught.

POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN INDEPENDENT UZBEKISTAN
The basic authoritarian orientation and character of the Uzbek regime
remained unaltered in the post-independence period. As before independence, the
Uzbek rulers' approach toward political liberalization in the post-independence period
witnessed shifts between short-lived, modest relaxations of political control and
extreme repression.
In retrospect, the political openness during the glasnost and immediate post
independence periods appears particularly striking considering the high level of
repression in the post-1991 presidential election period. The highest point in the
relaxation o f the post-communist authoritarian system in Uzbekistan occurred during
the period between independence and the 1991 presidential election. However limited
and short-lived, political openness of this period has so far gone unsurpassed. In fact,
in the period that followed the 1991 presidential election, the Uzbek authorities
extensively rolled back whatever limited political openness had previously been
available to Uzbek society. Barring a few encouraging tactical moves made in
1995-96, the Uzbek authorities took no substantive initiatives which could inspire a
reasonably positive assessment about the relaxation of the Uzbek post-communist
authoritarian regime after the 1991 presidential election.
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The remaining portion o f the chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion of the
two short-lived periods o f relaxation as well the long spell o f extreme repression in
the post-independence period in Uzbekistan.

SELECTIVE POLITICAL OPENNESS AFTER INDEPENDENCE
As already pointed out, in the immediate pre-independence period. Uzbek
authorities had begun to shrink even the modest independent political space which
they had made available to Uzbek society under glasnost. Interestingly, instead of
further shrinking it, Uzbek rulers expanded it in important respects in the immediate
post-independence period. Although several political restrictions were still in place,
the overall approach the Uzbek authorities adopted toward political liberalization
during this period was much more flexible than the one they adopted during the
preceding months in the pre-independence period. Also, during the immediate post
independence period, political liberalization reached a level which it never reached
again in the later post-independence period.
Although this short-lived relaxation of political control came about at an
intriguing juncture,20 we can make sense of it if we relate it to the temporary
jockeying among the ruling party elites for power position in the post-communist state
structures. More specifically, the decision to expand rather than further shrink
independent political space in the immediate post-independence period was a tactical
response the Uzbek leadership adopted to neutralize certain potential competitors
within the ruling party and state structure.
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Because the republican communist party was reincarnated intact into a new
party, the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, with its unhindered access to the
party and state resources, many prominent ex-communist leaders, besides Karimov,
wielded considerable power and influence in the ruling party circles and state
institutions. In other words, the Uzbek President’s position was not unchallenged, but
rather he could still face a challenge to his authority from many influential excommunist leaders of his party.
Such a challenge appeared, albeit temporarily, on the Uzbek political scene
about one month after the proclamation of independence. At a session o f the
parliament, almost 200 deputies signed and circulated a letter critical of the dictatorial
position of the president (Russian Press Digest, October 29, 1991).21 The president’s
press service admitted that the parliament expressed dissatisfaction with Karimov.
However, it claimed that this was nothing "unusual" and that the President made no
attempt to suppress criticism. At the same time, it accused the Russian press for
reporting a distorted version o f the episode before it occurred. The scant evidence
available on this episode suggests that perhaps the Russian press leaked the
information about the attempts Mirsaidov may have made during his visit to Moscow
in early September to enlist support of powerful forces in his bid to oppose the
increasingly dictatorial style o f Karimov (Fierman 1997:378, 404).
In his response to the rising challenge from within his own party, Karimov
eschewed an outright confrontation with his challengers. Instead, he successfully tried
a subtle method to neutralize their challenge. He tried to enlist support o f independent
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nationalist opposition forces such as Erk and Birlik and certain local religious-oriented
groups in the republic. He himself suggested in September 1991 the possibility o f
holding new parliamentary elections in 1992 (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 37.
1991:16). He was reportedly pleased with the anti-communist and anti-parliament
rhetoric o f the nationalist opposition groups like Birlik and certain local religious
groups in the republic. In addition, he tolerated (and perhaps encouraged) a number
of rallies o f certain Muslim groups who pressed the President to meet their demands,
including the removal of the communists from the political scene, ban on the
republican communist party, nationalization o f its property, dismissal of the
parliament and new parliamentary elections on a multi-party basis (Russian Press
Digest, October 21, 1991). Above all, Karimov decided to renew his popular
mandate, while the legitimacy of the parliament was still open to question. The main
purpose o f all these maneuvers and relaxation was to augment his political options and
send a clear message to his challengers both in Tashkent and Moscow: If the power
struggle continued and he was challenged, he was ready to promote and make
alliances with his open critics in the nationalist and religious groups who were eager
to cooperate with him in order to drive ex-communists out of power and undermine
interests o f their Russian supporters in Moscow.
As a result of the short-lived power struggle among the ruling party elites, the
immediate post-independence period experienced a substantive relaxation o f political
controls in Uzbekistan. However, it was meant to be a controlled relaxation. The
Uzbek leadership was careful enough not to let an opposition group become a
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formidable force in Uzbek politics. As was the case with the glasnost period, the
Uzbek authorities were more tolerant toward the groups they believed were willing to
operate within the permissible zone of activities than toward those who stepped out of
this zone and engaged in impermissible activities such as unauthorized and unwanted
public demonstrations. This approach was quite evident in the differential treatment
Birlik and Erk received from the Karimov government in the immediate post
independence period.
Erk was reportedly created out of Birlik with the blessings o f the Uzbek
authorities. It adopted a cooperative rather than confrontational stance toward Uzbek
rulers. Such an attitude earned Erk preferential official treatment in the immediate
post-independence era. Within less than a week after the declaration of independence,
the Uzbek authorities permitted Erk to register itself as a political party. In addition to
bringing other advantages such as permission to publish its own newspaper, this
official recognition enabled Erk to field its candidate in the December 1991
presidential elections.
Some other opposition groups, besides Erk, were also granted concessions,
though not at the same scale.22 In October 1991, Uzbek authorities released six
Birlik activists who were arrested on felony charges in Kokand.23 In addition,
despite their aversion to Birlik’s use of protest rallies as part o f its political struggle,
the Uzbek authorities approved its application for registration as a popular movement
in November 1991.24 However, Birlik was not permitted to participate in the 1991
presidential elections.
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In addition to registered groups like Erk and Birlik, some other unregistered
informal groups were also allowed to form and operate—o f course, within limits.
These groups include the Free Peasant Party, the Committee to Save the Aral, and
Homeland National Independence Front.
The rise of two Islamic organizations, Islamic Lashkari (Islamic Army) and
Adolat (Justice) in the Fergana Valley in Fall 1991 represents one o f the most
interesting and paradoxical aspects o f the Uzbek governm ent’s official approach
toward emerging informal groups. The Uzbek authorities not only tolerated the
formation and operations o f these organizations but also cooperated with the latter to
combat the rising crime rate in the region. In order to placate demonstrators o f these
organizations who were protesting against Karimov’s failure to keep his promise o f
meeting their representatives during his visit to the Fergana Valley in November
1991, he flew back to the Fergana Valley the very next day to listen to their ideas and
demands, including the establishment o f an Islamic state and legalization of the IRP.
Of all their demands, the only demand that Karimov accepted was the demand of
converting the ruling party building into a mosque. The whole episode of these
organizations appears particularly striking considering the harsh treatment the Uzbek
authorities meted out to the IRP. However striking, it is another piece of evidence
attesting to the limited and selective liberalizing approach the Uzbek authorities
followed in the immediate post-independence era, before imposing an extremely
repressive regime.
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As part o f its selective and limited liberalizing approach toward opposition
groups, the Uzbek leadership made modest concessions to some o f them on the
question of their direct participation in the electoral process and their access to the
mass media. After independence, Karimov decided to renew his mandate through
direct presidential election in December 1991. The election was ostensibly open to all
the qualified candidates. In principle, all registered political parties could nominate
their candidates and other public associations could do so through gathering the
required signature o f 60,000 voters. In practice, only the ruling party and Erk were
able to field candidates, Karimov and Solih, respectively. Despite his pro-government
leanings, the fact that Solih challenged Karimov in the presidential election, held
election rallies, presented his agenda to the masses, and appealed openly for public
support against his rival is particularly striking in comparison with the conduct of
Soviet elections.
In fact, the 1991 presidential election marked the apex o f the liberalizing
approach o f the Uzbek leadership in the post-independence era. The Uzbek authorities
spared opposition groups, including the IRP and Birlik, from persecution during the
election period. The election fervor generated a lot o f political activity by the
opposition forces, most of which the Uzbek rulers grudgingly tolerated. The election
period offered opposition forces a rare opportunity to establish contact with the
masses and promote their views. Birlik, for one, approached thousand o f voters to
gather the required signatures for nomination of its candidate in the presidential
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elections. In this process, it was able to expand its base and communicate its message
beyond party circles to the Uzbek people.
The republic’s press also became relatively open and accessible to the
opposition forces during the election campaign. For instance, it provide some
coverage to the election campaign of Solih. He could now use it with relative ease to
promote his views. Also, despite their failure to nominate their candidate in the
presidential elections, the Birlik leaders were permitted to use the republic's press to
discuss sensitive issues such as rules and regulations governing the presidential
election. O f course, they were dissatisfied with the existing rules and called upon the
Uzbek government to democratize them. The Uzbek rulers tolerated this criticism of
the electoral system, though they did not concede to any o f these demands.
The relative liberalism of the Uzbek authorities discussed in the preceding
pages by no means suggests that they ever lowered their guard during this period, in
fact, as it happened during the glasnost period, the Uzbek leadership ran two parallel
processes in the immediate post-independence period, relaxing certain political
controls and keeping in place certain restrictions, including repressive measures, in
order to keep the political situation under its firm control. It allowed all the registered
and unregistered organizations to engage only in easily controlled activities. The
requests of most o f these organizations to hold public rallies in support of their causes
were rarely approved. Rather, at times their efforts to hold unauthorized public
demonstrations were unhesitatingly crushed with all available means, including the use
of force.
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Even during this period of relative openness, the Uzbek authorities continued
to keep under control all sorts of unwanted mass activities. The Uzbek authorities
dispersed a Birlik-organized mass meeting held in support o f the democratic forces in
Russia in September 1991. Almost one hundred participants, including the Birlik
leadership, were arrested and fined. The second effort Birlik made within days to
organize another protest rally met with a similar fate. A delegation from Russia and
journalists from the British television company. CNC, who were in Tashkent to cover
the Birlik-organized rally were detained (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no.37,
1991:15-16). In fact, the Uzbek authorities made use o f all the means at their disposal
to ensure that opposition forces did not become a serious challenge to them. All kinds
of legal procedures were put in place to legalize actions o f an exclusionary,
controlling, repressive nature against the opposition forces.
The 1991 presidential election was ostensibly open to all qualified parties, but
the Uzbek authorities manipulated electoral procedures to preclude any real contest in
the election. Erk, a very small party allegedly created with official support and with
no real chance to win, was permitted to participate in the presidential election.
Whereas Birlik, a much stronger party, was kept out o f the election race for the
obvious purpose o f avoiding a real contest. Even Erk reported several violations of
the election laws. It alleged that it was not represented in election commissions at all
levels. The Erk leadership also charged that the state-owned press was willing to
publish neither information about the electoral procedures nor criticism of the Uzbek
government. The Uzbek authorities were blamed for other malpractices, including the
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delivery o f extra ballots to the polling stations (Fierman, 1997:380-1). Some other
violations o f the election laws were also committed.33
Birlik was the strongest o f all the registered and unregistered opposition
groups whose existence the Uzbek authorities tolerated during the period of relative
openness before the beginning o f 1992. Its claim of having thousands o f members is
partially supported by the fact that it was able to gather within days more than 60,000
signatures required under the electoral law to nominate its candidate in the
presidential election. Instead of outperforming Birlik in the presidential election with
the help of their tremendous material and organizational resources, the Uzbek
authorities rather manipulated its exclusion by declaring 25,000 signatures as invalid.
In fact, this exclusion was not an isolated incident, but rather one more piece of
evidence o f selective political openness during this period and the Uzbek authorities’
patterned behavior toward Birlik. It is no exaggeration to say that Birlik was singled
out for increasingly harsh treatment.
Even during the period o f relative openness before 1992, Uzbek rulers never
lost sight o f the their goal o f a systematic emasculation o f Birlik as a political force in
Uzbek society. They would not hesitate to use force, if necessary, to prevent Birlik
from expanding its base and promoting its ideas through public rallies. Its exclusion
from the presidential election was ensured through the manipulation o f electoral rules.
Although the Uzbek authorities permitted the state-controlled media to adopt a more
favorable stance toward Birlik during this period than during the previous period, they
shut down Birlik’s own publications.
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This discriminatory and repressive attitude toward Birlik worsened in the
period that followed the 1991 presidential election. However, this worsening was pan
of an overall intensification in repression which engulfed not only Birlik but other
opposition groups, too. It is no exaggeration to say that once the presidential election
was over, the period o f limited political openness in Uzbekistan was also over.
Following the presidential election, Karimov was able to control intra-party
dissension, consolidate his position in the party, and reduce the parliament to a pliant
institution. In addition, he was able to win support o f both the Russian authorities
(Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 9, 1994:20) and his Russian-speaking
population which was frightened by democratic slogans (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet
Press, no. 51, 1993:24)“ and whose leadership was supportive o f Karimov’s
repression o f the opposition forces (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 31,
1993:10). It is no exaggeration that once the parliament and other prominent excommunist leaders lost the clout vis-a-vis the president and he was able to consolidate
his power position, he unleashed an intensified repression against almost all forms of
independent political activity, marking an end o f the short-lived period o f limited
political openness.
The next portion o f the chapter will examine the repressive policy the Uzbek
authorities pursued toward in the period that followed the 1991 presidential election.
We will focus on the salient outcomes such as almost complete emasculation o f
independent opposition forces, effective curtailment of the rise o f a viable political
alternative to the incumbent Uzbek regime, the exclusion o f independent political
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forces from the electoral process, and repression o f independent institutions o f mass
media.

THOROUGH REPRESSION OF INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY
It did not take the Uzbek leadership long after the 1991 presidential elections
to mark the end o f whatever limited political openness it had made available to Uzbek
society before and after independence. In January 1992, the student body in Tashkent
provided the Uzbek government the first opportunity to demonstrate its utter aversion
to protest politics, dissent, and acts o f disobedience and its readiness to crush such
acts with an iron hand.
Despite their recognition of the importance o f social protection o f the
population during the transition period, the Uzbek authorities did not adopt adequate
and timely measures in this regard before freeing prices on January 16, 1992. This
act of freeing prices hit the students hard and compounded their growing frustration
over delays in the payment o f their stipends. On the same day the government freed
prices, almost 5,000 students held a protest rally in front of the presidential palace in
support of their demands. On their refusal to disperse, the special security forces
opened fire on the protesting students. The police chased the fleeing students, sprayed
their dormitories with bullets, broke into them, and beat up students with clubs.
According to official reports, two students were killed and two were wounded as a
result of the police firing. However, unofficial sources disputed this figure. The very
next day the students held another demonstration. They not only presented their
economic demands but also raised banners demanding the resignation o f Karimov and
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others responsible for the death of their comrades. The security forces again used
force to disperse the protesters. The Uzbek government closed educational institutions
and sent students home on an unscheduled long winter vacation in the middle o f the
exams (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, No. 3, 1992:27).
The Tashkent students were not alone in suffering a fate of this sort. The fate
of other independent opposition forces after the 1991 presidential election was also not
enviable. As already mentioned, several independent groups were organized in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Most of them survived into 1992. New groups were also
formed in 1992 (Hunter, 1996:51-52; Haghayeghi, 1995:84-127; Fierman,
1997:367-388). However, in the post-1991 period, it became increasingly very
difficult for them to engage in open political activity. As a result, most of them were
forced into underground and semi-underground positions within a year or so after the
presidential election. In fact, in the post-1991 era, the Uzbek leadership was not
willing to make even modest concessions to the opposition forces, despite the fact that
certain opposition members made goodwill gestures to it during the explosive situation
arising out of the student demonstration. Instead o f exploiting the explosive situation
to their advantage, the Birlik and Erk leaders urged the protesting students to maintain
calm. The Uzbek president appreciated this positive act and promised in public to
register Birlik and IRP (Fierman, 1997:383). Like so many his other promises, this
one, too, proved a false promise. Interestingly, in January 1992, Birlik gathered more
than the required number o f signatures for registration as a legal political party.
However, contrary to the promise of the Uzbek president, its application was rejected.
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Like Birlik, other parties were also denied registration in 1992. In fact, the
government amended the law on public associations. The new law prohibited the
formation o f political parties based on religion and ethnicity. The governm ent used
this law to deny registration to many political parties, including the IRP and the
People’s Movement o f Turkestan. The latter called for unification o f the Muslim
Central Asian republics (US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1992:975).
The use o f force to put down the student demonstrations and the rejection of
Birlik’s application for official recognition constitute part of the evidence which amply
shows that what the Uzbek authorities sought in the post-1991 era was a thorough and
systematic emasculation o f independent opposition forces. All sorts o f repressive and
cooptive measures were used to silence the leaders and activists o f independent
opposition forces with various orientations. Also, Uzbek rulers sought to block the
access of their opponents to all the potential sources o f support inside (including the
government circles) and outside the country.
After rejecting Birlik’s application for registration, the Uzbek authorities began
to adopt regulations which imposed insuperable restrictions on the functioning of
opposition groups and served as a legal basis for repressing any opposition group of
their choosing. One o f these measures was to prevent the illegal financing o f public
associations. In April 1992, the Supreme Soviet presidium passed a resolution which
made it illegal for public associations pursuing political objectives to solicit money for
their publications from domestic religious formations or foreign sources. T he same
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resolution called upon the Ministry o f Finance to ensure strict observance of this and
other relevant regulations on public associations. It was also instructed "to review
declaration on sources o f funding for all associations seeking registration in the
republic" (Fierman, 1997:384). In addition to this restrictive measure, the Uzbek
authorities made effective use o f several other measures to repress the opposition
forces.
The Uzbek opposition forces were conscious of the fact that a determined
effort was underway to eliminate all the potential sources o f opposition to the
incumbent regime in their country. They were, however, not willing to give up their
struggle and leave the political scene to the Uzbek rulers so easily. In addition to old
groups which tried to sustain their activities, new opposition groups with new
programs came into existence. Babur Shakirov,27 a political dissident of the Soviet
era, challenged the legitimacy o f the existing political system. In May 1992, he tried
to organize Milly Majlis, which was to serve as an alternate parliament. The
repression o f such an organization was a foregone conclusion. The government
blocked the effort after the first meeting o f the Milly Majlis. The participants o f the
first meeting were interrogated by the security forces. Three leaders o f the Milly
Majlis, Babur Shakirov, Hazaratkul Khodaberdiev, and Atanzar Aripov, were arrested
on charges o f attempting to overthrown the constitutional government (US State
Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992:973).
Another organization which emerged during 1992, with a new program was
the Human Rights Society o f Uzbekistan (HRSU). Abdumannob Pulatov, the brother
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Abdurrahim Pulatov, a Birlik leader, headed this human rights organization. This was
a smart move because it could potentially internationalize the cause of the opposition
forces and enlist the support of foreign governments and other powerful international
agencies working to promote human rights around the world. However important, this
human rights organization met more or less the same fate that other opposition groups
were suffering at the hands of the Karimov government. Its application for official
recognition was rejected and its leaders and activists were tortured, imprisoned, and
exiled.
The increasing repression brought the two most important competing parties,
Birlik and Erk, closer to each other. It was clear to them that they ought to cooperate
if they wanted any true relaxation o f the existing repressive political system in their
country. As repression intensified, Solih, who was accused of pro-government
tendencies, became convinced o f the futility o f his cooperation with the Uzbek
government. In May 1992, he expressed his frustration in an article. He made it
clear in that article that cooperation of his party "with the official powers was on the
basis of mutual respect, pluralism o f opinions, and political freedom." He also
underlined the possibility and necessity o f cooperation with "other political forces...in
the interests o f civil peace and a stable society" (Fierman, 1997:385, 406). Instead of
criticizing each other, the Erk and Birlik leaders marked the beginning o f their
cooperation at a joint conference held in May 1992 to demand dissolution o f the
parliament and new parliamentary elections. In the same news conference, they
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announced their plans to hold demonstrations in Tashkent and other cities in support
of these demands.
Instead o f receiving a sympathetic ear from Karimov, who himself, as already
mentioned, had earlier suggested the possibility o f holding new parliamentary
elections in 1992 (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 37, 1991:16), these demands
rather provoked a harsh reaction from his government. In fact, as o f May 1992, with
the parliament and the ruling party more or less under full executive control, the
Uzbek authorities were not willing to tolerate any challenge to their legitimacy and
other acts o f dissent such as those announced in the joint news conference o f Birlik
and Erk. On May 28, 1992, some men attacked the Birlik leader, Abdurrahim
Pulatov, with iron rods. He suffered serious injuries and was taken to the hospital for
treatment. This incident happened when Pulatov left the headquarters o f the Internal
Ministry where he was called in for questioning just two days before the announced
demonstration. The opposition quarters blamed the Uzbek government for the attack.
Quite expectedly, the Uzbek government denied any role in the attack; it blamed the
unidentified assailants and promised to investigate the incident. As the opposition
expected, investigation made no headway and consequently no one was arrested.
Instead o f hoping justice, Pulatov feared for his life. In view o f ever increasing
repression since early 1992, he left the country for Turkey in December 1992.
Like Pulatov, the Erk leader, Solih, also paid the price for his part in
co-sponsoring the May 1992 protest rally in particular and his overall opposition to
the Karimov government in general. By May 1992, it was clear that Solih had shed
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his pro-government leanings. In view of the fact that the political opposition had little
means to make itself heard, Solih tried to take advantage o f his seat in the Supreme
Soviet and speak in the July 1992 session o f the Supreme Soviet about the growing
repression in Uzbek society. However, he was prevented from doing so. In protest,
he left the session and resigned from the Supreme Soviet, which in his view was no
more a legal body. His resignation did not satisfy the Uzbek authorities. They sought
his complete silence. After Solih’s departure from the Supreme Soviet, the Uzbek
authorities mounted tremendous pressure on him and his party. He was accused of
high treason for alleged involvement with the Milly Majlis. As a result, before he
could be arrested and put on trial, he fled the country in April 1993 for his life—quite
a satisfactory outcome from the official point o f view.
Like Solih, other independent parliamentarians were either removed or kept
under constant threat o f removal under a law passed within weeks after Solih’s
departure from the Supreme Soviet. As part o f their repressive strategy against Solih
and his party, Erk, the Uzbek authorities removed a number o f Erk deputies from
their parliamentary positions. Erk deputies Jahangir Mamedov, M urat Djuraev,
Inamjan Tursunov, and Atajan Palvanov were deprived o f their parliamentary seats
through dubious legal means. Those means involved constituents’ meetings which
were held to recall their respective representatives from the parliament. Some deputies
quietly gave in to outright threats (US State Department, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1993:1143).
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Beating o f political opponents has been a regular feature o f government
strategy to deal with its political opponents in the post-1991 period. The case o f
Pulatov is already mentioned. He was not alone in suffering street beating. In separate
incidents, other opposition activists were also beaten on the streets by unknown men
who were never arrested and punished. Independent sources argued on the basis of
circumstantial evidence that such beatings were part of a calculated government effort
to intimidate the opposition. Among the prominent victims who were subjected to
street beatings in 1992 were Abdulla Yusupov, the Khorezm Regional Chairman of
Birlik, Miralym Adylov, Birlik Presidium member who was beaten thrice, and
Ravshan Dzuraev, the leader of Birlik’s youth movement. Like Birlik leaders
mentioned above, the leader of the People’s Movement o f Turkestan, Bahram Gaib,
was also beaten on the street in 1992.
The above pattern o f 1992 beatings continued in 1993. On different occasions
throughout the year, several opposition activists were beaten in the streets. In separate
cases involving important political figures, those who were beaten in 1993 included
Shukrat Ismatullaev, co-chairman o f Birlik, Shukrulla Mirsaidov, former vice
president, and Samat Murad, chief secretary o f Erk Party. AH suffered serious
injuries (US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992
and 1993:971 and 1138, respectively). The number of street beatings o f opposition
figures declined in the subsequent years for the simple reason that as a result o f
severe political repression fewer and fewer people were willing to challenge the
Karimov government.
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In addition to arresting and beating, the Uzbek government also dismissed its
political opponents from jobs as part of its systematic strategy to thoroughly
emasculate the opposition (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 3, 1993: l l ) . 2®In
1992-93, political repression engulfed universities and colleges. Many opposition
figures, especially from Erk and Birlik, were dismissed during this period. In 199293, almost 100 people from Birlik and Erk were claimed to have been dismissed from
their positions for their political affiliation and views. Notable among them include
Birlik co-chairman Shukrat Ismatullaev, Marat Zakhidov (a Birlik activist), Talib
Yakubov (all three were professors at the Tashkent State University), Yadgar Obid
and Gulchekhra Nurallaeva (both members of the W riters’ Union). In 1994, three
students of journalism were expelled from the Tashkent State University after they
criticized the way the government-controlled press was treating the Erk leader, Solih.
The department o f journalism was also closed. Later, the students were allowed to
reenter the university and the department was reinstituted.
The leaders and activists of parties and movements other than Birlik and Erk
also fell victim to the growing repression. On December 8, 1992, the Uzbek Supreme
Soviet approved a new constitution with all its democratic and human rights trappings.
Around the time the constitution was approved, the Uzbek authorities detained leaders
of Erk, Birlik, the HRSU, and the Free Peasants’ Party in order to prevent them
from attending an international conference "Human Rights and the Fate of Nations"
organized by an American Jewish human rights organization and the Uzbek and
Kyrgyz human rights organizations in Bishkek, the capital o f Kyrgyzstan. All roads
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leading to Bishkek were blocked and the conference invitees were taken to police
stations and were forced to sign statements that they would not leave the country
(Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 49, 1992:27).
On the same day when the parliament approved the constitution, the Uzbek
special security forces abducted and repatriated three Uzbek dissidents and human
rights activists, including Abdumannob Pulatov, from Bishkek. The abductees were in
Bishkek to attend the international human rights conference. On his repatriation,
Pulatov was tried on charges of using the news media to insult the honor o f the
president. He was found guilty and sentenced to three years in a corrective labor
colony, though he was later amnestied under a presidential decree (Current Digest o f
Post-Soviet Press, no. 4, 1993:31). Like his brother who had left the country earlier,
Pulatov also fled the country in February 1993. He soon arrived in the United States
and since then has been involved in monitoring and publicizing human rights abuses
in his country.
Unlike Pulatov who was arrested for an explicit political offense, most
opposition activists were arrested for nonpolitical crimes. Those arrested were often
accused o f drunkenness, hooliganism, illegal possession o f narcotics and weapons,
etc. In 1992, Pulat Akhunov, a Birlik activist, was arrested for hooliganism, and
Bahram Gaib, the leader o f the People’s Movement of Turkestan, was arrested for
drunkenness. In July 1993, while in prison serving his term, Akhunov was charged
with illegal possession o f narcotics and sentenced to an additional three years in
prison. In February 1993, Inamjan Tursonov, the regional chairman of the Erk Party

127

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in the Fergana Valley and a former deputy, was found guilty of hooliganism and
sentenced to two years in prison.
The pattern continued in the subsequent period. In 1994 alone, six prominent
opposition figures were arrested on charges o f drug possession, weapon possession,
hooliganism, misappropriation o f government funds, and possession o f unlawful
printed material. Those arrested on such charges included Mikhail Ardzinov (a
prominent leader o f Human Rights Society o f Uzbekistan), Mamadan Makhmudo (an
Uzbek writer and close friend of Solih), Nasrullah. Saidov (Erk secretary in Bukhara),
Saparboy Bekchanov (an Erk activist), Nosir Zokir (Erk chairman o f the Namangan
province), Atmatkhan Turakhanov (Erk chairman o f the city of Namangan), and
Vasilya Inoyatova (one o f the three human rights activists held in jail in order to
prevent them from attending human rights conference in Kazakhstan in April 1994).
In March 1995, Ibragim Buriev, an opposition activist, was arrested for possession of
weapons and drugs. The Islamic activists were favorite targets to be rounded up on
such charges. Beginning with the arrest o f activists o f Adolat in 1992, the government
has routinely booked Islamic dissidents on nonpolitical charges. In 1995, religious
leaders from the Kokand area were charged with narcotics and ammunition.
Less prominent opposition activists were also subjected to various repressive
measures, including imprisonment, detention, beatings, harassment, dismissals, etc.
Those not too fearful to continue to dissent were forcibly prevented from relating
their plight to visiting international dignitaries, especially from the Western countries
(CSCE, March 1997:2).
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In addition to the above cited repressive measures, the Uzbek authorities did
not hesitate from physically eliminating their political opponents. Politically motivated
disappearances and assassinations have occurred during the post-1991 period. The
Islamic activists bore the brunt o f such violent measures. The first politically
motivated disappearance occurred in December 1992. Abdullah Otaev, the leader of
IRP, was abducted by six men, according to his wife. After that, she never heard
from him. As o f 1997, there were no results o f government investigation, if any. into
his abduction. Most independent observers suspect that he is either dead or in the
custody o f the Uzbek security forces (Fierman, 1997:387). In August 1995, the imam
of an Andijon mosque, Abduivali Kori Mirzaev, and his assistant were reportedly
detained at the Tashkent airport by the security forces while en route to a conference
in Moscow. As o f 1997, there is no information on their whereabouts. In 1995.
Bakhtiar Yakubov, a local businessman, died o f torture in the custody at the Ministry
of Internal Affairs. He was a witness in a criminal case against opposition leader
Ibragim Buriev. Another Islamic activist related to the above missing imam also
disappeared in 1997. It is believed that these activists are either dead or in the custody
of security forces (US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 1995 and 1997:1111 and 1391, respectively).
The crackdown on individual opposition leaders and activists was partially
producing the desired results. Not only many individual leaders and activists were still
politically alive, though in a subdued form, but also opposition parties, groups and
movements as collective independent political activity were reluctant to withdraw
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from the political process. Besides continuing the repression o f individual political
leaders and activists, the Uzbek authorities set out to remove opposition parties and
movements from the Uzbek political scene. The first independent organization to
suffer repression and to be forced into underground position was Adolat in the
Fergana Valley. After the presidential election, Karimov crushed Adolat. He arrested
its members and put them on trial on various charges, including destablizing the
country, preaching fundamentalist Islamic views, possessing illegal weapons, etc.
They were given varying terms o f imprisonment (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press,
no. 51, 1993:24). The other independent registered and unregistered parties alike soon
met a similar fate.
As already mentioned, Erk was allowed to register as a political party and
Birlik as a social movement in 1991. In addition to plain coercive measures, legal
means were also used with the help of compliant judicial bodies to force opposition
groups out o f the official political process and deprive them of any legal basis for
their existence and operation. In 1992, the Uzbek authorities sought to undermine the
financial base of Birlik and Erk. Their bank accounts were frozen. Erk had to suffer
the seizure o f its assets on account of nonpayment of expenses in December 1992.
Making effective use of a restrictive law it passed, the Supreme Soviet demanded an
inquiry to find out Birlik’s compliance with the Law on the Public Associations in
December 1992. According to findings of the inquiry, Birlik was guilty of violating
several provisions of the said law. The Ministry of Justice requested the Supreme
Court to abolish Birlik. It was reasoned that Birlik had repeatedly organized
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unauthorized demonstrations and rallies and that "In 1991-92. 166 peoples received
administrative penalties and 20 people faced criminal charges" due to activities o f the
Birlik leaders and activists. Other reasons included the use o f the mass media to
discredit the authority, honor and dignity of the president and other public officials.
Without giving Birlik enough time and a fair chance to defend its position, the
Supreme Court suspended the activities o f Birlik for three months in its decision on
January 19, 1993 (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 3, 1993:24-5).
As if what the parliament, media and courts were doing was not enough, the
president used his own executive and legislative powers to expedite the process o f
emasculating independent opposition forces and force them out of the official political
process. In March 1993, the Cabinet o f Ministers passed a resolution which mandated
re-registration of all public associations by October 1993. The Erk leadership did not
seek re-registration. The Birlik leaders, however, decided to apply for registration.
They mailed an application but the Ministry of Justice claimed that it never received
the application (Fierman, 1997:388). Thus, the Uzbek authorities were able to
deprive the two most active and strong opposition parties of legal foundations for their
existence and operation. After the registration was over, it became clear that the
government did not register even a single true opposition group. Hence, no opposition
group could now legally operate in the country.
As a result o f increased repression in 1992-93, independent political opposition
parties and most individual opposition activists were forced underground, semi
underground, abroad or into inactivity. The extent to which the opposition was

131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

emasculated can be assessed from the fact that, as o f 1997. it did not try, after the
last attempt in May 1992. to hold public rallies. In 1993-94, Karimov remained busy
in building compliant political structures (which will be discussed later) and in
further consolidating his power position in the republic. As a consequence of
increased repression and executive-centered state-building, by 1993-94, one of the
most authoritarian regimes in Central Asia was installed in Uzbekistan—a regime
which had all the democratic trappings but no content, and which never ceased to
extol virtues o f gradual reformism in the transition from communism to political
pluralism.

SHORT-LIVED TACTICAL POLITICAL OPENNESS
Once serious potential challengers from the opposition as well as within the
government and the ruling party circles (which will be discussed later) were
thoroughly emasculated, Karimov felt safe and decided to try his much-trumpeted
gradual reformism. His hardened approach toward the opposition witnessed a thaw in
1995-96. However, rather than gradually evolving into genuine political openness and
democratization, this thaw turned out to be o f short duration and o f fleeting nature,
followed by a new wave o f repression against the opposition. We shall first discuss
the tactical thaw.
The first sign of the thaw appeared when the Uzbek government released five
political prisoners in November 1994, almost one month before the parliamentary
elections. The release o f these prisoners was attributed to the effort o f international
human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
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The Uzbek opposition viewed the release as a political move, intended to enhance
Karimov’s image in the eyes o f US administration which had on several occasions
turned down his request for an official visit to Washington (Current Digest o f PostSoviet Press, no. 46, 1994:28). As we shall see, these influences and corresponding
political changes proved to be o f fleeting nature so far as genuine political
liberalization is concerned. In addition, this short-lived thaw was intended to coopt the
opposition forces rather than to let them pursue genuine independent political activity
in the republic. After the opposition refused to oblige the authorities, the latter
unleashed a new wave o f repression.
After conducting the multi-candidate and multi-party parliamentary elections in
which almost all the electoral candidates were pro-government, the government
showed further magnanimity in, at least, recognizing the existence o f an opposition.
The first unmistakable sign in this regard was the mission o f the two Uzbek cabinet
ministers, Abdulaziz Kamilov (Foreign Minister) and Alishr Mardiyev (Justice
Minister) to win the opposition leaders abroad and to persuade them to cease their
dissident activities. In this regard, notable event was the visit of the Justice Minister
to Washington in January 1995. He travelled to the United States to participate in a
meeting with the opposition leaders, including Pulatov and Solih. The meeting was
organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Although
nothing concrete came out of the meeting, its symbolic importance was immense.
That is, the meeting was an evidence of the Uzbek government’s willingness to enter
into a political dialogue with those political leaders who were officially accused of
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serious anti-state crimes (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 13, 1995:22;
CSCE, March 1997:3). Following this meeting, the government took a number o f
encouraging steps which promoted the impression that the much-trumpeted gradual
reformism was ultimately dawning and raised hopes that more political openness was
on its way to Uzbekistan.
In addition to building government-controlled institutions (such as a human
rights office in the parliament in February 1995 and a commission on constitutional
and civil rights in May 1995) to monitor human rights situation in the country, the
Uzbek government permitted international human rights and broadcasting agencies to
open their offices in Tashkent, to visit the country, and to broadcast their programs.
In July 1995, the CSCE’s Warsaw-based Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR) opened its office in the capital city. The New York-based
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki was able to send its representatives to Uzbekistan twice
in 1995, after it had been denied such a visit for two and a half years. In March
1996, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was permitted to broadcast its
program in Uzbekistan. One month later, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty received
permission to open an office in Tashkent. In June and July 1996, the Soros
Foundation’s Open Society Institute and Human Rights Watch/Helsinki opened their
offices in the capital city, respectively. Interestingly, before the former received
permission to open an office in Tashkent, in its May report on Uzbekistan, it had
reported a marked improvement in human rights situation in that country.
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Around the time when these developments were occurring, Karimov publicly
spoke about the need to speed up political reforms which, in his view, were lagging
behind econom ic reforms and the gap was detrimental to overall development o f the
country—a position contrary to his earlier views on the sequence and pace o f
economic and political transitions. Ignoring his earlier views, he publicly called for
greater democratization, stating that active opposition parties, a free press, and
respect for citizens’ rights are essential to Uzbekistan’s development (CSCE Digest,
February 1997:20).
Around this period, he signed several amnesties. In June 1996, he pardoned
almost 80 political prisoners, including members o f Erk, who were in jail for
allegedly anti-state and terrorist activities. The list also included four organizers o f the
student protests in Tashkent on January 16-17, 1992 (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet
Press, no. 25, 1996:22). He took this action just tens days before his long-sought visit
to the United States. In addition, before the release o f these prisoners, in its letter to
President Clinton on June 10, 1996, the opposition had explicitly indicated its
readiness for establishing a dialogue with the Karimov government. While in the
United States, Karimov permitted Pulatov to return home without fear o f repression.
Earlier, he had already promised to register Pulatov’s human rights organization. His
pro-reform measures are said to be linked with his desire to win his much-desired
meeting with President Bill Clinton in particular and to build a good working
relationship with the United States in general (CSCE, March 1997:3, 12; CSCE,
March 1998:6). N o matter how closely his pro-reform measures were linked to such
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concerns in immediate terms, such influences proved, at best, to be of transient
nature in the long run so far as the introduction o f genuine political liberalization is
concerned and were intended, as already mentioned, to coopt the opposition forces
through persuading to engage in the so-called constructive opposition activities.
However, we must hasten to add that the pro-reform shift continued even after
Karimov’s June 1996 visit to the United States. In July 1996, the parliamentary
commission created to monitor constitutional civil rights o f the citizens was permitted
to issue a report critical of government agencies for their "bureaucratic, callous,
indifferent treatm ent” o f the people (FBIS, July 18, 1996:56-57). The next month he
signed another amnesty and reduced jail terms for some prisoners.
In addition, keeping his promise to Pulatov, Karimov let the former return to
the country the same month. Also, in September 19%, he granted permission to
Pulatov’s Human Rights Society o f Uzbekistan to hold a founding conference in order
to meet the legal requirement for registration. However, the high point of high proreform shift reached when in September 19% , he permitted the ODIHR to organize
an international conference on National Human Rights Institutions in Tashkent. The
Karimov government created a remarkably open atmosphere for conference
participants. At the conference, Pulatov, Mirsaidov, and representatives of
independent Islamic community were free to speak and exchange arguments with the
government representatives. The opposition’s interventions at the conference were
strongly critical o f the government’s human rights policies. Interestingly, Pulatov’s
interview with Uzbek state radio was aired without censoring any o f his remarks
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(CSCE, March 1997:6-8). As the ODIHR conference was over, the period o f proreform measures was also over, ushering in a new wave of repression.

A NEW WAVE OF REPRESSION OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION
The above pro-reform developments which occurred in 199S-96 generated
optimistic assessments and projections in many concerned circles about future
improvements in political liberalization in Uzbekistan. However, it did not take these
projections long to crash. As already mentioned, the ODIHR conference was the
highest point o f such assessments. Although it was only after the conference that the
Uzbek government took concrete steps which decisively shattered optimism about
political liberalization prospects in Uzbekistan, there were disturbing indicators even
before the conference.
Around the same time in 199S when Karimov was calling for more political
reforms, Mirsaidov was beaten in the street, Erk activists were convicted o f anti-state
crimes such as attempting to overthrow the constitutional order o f the country, and
other opposition activists were arrested for nonpolitical crimes. In his address to the
parliament in August 1996, Karimov declared that he would welcome constructive
opposition—an opposition capable o f promoting development and renovation o f
society. However, in his next breath, he excluded all Uzbek opposition groups from
the category o f constructive opposition by stating that unfortunately, he had
experienced those who "pretended to be an opposition" and "choose the way o f
pseudo-democratic...extremist slogans and action" (CSCE, March 1997:4). Although
the Karimov government had granted permission to international agencies to open
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offices in Tashkent and monitor human rights situation in the country, it showed little
sensitivity to them. The broadcast of BBC and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty were
reportedly jammed. Almost two weeks before the ODIHR conference, John MacLeod,
the director of the recently opened Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, was picked up
from a street in Tashkent during night, taken to police station, humiliated and accused
of drunkenness, possession o f weapons and possession of drugs. The Uzbek
authorities reluctantly admitted to the police excesses against MacLeod after lot of
Western pressure. In addition, they were using various bureaucratic and technical
pretexts to prevent Pulatov from organizing a founding conference o f the HRSU, and
ultimately allowed him again under Western pressure (CSCE, March 1997:5-6).
Soon after the ODIHR conference was over, the government-controlled press
printed scathing articles against the opposition leaders like Pulatov and Mirsaidov.
The former was blamed for riding the wave o f false democracy in the early 1990s,
for engaging in protest politics, and for plunging the country into the depth o f chaos
and civil confrontation. He was also rebuked for his alleged failure to understand the
role and place o f a constructive political opposition. The latter was accused o f
corruption, and his advocacy for democracy and human rights was dismissed as a
mere change o f methods. Quite high officials such as the Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz
Kamilov, participated in the attack on the opposition (CSCE, March 1997:8-9). It
appears that the Uzbek leadership was expecting appreciation rather than criticism for
allowing the opposition leaders to return to politics. It was displeased by the
candidness the opposition leaders showed during the ODIHR conference. Also, having
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served his tactical purpose of meeting with the US president, Karimov had no strong
reason to change his policy toward the opposition and to move ahead toward genuine
political liberalization and democratization.
After the ODIHR conference, the Karimov government quickly retrenched
whatever political openness it had made available to the opposition in 1995-96. Within
less than a month after the first ODIHR conference, ODIHR organized a round table
on Media Issues in the Transition to Democracy in Tashkent. Unlike the previous
conference, the Uzbek organizers did not invite representatives of independent media.
Also, no independent advocate o f media freedom or any opposition leader attended
the meeting. In December 19%, the Uzbek parliament passed a law on political
parties. This law made it more difficult for political parties to register. For instance,
it increased the number of signatures from 3,000 to 5,000 which a parties need for
official recognition.
In January 1997, the Uzbek government rejected the application o f the HRSU
for registration, despite Karimov’s commitment to register it. Again citing technical
problems, the government rejected the HRSU’s application for registration in April
and August 1997. Another leader o f the HRSU, Mikhail Ardzinov, after he split from
Pulatov, organized the founding conference o f an independent human rights
organization, the Independent Human Rights Organization o f Uzbekistan, in August
1997. The conference took place in secret and without government approval because
the authorities did not respond to his request for holding such a conference. He tried
to register his organization with the government. In December 1997, the application
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of Ardzinov was rejected on technical grounds. As o f 1997, as a result o f government
restrictive registration policy and other repressive measures, there was no single
independent registered opposition group legally operating in Uzbekistan. Unregistered
opposition parties and movements are effectively prevented from freely operating in
the country (CSCE, March 1997:6-12; CSCE, March 1998:7-8).
In addition to blocking the rise o f organized independent political activity, the
Uzbek governm ent continued to repress individual political dissidents in the postODIHR conference period. In May 1997, the security forces confiscated the passport
of Ardzinov and refused him exist visa. He was later given an exit visa in November
1997. On December 21, 1997, he was detained by the Samarkand police for
organizing an illegal meeting. He was set free a day later, but was reportedly abused
during his one day detention. The Islamic dissidents were special targets of
government repression. In June 1997, an Islamic teacher, Rahmatjon Otaqulov, was
convicted o f the illegal possession of drugs and weapons. He was sentenced to
imprisonment for three and a half years. Another Islamic teacher, Olimjon Gafurov,
received one year prison term for similar charges. In August 1997, one more assistant
of the missing imam Abduvali Mirzaev disappeared. The assistant, Nematjon Parpiev,
went to the local market but never came back.
Unlike 1995, there were no specific amnesties for political prisoners in 1997.
Rather, the governm ent refused to release even those political prisoners who had
served their full terms of imprisonment or were eligible for their release under annual
amnesty. Using its favorite pretext, the threat o f Islamic fundamentalism, the Uzbek
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government charged several political prisoners and Islamic activists with minor
breaches o f prison regulation and blocked their release. For instance, Abduraub
Gafurov, was sentenced to an additional three years in prison for such breaches. It is
interesting to note that the security forces closed his trial and did not allow even
foreign observers to attend it.
As o f 1997, according to the list compiled by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki,
there were 20 to 30 political prisoners in Uzbekistan. In its August 1997 issue, the
Turkistan Newsletter, affiliated with Erk, put the number o f political prisoners at 40
(CSCE, March 1998:9). This figure must be read in view of the fact that in addition
to official hurdles, it is difficult to document all instances o f political arrest because
most political dissidents are arrested on criminal, nonpolitical charges such as
drunkenness and because arrests o f less prominent, especially in remote areas go
unnoticed. The above examples clearly show that the post-ODIHR conference period
was the return of Soviet-style repressive methods.

REPRESSION OF INDEPENDENT MASS MEDIA
Accompanying the crackdown on individual leaders, activists and independent
opposition formations was the systematic effort of the Uzbek authorities to ensure that
neither their own repressive actions nor the views of their opponents got an extensive
coverage in the mass media. It is clear in the above pages that by disallowing the
opposition forces to hold public meetings, protest rallies and demonstrations, the
Uzbek government had effectively blocked a very valuable means to promote their
views beyond party members. As already mentioned, after 1992 the opposition did not
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try to hold public rallies. The ban on such activities had, without any doubt, made it
extremely difficult for the opposition forces to openly transmit their message and
relate their continuing plight to the Uzbek masses. What further worsened the
situation in this context was the complete government control o f the state-owned
mass media, its almost complete inaccessibility to the opposition forces and thorough
repression o f the independent media outlets.
Coinciding with their efforts to suppress dissenting individual and organized
political voices, the Uzbek authorities made a systematic effort to muzzle the
independent mass media and prevent their use in support of opposition causes. In fact,
they instituted comprehensive censorship and established strict guidelines for the mass
media to follow. These guidelines specified what was permissible in print and what
was not. In this context, the Uzbek authorities identified a number o f vague
punishable offenses, including criticism o f the president, disclosure of state secrets,
and other anti-state activities. These guidelines were so vague that the Uzbek
government could bend their interpretation to suit any occasion. The central and local
Uzbek authorities created various hurdles for opposition publications even if they saw
no violation o f these guidelines. They interfered with opposition publications often
without any justification. In fact, printing facilities have been under full control o f the
local and central authorities in Uzbekistan. As o f 1997, there was no private printing
house in the country. The government has effectively used its control over printing
facilities to block publication o f unwanted material. The opposition publications paid
prohibitively high prices and at times their printing was blocked on the lame excuse
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o f inadequate capacity. W ithout giving any sound reason, even the local authorities at
the level of oblast were able to block any opposition publication within their
jurisdiction.
Of course, the purpose o f the official guidelines for the mass media and
frequent interference with opposition publications was to stem the flow o f undesired
information. The majority o f newspapers and electronic mass media were
government-controlled. The law permits the establishment o f independent media
outlets, including newspapers. However, mass media institutions must register with
the government before they begin their operations. The government has effectively
used the registration requirement against independent newspapers critical o f the
Karimov government. In 1992, the Uzbek authorities refused to register Birlik’s
newspaper, Mustaqil haftalik. The hunger strike o f Birlik activists in support o f their
demand for registration o f the newspaper was of no avail. Birlik leaders were able to
print several editions o f their newspaper in Moscow and smuggle them into
Uzbekistan for distribution. The security forces raided houses o f Birlik activists and
confiscated almost 8,000 copies o f the newspaper. After 1992, Birlik ceased its effort
to publish a newspapers. In April 1992, another newspaper, Businessman , was
officially registered. After it published several articles critical o f economic transition
policies of the government, it was shut down in August the same year.
Toward the end o f 1992, the code on the conduct o f the mass media was
further supplemented with a new article which heightened the risks for those involved
in issuing publications without official permission. O f course, it was not the last legal
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measure which the Uzbek authorities put in place to control access of opposition
forces to the mass media. In May 1993, the Uzbek authorities devised a new statute
"Law on Protection o f State Secrets” which made it a punishable offense to reveal
any information that would hurt not only the national security interests of the country
but also its interests in "the areas o f science, technology, and production and
management" (Fierman, 1997:387). In addition, a cabinet resolution passed in 1993
made it unlawful for individual citizens and journalist collectives to set up a media
outlet.
The Uzbek authorities readily used the criminal code to harshly cut short any
attempt to move outside the vaguely defined permissible zone o f journalistic
activities. The government instituted comprehensive censorship, banned obstinate
opposition publications, and harassed and tortured renegade journalists. Soon after
the 1991 presidential election, the authorities began to tighten censorship and institute
other restrictions on the flow o f information. As already mentioned, because o f their
status as registered public associations, Erk and Birlik occasionally issued their
publications. However, by the summer of 1992, it became very difficult for the
editors o f Erk newspaper to publish and distribute any material which was critical of
the Uzbek government officials and policies. As a result, the size and the quantity of
the newspaper decreased. Also, it was now available only through subscription. The
Uzbek government banned it altogether in January 1993 and has not been published
since then. As o f 1997, Erk proved to be the last independent opposition newspaper to
be published in Uzbekistan.
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In addition to newspapers affiliated with Birlik and Erk, other independent
publications were also subjected to repression. In the post-independence period, a
number o f independent publications which had sprouted up during the glasnost period
and several publications affiliated with the former communist party and its affiliates
such as Young Communist Leagues, began to publish articles in a democratic spirit.
In addition to the publications o f Birlik and Erk, the government decided to control
other independent publications, too. In 1993, the government mandated reregistration
of all the newspapers, weeklies, and magazines by January 1994. The reregistration
procedures required these publications to provide information about the sources of
funding, means of distribution, founders, and sponsors. As already mentioned, at the
same time, the Cabinet o f Ministers passed a resolution which prohibited individuals
and journalists’ collectives from establishing mass media institutions. As the
reregistration o f the print news media was complete by January 10, 1994, no
independent and opposition publication was registered (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet
Press, no. 2, 1994:28-29). As a result, the opposition was forced to publish their
newspapers from abroad. In December 1995, Uzbek dissidents living abroad joined
hands with dissidents from Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to found a magazine,
Tsentralnaya Azia (Central Asia), from Switzerland. The magazine, devoted to social
and political affairs o f the region, became one o f the chief spokesmen o f the
opposition (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 22, 1996:19-20). Likewise, Erk
began its own newspaper, The Turkistan Newsletter from abroad (CSCE, March
1998:9).
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In addition to repressing opposition publications, the Uzbek government did
not spare even pro-government newspapers if they were found to be stepping out o f
the permissible zone o f activities. Even pro-govemment newspapers were punished
for showing nominal and symbolic independence. For instance, in August 1996,
Vatan, the newspaper o f a pro-govemment party Vatan Taraqiaty, was temporarily
shut down after it published an analytical piece on the August 19% speech of
Karimov in the parliament (US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 19%: 1214).
Like opposition newspapers, independent individual journalists who dared
question the government conduct were also subjected to repressive measures,
including beating and arrest, and imprisonment on various crimes. For instance, one
journalist , Abdurashid Sharipov, was beaten in 1992. In 1993, the editors and key
bookkeepers o f Erk were tried for their involvement in misappropriation of
government funds which the government allegedly provided. According to Erk
activists, these charges were false because the newspaper never received any
government economic assistance. Even individual citizens and political activists were
arrested for possession o f the banned newspapers like Erk. For instance, one of the
charges under which eight Erk activists were arrested was that copies o f the
newspaper Erk were found in their homes. Two other activists and a Birlik leader,
Vasilya Inoyatova, were arrested for the same charge in 1993. In 1997, the editor of
Hurriyat (Freedom), an Uzbek-language newspaper —established in January 1997 and
initially escaped censorship with the support o f Karimov— received several warnings
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from officials after the newspaper published an attack on censorship and criticized
some aspects o f electronic media in the country. The editor o f the newspaper resigned
when it became clear that the paper will be censored (CSCE, March 1998:9).
In addition to controlling the republic’s mass media, the Uzbek authorities also
sought to tame the foreign mass media operating in Uzbekistan. In fact, they made
little distinction between the national and foreign institutions of mass media and
journalists so far as their efforts to block damaging information through repressive
measures were concerned. As with the national mass media, the Uzbek authorities
spared no effort to block access of opposition forces to the international mass media
and discourage the latter from providing objective coverage to their activities.
Like the national newspapers, the government also censored foreign
newspapers printed in the country. It will suffice to mention a few salient examples
out o f numerous cases. Publication o f Izvestiia, a Moscow-based newspaper, was
suspended twice 1992. In the Fall of 1992, the Uzbek authorities refused to print the
edition o f Izvestiia in Tashkent. What triggered this refusal was the protest o f the
newspaper against the decision o f the Uzbek government to remove from its Tashkent
edition an article which was critical o f tightening censorship in Uzbekistan.
Following its protest, 17 workers at the printing house refused to print the paper.
They accused Izvestiia o f interfering in the internal affairs o f their country and
stirring up ethnic discord conducive to destabilization o f the situation there. The list
of foreign newspapers which were granted accreditation by the Uzbek Ministry o f
Foreign Affairs did not include the name o f Izvestiia (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet
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Press, no. 49, 1992: 32). In fact, after its last suspension, Izvestiia could never
publish again from Uzbekistan.
During the same period, the Uzbek authorities banned the importation of
another Russian newspaper, Komsomol skaia pravda. Like Izvestiia and Pravda,
Argumenty 1 fakty became persona non grata in Uzbekistan (Current Digest of PostSoviet Press, no. 4S, 1992:24). In 1994, another Russian newspaper, Sevodnya, was
added to the list o f banned publications after it published a num ber o f critical articles
on human rights situation in Uzbekistan. The well known Russian newspaper,
Nezavismaya gazeta, was also banned (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 46,
1994:28; no. 41, 1996:13-4). In short, as of 1997, after passing a number of anti
media regulations, the government did not allow general distribution of foreign
newspapers and other publications, with the exceptions o f two to three conservative
Russian newspapers. Only subscribers have access to foreign newspapers. It must be
kept in mind that newspapers critical o f the government have not been allowed to
come out and circulate. In addition, Russian broadcasts are available in Uzbekistan,
but the government continued to black out those broadcasts which were found to be
critical o f its policies.
Individual writers and journalists were discouraged from reporting about the
Uzbek opposition causes. Tactics the Uzbek authorities used for this purpose
including detention, restriction on movements, deportation and other forms of
pressure. Very tedious procedures were put in place for foreign journalists desiring to
operate in Uzbekistan (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 49, 1992:32). Many
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foreign journalists were denied accreditation. Some were deported from Uzbekistan
for simply having contact with the opposition. Most instances o f deportation involved
Russian journalists (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 25, 1992:9). In October
1994, the Uzbek government refused to renew the accreditation o f Steven Le Vine, a
free lance journalist for several U.S. publications because o f his articles critical of
Karimov and his human rights record (US State Department, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1994:1040). In 1996, four Russian journalists were
denied accreditation without specifying any reason. The first journalist to lose
accreditation and previous privileges was the correspondent o f Pravda. After him, a
female correspondent for the Interfax economic news agency and head o f the Itar-Tass
bureau were denied accreditation. The request o f the staff correspondent o f
Rabochaya tribuna for accreditation was rejected by the Uzbek government. The
authorities even did not bother to respond to the letter o f the editorial staff who
wanted to known the reason for denial o f accreditation (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet
Press, no. 41, 1996:13-4).
The unaccredited journalists were denied participation in press conferences and
other officials functions. In order to maintain the status o f desirable staff
correspondent, the accredited journalists were required to show political correctness in
their publications on events in Uzbekistan. They were expected to exercise restraint in
their judgement on the level of democracy and to ignore mass disturbances and
political scandals in the republic. Instead, they were under an unstated obligation to
report Karimov’s economic and political achievements (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet
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Press, no. 41, 1996:14). In addition, reports o f Uzbek government detaining the crew
of foreign news media (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 18, 1993:20) and
harassing and threatening the local translators working for foreign journalists and
other foreign mass media outlets have been appearing in the post-independence
period.
REPRESSIO N O F DISSENT W ITH IN R U L IN G PARTY AND G O V ER N M EN T
Like its position toward independent opposition forces and national and foreign
mass media discussed in the above pages, the Karimov government showed no
tolerance toward dissenting voices within the ruling party and government apparatus.
After almost two hundred members o f the Uzbek Supreme Soviet singed, as already
mentioned, a letter o f protest against the increasingly dictatorial position o f Karimov,
taming dissenting voices within his own party and government apparatus became one
of his top priorities. One o f the first things Karimov did after the 1991 presidential
election was t5 restructure political power in the country. He abolished the post of
vice president occupied by his potential rival, Mirsaidov. The latter was given another
position in the government but he resigned in protest. Mirsaidov’s resignation did not
bring his plight to an end.
In July 1992, soon after Solih quit the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, the parliament
passed a law curtailing the powers of its own members. This law authorized
parliament to curtail, under exceptional circumstances, the privileges o f its sitting
members. The exceptional circumstances which could make a sitting member lose his
i
privileges were worded in very vague language. The law covered acts that could
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"besmirch or discredit the high calling of people’s deputy" or destabilize
"sociopolitical situation" in the country, or involve simple "calling for such acts..."
(Fierman, 1997:386).
O f course, the purpose o f this law was to intimidate non-compliant members
of the parliament and drive them out of this body. The Uzbek rulers made effective
use o f this and other laws to make an example out o f Mirsaidov and other
non-compliant members of the parliament. They did not have to wait for long to reap
the fhiits o f this law. In August 1992, Mirsaidov resigned his seat in protest against
this law. In August 1993, he was charged with corruption and misuse of power, and
sentenced to three years in prison. Later, he was amnestied under a presidential
decree, but "was forced to live in virtual house arrest" (Fierman, 1997:386-7, 406).
Despite the fact that Mirsaidov and other convicted political figures were out
of jail, they were disqualified from running for any public office, hence effectively
barred from challenging Karimov politically (Kangas, 1994:180-2). The disgraceful
departure o f Mirsaidov and other influential political figures and their disqualification
from holding any public office served Karimov well. Since then, the members of the
ruling party, government apparatus, and parliament have rarely dared challenge
Karimov’s position as the primary actor in Uzbek politics rather, they have been fully
supportive o f his effort to build compliant political structures and run mock
democracy in the country.
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ELECTORAL PROCESS: A PLAYFIELD FOR RULING PARTY AND LOYAL
OPPOSITION
As already mentioned, soon after independence the Uzbek president promised
to build the republic’s electoral process on democratic principles. He also alluded to
the possibility o f holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the near future.
As these elections were held over time, it became clear that the electoral process was
open for participation only to the ruling party and loyal opposition forces—individual
political leaders as well as organized groups.
In fact, even well before these elections were held, there were indications that
independent political groups which could pose a serious challenge to the Uzbek rulers
would be kept out o f the electoral process. While within weeks after independence the
Uzbek president was speaking of holding democratic elections in the country in the
near future, he doubted Birlik’s participation for lack o f its registration as a political
party. True to this fateful statement, Birlik could not participate in the electoral
process because it was never granted an official recognition as a political party. In
fact, before it was outlawed in 1993, Birlik was recognized as a social movement, not
as a political party. As a result, it was not entitled to the rights and privileges which
were available to political parties, including the right to nominate a candidate in an
election without submitting thousands of signatures. The Uzbek rulers found ways to
block the participation o f independent groups like Birlik in the electoral process even
if the latter were able to gather the required signatures to nominate a candidate.
Not only independent groups were kept out o f the electoral process. The
Uzbek leadership also manipulated electoral rules and used other extralegal tactics to
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ensure that no true contest ever took place even between the ruling party and the loyal
opposition forces, preserving the dominance o f the ruling party and its leadership in
Uzbek politics.
The manipulation of the electoral process was quite evident in the 1991
presidential election. The 1991 presidential election was planned for December 1991,
but election rules were not published until November 23. According to these rules, a
registered political party could nominate its candidate. Other public associations with
non-party status were required to gather a specific number of signatures o f voters to
be able to nominate a candidate in the upcoming presidential election. As a result, two
parties, PDPU and Erk, were able to nominate their candidates, whereas Birlik was
required to gather the signatures to be able to nominate its candidate. It is important
to remember that Erk was then cooperating with the government.
In addition to a delay in the publication o f general election rules, the
procedures regarding collection o f signatures were further delayed for three more
days. Due to holidays and the time required to call a nomination meeting, political
groups with non-party status were in effect given only one day to collect the required
number of signatures (Fierman, 1997:379). As already mentioned, Birlik was still
able to gather 60,000 signatures but the Uzbek authorities found a way to keep Birlik
out of the presidential election through rejecting thousands of the signatures as false.
After the presidential election, the Uzbek leadership would not venture another
electoral show until almost all the independent opposition forces were either forced to
flee the country or driven into underground and semi-underground positions. Once it
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was achieved, the Uzbek authorities set out to restructure the parliament and
reformulate electoral rules. During the period from December 1993 to May 1994, a
body o f laws governing elections to a new parliament and all sorts o f councils down
to the level o f town council was adopted. In September 1994, parliamentary elections
were scheduled for December 1994. At the same time, a constitutional amendment
was passed which increased the number o f seats in the parliament from ISO to 250.
According to new election laws, only two types o f public associations, oblast councils
and registered political parties, can nominate candidates in the parliamentary
elections. Considering that most o f the old relationships between masses and official
powers were carried over into the post-communist era, that oblast chiefs are appointed
and controlled from above, and that secret voting is not in vogue in Uzbekistan, it is
not difficult to understand the reluctance of most voters to vote against the local
political bosses. Through such electoral and other administrative devices, the Uzbek
authorities were able to block the nomination o f renegade candidates even at the local
level.
In theory, the new election rules provided for a multiparty parliamentary
election. Political parties were granted the right to nominate their candidates.
However, a party must be registered at least six months prior to adoption o f this law
in order to be able to nominate its candidates. Thus, in practice, this provision
reduced the December 1994 parliamentary elections to a friendly electoral contest
between two parties, PDPU and Vatan Taraqiaty. As compared to the 1990
parliamentary elections, the December 1994 parliamentary elections offered the Uzbek

154

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

electorate a greater choice o f candidates. However, this choice did not involve
election of potentially renegade candidates. In fact, it was still impossible for a
candidate opposed to government policy to contest election. The Uzbek rulers made
an example out o f Rustam Usmanov, an outspoken candidate o f the Vatan Taraqiaty,
when the Central Electoral Commission Election disqualified him as candidate for
"preparing and distributing leaflets which denigrated citizens’ constitutional rights and
freedoms" (Fierman, 1997:391).
As a result o f all these electoral and other administrative devices, the PDPU
retained its dominant position in the parliament while giving out some parliamentary
seats to its sister party, Vatan Taraqiaty. Later, as already mentioned, other progovemment parties and formations were awarded parliamentary seats through
unopposed by-elections.
At its first session, the new parliament voted to extend through a popular
referendum the term o f Karimov until the year 2000. The Soviet-style referendum
took place in March 1995. According to official figures, out o f 99.6 percent o f the
voters who voted, 99.4 percent voted yes. After the referendum, the parliament voted
to include this extension o f three years in his first term, making it legally possible for
Karimov to run again for the second term in the year 2000. By holding the
referendum, Karimov spared himself the trouble o f arranging a sham contested
presidential election in order to prove that the country’s electoral process was
competitive.
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CONCLUSION
As compared to other, especially European, parts of the former Soviet Union,
Gorbachev’s political reform program belatedly made its way to Uzbekistan and had
limited impact on Uzbek politics. However, in retrospect, Uzbek society enjoyed
more political openness in the late 1980s than in the post-Soviet era. Although
autonomous sociopolitical groups were not registered in the pre-independence period,
their leaders were by and large able to engage in a number of independent political
activities without being subjected to brutal repressive measures such as torture,
imprisonment, and disappearance. The pre-independence political openness was
primarily a weak reflection of the center-sponsored reform program rather than a
result of the political vision of the republican communist leadership. Because the
Uzbek authorities were unable to openly defy the central authorities, they, in spite of
their aversion to the center-sponsored reforms, had to tolerate some independent
political activity and could not unleash the level of repression they freely unleashed in
the post-independence period. Although Uzbek authorities tolerated some independent
political activity in the pre-independence period, they successfully resisted the
inclusion o f more societal elements in the democratization process in correspondence
with their political vision. They were able to resist such an inclusion because they
faced little effective pressure in the absence o f a large, politicized Russian minority,
and in the presence of a cohesive elite structure in the republic.
After independence, the Uzbek authorities built political structures and
procedures with all the western democratic and constitutional ideals. Tactics aside,
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these ideals turned out to be nothing more than sheer trappings and the Uzbek
leadership never made a genuine effort to put them into practice. Rather, it unleased a
rein of terror to completely silence both individual and organized opposition voices in
the post-independence period. After Birlik and Erk were disfiranchised as political
formations in 1993, no tolerated individual and organized opposition activity
whatsoever existed in the republic. This was also true o f the electoral process. No
independent individual and organized electoral participation was allowed.
Independent media outlets met a similar fate in the post-independence period.
The Uzbek authorities instituted comprehensive censorship, banned opposition
publications, and harassed and tortured renegade journalists. Let alone the personal
criticism o f the leadership and the coverage o f their repressive actions, they did not
tolerate even criticism o f their policies. The post-independence repressive policy
engulfed the foreign mass media and journalists operating in Uzbekistan.
Inconvenient foreign television broadcasts were jammed, newspapers banned and
journalists deported and imprisoned.
The Uzbek leadership has postponed political liberalization on the pretext of
local conditions, including political culture and stability, and put in place one o f the
most regressive regimes in the region. However, at the same time, it has promised to
build a truly democratic polity. How long it will take the incumbent leadership to
achieve the required stability before the it decides it is safe to initiate the political
liberalization process? Will the incumbent leadership ever try to fulfill its promise o f
building a democratic polity? In other words, will it initiate the political liberalization
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process by controlling its parameters? Or will it continue to postpone it and/or pass it
on to its political descendants until the appropriate conditions are developed in the
republic?
There is no indication that the incumbent leadership has made any preparation
to initiate the political liberalization process. In fact, Karimov has consolidated
personal power and is unlikely to dismantle the power structure and political machine
he took lot o f pains to build around himself. More importantly, he is left with little
time to prepare him self for and initiate the political liberalization process. According
to the law, he can not serve more than two consecutive terms. If he decides to
remain in power beyond the year 2,000, he will have to manipulate the constitution,
keep in line ambitious political allies, keep intact the political machine he built around
him, and scare away the latent opposition forces. O f course, he can not achieve all
this without the continued policy o f repression. In such case, there is little hope for an
improvement in political liberalization.
Because the incumbent leadership appears ready to unleash excessive
repression and because it has so far been able to satisfy people’s basic needs without
raising their expectations for sociopolitical change, adequate pressure for political
liberalization is unlikely to develop from below in the foreseeable future. If the
political liberalization process is to begin under the incumbent leadership, the most
favorable condition for such a prospect would be the rise o f a powerful challenger to
the president from within the ruling alliance accompanied by a split in the hitherto
cohesive elite structure along regional and tribal lines, political mobilization o f
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religious forces, and their formal or informal alliance with democratically oriented
forces. If this happens, Karimov will face the following two likely options: a) to
initiate political liberalization, enlist support o f the excluded and marginalized secular
societal forces in order to improve his position vis-a-vis the splintered and religious
groups, and to accommodate the former in the newly created independent political
space: or b) use excessive repression to neutralize the challenge. In the later case, he
is likely to risk a civil war among regional and tribal forces, let alone other
prohibitive costs. Such a challenge is by no means on the horizon; however, it is
more likely to develop if the incumbent president decides to perpetuate his rule with
no end in sight for ambitious political, regional and clan leaders. More likely but less
dramatic scenario is the leadership change. In other words, a genuine movement
toward political liberalization will have to await the departure o f the incumbent
leadership. The best hope is that after the incumbent leadership leaves office, the
political machine built around it is likely to weaken and certain reformist elements in
the power structure (or tribal and regional groups within the ruling alliance) may
demand more independent political space for themselves and hence prove catalyst for
the relaxation o f excessive political control in the country.

NOTES
1. The influx o f Russian settlers into the Central Asia region began with the Russian
conquest o f the large portion o f the region in the 19th century and continued
afterwards under various pretexts.
2. Ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan organized an inter-ethnic movement, Intersoyuz, in
1989. This movement failed to draw a large scale following. As a result of a small
following and government pressure, Intersoyuz withered away in the post-
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independence period (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, October 31,
1991).
3. In the 1991 presidential election, they supported Karimov because he promised to
maintain inter-ethnic peace in Uzbekistan (Russian Press Digest, February 4, 1992).
4. The Uzbek secret service agents reportedly harass Uzbek human rights activists in
Moscow. The Russian authorities refuse to register such activists as refugees and have
made it clear to them that they would not help them avoid persecution (Russian Press
Digest, November 11, 1993).
5. Mirsadov resigned from the government on January 13, 1992, and warned about
the advent o f a dictatorial regime in the republic (Russian Press Digest, January 27,
1992). He later resigned from the parliament and was subjected to repression.
However, his resignation from the government and parliament and subsequent
repression by Karimov did not create any uproar among his former comrades.
6. In his telegram to George Bush, the US President, Karimov affirmed that he was
strengthening the democratic foundations o f society (BBC, March 11, 1992).
7. In one of his interviews, Karimov said: "I do not tire o f reiterating to my critics:
reforms are under way here, democratic processes are under way, and we are
building a democratic society based on the rule o f law. The stages through which we
are passing are another matter" (BBC, June 12, 1993).
8. The Turkish model was described by Karimov as a "secular and civilized" road of
development (Russian Press Digest, May 15, 1992).
9. Gorbachev continued to have a negative perception of Islam. Buying the Uzbek
authorities' interpretation o f the June 1989 ethnic violence in Fergana Valley that a
religious political party, Islam and Democracy, fanned this violence, Gorbachev
observed: "Islamic extremism has bared its teeth" in the Fergana Valley (Financial
Times (London), June 14, 1989:A2; The Daily Telegraph, June 15, 1989:14).
10. Abdurrahman Pulatov, the leader o f an independent but unregistered civic
movement, Birlik, admitted that democratic forces were weak in the republic and that
it would take time to arouse people from social passivity (Guardian. October 25,
1990:9).
11. Islam and Democracy reportedly held its founding congress in Kazakhstan on
October 25, 1988. The organization played an important role in removing Mufti
Babakhanov in 1989 through holding a series o f demonstrations against him in
February 1989. The Mufit was accused o f immoral conduct (Haghayeghi 1995:85).
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12. For example, the Uzbek communist party continued to view Birlik as an extremist
formation unworthy o f any cooperation. Internal party reports condemned the
’cliques’ and 'self-proclaimed leaders” for their efforts "to create extremist
formations and informal associations* like "Birlik" and "Free Union o f Uzbekistan
Youth’ (Fierman, 1997:368).
13. Birlik requested permission to hold a rally in support of Uzbek language in early
1989. When the authorities continued to refuse permission for two months, the Birlik
leadership held rally without permission on March 19, 1989. A large number of
people participated in the rally without government interference (Fierman 1997:3678 ).

14. Solih reportedly won the 1990 election and separated from Birlik with the support
of the Uzbek authorities two days after the election to create his own political party,
Erk (Will). Erk had many communists in its ranks and its leadership hilly supported
the CPSU platform, emphasizing the need to outlaw public associations which called
for violence and ethnic strife and pursued militant and unconstitutional causes (Tass,
February 27, 1990). However, like Birlik, Erk also supported independence— a
demand which suited the Uzbek authorities.
15. The respected Uzbek writer, Shukrullo Yusupov, who was a leading supporter o f
Birlik and veteran o f five years in Stalin’s camps in the early 1950s, was appointed to
the presidential council (Guardian, October 25, 1990:9).
16. For instance, the Birlik leadership came under severe official criticism a few days
after the elections, and its attempt to hold a public rally in the town of Parkent on
March 3, 1990, was quelled with the use o f force which resulted in a number of
deaths and scores o f injuries. The attempt by the IRP to hold its founding congress in
Tashkent in January 1991 met a similar official response.
17. Of course, opposition groups like Birlik and IRP were prohibited from publishing
their own newspapers. International media outlets also became targets. In March
1991, the Karimov government reportedly banned the reception o f the Kyrgyz
television broadcast in order to prevent Uzbek people from learning about impressive
democratic achievements in Kyrgyzstan (Russian Press Digest, May 7, 1991). In
addition, foreign journalists, including two representatives of the Radio Liberty, were
deported from the republic in 1991 before independence (BBC, August 3, 1991).
18. Uzbekistan declared sovereignty on June 20, 1990.
19. Birlik entered into alliance with Intersoyuz, an association which was founded in
1989, to represent the interests o f the Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan.
Abdurrahim Pulatov, a Birlik leader, conceded that without such alliances the
authorities would have crushed his movement (Russian Press Digest, October 31,
1990; BBC August 28, 1991).
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20. In the immediate pre-independence period, the central authorities pushed for more
relaxation o f political controls, whereas the Uzbek authorities tried to retrench
whatever relaxation was available to Uzbek society. In the immediate post
independence period, the Uzbek leadership was free o f the central dictates and
enjoyed more latitude to intensify repression o f the opposition forces, but it decided
otherwise. As compared to their aggressive approaches toward their critics in the
immediate pre-independence and post-1991 periods, the Uzbek authorities tolerated
their critics even though their repression did not involve a prohibitive cost because
they lacked a strong support base in Uzbek society. Moreover, the Uzbek leadership
adopted a relatively flexible approach toward them even though they were busy in
discrediting it for its supportive role in the August 1991 putsch, criticizing its
authoritarian methods, and mocking its decisions such as proclamation of
independence as nothing more than a cover to "preserve a totalitarian regime in a
separate republic" ( Russian Press Digest, August 27, 1991; The New York Times,
September 18, 1991:A1).
21. The Russian press which had already published reports o f the growing distance
between Karimov and the ex-communist party elite in the republic reported the bold
behavior o f "previously dormant deputies" in the parliament (Russian Press Digest,
October 29, 1991).
22. Birlik received some important concessions which, the Birlik leadership believed,
were reflective o f the fact that the authorities had realized the ineffectiveness of
authoritarian methods and therefore had begun to compromise (Russian Press Digest,
November 20, 1991).
23. These activists were released in order placate the Birlik leadership which was
unhappy with the decision o f the authorities to turn down its application for
registration as a political party. Although the authorities refused to register it as a
political party in order to prevent it from fielding a candidate in the upcoming
presidential elections in December 1991, they promised the Birlik leadership to
register it as a movement (Russian Press Digest, October 8, 1991).
24. This development enthused the Birlik leaders. They interpreted it as the first
genuine democratic step toward the democratic development o f Uzbek society
(Fierman, 1997:379). O f course, this official recognition meant relatively more
freedom of action.
25. For instance, the election law that all the presidential candidates should have
equal access to the government-controlled media was clearly violated. The state mass
media provided extensive coverage to the election campaign o f Karimov. The
state-controlled television regularly broadcast his speeches. However, his rival,
Solih, could get only 15 minutes o f air time (with two minutes o f his speech lost due
to censorship) after Birlik and Erk activists demonstrated in support o f such media
coverage (Fierman, 1997:380).
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26. Interestingly, it was among the Russian minority that Karimov enjoyed the
greatest influence (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 51, 1993:24).
27. Babur Shakirov was imprisoned during the Soviet era for his political views.
After his release he left the country. After independence he came back to participate
in politics under the impression that things would be different. He was dismayed to
find that old power structures were still in place in his country even after
independence (Moscow News, January 16, 1993).
28. According to one report, virtually all known opposition activists were fired from
their jobs (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 3, 1993:11).
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CHAPTER 4
KAZAKHSTAN
THE RISE OF AN ENLIGHTENED AUTHORITARIAN REGIME?
INTRODUCTION
At the time of its independence and the formal break o f the Soviet Union in
December 1991, Kazakhstan was in the throes of economic and political reforms the
center had sponsored under the rubrics of perestroika and glasnost. Although pre
independence economic reform measures were initially introduced in the republic in
line with the central guidelines, Kazakh authorities at times went ahead o f the center
and took independent initiatives to deepen the process o f economic transition.1
However, the same can not be said o f political reforms. Before independence, they
expressed rhetorical solidarity with the center on its political reform program but
sought to subtly circumvent its full enforcement.
After independence, Kazakh authorities were free o f the central dictates to
decide the fate o f the center-sponsored reform program. While they acknowledged
enormous obstacles in their way, they publicly expressed their firm commitment to
the transition process underway in the republic and to build Kazakh polity on free
market and democratic principles. The Kazakh leadership made reasonable progress in
dismantling, though gradually, bases o f command economy and introducing instead
free market principles. Although Kazakh authorities’ pre-independence lack o f
enthusiasm for genuine political reforms raised doubts about the face value o f their
commitment to democratic principles and the future of such reforms, Kazakhstan
witnessed an overall improvement in political liberalization in the post-independence
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period. However, its record o f political liberalization is modest in comparison to that
of Kyrgyzstan, but it is certainly far better than that o f Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan’s middle position on the political liberalization scale is intriguing
because it clearly surpasses Kyrgyzstan and roughly matches Uzbekistan in
socioeconomic indicators commonly associated with political democracy. In this
chapter, we intend to address this intriguing question with the help o f our theoretical
framework. It is our contention that the way our three independent variables, the
Russian minority, elite structure, and political orientation o f the Kazakh leadership,
operate(d) in Kazakhstan accounts for its middle position on the political liberalization
scale. Before we examine our empirical evidence on political liberalization and its
correspondence with our theoretical expectations, it is important for us to first discuss
the extent to which these independent variables hold in that country. A brief
discussion o f these variables will be useful for interpreting the empirical data and for
assessing the adequacy o f our theoretical framework.
Because the post-independence political liberalization is rooted in the preindependence political reform initiatives and in order to adequately appreciate the
level of political liberalization Kazakhstan achieved in the post-independence period,
we will also examine the extent to which the center-sponsored political reforms under
the rubric o f glasnost affected that republic in the pre-independence period. In fact,
such discussion will help us to properly appreciate the difference between the pre- and
post-independence periods in terms political liberalization in Kazakhstan and enhance
our comparative understanding o f various phases o f political liberalization in that
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republic and across the countries under study. The remainder o f the chapter will focus
on various aspects of political liberalization in the post-independence period. More
specifically, the rise of political parties and social movements and the freedom o f
action they enjoyed, the openness o f the electoral process, and the freedom o f the
independent mass media will receive our special attention. Main findings of this
chapter will be summarized in the conclusion.

A LARGE AND POLITICIZED RUSSIAN MINORITY
Kazakhstan houses the largest and the most politicized Russian minority in
Central Asia. At the time o f its independence, it was home o f m ore than six million
ethnic Russians who made up 37.8 percent o f the total population. The Russian
minority is mostly concentrated (59.1 %) in Alma Ata, the capital city (see Table 3),
and northern industrial regions o f the republic. Ethnic Kazakhs w ho made up 39.5
percent o f the total population at the time o f independence (see Table 2) are a
minority in the capital city, making up only 22.5 percent o f its population (see Table
3). They are mostly concentrated in the south (Khazanov 1995:163, 258; Heleniak
1997:368-370). According to the 1996 estimate, Russians dropped to 33.9% and
Kazakhs increased their share to 47% (see Table 2). In addition to their distinct
geographical concentration, Kazakhs and Russians are separated by division of labor.
As compared to Kazakhs who dominate in the humanities, ethnic Russians are mostly
involved in natural sciences and medicine. Consequently, the bulk o f technical elites,
skilled labor force, and office corps in the army comes from the Russian minority
(Khazanov 1995:165; Kubicek 1997:645).
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The Russian minority has been increasingly shrinking in proportion to the
titular nationality primarily due to its out-migration. As a result o f its accelerated out
migration after the demise o f the Soviet Union, its share o f the total population
dropped to 33.9 percent in 1996; whereas the titular nationality increased its share to
47 percent (Heleniak 1997:369). In spite of its shrinking size, the Russian minority
continues to be a very resourceful, politicized ethnic group in Kazakhstan.
A number o f internal and external factors significantly contribute to its
resourcefulness. Internal factors include its sheer large size, concentration in the
urban and northern industrial areas, technical and professional skills, economic
strength, and political activism. The support of its co-ethnics in Russia, including the
Russian troops based on Kazakh soil, constitutes the most important external source of
its resourcefulness, and effectively underwrites its security in the republic. In fact,
Kazakh authorities are seeking ways to accommodate the Russian minority not only
because o f its importance for economic and sociopolitical stability of the republic but
also because of Russian authorities’ expressed concern with and readiness to use
material and political means to promote its welfare. Not to speak o f regular Russian
support for those Russian political dissidents who accept the integrity o f Kazakh state,
Russian authorities have at times supported and sheltered even secessionist elements
o f the Russian minority in Kazakhstan (Khazanov 1995:171; Russian Press Digest,
June 1, 1991).
The resourcefulness o f the Russian minority resulting from both internal and
external sources has been a valuable asset in pursuit o f its interests in the republic.
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Especially, the politically active members o f the Russian minority greatly benefitted
from it in their political competition with other sociopolitical groups, including the
titular nationality, in the pre- and post-independence periods. The Russian minority
demonstrated its independent political activism on many occasions after the Soviet
leadership introduced political reforms in the pre-independence period. The first
unmistakable sign of its independent political mobilization became visible in
December 1986 when armed units o f ethnic Russians beat Kazakh nationalist
demonstrators who were raising anti-Russian slogans and protesting on the streets of
Alma Ata the dismissal o f Dinmukhamed Kunayev, a Kazakh, and the appointment of
Gennady Kolbin, a Russian, as the first secretary of the Kazakh communist party
(Khazanov 1995:166-7). In the wake of these nationalist riots, Kolbin set up more
armed units o f ethnic Russians in Alma Ata, further strengthening them in the
republic (Reuter September 27, 1990).
The Russian minority did not lag behind the titular nationality in organizing its
own informal sociopolitical groups such as Wisdom,2 Yedinstvo (Unity), and Social
Democratic Party and in using protest politics to promote its interests after glasnost
made its way to Kazakhstan in the late 1980s (Haghayeghi 1994:192). These groups
joined hands with the communist members of the Russian minority to strongly oppose
the sovereignty and language laws the Kazakh parliament passed in the late 1980s and
to press for their own demands, including the status o f Russian language as an official
language in the republic. These groups organized a number of protest demonstrations
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in support o f their demands in the pre-independence period (Pom fret 1995:79:
Khazanov 1995:170).3
The Russian minority’s political activism did not subside with the demise of
the Soviet Union. Rather, not only the Russian minority has become more politicized
but has also taken on a new dimension o f secessionism in the post-Soviet period. The
transition policies of Kazakh authorities in the post-independence period are in pan
responsible for this situation. In fact, most o f these policies are tailored to the needs
of the titular nationality, but are detrimental to the interests o f the Russian minority.
In order to promote its interests, the Russian minority has organized many vocal
sociopolitical groups such as Lad (Harmony), Slavic Movement, and the Congress of
Russian Communities and resorts to protest politics in the post-independence period.
Its overall political mobilization, especially the rise of highly politicized and
secessionist groups, renders the use of excessive repression to depoliticize it a very
risky proposition for Kazakh authorities.

FRAGMENTED ELITE STRUCTURE OF KAZAKHSTAN
In Kazakhstan, the communist elite structure began to lose its cohesiveness as
soon as Gorbachev introduced his reform program. As the central leadership began to
deepen its reform program, a section o f the Kazakh communist elites distanced itself
from the republican leadership and supported the center-sponsored unabated criticism
of it for a host o f serious problems in the republic. The first serious split in the
republican communist party became open at the 16th party congress held in February
1986 when a number of leading delegates, including the prime minister o f the
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republic, Sultan Nazarbayev, handed down a long list of accusations, including
political corruption, to the republican leadership (BBC February 13 and 21, 1986:
The Economist, February 15, 1986:49 U.S. Edition). As a result, the republican
communist party split into pro- and anti-Kunayev factions. The anti-Kunayev faction,
including its members in the republican press, continued to criticize the republican
leadership with impunity—an unprecedented development that introduced the principle
of open debate at least among the party circles.
The republican communist elites further split after the central leadership
imported Kolbin into Kazakhstan to replace Kunayev as the first secretary o f the
republican communist party in December 1986. Kolbin’s appointment suggested that
no local communist leader was competent enough to assume the leadership role in the
republic. Of course, it annoyed even those Kazakh communist leaders who were
opposed to Kunayev.4 The use o f massive force by Kolbin to handle the December
1986 Alma Ata nationalist riots further angered them. Let alone the pro-Kunayev
faction, even important members o f the anti-Kunayev faction soon began to publicly
question Kolbin’s policies and style and method of leadership. The growing party split
along ideological, inter- and intra-ethnic lines prompted certain comm unist leaders to
make allies outside the communist party and promote their concerns (BBC, March 4,
1989).
The republican communist elite structure continued to disintegrate even after
Kolbin was recalled to take up an assignment at the center in June 1989. In fact, in
the wake of his departure, the republican communist party further split along ethnic
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lines. After he left his post, activists of the titular nationality became more vocal in
their demands, forced Kazakh authorities to reinterpret the 1986 riots, and received
open support for their concerns from the leading Kazakh communists, including
Nazarbayev who replaced the former as the first secretary of the republican
communist party (Tass February 23, 1990; Russian Press Digest, September 2, 1990).
The Russian communists were displeased with Kazakh authorities' attempts to make
"national heroes out o f the nationalist criminals” involved in the December 1980 riots
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, November 1, 1990). Likewise, in the
wake of the growing ascendancy of Kazakhstan in its relationship with the center and
consequently the growing ascendancy of the titular nationality partially reflected in the
language and sovereignty laws, the support for the interests o f the Russian minority
and opposition to pro-Kazakh policies, including the language and sovereignty laws,
solidified among the Russian communists (Russian Press Digest September 28, 1990).
A number o f republican deputies of Russian origin formed a democratic block within
the republican parliament to defend civil, political, and cultural rights of minorities
and publicly opposed a number o f official positions, including the language law and
declaration o f sovereignty (Russian Press Digest, October I, 1990; Official Kremlin
International News Broadcast, October 16 and 17, 1990; BBC November 2, 1990).
The rise o f a Russian-oriented parliamentary group proved fateful for the
future of the republican communist party. In fact, it turned the nascent inter-ethnic
divide in the republican communist party into an enduring sharp split which in large
part accounts for the failure of the party to transform itself intact, like the Uzbek
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communist party, into a ruling party in the post-independence period. These deputies
and other communist elites of Russian origin became more aggressive supporters of
the Russian minority after Kazakh authorities and elites tried to pursue explicitly proKazakh policies in the post-Soviet period. As a result o f their respective intractable
positions on sensitive nationalist issues, including language and economic and political
reforms, most Russian and Kazakh communist elites failed to narrow their political
differences and remain united in a single political party in the post-independence
period. Instead, they patronized their respective ethnic communities and ethnicoriented political groups in the post-independence period. In fact, the inter-ethnic
tension and competition exist even in those parties, such as the Socialist Party and
People’s Congress, which are sponsored by Nazarbayev to unify political elites o f
different ethnic origin. Even these parties have come to be identified with specific
ethnic groups, the Socialist Party with Russians and People’s Congress with Kazakhs
(Olcott I993a:57).
The multiple split among the post-independence political elites was amply
reflected not only outside but also inside the parliament in the post-Soviet period,
prompting Kazakh authorities to work harder to strike a balance between the
contending factions of political elites, including various tribal and clan leaders, in the
republic (Khazanov 1995:125-6, 165-6). Soon after the 1994 parliamentary elections,
a number o f political parties and social movements, including ethnic-oriented and
ideological ones, joined forces to form a constructive opposition bloc in the
parliament. Such opposition bloc had the support o f 85 deputies who held the illegal
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decisions and actions of Kazakh authorities responsible for the disastrous situation in
the republic and demanded the resignation o f the incumbent government (Russian
Press Digest, May 28, 1994). The same group of deputies later resisted the
dissolution o f the parliament in 1995 and entered into alliances with other political
forces to oppose the authoritarian practices in the republic. In short, the disintegration
of elite structure which began in the pre-independence period inexorably continued in
the post-independence period, increasingly dispersing political resources and raising
the cost o f depoliticization of society in the republic.

NAZARBAYEV: A CAUTIOUS REFORMIST LEADER?5
In the wake o f the Gorbachev reform program, Nazarbayev, then the prime
minister o f the republic, distanced him self from his conservative mentor, Kunayev,
and adopted a reformist posture. As already mentioned, at the 16th republican party
congress held in February 1986, he denounced his mentor for promoting a false sense
o f economic success and hiding serious economic problems in the republic (BBC,
February 13, 1986). By taking similar pro-reform positions in the subsequent period,
he quickly succeeded in building his image as a firm supporter of the Gorbachev
reform program . Such image won him the confidence o f Gorbachev and the
leadership position in Kazakhstan in June 1989.
After he assumed the leadership position and began to clearly articulate his
views about the reform process underway in the country, it became quite clear that
Nazarbayev was an enthusiastic supporter o f economic rather than political reforms.
However, his concept o f economic reform s involved: a) economic autonomy for the
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Soviet republics;6 and b) a movement toward market-based relations. In fact, he was
convinced o f the importance o f market-based relations for the much-needed
socioeconomic acceleration in the country.7 However, he left no doubt that his
republic would make such shift in a gradual manner, slower than the rest o f the
country, and was likely to last longer, for a number o f reasons, including the oriental
mentality o f his people, the pervasive influence o f the communist party, and
sociopolitical situation in the republic.6
As compared to his economic approach which was gradual but reflected a
genuine concern for market-based reforms, Nazarbayev adopted a more conservative
outlook toward the question o f political reforms. Although he supported limited
democratization o f internal party life (BBC, March 8, 1990), he was averse to
genuine democratization o f public life in the pre-independence period. Also, he called
for political decentralization that was meant to enhance autonomy o f the republican
communist party rather than Kazakh society vis-a-vis the CPSU (Tass, February 23
and March 19, 1990). Given his growing control in the republic, such autonomy
essentially meant his own autonomy in the republican affairs.
Although Nazarbayev praised the Gorbachev reform processes for enabling the
Kazakh people to speak loudly o f their national aspirations (Official Kremlin
International News Broadcast, May 31, 1991), he resented the sequence o f such
processes. More specifically, he believed that one o f most serious mistakes the central
leadership made in the transition process was that it let political reforms take
precedence over economic reforms (BBC, November 29, 1991). According to his
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understanding, a smooth transition to a market economy requires strict discipline and
full scale democratization o f society during the transition is a sure recipe for social
unrest.9 Responding to an assertion that the relative social peace in the republic was a
product o f its lagging behind the country in the democratization process, Nazarbayev
remarked that he was "proud of such a lag" and attributed it to "the civic and political
maturity o f the population o f Kazakhstan" (Russian Press Digest, June 13, 1990).
Likewise, the Kazakh leader saw the rise of new public associations of
"different nationalities, views, convictions and....interests” as a positive development
which could potentially "cement society hundreds of times stronger than the partystate monopoly on everything" (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, May
31, 1991), and suggested to implement their productive proposals without delay and
to find mutual understanding with them, instead of rejecting them (Tass, August 25,
1989 and December 11, 1990). However, he was averse to their involvement in
protest politics and was unwilling to provide them expansive independent political
space. He rather wanted to coopt their leaders into responsible positions in the party
and government (Tass, August 25, 1991).
Independence brought little or no notable change in Nazarbayev’s views about
political reforms. If anything, he became more candid in their expression in the post
independence period. While he viewed the rise of various political movements and
parties as part of a "logical, democratic process" in the post-independence period
(BBC, May 14, 1993), he continued to express his utter aversion to their protest
actions and call them a potential source o f a "serious rupture" in society (Agence

175

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

France Presse, June 18, 1992). In fact, in his scheme o f things, economic reforms
continue to take precedence over political reforms. The Kazakh president almost
always referred to the need for economic acceleration to justify his political
machinations, including institutional engineering10 and the postponement o f full scale
democratization o f society.
More importantly, he did not hide his inclination toward authoritarianism as a
transitional stage on the road from totalitarianism to a market economy and
democracy (Khazanov 1995:148). And, if his views are o f any guidance, this
transitional stage is bound to last long. Reacting to the negative international
assessment o f the March 1994 parliamentary elections, Nazarbayev left no doubt
about it in his following remarks: "We have not lived to reach the European standard
yet — in terms o f either our economy, our development, or our democracy.
Yesterday’s party discipline...(means) it is a long way to democracy. We cannot have
such a level o f democracy (that) exists in France or Britain" (BBC, March 12, 1994).
Almost a year later, he reiterated this position. In a response to his critics who
described the April 1995 referendum held to extend his term o f office until the year
2000 as another example of ’renewed authoritarianism’ in Central A sia,11 the Kazakh
president justified it in the following words: "We are Asian countries — we have our
own certain mentality. It’s impossible in the last three or four years to establish the
same kind o f democracy you have in England" (The Associated Press, April 30,
1995). He also reminded them that "Democracy is only just knocking at our door"
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and they "don't have to mourn for something we never had" (Deutsche Presse Agentur, April 30, 1995).
The preceding discussion makes it clear that, in spite of his somewhat
favorable opinion about the Gorbachev reform program , Nazarbayev was primarily a
leader with little sympathy for genuine political openness. In the light o f his views,
we can expect him to tolerate modest political openness but not full scale
democratization o f Kazakh society. Also, we can expect him to temper factors
conducive to speedy and expansive political liberalization both in the pre- and post
independence periods.

GLASNOST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: THE KUNAYEV ERA
Almost one month before Mikhail Gorbachev was named the first secretary of
the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (CPSU) on March 10, 1985, Dinmukhamed
Kunayev, the first secretary o f the communist party o f Kazakhstan was proclaiming
that his republic was rising to the "new heights o f socioeconomic and cultural
development" (BBC, February 13, 1985).12 However, challenging such lofty claims
within less two weeks after the former assumed power, the central newspapers,
especially Pravda, began to depict a rather bleak picture o f the socioeconomic and
cultural development o f the republic and blamed it on the republican leadership. The
central authorities soon joined the press in this crusade (Pravda, March 18, 1985;
Current Digest o f the Soviet Press no. 11, 1985:3; Pravda, March 29, 1985; BBC,
December 29, 1986).13
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The Kazakh leadership immediately abandoned its earlier complacent view of
the socioeconomic and cultural development of the republic. It conceded to the
existence of serious problems in the party discipline and distortions in the socialist
development of the republic and promised to correct the situation and promised to
rectify the situation (BBC, July 13, 1985). Kazakhstan saw a flurry o f activities
geared toward socioeconomic revitalization but no reported movement toward the
formation of autonomous sociopolitical groups and independent institutions o f mass
media during the last one and a half year o f the Kunayev rule. Although limited
democratization o f party life made the republican leadership accessible to intra-party
criticism which was regularly reported in the central and republican press, it was still
beyond the reach of criticism from non-party sources. In fact, this situation was very
much in accordance with the central authorities’ focus on economic acceleration and
party discipline rather than on democratization of public life during this period.14
Although a hostile approach o f the republican leadership toward the potential
sources o f independent political activity13 remained intact during one and a half year
o f the Kunayev era, it can be safely said that at least a basis for the rise o f such
activity was truly laid during this period.
As a result o f a number o f reasons, including the center’s unabated sharp
criticism o f Kunayev and his close associates, and local rivalries among the republican
party elites, a section o f the republican party distanced itself from him and joined the
central authorities in their criticism o f him for a host o f serious problems in the
republic (BBC, February 13 and 21, 1986; The Economist, February 15, 1986:49
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U.S. Edition). As a result, the republican communist party split into pro- and antiKunayev factions. In the wake o f this split and increasing central pressure for
socioeconomic acceleration, Kunayev had little choice but to tolerate his critics in the
spirit of openness and socialist democracy—an unprecedented development that
facilitated the introduction o f the principle o f open debate, and rendered the leadership
open to criticism, among the party cadres. Once established for party cadres to
discredit Kunayev, it became difficult for his successors to deny it to both party
cadres and non-party activists concerned with a host of societal issues.
In addition to introducing the principle o f openness, the Kunayev era can also
be credited for raising a number o f issues such as environment around which various
autonomous sociopolitical groups were later organized. In fact, a number o f such
issues were raised in an exchange o f criticism and counter-criticism between the
central leadership and its local allies on the one hand and pro-Kunayev faction on the
other.16 After acknowledging a number o f serious problems facing the republic, it
became difficult for both the republican and central leaders to justify repression o f the
communist and non-communist activists who advocated these issues and sought to
organize sociopolitical groups around them in the subsequent period.
In spite of this open debate about the republic’s problems and massive purges
of the corrupt party cadres carried out under his supervision, Kunayev failed to please
the central authorities and continued to face unabated sharp criticism for political
cronyism and poor economic performance in the republic. The lack o f improvement
in the situation was squarely blamed on the political machine he built over the last
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two decades. Because this political machine was built under and around Kunayev, the
central leadership became convinced that it was extremely difficult to completely
break it while he was in power. As a result, the central authorities sent a senior
representative to oversee his replacement in a plenary session o f the republican
communist party central committee on December 16, 1986.17
GLASNOST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: T H E KOLBIN ERA
Kunayev’s removal hardly surprised anyone. It was long expected.18 In fact,
the surprising and fateful decision was the appointment of Gennady Kolbin, breaking
the traditional practice o f appointing a member o f the titular nationality as first
secretary, with a Russian as second secretary, in a non-Russian republic. It also
suggested that no local party leader was reliable and fit for the job the central
authorities wanted to accomplish in Kazakhstan—an offensive proposition even for the
anti-Kunayev faction in the republican communist party.
Almost within 24 hours o f the announcement of the decision to replace
Kunayev with Kolbin, student-led riots broke out in Alma-Ata against this decision.19
The central and republican authorities were shocked because such riots were unheard
o f for a long time. In addition to showing disapproval o f the above decision, the
Alma-Ata riots displayed an anti-Russian content. However, it was blown out of
proportion by the authorities. Angered by the false and provocative rumors that the
rioters were seizing Russian educational institutions and killing Russians in the streets
(FBIS, December 9, 1988:71), the authorities used massive force to quell the riots.
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According to the questionable initial official figures, at least two people died, almost
two hundred were injured and one hundred were detained.20
In his immediate reaction, Kolbin strongly condemned the prevalence and
manifestation of nationalist sentiments in the republic and resolved and sought to
activate available resources to combat this negative phenomenon. He led a massive
campaign to expose and punish those who incited and took part in the riots.21 His
campaign contained, albeit temporarily, the eruption o f independent political activity
along the lines in Russia and the Baltic republics. It created an atmosphere o f fear,
coerced Kazakh activists into a low profile, and contained the galvanizing impact o f
these riots on Kazakh society, hence its immediate further politicization.22 However,
this situation did not persist for a long time and restricted glasnost made its way to
Kazakhstan during the Kolbin period for a number o f reasons.
First, it was difficult to insulate Kazakh society from the impact of the
intensifying reform program underway in the country for a long time without brutal
repression and enormous cost. In fact, Kolbin was imported into Kazakhstan to
implement the center-sponsored reform program, not to insulate the republic from it.
The fact that the central leadership was increasingly calling for more political
openness across the country rendered it difficult for Kolbin, its trusted representative,
to defy it and continue his confrontational approach toward Kazakh society.
Second, the split in the republican party made it difficult to effectively pursue
reform program, let alone a sustained confrontational approach. In fact, the very
decision of the central authorities to import Kolbin into the republic annoyed even
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those Kazakh leaders who were opposed to Kunayev. The way the authorities handled
the Alma-Ata riots further angered them. Let alone the pro-Kunayev faction, even
important Kazakh leaders o f the anti-Kunayev faction soon began to question Kolbin’s
policies and style and method o f leadership. In fact, Kolbin remained an outsider,
exposed to criticism under the principle o f openness he himself championed in his
attack on the previous republican leadership, and did not receive the kind o f
cooperation he needed for his success. The party split, which further deepened with
the passage of time, not only complicated his anti-corruption campaign (and pursuit o f
perestroika) but also made it difficult for him to arrest the growth of what he called
subversive activities o f independent sociopolitical associations. It became a difficult
task because certain party activists and bodies reportedly protected those members o f
informal associations who were allegedly involved in such activities (BBC, March 4,
1989).23
Third, Kolbin’s approach toward the Alma Ata riots and corrective measures
he adopted to fix mistakes in the nationality policy o f his predecessor(s) obliged him
to discontinue his initial hostile approach to Kazakh nationalists. In their initial
analysis o f the riots, central and republican authorities blamed that the flawed
nationality policy o f Kunayev unduly benefited the Kazakh nationality and in part
caused these riots. This analysis infuriated many leading Kazakh figures, including
party members, who began to speak of socioeconomic and cultural injustices done to
the Kazakh nationality. For instance, an increasingly number o f leading members o f
Kazakh intelligentsia came forward and began to highlight how the Kazakh language
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was restrained and the scope of its use was narrowed in the republic over time and
called for measures, including legal guarantees, to promote it (FBIS, December 9,
1988:70; Tass, August 22, 1989). The authorities soon realized that it was very
difficult to improve the situation without addressing genuine grievances of the Kazakh
nationality and reducing inter-ethnic tension in the republic. In addition, Kolbin knew
that he had authorized the use o f massive force on the basis o f false information and
had annoyed many leading Kazakh communists in the process (FBIS, December 9,
1988:71). He later tried to compensate his mistake by adopting a relaxed approach
toward Kazakh society, if not toward the corrupt party cadres. Although purges of
corrupt party cadres continued unabated, an appeasement policy toward the Kazakhs
nationality and its concerns, including the language, was underway within weeks after
the riots.24
Party and nonparty activists surprised Kolbin when they quickly seized upon
the opportunity his appeasement policy had created for them to come out in support o f
their causes, including the language, sovereignty, and environment.25 Partly
encouraged by his defensive and apologetic stance on a number o f issues, including
the riots, they began to speak and organize autonomous sociopolitical groups for their
causes. In spite o f his aversion to the rise o f autonomous sociopolitical forces,26 he
found it difficult after his call for reconciliation (The Associated Press, January 22,
1987) to crush them and undo his own claims of progress in the republic. As a result,
limited independent space became available to Kazakh society and a host of
autonomous sociopolitical groups began to form around various causes during the
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Kolbin period. Almost 70 to 100 autonomous sociopolitical groups were reportedly
active in Kazakhstan by the time Kolbin left office in June 1989 (BBC, December 24,
1988; BBC, January 14, 1989).27
Although Kolbin relaxed his approach toward independent sociopolitical
initiatives, this relaxed approach was by no means comprehensive. In other words, the
independent space his relaxed approach initially created was available to certain forces
for limited activities. More specifically, such space was available to those autonomous
sociopolitical forces who, although critical of the flawed policies o f the party and
government, did not seek to challenge the party dominance, avoided politics o f rallies
aimed at discrediting the party leadership, and expressed, at least rhetorical, support
to the center-sponsored reform program. Those independent sociopolitical initiatives
which, in the eyes of the republican authorities, represented a threat to the social
peace and existing power structure were in most cases repressed and their advocates
were subjected to punitive measures, including arrest and imprisonment.28 In
addition, autonomous sociopolitical groups could not freely establish independent
institutions o f the mass media and participate in the electoral process29 in the
republic during the Kolbin era.
In spite o f these restrictions on autonomous sociopolitical forces, there is no
denying the fact that glasnost made its way to Kazakhstan during the Kolbin period.
The fact that political groups such as the Democratic Union and Popular Front could
form and engage in independent political activities, however limited, especially
toward the end o f the Kolbin era shows that the republican authorities relaxed their
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approach, at least in practical if not in rhetorical terms, even toward those groups
which aspired to the role of opposition to the communist party and made no secret of
their objective o f changing the communist system in the country (BBC December 24,
1988). Hence, w e can safely say that in spite o f the aversion of the republican party
and authorities to independent political space, it was surely expanding when Kolbin
left his post in June 1989.

GLASNOST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: THE NAZARBAYEV ERA
The central committee o f the republican communist party relieved Kolbin of
his duties and elected Sultan Nazarbayev as first secretary of the party on June 22,
1989. Independent political space further expanded under the latter. In fact, it is no
exaggeration that autonomous sociopolitical initiatives, in spite of the republican
leadership’s aversion to them, acquired greater salience under Nazarbayev than under
his two predecessors. A number of reasons account for the qualitative improvement
glasnost experienced during the Nazarbayev era before independence.
First, central authorities introduced more profound political reforms, including
the sanctioning o f political parties, independent newspapers, and organized noncommunist participation in the electoral process. These reforms reverberated in
Kazakhstan, too, as the republican authorities were obliged to follow suit, at least
partially in order to demonstrate their commitment to such reforms.
Second, in the wake of the departure o f Kolbin, Kazakh activists became more
aggressive in voicing their demands and received open support from the leading
Kazakh communists, including Nazarbayev himself. Likewise, ethnic Russian rapidly
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became politicized and began to aggressively voice their own demands in the wake of
growing ascendancy o f the Kazakh nationality in the republic. A number o f Russian
sociopolitical formations, in addition to the armed units o f Russian volunteers set up
by Kolbin to protect 'citizens’in Alma-Ata in the wake o f the 1986 riots, arose in the
republic. Like supporters o f the titular nationality, there were supporters o f the
Russian minority in the republican communist party. The support for the Russian
minority solidified within the party as the republican authorities began to pursue proKazakh policies. Thus, the political mobilization o f the two most resourceful ethnic
groups complicated the excessive use of repression in the republic.
Third, the fact that the support for the titular nationality and Russian minority
solidified in the republican communist party deepened and accentuated the split among
the republican party circles along ethnic lines. As already mentioned, a number of
republican parliamentarians o f Russian origin formed a democratic block within the
republican parliament to defend civil, political, and cultural rights o f minorities and
publicly opposed a number of official positions, including the language law and
declaration o f sovereignty. This situation made it harder for the Kazakh authorities to
suppress general societal dissent and opposition to their policies. In fact, in view of
their own support for the interests of the titular nationality and their need for societal
support in their efforts to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the center, let alone the
central authorities’ concern and the active defense o f the leading republican Russian
communists for the interests o f the Russian nationality in Kazakhstan, the outright
repression o f activists o f either nationality became a costlier and riskier proposition. It
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was not expedient for the republican authorities to alienate Kazakh activists and lose
their much-needed support through repressive policies toward them at the time when
they were trying to win more autonomy from the center. At the same time, it was
also not expedient for the authorities to repress Russian activists and provide
justification for and strengthen secessionist voices, let alone other adverse
consequences.
As a result o f Nazarbayev’s relaxed approach he pursued due to the above
factors, many new autonomous formations, including explicitly political groups with
anti-communist orientation, arose during his rule before independence. The most
prominent autonomous groups formed to champion exclusively Kazakh interests
included Alash Party for National Independence, and Azat (Freedom). Alash pursued
a radical, anti-communist program. It openly aspired for power and called for the full
independence o f the republic and the establishment o f an Islamic state (Current Digest
of the Soviet Press, no. 16, 1991:12; Haghayeghi 1995:86). A number o f localized
autonomous formations exclusively committed to Russian and Cossack causes also
arose. These formations included Rebirth, Cossack Society, and Popular Movement
for Revival. Rebirth and Cossack Society represented secessionist tendencies.30 The
republican authorities admonished the extremist and secessionist groups (Official
Kremlin International News Broadcast, September 25, 1990), but took no practical
measures to repress them.
In addition to these exclusivist Kazakh and Russian autonomous groups, a
number o f inter-ethnic political groups, parties, and movements arose to apparently
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represent broader interests of society. These groups included Social Democratic
Party. Yedinstvo (Unity), National Democratic Party, Democratic Election-90, and
Democratic Kazakhstan (a parliamentary group). Although these groups were formed
with inter-ethnic trappings, most of them came to be identified with the interests o f
one or the other nationality.31
According to official reports, more than 100 informal formations, including
both political and apolitical,32 were operating in the republic in September 1990
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, September 25, 1990). However,
because o f the republican authorities’ aversion to autonomous sociopolitical initiatives,
a predominant majority o f them was not registered. Legally, only registered
formations could operate in the republic. Nonetheless, both registered and
unregistered sociopolitical groups engaged in a number o f independent activities,
including founding conferences, public debates, and authorized and unauthorized
rallies,33 for the most part, with impunity. At times these groups were very critical
of the authorities. For instance, the parliamentary group, Democratic Kazakhstan,
launched a scathing attack with impunity on the republican authorities for
concentrating power in the executive bodies (Russian Press Digest, October 1990)34
and criticized their positions on the questions o f sovereignty and official language.
In spite o f their aversion to rallies held in support o f causes contrary to their
purposes, Kazakh authorities, for the most part, refrained from the use of force to
control such rallies and put away their organizers. Rather, they resorted to
manipulative practices to curtail the incidence o f such activities. They blocked the
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registration o f many inconvenient autonomous formations, often denied permission
even to registered groups to hold rallies, reminded them of the need to preserve peace
in the republic, admonished organizers o f unauthorized rallies and administered token
punishments to some of them in order to discourage them from such activities
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, October 18, 1990). In addition, they
tried to keep at least the capital city free o f rallies and demonstrations through
negotiating with informal formations a year long moratorium on such activities in the
first week o f October 1990 (Tass, October 3, 1990).
In addition to sociopolitical groups, the mass media also benefitted from the
somewhat relaxed approach of Nazarbayev. At times, the official mass media was
permitted to report activities and views which were critical of certain official policies,
the ruling party, and the republican as well as the central authorities.33 In addition to
occasionally making the official mass media accessible to opposition activists, Kazakh
authorities grudgingly allowed a number o f informal formations and individuals to
publish registered newspapers such as S-Democrat, Era o f Compassion, and Freedom
Banner, and tolerated the circulation o f unregistered newspapers such as Alas (the
underground newspaper o f Alash) (BBC, September 29, 1990 and March 15, 1991;
Russian Press Digest, May 12 and 23, 1991).
As compared to their somewhat relaxed approach toward the rise o f
autonomous sociopolitical groups and the newspapers, the republican authorities
jealously guarded the electoral process from independent individual and organized
participation. Although the March 1990 republican parliamentary election was a multi-
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candidate election, the contest was mostly among communist candidates. Kazakh
authorities ensured that leading communist figures win their seats unopposed. Also,
they resorted to manipulative tactics to keep unwanted party as well as independent
candidates out o f the electoral process. Consequently, 96.7 percent of the new
deputies were members o f the communist party (BBC, January 29, 1990; Tass, March
26 and April 3, 1990).
The above discussion clearly shows that in spite o f many restrictions on
independent sociopolitical initiatives and occasional punitive actions against activists
of autonomous formations, independent political space considerably expanded during
the Nazarbayev era. However, this expanded space was by no means equally available
for all sorts o f independent political activities. In fact, opposition activists could
engage in some political activities more freely than others. More specifically,
independent political space the authorities provided Kazakh society was more readily
available for group-formation and to some extent rallies than for the rise of
independent institutions o f mass media and for independent organized participation in
the electoral process before independence.
PO LITICA L LIBERA LIZA TIO N IN TH E POST-INDEPENDENCE PE R IO D
Although Kazakhstan formally announced its independence in December 1991,
it was, like any other independent republic, free to decide the fate o f political reform
in the wake o f the 1991 abortive coup at the center. Kazakh authorities reaffirmed
their commitment to the post-communist transition after the coup. Whatever progress
occurred in various areas o f political liberalization before the coup remained intact
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during the period between the coup and the formal announcement of independence o f
the republic in December 1991.
After independence, Kazakhstan witnessed an overall improvement in political
liberalization. Genuine, though weak, political opposition arose in the republic. The
number of independent sociopolitical groups increased. Although certain serious
restrictions remained in place on them, these groups continued to engage in a host o f
independent political activities. Although independent individual and organized
electoral participation continued to face serious restrictions, the post-independence
electoral system was still an improvement on the previous one. Independent
institutions of the mass media witnessed qualitative as well as quantitative progress in
the post-independence period. In spite of the fact that certain topics were declared or
considered to be ’off-limits’ and both the official and private mass media practiced
self-censorship, they could still provide coverage to activities and views of the
opposition and publish and broadcast information critical o f the Kazakh government
and its policies.
The remainder o f this chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion o f our
empirical evidence on political liberalization and its correspondence with our
theoretical expectations. More specifically, we will examine progress and lack of
progress in different areas o f political liberalization in the post-independence period
and relate it to our three independent variables without maintaining a sequence in
them: a) political orientation, decisions, and policies o f the Kazakh leadership; b)
political mobilization o f the large, resourceful Russian minority; c) fragmented elite
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structure in Kazakhstan. In the preceding pages, we have discussed in detail the extent
to which these variables hold in Kazakhstan. In the following pages, we will briefly
revisit them with a view to highlight their relationship with our empirical data on
political liberalization.
In the wake o f the August 1991 putsch, Nazarbayev (who joined, although
somewhat late, the anti-putsch forces led by the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin)
resigned from the CPSU. In addition, he issued a presidential decree banning the
presence o f all political parties, including the communist party, in state structures.
According to this decree, people with formal party affiliations were forbidden to hold
senior positions in the government (Reuters, August 22, 1991; BBC, August 30,
1991). In addition to resigning from the republican communist party and suggesting it
to break its ties with the CPSU, he publicly resolved not to join any political party
(Current Digest of the Soviet Press, no. 6, 1993:21; Haghayeghi 1995:128). In the
wake o f such decisions and actions, the republican communist party disbanded itself
and made an unsuccessful effort to transform itself intact into a new political party;
many leading communists left the party and joined other political groups or made
their own.
All these developments further eroded the position and unity o f the already
split republican communist party and elite structure, dispersed political resources in
Kazakh society, and diminished the party’s usefulness as an effective tool o f political
control in the republic. In addition, once Nazarbayev lost attraction in the party, he
had little or no incentive to use state power to promote one faction o f old communists
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at the cost o f another faction o f old communists or any other political force—a
propitious situation for the rise o f a multiparty political system in the post-communist
period.
However, Nazarbayev was aware o f the importance of an organized political
support base independent o f state power during the difficult time o f transition and
shifting political loyalties. In view o f the fact that republican communist party was
considerably weakened due to many reasons, including multiple deep division, and
that Kazakh society and elite structure were sharply divided along ethnic lines, it was
difficult to create a single strong and unified organized support base out o f the
existing sociopolitical forces in the republic. As a result, Nazarbayev looked toward
diverse individual and organized sources o f political support. In this context, he not
only helped the republican communist party transform itself into a new political party,
Socialist Party, but also helped create two more broad-based, inter-ethnic political
parties, the People’s Congress and Union of National Unity o f Kazakhstan, in order
to muster support o f as many political elites as possible in the post-independence
period.
Although these parties lent support to Nazarbayev on different issues, they at
times criticized him and his policies. In addition, these parties competed with each
other and at times entered into alliances with other more independent nationalist
parties. This situation complicated and increased the cost o f outright repression of
active political forces in society because it meant repression o f his own allies,
including political leaders o f international repute and with considerable political clout
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in society, and Kazakh- and Russian-oriented nationalist parties he needed for equally
important reasons. The rise o f nationalist parties served two purposes for Nazarbayev.
First, he used the presence and demands o f Kazakh nationalist parties to convince the
Russian-speaking population in the republic and Russian authorities that as compared
to other potential alternatives he was best suited to serve their interests and to win
their support. Second, he allowed moderate Kazakh and Russian nationalist parties to
operate but repressed radical Kazakh and Russian political groups and activists who
he perceived as his most hardened and dangerous enemies.
Another important restraint against the option o f indiscriminate repression of
opposition forces, along the lines in Uzbekistan, has been the large, resourceful
Russian-speaking population o f the republic. In the wake o f the breakup of the Soviet
Union, the political loyalty o f the Russian nationality largely shifted to "Mother
Russia" rather than to the new political identity, the Kazakh state. Russians living in
the Russian-dominated northern and eastern provinces feel as if they still live in
"Mother Russian” (Olcott, 1995b: 182). In fact, the Russian-speaking population has
increasingly become disgruntled, politicized, and organized in response to a number
of developments, including the change in its status from a dominant ethnic group to a
minority ethnic group and its slow but steady marginalization in Kazakh society in the
wake o f perestroika, the collapse o f the Soviet Union, and ethnonationalist policies of
the Kazakh state.
The growing resentment among the Russian-speaking population has
manifested itself in moderate as well as radical demands ranging from local control
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and autonomy to secession o f the Russian-dominated areas. This situation posed a
potential threat to the territorial integrity o f the new Kazakh state. W hat unnerved
Kazakh authorities most was the statement o f the Russian authorities in the fall 1991,
indicating their intention to readjust the Russian borders with its neighbors.
Nazarbayev had to expend enormous political capital and work hard to extract a
public commitment of Yeltsin to the territorial integrity of his republic. However, the
specter o f the Russian intervention still hanged over his head due to the new Russian
foreign policy doctrine under which the Russian government reserved the right to use
force, if necessary, to protect the Russian-speaking population in the ’near abroad’. In
view o f this situation, Kazakh authorities found it expedient to exercise caution
especially in their dealing with the Russian-speaking population in the republic.
Kazakh authorities recognized that the Russian-speaking population was most
unlikely to offer real political allegiance to them in the foreseeable future. In addition,
it increasingly became difficult for them to create a loyal political group acceptable to
the majority of this population. An indiscriminate policy of repression o f political
activists of the Russian nationality was also ill-advised because it would heighten the
importance of the secession option and transform the low profile local struggle o f
secessionist forces into an active struggle with potentially adverse consequences for
the territorial integrity of the country. In fact, this was a real possibility because many
of them looked toward Russian authorities for a signal to agitate for their demands
(Olcott, 1995b: 182). More importantly, it would certainly internationalize their cause,
further infuriate Russian nationalist politicians like Zhirinovsky who threatened to
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make war on Kazakhstan to protect Russian-speaking population (The San Francisco
Chronicle, December 20, 1993:A 12), and provoke Russian authorities to invoke their
right to intervene in the ’near abroad’ on behalf o f the Russian-speaking population
and to renege on their public commitment to the territorial integrity o f Kazakhstan.
Kazakh authorities adopted a multiple approach toward this problem which
further facilitated the rise o f genuine political opposition in the republic. In order to
assure Russian authorities o f the safety and welfare o f the Russian-speaking
population in Kazakhstan and to win support and cooperation, if not political loyalty,
of this population, Nazarbayev made a public commitment to protect its interests and
offered it a num ber o f cultural, economic, and political concessions, including the
extraordinary degree o f local autonomy for some Russian cities and towns (Olcott,
199Sb:182) and the freedom to organize moderate political groups devoted to the
interests of the Russian nationality in the republic.
However, it was obvious that Nazarbayev would brook neither secessionist
claims nor a serious challenge to his authority. Also, in accordance with his overall
conservative approach toward political reforms and his understanding o f limited
acceptable political openness during the transition, he was expected to temper the
potential favorable impact o f the Russian political activism and fragmented elite
structure on political liberalization and resist greater democratization o f public life in
the post-independence period. In view o f the presence o f structural constraints o f the
Russian minority and fragmented elite structure, he made a very selective use o f
repression in order to deal with secessionist claim s, challenges to his authority, and
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pressures of autonomous political forces for political openness beyond acceptable
limits. In fact, the Kazakh leader made a skillful use o f the pretext o f inter-ethnic
accord to occasionally justify repression o f both Kazakh and Russian radical groups.
Because independent political space was available to Kazakh society and because
Kazakh authorities avoided extreme repressive measures such as political
assassinations and long term imprisonments for political offenses, even radical groups
and individual activists kept coming back into the political arena and could
intermittently engage in a number of independent political activities in the republic.
The net effect o f the above conducive and nonconducive factors was a mixed
record of Kazakhstan on political liberalization in the post-independence period. Still,
as compared to its record in the pre-independence period, Kazakhstan witnessed an
overall improvement in almost all areas of political liberalization in the post
independence period. And, this improvement earned Kazakhstan a middle position on
the political liberalization scale between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

THE RISE OF WEAK BUT GENUINE POLITICAL OPPOSITION
The freedom o f political forces to organize themselves is one area o f political
liberalization which recorded sustained progress in the post-independence period. The
autonomous sociopolitical groups formed in the pre-independence period continued to
exist and operate after independence. Not only many of the pre-independence
autonomous groups evolved into explicitly political groups and played the role of an
active opposition but also new political groups continued to arise and oppose the
Kazakh authorities in the post-independence period.
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The range o f independent political activities these opposition groups could (and
did) engage in also widened after independence. This assertion does not suggest that
opposition groups and individual activists were never subjected to repression for their
political activities. Quite the contrary. However, it is important to note that Kazakh
authorities made a very cautious and selective use o f repression against their
opponents. In other words, unlike the Uzbek political opposition which was totally
crushed through brutal repressive measures, including assassinations, Kazakh
opposition was largely spared of indiscriminate and brutal repression and was able to
enjoy a sizable independent political space in the post-independence period. This fact
is amply reflected in the area of group formation.
As o f 1997, Kazakhstan housed more than a dozen autonomous political
formations o f various orientations, in addition to independent human rights groups and
independent professional associations and almost over one hundred other
socioeconomic and cultural associations. A detailed discussion o f all the existing
independent sociopolitical formations and their orientations is outside the scope o f this
inquiry. For the purpose of this study, it will suffice to briefly mention important
political formations, their orientations, and the freedom o f action they enjoyed in the
post-independence period.
A number o f autonomous political formations Kazakhstan housed in the post
independence period can be broadly divided into liberal democratic, ethnonationalist,
and communist parties and movements. The major liberal democratic formations
include the Socialist Party, the People’s Congress, National Democratic Party, and the
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Party o f the Law-Based Development o f Kazakhstan. The prominent ethnonationalist
parties and movements formed to promote the interests o f the titular nationality
include Zheltoqsan, Alash, Azat, and the Republican Party of Kazakhstan. The major
autonomous formations formed to exclusively promote the interests o f the Russianspeaking population include Yedinstvo, Social Democratic Party, Lad (Harmony), the
Semirechye Cossack Society, Party o f Democratic Progress, the Russian Community
of North Kazakhstan, and the Russian Center. In 1992, the Communist Party was
formed to promote Leninist principles.
In addition to these groups, Kazakhstan housed a number o f other autonomous
associations which pursued agendas with political overtones. As a result, they often
found themselves in opposition to the authorities. These associations included human
rights groups and labor and trade unions. Independent human rights groups included
the Kazakh-American Bureau on Human Rights and the Rule of Law, the Alma-Ata
Helsinki Commission and Legal Development o f Kazakhstan, and the Democratic
Committee on Human Rights. Independent labor and trade unions include groups like
Independent Trade Union Center and W orker’s Movement (an affiliate group o f the
Communist party). A number of the above explicitly political and other groups have
also joined hands to create two broad-based national movements, Republic and
Azamat. In addition to these two broad-based national movements, autonomous
groups of various orientations have been entering into loose alliances in support o f
their causes. Alliances o f this sort include Kazakhstan’s Social Protection
Coalition,36 anti totalitarian league,37 and People’s Front.38
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Kazakh authorities at times bent the law on public associations, which is not
only illiberal but also loose and liable to misuse, to delay, block, and cancel
registration of various autonomous formations, including Kazakh radical groups like
Alash and Russian radical groups like Semirecheye Cossack Society.39 However, the
sheer presence o f a large number o f registered autonomous groups, including Russianoriented moderate groups like Lad, partly confirms that the constitutional right of
association is generally respected, if somewhat circumscribed, in Kazakhstan.
In addition to enjoying considerable freedom o f action in the area o f group
formation, most independent sociopolitical groups, both registered and unregistered,
have been able to engage in a host independent political activities with impunity in the
post-independence period. They have been able to hold press conferences to criticize
human rights violations and heavy-handedness o f Kazakh authorities toward opposition
(BBC, November 14, 1996 and December 30, 1997), party congresses, and round
tables to form alliances and to discuss important political issues, including platforms
and strategies to counter one man and/or one party rule (Current Digest o f the PostSoviet Press, no. 7, 1993:22; Russian Press Digest, December 2, 1993; BBC April
14, 1994 and September 26, 1996).
In fact, let alone the registered parties and movements, unregistered
autonomous sociopolitical formations have also been able to hold public meetings,
publish their own newspapers, and run cultural centers in the post-independence
period (U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1997:1144). More importantly, autonomous formations, especially the registered ones,
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conducted and/or strove for their right to conduct activities Kazakh authorities abhor
most. More precisely, these groups continued to hold rallies, authorized and
unauthorized, publicly criticize the authorities, talk about sensitive topics like ethnic
relations, participate (or continued to push for participation) in elections, and set up
independent institutions of mass media. However, unlike the activities discussed in the
preceding paragraph which entailed little or no serious punishment for those who
conducted them, most o f these activities did entail punitive consequences for those
who were involved in them. In fact, most o f political dissidents who were persecuted
for political reasons were persecuted for their participation in unauthorized rallies, for
their attempts to fan social tensions, for their actions prejudicial to the security and
integrity o f the state, and for sullying honor and integrity of the leading state officials,
first and foremost the head of state.
According to the law, public associations, including political parties, need a
prior approval to hold protest rallies in support of their demands and causes.
Unauthorized rallies, protests, marches, and demonstrations are considered illegal.
Those who organize them and participate in them are subject to prosecution. Only
registered public associations could be granted permission for such activities. How did
Kazakh authorities apply the law? In other words, how far was the constitutional right
o f peaceful assembly respected in Kazakhstan in the post-independence period?
Kazakh authorities’ record in this context is mixed.
As already mentioned, the Kazakh leadership was averse to politics o f rallies
and made no secret of it. Ideally, it wanted autonomous sociopolitical formations to
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voluntarily

regard
from

renounce it. Most opposition formations refused to oblige them in this

Unlike Uzbekistan where no opposition rally was allowed to take place

1993 through 1997. numerous rallies, authorized and unauthorized, were held by

both registered and unregistered sociopolitical groups in Kazakhstan in the postmdepcndence period. Both sanctioned and unsanctioned protest rallies were held on a
nu m b er

of occasions to publicize and support various opposition demands and causes,

tncluding exclusive Kazakh and Russian interests (Reuters, November 30, 1991; BBC,
December 20. 1991), resignation o f the government due to flawed economic policies
(Russian Press Digest, June 22, 1992), opposition to extending the president’s term of
office and adopting the constitution through a referendum (BBC, April 27, and August
17. 1995;), and protest against falling living standards (BBC, November 14, 19%).
More importantly, unauthorized rallies were held to protest widespread official
corruption and the president’s dictatorial policies, including political persecution of
opposition parties (Agence France Presse, December 8, 19%; BBC, September 11
and December 1, 1997).
In spite o f their aversion to protest rallies and demonstrations, Kazakh
authorities avoided brutal repressive measures to completely rid politics o f such
activities because o f the prohibitive cost involved in depoliticizing political activists of
both the titular nationality and Russian minority. Thus, Kazakh authorities’ aversion
to protest action and the prohibitive cost of ridding politics of such activities partly
account for their erratic approach in this regard. In some cases, they readily allowed
the registered independent sociopolitical groups to hold public meetings, rallies, and
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demonstrations. As o f 1997, many authorized rallies w ere reportedly held in different
parts of the country. However, in most instances, they delayed or denied permits for
such activities (BBC, July 20, 1995 and November 14, 1996) on many grounds,
including lame excuses.41 However, the most common reason the authorities cited to
refuse to issue a perm it was the presumed inability o f rally organizers to guarantee
public safety and order (BBC, November 14, 1996).
The denial o f permits for protest actions failed to stop opposition groups from
organizing such activities in support of their causes. M ost of the opposition groups
which planned protest rallies held them even if they were denied a permit for such
activities. As o f 1997, more unsanctioned rallies have been held than the sanctioned
rallies in Kazakhstan. The authorities pursued a less than consistent approach toward
unsanctioned rallies.
In some cases, they took no punitive measures and tolerated unsanctioned
rallies.42 In other cases, they issued symbolic administrative warnings and
reprimands without prosecuting rally organizers. Certain rally organizers and
opposition leaders were harassed and intimidated with the threats of prosecution on
corruption charges. Those who were harassed and intimidated include the former
speaker o f the parliament, Serikbolsyn Abdildin (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press,
no. 17, 1995:22) and the co-chairman of the Azamat movement and the former
cabinet minister, Petr Svoik (U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human
Rights for 1996:991). Both attempts, however, failed to intimidate the two leaders and
Kazakh authorities decided not to initiate legal proceedings against them.
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In most cases, they prosecuted and punished rally organizers. In fact, as of
1997, more opposition leaders were persecuted for their role in unsanctioned rallies
than for other offenses combined. Leaders of almost all ardent opposition groups
(such as Alash, Azat, Zheltoqsan, Azamat, W orkers’ Movement of Kazakhstan, and
others representing Russian causes) have been reprimanded, fined, arrested, put in
jails and/or beaten for their participation in unauthorized activities (BBC, August 24,
199S and December 30, 1997). Those prosecuted and convicted for their role in
unsanctioned public activities received varying sentences. In most cases, these
sentences included small fines and/or short jail terms o f 7 to 30 days (BBC August
24, 1995, November 30, 1996 and December 30, 1997). Only few received longer
sentences o f a year or so (BBC, September 11 and 22, 1997).43
In addition, certain autonomous groups faced suspension or threat o f
suspension but not brutal repression for their role in certain unsanctioned rallies held
in support o f causes the authorities found offensive to the constitution, the security
and the integrity o f the country. The sociopolitical groups which faced such threats
include Lad and the Communist Party.44
Unlike Uzbekistan where rallies have been broken and participants shot at and
killed, Kazakh authorities, for the most part, avoided such approach to curb politics
of rallies. Save a couple o f reported incidents in which the authorities dispersed
demonstrators without shooting at them and without any deaths (Agence Frace Presse,
June 18, 1992; U .S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1995:911), the Kazakh authorities avoided to interfere with protest
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rallies, demonstrations, marches, and strikes while they were in progress, even if the
protesters chanted derogatory slogans against Nazarbayev (Agence France Presse,
December 8, 19%). Legal proceedings were almost always initiated after rallies were
over.
In fact, Kazakh authorities avoided the violent use o f force to disperse even
those rallies and public gatherings which were organized by secessionist forces and/or
in support o f causes prejudicial to the constitution, the security and the integrity o f the
country. Because such rallies were mostly organized by Russian-speaking population,
it was too risky for the authorities to apply brutal force to disperse these rallies and
gatherings. The Kazakh president rather used other manipulative methods such as
seeking help from Russian authorities to stop them and sponsoring counter-rallies and
gatherings o f Kazakh ethnonationalist groups to convince the Russian-speaking
population that he is the best choice for them and to justify measures like occasional
suspension o f activities of inconvenient formations and arrest o f leaders involved in
such activities in the name o f inter-ethnic accord (Russian Press Digest, June 1 and
September 17, 1991; BBC, September 13, 18, 20, and

November 30, 1991; Olcott

1993b:326).
The explanation of the considerable restraint the Kazakh leadership exercised
in punishing opposition formations and their leaders for holding unauthorized rallies
partly lies in the fact that such groups were led by well-known leaders (of national
and international repute), including former members of the parliament and former
communist party members who happened to be important members o f their respective
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ethnic communities, and it was o f the considerable pressure their longer imprisonment
could potentially generate within and outside the republic. In the light o f Kazakh
authorities’ bitter and expensive experience with the arrest and imprisonment o f an
important Russian activist and journalist, Boris Suprynuk, for his allegedly
incendiary writings and a Cossack leader, Nikolai Gunkin, in 199S for his role in two
unauthorized rallies and the mounting pressure they faced from the Russian-speaking
population o f the republic, Russian political parties, and Russian authorities for their
release,45 it was expedient for them to avoid a harsh treatment and rather rely on
other token punishments o f leaders o f Russian origin (like Petr Svoik) in order to
discourage them from politics o f protest rallies.
If Nazarbayev avoided an outright and thorough repression o f Russian
ethnonationalist groups and individual political leaders for fear of further alienating
the Russian-speaking population, reinforcing secessionist tendencies, and provoking
the Russian authorities to come to the help o f their compatriots in his republic, he
avoided a thorough repression of Kazakh ethnonationalist groups and important
individual political leaders because it would have cost him his nationalist credentials,
weakened his support base among his co-ethnics, and undercut his manipulative tactics
to deal with the Russian nationality in general and the secessionist forces in particular.
As Kazakh authorities avoided the option o f thorough repression and allowed
genuine political opposition forces to arise in the post-independence period, the fact
that these forces would take independent positions on different matters, publicize their
ideas, and publicly criticize the authorities and their policies was a foregone
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conclusion. The option then the authorities faced and pursued was not how to
completely stop opposition forces from taking independent position and criticizing
them but how to either convince them or coerce them to tone down criticism.
Like their record on unsanctioned rallies, Kazakh authorities’ record o f their
tolerance toward their critics is mixed, too. In some cases, the authorities tolerated
open criticism or discussion o f certain topics.4* In other cases, they persecuted their
critics for such criticism. Interestingly, while some opposition activists were allowed
to blame Kazakh authorities for serious lapses such as corruption and authoritarian
practices, others were arrested and convicted on minor, presumptive and fake
charges.
The law provided for the freedom o f speech. However, the law also imposed
restrictions which could be bent to punish any criticism or misdemeanor of
opposition. The subjects which were considered ’off-limits’ included insulting the
president, members o f the parliament, and senior public officials, inciting inter-ethnic
and social tensions, and endangering the security and integrity o f the country. Kazakh
authorities used the law on the protection o f the honor and dignity o f the president to
prosecute a number o f opposition activists, including the seven members o f the Alash
party in 1991-92 (BBC, October 8, 1992).47

Although the most important

subject considered to be ’off-limits’ was the personal criticism o f the president, some
opposition activists were prosecuted for other offenses, too.48
In spite o f such cases o f persecution, criticism o f Kazakh authorities,
including the president, and their policies continued throughout the post-independence
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period. In view o f the fact that many cases of scathing criticism o f the authorities
went unnoticed and unpunished, the above cases of persecution o f opposition activists
suggest that they were intended to reduce rather than completely suppress the volume
o f open criticism o f them. A cursory look at the subjects opposition activists
addressed, the demands they made, the slogans they shouted, and speeches they made
at news conferences, round tables o f political parties, party congresses, and protest
rallies clearly supports this view.
As already mentioned, Kazakh authorities faced criticism o f their economic,
social, and ethnic policies, their unconstitutional ways to dissolve the parliament and
to adopt the constitution and extend the president’s term o f office through a
referendum, their manipulative electoral practices, their corruption, and their
authoritarian policies and practices. In addition, opposition leaders demanded
resignation o f the government and publicly appealed the mass to either boycott or vote
against Nazarbayev in the 1995 referendum on the extension o f his term of office
(BBC, April 8, 1995).
More importantly, on a number of occasions, the Kazakh president was
personally criticized and his critics went unpunished. For instance, the leader of the
Democratic Movement o f Kazakhstan, Erkin Sultanbeko, and disgruntled members of
the dissolved parliament and leaders o f the Republic, an alliance group of many
opposition formations, publicly criticized the unconstitutional tactics o f the president
to enhance his power at the cost o f legislative authority, described the enhancement of
his personal power as the most serious problem the country was faced with, and
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demanded his resignation (Russian Press Digest, December 2, 1993; BBC, August 18,
1994 and April 8, 199S). In yet another instance, at a press conference held on
December 23, 1997, to protest the imprisonment o f the leaders o f the Azamat
movement for organizing an unauthorized rally at the end of November 1997, the
leader o f the Communist Party and form er chairman o f the parliament, Serikbolsyn
Abdildin, said: "As long as Nursultan Nazarbayev is in power, the country will be
unable to overcome its crisis” (BBC, December 30, 1997 and January 13, 1998). Still
more derogatory language was used in the slogans the demonstrators shouted during
an authorized rally held in June 1992, in protest against the president and the delay in
the payment o f salaries.49 There are no reports to indicate that Kazakh authorities
took any punitive action against these demonstrators and their leaders.
The preceding discussion suggests that although Kazakh authorities persecuted
their some critics for certain forms of criticism, they tolerated others who subjected
them to the same and/or other scathing criticism. It also shows that in addition to
considerable freedom o f action autonomous sociopolitical groups enjoyed in holding
founding conferences, party congresses, press conferences, round tables, public
gatherings, and protest demonstrations, they showed remarkable independence in their
positions they took on various important matters, including institutional engineering
and authoritarian practices of the president.

THE NATIONAL ELECTORAL PROCESS: OPPOSITION ON THE
SIDELINES?
As compared to the considerable freedom o f action in the area o f group
formation, Kazakh authorities provided their citizens with relatively little freedom in
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the exercise o f their constitutional political right to choose their representatives
through a free and fair election. A number o f factors explain why the Kazakh
leadership continued to exercise relatively tight control over the electoral process. As
already mentioned, Nazarbayev believed that Kazakh society needed to pass through
enlightened authoritarianism in order to make a smooth transition from totalitarianism
to a market economy and democracy. In addition, he believed that economic reforms
must take precedence over political reforms in such transition. A fair, free and
competitive electoral process could potentially democratize society beyond limits
acceptable to him. He feared that such democratization could ruin his economic
reform project. Such outlook induced him to try to keep the electoral process under
his control and temper pressures of individual and organized political forces,
including political activists of the Russian minority and other important communist
and non-communist political leaders, for an unhindered access to the electoral process
in the country. In other words, it led him to manipulate presidential and successive
parliamentary elections to his favor, keeping unwanted elements on the sidelines o f
the electoral process.
Although there were apparently no real electoral competitors to the president,
the free and fair executive election held during the difficult times o f the post
communist transition carried the potential risk o f his replacement, let alone other
adverse consequences such as free access o f opposition candidates to the masses and
their potential mobilization against him and his reform policies. The 1991 uncontested
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presidential election and the extension o f his term through a referendum rather than a
presidential election in 1995 partly illustrate his manipulative approach.
In addition, due to deep and multiple division among the former communist
elites, sharp division of society along ethnic lines, and the consequent dispersion o f
political resources, the free and fair parliamentary elections carried the potential risk
of an independent and divided parliament coming into existence which was most likely
to complicate the scheme o f things the incumbent executive leadership wanted to
pursue. After he faced serious challenges from the two seemingly compliant
parliaments elected in 1990 and 1994, such prospect was sure to greatly worry the
president bent upon running the country single-handedly. The president wanted to
have his men dominate the parliament, avoiding potential risks associated with the
election o f an independent parliament.
Given the potential costs of the indiscriminate use o f repression o f opposition
forces (which meant hundreds of inconvenient electoral candidates, including ex
members o f the parliament) and the adequacy o f the procedural and judicial methods
to avoid these risks, Kazakh authorities adroitly used the latter methods toward those
ends. In addition, due to the short duration and rarity o f election seasons (which
meant the quick evaporation o f the election-produced activism without the use o f
repression), they could and did safely and adroitly employ the judicial process and
electoral procedures to deny most opposition candidates the access to the electoral
process and to maintain a firm control over it. However, in order to placate certain
independent political forces, including ethnonationalist activists of Kazakh and Russian
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origin, Kazakh authorities allowed a very limited number o f their candidates to
participate in and win parliamentary elections.
As o f 1997, Kazakh citizens have been allowed to vote in a number of
elections and referendums. A popular uncontested presidential election, two
parliamentary elections, and a number o f referendums have been held in the republic
since it achieved its de facto independence in the wake of the 1991 coup. A number
o f local bodies elections have also been held during this period. However, we will
confine our focus to national elections and their openness to opposition participation.
The first national election which took place in the wake o f the 1991 abortive
coup was the general uncontested presidential election held on December 1, 1991. As
already mentioned, the pre-independence republican parliament had elected
Nazarbayev as president in 1990. He could serve out his remaining term o f office. He
instead chose and justified the need to renew his popular mandate and legitimacy
through a general presidential election (BBC, October 18, 1991). In principle, all
candidates who could get the required 100,000 signatures o f the electorate could
contest the presidential election.
In addition to Nazarbayev, only two more candidates, Hassen Kozhakhmetov,
the leader of the National Democratic Party, and Olzhas Suleimenov, the leader o f the
People’s Congress announced their plans to run in the election. Olzhas Suleimenov,
the leader o f the People’s Congress, withdrew from the race because he claimed that
he had no chance o f winning the election (Tass, November 2, 1991). Kozhakhmetov
tried to collect the required number o f signatures to contest the presidential election.
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However, he did not submit his nomination papers, ensuring the president an
uncontested victory.30 The National Democratic Party alleged that some unidentified
persons had stolen the list of 40,000 signatures it had collected in support o f its
candidate (The Reuter Library Report, November 12, 1991). However, it must be
mentioned that there are no reported cases to show that Kazakh authorities used force
or other intimidating methods to prevent the leadership o f the National Democratic
Party from collecting the required number o f signatures.
The second national level election took place in March 1994. It was held to
elect the first post-independence national parliament. After the presidential election,
opposition parties increasingly questioned the legitimacy of the pre-independence
communist-dominated parliament, depicted it as a vestige o f the communist era, and
demanded its ouster (BBC, June 19, 1992).51 Although Nazarbayev immediately and
squarely rejected the opposition demands (Russian Press Digest, June 22, 1992;
Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 24, 1995:26),52 he increasingly became
supportive o f the demand for a new parliament for his own reasons.
The parliament, for the most part, cooperated with the president. However, it
proved less compliant than he wanted it to be. At times, it refused to support him in a
slavish manner and exercised its constitutional authority which was at variance with
his preferences. A number of deputies, backed by Kazakh ethnonationalist groups,
criticized the president’s plan for an economic union treaty with Russia and for
remaining within the ruble zone (Russian Press Digest, October 1, 1993). The
parliament also reportedly angered him when it began checking the enforcement o f
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laws by the government (Russian Press Digest, October 2, 1993). More importantly,
the parliament rejected a president-sponsored resolution that was intended to give
powers to him to speed up economic reforms in November 1993 (CSCE, March
1994:1).
In addition, he wanted to reward members of loyal parties and other
individuals faithful to him. A sizable number o f members o f the former communist
party and parliamentarians had not joined the pro-president parties (Olcott,
1993b:326). O f course, the president could not take their cooperation for granted.
Also, the fact that the parliament acted at variance with the executive preferences
demonstrated that such a parliament, with lot o f constitutional powers invested in it,
could potentially pose a serious challenge to the executive authority—a worrisome
situation for the president.
Not only the national but also the local legislative bodies acted in ways at
variance with the president’s preferences (CSCE, March 1994:3; BBC, December 7,
1993). In order to deal with this situation, he began to engineer self-dissolution of the
local legislative bodies and emphasized the need for a professional national parliament
with a new popular mandate (Tass, November 8, 1993). The president tried to sell to
the parliament the idea o f its graceful exit. Although, in December 1993, the
parliament publicly agreed to dissolve itself due to his forceful persuasion, he
reportedly threatened to withdraw his men from the parliament if it refused to accept
his idea of an honorable exit, leaving it devoid of the needed quorum to function and,
hence, paralyzed. He had already adopted such method to paralyze many local
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legislative bodies (Russian Press Digest, October 1, November 23, and December 2,
1993). In order to ensure the desired outcome, a group o f 190 pro-president deputies
were made to resign before the parliament began its session on December 8, 1993.
These members urged their fellow members to follow suit (The Reuter Library
Report, December 8, 1993).
On December 8, 1993, 218 out o f 360 deputies voted behind closed doors to
dissolve the parliament and scheduled the election to parliament for March 7, 1994.
In addition, they voted to give the president extra powers, including legislative ones,
in the interim so that he could run the country in the absence o f a legislature.33
A detailed analysis o f the pre-term election to parliament is outside the scope
of this study. However, a discussion o f a question directly relevant to political
liberalization deserves our attention. That is, the government interference with the
electoral process. In this regard, we will focus on three issues: a) openness of the
elections to popular and independent participation; b) campaign and voting; and c)
electoral outcome. In order to discuss these issues in proper perspective, we need to
look at the law under which these elections were held.
According to the new constitution o f the republic passed in 1993, there were
177 seats in the new parliament (Supreme Kenges), including 42 reserved for
candidates on the "state list" or the so-called president’s list. The registered political
parties and civic associations and movements could nominate their candidates. The
self-nomination o f candidates was also provided for in the law. However, in order to
be able to run in the elections, independent candidates needed 3,000 signatures. In
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addition, all candidates had to give an amount, almost five times their monthly wage,
to the election commission. The law stipulated that those who could not receive five
percent o f the polled votes in their constituency would lose their money. Each
candidate had the right to get 10 minutes o f free airtime on radio and televisions, in
addition to 100 lines of newspaper space. However, it was unlawful for candidates to
promote hatred and enmity among the residents of Kazakhstan through ideas of racial,
national, religious, and social exceptionality (Tass, March 5, 1994; CSCE, 1994:6-7).
The pre-term election to the parliament began with the nomination o f
candidates from December 25, 1993 through January 25, 1994. Except few reported
problems like the delay in the availability o f official signature form to some
independent candidates, there are no reports to the effect that there was massive
official interference with the nomination process. However, the same can be said of
the registration process.
A period o f two weeks from January 26 through February 8, 1994, was
reserved for the registration o f candidates. A total o f 754 candidates were registered.
Altogether 29 public associations, including three registered political parties, the
Union o f National Unity of Kazakhstan (a party closely associated with the president),
the Socialist Party (the reincarnated communist party), and the People’s Congress,
and popular and ethnonationalist associations like LAD (a Russian-oriented group)
were able to register their candidates (BBC, March 19, 1994; CSCE, march 1994:79). A number o f independent candidates were also registered. Interestingly, Alash, a
radical nationalist-cum-religious movement accused o f extremism, could not nominate
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its candidates because it was not registered, but its deputy chairman was registered
and contested election as an independent candidate (CSCE, March 1994:8).
Although a number o f independent individual and party candidates were
registered, the registration process was used to screen out inconvenient candidates.
According to the press reports, more than 900 candidates tried to register as
candidates in the pre-term parliamentary election, but Kazakh authorities refused to
register about 200 candidates, including independent journalists, leaders of
independent trade unions, ethnonationalist groups, and critics of the central and local
authorities (The Washington Post, March 8, 1994: A 14; BBC, February 15, 1994). In
fact, most registered candidates were president’s men in one way or another.54 Some
analysts believed that the list o f 754 registered candidates was prepared by the
national and regional authorities who intentionalLy prevented many prospective
candidates and associations from registering for the election (Financial Times
(London), March 8, 1994:4).
A large number of truly independent candidates complained that the local
election commissions rejected their nomination papers and refused to register them for
unjustified reasons, including false signatures (The Washington Times, March 9,
1994:A 12; BBC, February 15, 1994; Agence France Presse, March 4, 1994). For
instance, the Russian ethnonationalist association, LAD, protested to the central
election commission that the local election commission chairman in Kokshetau openly
said that the commission would not register candidates who advocate the desirability
of dual citizenship (CSCE, March 1994:11). The disqualified candidates also had
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often little time to appeal their disqualifications. In certain cases, the appellate courts
could not reportedly overrule the decisions o f the local election commissions even if
the complaint o f a disqualified candidate was found to be justified (CSCE, March
1994:10).
Although a large number o f independent candidates o f different ethnic origin
received arbitrary treatment, candidates of Russian minority who would promote its
controversial causes such as dual nationality and Russian language in the parliament
were specially targeted in this regard. They lodged a strong protest over the
discriminatory treatment they received in the registration process by pointing out the
fact that Kazakh authorities registered only 128 Russian-speaking candidates as
compared to 566 Kazakhs (Financial Times (London), March 8, 1994:4; CSCE
1994:6)—an unrepresentative figure o f their share of the population o f the republic.
Speaking at a press conference held to protest over the biased attitude o f the local and
central election commissions, Leonid Solomin, the leader o f the Independent Trade
Union Center, pointed out that Russian-speakers constitute 70% o f the population of
the Tastak rayon of Alma-Ata but authorities knocked out "virtually all Russianspeaking candidates" for a number o f reasons (BBC, February 15, 1994). O f course,
this is by no means an exhaustive inventory o f fraud cases in the registration phase.
The press reported numerous stories o f the heavy-handedness o f the authorities toward
opposition candidates in the registration phase (Agence France Presse, March 4,
1994).
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Kazakh authorities partially respected the law which allowed candidates to
freely campaign and publicize their program. They provided the allotted 10 minutes
free airtim e on state radio and television to the registered candidates. The candidates
were also able to make use of the allotted 100 lines in newspapers. In addition, they
could and did freely organize meetings with their voters. While a predominant
majority o f the candidates touched common and general issues such as economic
reforms and inter-ethnic harmony, a number of candidates were very critical o f the
authorities and presented bold and independent platforms. For instance, the deputy
chairman o f Alash ran newspaper advertisements which accused the president and his
administration o f incompetence and branded them as a "bureaucratic-criminal mafia"
(CSCE, March 1994:8). Kazakh authorities patiently put up with some instances o f
independent and critical campaign activity like this.
However, most independent candidates were not so lucky. They faced serious
restrictions on their campaign activities. Beyond the allotted airtime on the statecontrolled radio and television and 100 lines in the official newspapers, the state mass
media did not cover election programs o f most independent candidates. The official
newspapers at times censored the election program o f independent candidates before
publishing it. For instance, one candidate o f LAD complained that important points
such as the need for dual citizenship and making Russian a state language were
deleted from her 100 lines printed in the official press (CSCE, March 1994:10).
Kazakh authorities also reportedly prohibited television stations not under direct state
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control from providing any coverage to opposition candidates or their election
program (Agence France Presse, March 4, 1994).
In addition, some institutions o f independent media were shut down for
supporting independent and opposing pro-govemment candidates. For instance, the
local authorities in the capital city closed down an independent television station
during the campaign for broadcasting stories critical of the city’s mayor and the
election itself. The television station was owned by Sergei Duvanov whose application
for registration as a candidate in the election was rejected by the authorities (The
Washington Post, March 8, 1994:A 14). In another instance, state-controlled printing
facilities ceased printing 17 newspapers, including opposition ones, during the
campaign period on the pretext that such a move was unavoidable due to paper
shortage and mechanical problems in the facilities (Agence France Presse, March 4,
994). The authorities also used other intimidating methods to obstruct the campaign of
independent candidates. For instance, LAD complained that the authorities shut down
the headquarters o f local chapters o f independent associations (CSCE, March,
1994:10-11) and Hassen Kozhahmet, a leader o f the Kazakh nationalist movement,
Zheltoqsan, had to suspend his campaign because his campaign agents were subjected
to mounting pressure (Agence France Presse, March 4, 1994).
Like the registration and campaign, the voting also had both positive and
negative sides. In some cases, the chairman o f the polling station observed the
election rules and conducted the voting in a fair way. However, in many cases, the
voting was marred by numerous violations. These violations included multiple voting,
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returning officers telling voters how to vote, harassment o f media, and ballot stuffing
resulting in discrepancies in the number of votes cast and the votes counted (CSCE,
March 1994:11-12; Reuters World Service, March 9, 1994).
Although there is no hard evidence to impute these irregularities to the
executive leadership and these clearly appeared to be the handiwork o f the local
authorities and election commissions, a look at the election results leads one to
reasonably suspect that the local authorities enjoyed some sort o f blessing o f the
executive leadership in this handiwork. The electoral outcome surely pleased the
president because the new parliament was dominated by his men. In addition to 42
seats on the president’s list, 33 seats went to the president’s party, the Union of
National Unity o f Kazakhstan, and 11 seats were won by the Federation o f Trade
Union, another public association closely associated with the president and involved in
harassing independent trade unions (CSCE, March 1994:9, 13). A number o f other
associations which each won one seat were also pro-goverament. The People’s
Congress won 9 seats and the Socialist Party 8 seats. Although at times both parties
took independent positions on various matters and have been critical o f certain
policies o f the president, both were expected, in view o f the president’s hand in their
creation and subsequent close cooperation with him, to support him in the new
parliament. However, in addition to a number o f individual independent candidates,
the truly independent public association with a noticeable presence in the parliament
was LAD which won 4 seats in the election (CSCE, March 1994:13). The total
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opposition seats were 32, according to one press report (The Christian Science
Monitor, March 11, 1994:8).
The electoral outcome hardly pleased opposition parties and they loudly
protested. LAD was the fu st opposition group (followed by others) to lodge its formal
protest over serious violations which occurred in the voting. In a letter delivered to
the central election commission, a leader o f LAD condemned serious violations in the
election and demanded its cancellation (Rueter World Service, March 9, 1994). The
Kazakh nationality was overrepresented with 105 seats (or 60 percent o f seats) in the
parliament, whereas they constituted close to 43 percent of the population. The
Russian nationality was underrepresented with 49 seats (or 28 percent o f seats) in the
parliament, whereas they constituted close to 37 percent o f the population. The
Russian individual activists and associations like LAD protested over this situation.
Their complaints were supported by the Russian government officials (Tass, March
11, 1994; Agence France Presses, March 10, 1994; Official Kremlin International
News Broadcast, March 11, 1994).55
The victorious candidates represented other nationalities, too. There were 10
Ukrainians, 3 Germans, 3 Jews, and a number o f other nationalities each with one
seat (CSCE, March 1994:13). It looked, at least at that time, as if the president got
what he wanted—a pliant parliament made up o f deputies representing various
nationalities.
However, the immediate jubilation o f the executive leadership over the
electoral outcome was dampened by the negative assessment o f some important
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international observers such as the delegations from CSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly
and the Helsinki Commission, the Russian mass media, and the local press (The
Christian Science Monitor, March 11, 1994:8; Reuter World Service, March 9, 1994;
CSCE, March 1994:12).56 While these international observers praised the
government for holding multiparty elections, allowing opposition groups to participate
in the election, inviting international observers, and showing "a desire...to move
toward democracy" (Los Angeles Times, March 9, 994:A7), they in the final analysis
concluded that the election did not meet international standards and refused to
consider it free and fair (CSCE, March 1994:12).
Although some international monitors, including the French members o f the
C SCE’s parliamentary delegation, came to his rescue by observing that the election
was relatively free and fair and that many problems resulted from inexperience rather
than from deliberate attempts to rig elections (CSCE, March 1994:13; Los Angeles
Times, March 9, 1994:A7; The Reuter European Community Report, March 15,
1994), the negative assessment o f some important international observers cast a
shadow on the authenticity o f electoral results and greatly angered the president and
his administration. He vehemently rejected the charges and considered election
democratic in a televised address on March 10, 1994 (CSCE, March 1994:13).
However, this defense later came to haunt him when the Constitutional Court
invalidated the 1994 parliamentary election on the basis of a number of irregularities,
including multiple voting.
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The second reason that dampened the jubilation o f the executive leadership
over the electoral outcome was that it soon learnt that its efforts to create a propresidential parliam ent were coming to naught. Soon after the election, a number of
parties and movements joined forces to form a constructive opposition bloc which was
to promote democratic-buiiding through its faction in the parliament. The so-called
constructive opposition bloc publicly said that the main reason for the disastrous
position o f the people was not "legal but often illegal decisions ami actions by
Kazakhstan’s state authorities" (BBC, April 19 and May 18, 1994).
After the opening session which went smoothly, the opposition faction, Legal
Development o f Kazakhstan, circulated a statement that sharply criticized the
government and demanded the resignation o f the government. Within days 85
members o f the parliam ent supported the statement (Russian Press Digest, May 28,
1994). Although the president was abie to avert the immediate crisis with the help o f
his allies in the parliam ent, he later appointed a new government which entered into a
dialogue with the disgruntled deputies (Russian Press Digest, May 28, 1994; BBC,
October 22, 1994). The lesson of this crisis was clear to the president: He could no
more trust the parliam ent as a united presidential bloc. What made this lesson more
clear was the fact that the parliament resisted the president on a number of important
issues. For instance, it rejected his proposal to convert the parliament into bicameral
parliament and overruled him when he vetoed the laws on social security issues,
including the minimum wage (BBC, August 18, 1994).
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In March 1995, the Constitutional Court provided much-needed relief to the
president when it decided a complaint about the legality of the 1994 parliamentary
election. The Constitutional Court ruled that the election was illegal because o f a
number of irregularities, including discrepancies between the number o f votes cast
and the actual number o f voters. Both the president and the parliament objected to the
ruling, but the Constitutional Court reconfirmed its decision.
W hether the president engineered it, as some of his critics (including the
members o f the parliament) and political analysts claim (Agence France Presse,
March 15, 1995; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 12, 1995) or not, the ruling surely
provided him with a unique opportunity to try to restructure political system with the
executive position impervious to future institutional challenges.
After the Constitutional Court rejected his objection to its ruling, Nazarbayev
decreed that the parliament ceased its existence as of March 6, 1995, the day the
court handed down the decision to this effect. Most parliament members tried to defy
the judicial verdict as well as the presidential decree. They suspended certain articles
of the constitutions, passed resolutions, staged hunger strike, and set up an alternative
People’s Parliament, but all came to naught. The president prevailed (Russian Press
Digest, March 14, 1995; Agence France Presse, March 15, 1995). He assumed
special powers, both executive and legislative, which were bestowed upon by the
parliament in December 1993, and promised to hold the next parliamentary election
within two to three months. However, he soon abandoned the idea, inaugurated a
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period o f presidential rule by decree, and attended the project o f political restructuring
in order to make his position impervious to the parliamentary pressure.
The first thing he did was that he convened a People’s Assembly which voted
to extend his tenure as president until 2000. He then held a successful national
referendum to seek a popular approval o f the extension in April 1995. He singlehandedly drafted a new constitution and held another successful national referendum
to approve it in August 1995. All o f this was being done over the objection and
protest o f a number of leading individual politicians, opposition parties, and above all
the judges o f the Constitutional Court. After the Constitutional Court judges expressed
their views that the draft constitution published in June 1995 contained undemocratic
provisions which would give the president extensive powers (but would not hold him
responsible for anything), greatly limit the power of parliament to only lawmaking
(but with no right to change the constitution), and infringe on human rights (Russian
Press Digest, August 30, 1995), the president dropped the provision o f the
Constitutional Court in the final draft and instead proposed a Constitutional Council
controlled and guided by the chief executive (Agence Frace Presse, August 31, 1995).
After the referendum on the 1995 constitution, he scheduled legislative
elections for December 5 and 9, 1995. The new constitution restructured the
parliament. The new parliament was composed of two chambers, the Majlis (or lower
house) with 67 seats and the Senate (or upper house) with 47 seats. The lower house
members would be elected in a one-seat territorial constituencies through direct vote,
whereas tw o senators will be elected in each of the republic’s 19 regions and the
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capital city through electorate college o f the representative bodies o f the regions. The
president would hand-pick 7 more senators.
Nomination o f candidates for the upper house took place between October 10
and November 4, and the period for nomination o f candidates began from October 10
through October 29, 1995. The registration results were announced on November 17,
1995. A total o f 49 candidates were registered to contest 40 seats in the upper house.
285 candidates vied for 67 seats in the lower house. A total o f 30 public associations,
including political parties and movements, took part in the election (Tass, November
3, 1995) and nominated a total o f 193 candidates. 138 candidates were selfnominated, including 10 for the upper house and 128 for the lower house (Tass,
December 9, 1995).
The majority o f candidates were nominated by the pro-president sociopolitical
associations such as the Union o f People’s Unity o f Kazakhstan (38), the Federation
o f Trade Unions,candidates (21), the Democratic Party (22), and the Kazakh Peasant
Union (13). The representation o f real opposition parties was quite small (Tass,
November 17, 1995). Most of the registered candidates were leading local officials,
businessmen, managers in state-run enterprises and companies, and members o f the
sociopolitical associations close to the president (Russian Press Digest, December 1,
1995; BBC, November 19, 1995).
As compared to the 1994 parliamentary election, there were fewer complaints
about the nomination and registration processes in the 1995 elections. In fact, the
main reason for fewer complaints and small representation of opposition parties was
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that the main opposition parties and movements such as the Socialist Party, Azat, the
W orker’s Movement and Social Democratic Party boycotted the election (Agence
Frace Presse, December S, 1995). In fact, immediately after the election commission
announced the time table for the legislative elections, most opposition parties and
movements met in the capital city to express their fears about the "complete
dependence o f the future parliament on the executive structures” and about its
inability "to work as a full-fledged legislative body” (BBC, October 14, 1995). They
also doubted the legality of the elections held in accordance with the constitution
which was illegally adopted and feared that the executive bodies and election
commissions formed by them might create obstacles in the way o f opposition parties.
As a result, they announced their reluctance to take part in the 1995 legislative
elections. O f all the parties which attended the meeting, only the Communist Party
took a different decision and participated in the elections because it had thought it
could win seats in the upper house (BBC, October 14, 1995; Agence France Presse,
December 5, 1995). Interestingly, the Communist Party fielded only 10 candidates for
both the houses (Agence France Presse, December 5, 1995).
Although a number o f independent candidates were allowed to register,
Kazakh authorities did not hesitate to block their arch critics or those candidates
whose campaigning was judged to be contrary to the constitution from running in the
election. In one important instance, the authorities arrested a Cossack leader, Nikolai
Gunkin, in Alma-Ata on October 28, 1995. He was reportedly trying to register
himself as a candidate in the election for the lower house. The authorities took him in
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custody on charges o f holding illegal rallies (BBC, October 31, November 2 and 4,
1995) in January 1995. The time lapse between the rally and the arrest raised serious
questions about the motives of the authorities and provoked strong protest from the
Cossack community and a short-lived crisis in Russian-Kazakh relations (BBC,
November 6 and 20, 1995; Russian Press Digest, November 14, 1995; Tass,
November 20, 1995). In addition, the authorities canceled the registrations o f a
number o f candidates for specific campaign violations.37 However, as compared to
the 1994 elections, the number o f such incidents was insignificant, thanks to the
boycott of most opposition parties, in the 1995 legislative elections, and, as a result,
helped the authorities receive an overall satisfactory assessment from most
international monitors.
Almost 100 international observers monitored the elections. The lack o f
alternative candidates in the upper house was too apparent to escape their eyes
(Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Dec 5, 1995). In addition, they noted a number o f
previous but less serious violations, although most international observers, including
the European Parliament’s delegation, considered the conduct of the 1995 legislative
elections as an improvement on the previous one (The Reuters European Community
Report, December 14, 1995). While crediting the Kazakh authorities for adopting a
number of international observers’ recommendations such as "simpler candidate
registration process, greater dissemination o f opposition views, more funding
opportunities for candidates and the inclusion o f independent domestic" monitors, the
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OSCE delegation noted the downside o f the elections, including the practice o f family
voting and the lack o f standardized voting procedures across the country.
O f course, such violations were far less serious than the ones committed in the
previous legislative elections. In addition, the OSCE delegation noted that the election
campaign was "exceptionally quiet, with little debate or information" (Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, December 11, 1995). O f course, when most candidates were the
president’s men and members o f the pro-president parties, and when most opposition
parties were staying out o f the elections, it could hardly been otherwise. In any event,
thanks to the opposition boycott which saved Kazakh authorities the trouble of
keeping inconvenient candidates out o f the electoral process under the close scrutiny
of international observers and the consequent international embarrassment, they were
able to finally put in place a truly pliant parliament—an outcome which hardly
surprised opposition circles and others, including journalists and analysts, who were
expecting it.
The preceding discussion o f the electoral process highlights two important
points. First, although independent individual candidates and political parties were
provided a limited access to the post-independence electoral process, Kazakh
authorities made it sure that this restricted access did not result in any strategic
advantage for the opposition forces. In other words, because o f their limited access to
the electoral process, opposition forces would have no real chance o f either replacing
the executive leadership or dominate the parliament. Second, Kazakh authorities
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predominantly relied on manipulative practices and procedures rather than on outright
repressive methods to avoid these potential risks.
THE RISE O F INDEPENDENT MEDIA W ITH D E FIN IT E LIMITS
Like their approach toward other aspects of political liberalization. Kazakh
authorities pursued a less than consistent approach toward the mass media in the postindependence period. As compared to the pre-independence period, independent
sociopolitical forces were also relatively free to set up independent media outlets in
the post-independence period. In fact, as already mentioned, independent institutions
of the mass media witnessed quantitative as well as qualitative progress in the post
independence period. In other words, not only the number o f independent media
outlets increased in the post-independence period but also they continued to put out
certain information and material quite critical of Kazakh authorities. However, they
continued to face a number o f serious restrictions and were subjected to various
repressive measures in the post-independence period.
As already mentioned, once they allowed a number o f autonomous formations
to arise in the post-independence period due to the high cost involved in the complete
depoliticization o f opposition forces, including political activists of the resourceful
Russian minority and important communist and non-communist political leaders,
Kazakh authorities lost, for all practical purposes, the option o f completely stopping
them from all sort o f independent political activity. Hence, the fact that these groups
would engage in a number o f independent activities, including efforts to set up their
own media outlets, was a foregone conclusion. In addition, once they allowed
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opposition groups to hold press conferences, party congresses, round tables, and
protest rallies (both authorized and unauthorized), the fact that the media outlets, both
the state-owned and independent, would cover these events with critical remarks about
them and their policies was yet another foregone conclusion. The use of outright and
indiscriminate repression o f independent and opposition media outlets could
potentially entail by and large similar repercussions and costs which in the first place
obliged the Kazakh leadership to tolerate the rise of autonomous sociopolitical groups
and their engagement in a number of independent activities. The truly affordable
option then Kazakh authorities faced and pursued was not how to completely stop
opposition forces from setting up their own media outlets and from criticizing them
but what topics to keep off-limits, how to keep independent media outlets within
definite limits, and how to reduce the volume of overall criticism o f their policies.
Thus, Kazakh authorities’ less than consistent approach toward the mass media is the
product of the interplay between their desire (and attempts) to slow down the
democratization process and pro-reform pressures generated by the political activism
o f the Russian minority and members of the split elite structure in the post
independence period. In the following pages, we will discuss our empirical data on
the mixed record o f the Kazakh leadership on the question o f the press freedom.
While the law guaranteed freedom o f the mass media and the Kazakh
leadership generally tolerated independent media outlets in the post-independence
period, certain restrictions, including the registration requirement and the prohibition
o f discussion o f certain ’off-limits’ subjects discussed in the preceding pages, were
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also codified in order to apparently prevent the abuse o f such freedom. In addition,
Kazakh authorities’ control over printing facilities, printing paper, distribution system,
and subsidies further increased the vulnerability o f independent media outlets to
official pressure and manipulation.
Although the law contained a number o f restrictive provisions, Kazakh
authorities mostly refrained from overstretching them in order to curb all sorts of
criticism in the media and prosecute every seeming violation o f such provisions. In
fact, they discretely invoked these restrictive provisions to curb the discussion of ’offlimits' subjects in the media, encourage independent media outlets to practice selfcensorship in other matters, coerce their certain critics in the media, and curtail
freedom of independent media outlets without attempting to completely eliminate
them.
Kazakh authorities adopted varied responses toward their critics in the media,
and independent journalists and media outlets that were judged to have violated the
media code. In some cases, they took no action. However, in most cases, the
authorities did take some action against those who were judged to have stepped
outside the loosely defined limits. A variety of sources, including the press and
human rights groups, have reported and documented these varied anti-media actions
throughout the post-independence years.
In some cases, independent journalists and media outlets found to be in
violation of the guidelines were only warned and cited.38 In other cases, critics of
the authorities in the press and electronic media were tacitly harassed by the national
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and local authorities. In other words, they took administrative actions to harass
independent media outlets but did not formally charge and prosecute them. The outlets
which were dealt with in this way include Birlesu (the independent trade union
publication), Telemax (an independent television station in the capital city), the
Almaatinsky Birzhevoy Vestnik (Almaty Stock Exchange News), ABV (Auction
Bulletin), Karavan (the most independent newspaper in the capital city and the largest
circulation newspaper in Central Asia), and Zvezda Priirtyshya (Star o f the Irtysh
River Region).
The case o f Karavan deserves further comments because it clearly illustrates
how even tacit anti-media actions contributed to the impulse o f the largest circulation
paper in Central Asia to self-censorship. Karavan has been the target o f the disguised
pressure from local authorities for its independent views from the outset. However,
close to the 1994 parliamentary election, a specific incident which increased the
official disguised pressure was that it (and the Almaty Stock Exchange News)
published an open letter from the head of a major corporation who questioned the
mayor’s ability to administer the capital city. As a result, the newspaper was
subjected to various administrative measures without facing a formal charge in the
court (Tass, February 18, 1994). In addition, the newspaper ran critical stories about
the dissolution o f the parliament in March 1995—a step which constituted an indirect
criticism o f the president. After the newspaper ran such stories, a warehouse o f
Karavan burned down for reasons disputed between the newspaper and the authorities.
In any case, a loss o f about 1 million dollars in the fire incident caused the newspaper
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to gradually reduce its coverage of political topics (U .S. Department of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995:910).
A look at such harassment cases shows that most cases occurred during the
national election and referendum periods. In other words, it suggests that Kazakh
authorities became more sensitive to open criticism and relatively more aggressive in
their dealing with opposition and independent media outlets during these periods. The
opposition and independent media outlets, including those run by powerful economic
and political figures, acknowledged this connection, and yet increased the volume of
criticism o f the national and local authorities during such periods (Tass, February 18,
1994) to resist official heavy-handedness and to protect the available independent
space.
In still other cases, a number of critics in the media were subjected to some
sort of undisguised punitive measures such as dismissal from service, detention,
arrest, prosecution, and conviction for their criticism o f Kazakh authorities and for
other offenses ranging from insulting the honor o f the president and leading public
officials to inciting ethnic tension in the republic. In addition, a number o f
independent media outlets were either banned altogether or suspended temporarily or
sued or threatened with a law suit under similar charges.59 The fate o f the stateowned media which tried to step out o f the loosely defined limits was no different
from that o f independent media outlets. For instance, the General Prosecutor’s office
closed down the official newspaper, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, and initiated legal
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action against the editor o f the newspaper for inciting ethnic tension in the republic
(BBC, April 6, 1995).
In addition to the preceding anti-media actions toward national journalists and
media outlets, Kazakh authorities displayed heavy-handedness toward foreign
journalists and media outlets as well. A number o f international journalists have been
reportedly expelled, warned, detained, arrested and/or convicted for violating the
media code. In one instance, the authorities blocked Russian correspondents from
transmitting reports to Moscow about ethnic tensions in May 1993. International
media outlets were also subjected to official heavy-handedness for similar violations.
For instance, in April 1996, Kazakh authorities charged a Russian newspaper,
Komsomolskaya Pravda, with fanning ethnic tension and requested the court to
suspend the newspaper for six months. In fact, the newspaper had published an article
of a Russian writer, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who advocated annexation o f northern
provinces of Kazakhstan with Russia. After independent journalists requested the
court not to take any action and more importantly after the newspaper dissociated
itself from the article and its claims, the authorities dropped the case (Tass, June 7,
1996; Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet Press, no. 19, 1996:17; BBC, July 26, 1996).
In addition to the above clear-cut example o f official heavy-handedness toward
both national and international independent journalists and media outlets, there are a
number of doubtful cases o f the closure of certain independent media outlets. In other
words. Kazakh authorities on the one hand and opposition and independent sources on
the other offered different versions about why and how some media outlets went out
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of business (The Xinhua News Agency, July 6, 1993; BBC, February 6, 1997; U.S.
Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996:993-94).
Such outlets include Pravda (the mouthpiece of the CPSU), Max radio and television
company, a number of radio and television stations which went off air due to the
auction o f frequencies in 19%, and All-Russian Television and Radio Company.
The official heavy-handedness toward independent journalists and media
outlets, the fear of punitive official reactions to concocted violations of the law, the
government control over printing facilities, printing paper, subsidies, and registration
surely contributed to the impulse to self-censorship and reduced the volume of
criticism o f Kazakh authorities in the media. A wide variety o f anti-media actions,
disguised and undisguised, and so many victims of such actions can understandably
create an impression that the mass media in Kazakhstan enjoyed little or no freedom
in the post-independence period. A number of opposition and independent sources,
including the Association of Independent Electronic Media o f Central Asia (ANESMI)
hold this view (CSCE, March 1998:36; U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for 1997:1141). In spite o f the above large body of
indisputable evidence, this view is partly true. There is also an almost equal amount
of indisputable evidence which persuasively tells the second half o f the story. That is,
in spite o f many restrictions and many examples of heavy-handedness of Kazakh
authorities, independent media outlets have been able to arise, create a sizable
independent space for themselves, and win an official, however grudging, recognition
of this space in the post-independence period.
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In fact, all the available evidence on the official heavy-handedness toward
independent media outlets does not prove the case that Kazakh authorities ever
launched a frontal attack to eliminate all o f their critics in the media, independent
journalists and media outlets. There is strong evidence to show that, in spite o f their
heavy-handedness in many cases, the authorities tolerated sizable independent space
for the mass media in the post-independence period. Throughout the post
independence years, independent media outlets continued to express their own views
on various important matters and criticize the authorities, o f course within definite
limits, with impunity.
A comprehensive look at the total available evidence in this context suggests
that both the state-owned and independent institutions o f mass media continued to
appear and disappear in the post-independence period for political and economic
reasons and that both restrictions and freedoms characterize the post-independence
period. If some independent media outlets were at times shut down by the government
for political reasons, other independent institutions o f mass media were allowed to
arise and operate. If the local authorities cut o ff electricity to the television station
Telemax for its critical broadcast, they tolerated its critical broadcast from a different
location and continued to allow its affiliate radio stations to broadcast news critical o f
them (U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Practices for 1994:859).
There are several other similar instances which further illustrate the fact o f the
continued existence o f independent institutions o f mass media in Kazakhstan in the
post-independence period. The fact that independent media outlets, especially the
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press, have been relatively free in Kazakhstan throughout the post-independence years
is acknowledged by opposition political parties and other independent associations,
including human rights groups (CSCE, March 1998:35). Of course, leaders o f most
opposition parties and independent human rights groups can not fail to confirm this
relative freedom o f the mass media because their press conferences, party congresses,
round tables, unauthorized rallies, and their speeches and remarks critical o f the
authorities have, for the most pan, regularly appeared in both the state-owned and
independent media outlets without any punitive action against the reponing media.
By the end o f the first year o f its independence, Kazakhstan was reported to
have a large number o f both registered and unregistered independent publications and
electronic media companies. Most opposition groups, including unregistered and
radical groups, could and did publish their own newspapers in the post-independence
period (BBC, August 27, 1992; U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1992:815). By and large, this situation persisted
throughout the post-independence period. As of 1997, there were 31 independent
radio and television stations in country, including 11 in the capital city alone; each
population center housed at least one independent publication; the capital city alone
housed 7 major independent newspapers (U .S. Department of State, Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for 1997:1140-1141). It is outside the scope o f this study
to discuss in detail each and every opposition and independent newspapers and other
institutions o f mass media which existed in Kazakhstan in the post-independence
period. It will suffice for our purpose here to list notable opposition and independent
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media outlets and briefly discuss the freedom o f expression they enjoyed in the post
independence period.
In addition to some independent media outlets cited in the preceding pages,
other notable independent and opposition newspapers which were allowed to appear in
the post-independence period include Delovaya Nedelya (Business Weekly), Novoye
Pokleniye (New Generation), Karavan Blitz, and Twenty-first Century. The
newspapers like Delovaya Nedelya, Novoye Pokleniye, and Twenty-first Century
truly emerged as voices for the opposition.
In addition to providing considerable coverage to the opposition’s activities and
positions critical of Kazakh authorities (BBC, September 26 and November 27, 1996),
independent (and official) newspapers debated several unsavory issues in ways critical
of the government and its policies. The flawed economic transition policies, poor
social policies (BBC, August 18, 1994), bureaucratic mismanagement, and heavyhandedness o f law-enforcement forces (BBC, September 26, 1996) were common
unsavory issues the press could and did freely report on and debate (BBC, November
21, 1997). More unsavory topics the independent press discretely reported on and
debated with impunity include concentration of power in the president, constitutional
matters (Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet Press, no. 16, 1995:22), power struggle
between the executive and the parliament, (BBC, January 28, 1993), electoral
violations (Tass, February 18, 1994), and official corruption. In addition, independent
print media increasingly criticized not only the parliament*0 but also certain
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presidential decisions, including the agreement with Russia on the lease o f Baikonur
space center (BBC, July 25, 1995).
Although the key subjects which have remained and have been considered to
be "off-limits” alm ost throughout the post-independence period were the ethnic
relations, personal criticism of the president and his family, and corruption of political
office holders, the press has taken remarkably bold steps to print critical material
about some o f these topics. Some independent newspapers have lately dared touch on
most ’off-limits’ subjects. Karavan has reportedly gained respect and become the most
widely circulated newspaper in the republic for its independent stance on various
issue. It was admired for ”taking on Alma Ata’s powerful former mayor, and
publishing detailed articles on the discontent o f Kazakhstan’s Russian population”
(Financial Times (London), February 13, 1995:2). Its affiliate, Karavan Blitz, a
tabloid newspaper, also carried news about hard economic conditions in Russiandominated towns and cities (BBC, October 18, 1996).
In August 1996, Karavan and another independent newspapers, Delovaya
nedelya (a Russian-language business weekly in the capital city) "broke a national
taboo by criticizing" the president and got away with it (Financial Times (London),
September 10, 1996:6). Karavan carried an article by a former cabinet minister and
the leader of Azamat, Petr Svoik. The writer described Kazakhstan a "banana
republic" and accused Kazakh authorities o f nepotism. He blamed the president rather
than his advisers for the lack of progress in democratic reforms in the republic
(Financial Times (London), September 10, 1996:6). The second article published in

241

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Delovaya Nedelya lashed out at foreigner investors for questionable practices,
including hiring relatives o f senior officials, to ensure lucrative contracts. The author
with the pseudonym o f Maxim Mikhailichenko lamented the role o f bribes and
connections in shaping things in the republic. He went on to assert that there were no
equal opportunities and that if he had been married to the daughter o f the president he
would be one o f the "wealthiest businessmen" in the country. The one day detention
of Svoik by police for driving a stolen car during his tour of the country can be
attributed to the article but no action was taken against both Karavan (the most critical
newspaper published by one of the most resourceful person in the republic) and
Delovaya Nedelya (Financial Times (London), September 10, 1996:6).
The publication o f the two articles was not the last time that the press broke a
national taboo. In fact, Karavan dared publish two more articles on October 3, 1997,
which contained sharp and direct criticism o f both the president and the prime
minister. The first letter called upon the president to oust the prime minister, Akezhan
Kazhegeldin, for leading the country to a "catastrophe" and for his image "among
businessmen and high government bureaucrats" as a corrupt person who "does not
just take (bribes and kickbacks), he takes a lot" (CSCE, March 1998:35). Although
the letter was ostensibly aimed at the prime minister, no one could mistake that it
implicitly tried to discredit the president, too, for presiding over this situation. The
second letter was far more explosive and direct in its attack on the president. It was
first published in the Moscow press. However, Karavan reprinted it, unedited. The
letter chronicled, in an accusatory fashion, his political engineering in the post-
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independence period and levelled a number o f other serious charges. More
specifically, it accused the president for incessantly experimenting with the
constitutions and governments, for dissolving two disobedient parliaments and creating
one totally under his control, for wielding unlimited authority without being
responsible for any action, for placing family members in lucrative positions, for
creating personal dictatorship with the potential for a family dynasty, for coercing and
intimidating leaders o f autonomous sociopolitical associations on a regular basis, and
for allowing the overwhelming majority to impoverish and a small group o f people in
power to appropriate great riches (CSCE, March 1998:36-36). The letter stopped
short of personally accusing the president o f corruption.
There are various theories as to how the authors dared and why karavan
published such letters and why the authorities tolerated them. According to one
theory, the second letter was sponsored by the prime minister and his close ally, Boris
Giller, the publisher o f Karavan and the biggest media tycoon in Central Asia. The
motive behind their sponsorship o f the letter was to prepare the way for the former to
become a formidable challenge to the president in Kazakh politics, especially in the
next presidential election. If this theory is true, it means that division and political
struggle among powerful elites contributes, as we expected, to political liberalization
in the post-communist countries in Central Asia. According to another view, the
president him self sanctioned the publication o f the letter to demonstrate how open is
Kazakhstan under his rule (CSCE, March 1998:36). Whatever the case may be, the
fact that the newspaper was not punished underscored the possibility o f open and
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personal criticism o f the president who was once considered to be the key ’off-limits'
subject.
The preceding discussion suggests that in view of political mobilization o f the
large, resourceful Russian minority and the split elite structure, the affordable option
Kazakh authorities faced and pursued in line with their desire to avoid full scale
democratization o f society was not a frontal attack but a selective use o f coercion to
reduce rather than eliminate criticism o f them in the mass media. If some independent
media outlets were at times closed, others were permitted to arise and operate. In
other words, both restrictions and freedoms characterize the post-independence
relationship between Kazakh authorities and the mass media outlets.
CONCLUSION
In the pre-independence period, political openness belatedly made its way to
Kazakhstan initially as a weak reflection o f the center-sponsored reform program.
However, ethnonationalist policies o f Kazakh authorities, political activism of ethnic
groups, especially the Russian minority and the titular nationality, and the growing
fragmentation o f the communist elite structure later supplemented the positive impact
of the perestroika and glasnost processes on political liberalization. The political
liberalization process experienced an incremental improvement during the three
successive leaders, Kunayev, Kolbin, and Nazarbayev, who oversaw the
implementation o f the Gorbachev reform program, in spite o f their continued aversion
to independent sociopolitical initiatives. In spite o f the greater salience independent
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sociopolitical initiatives acquired under him, Nazarbayev, like his predecessors,
jealously guarded the electoral process from the rising autonomous societal forces.
After independence, an overall improvement occurred in various areas o f
political liberalization in the republic. A weak, but genuine, political opposition was
able to arise and function within definite limits. Not only the number of independent
political groups increased but also the range of independent activities in which they
could engage widened in the post-independence period. The independent mass media
also witnessed qualitative as well as quantitative progress in the post-independence
period. A sizable number o f independent institutions o f mass media continued to
appear and disappear for both economic and political reasons in the post-independence
period. O f course, some topics were declared or considered to be 'off-lim its’ and both
the official and private mass media practiced self-censorship. However, they could
still cover activities and views o f opposition forces, take independent position on
important matters, and publish and broadcast information critical of Kazakh
authorities and their policies. O f all the areas of political liberalization, the
independent individual and organized electoral participation experienced least
progress. Because a fair, free and competitive electoral process could potentially
politicize, mobilize, and empower social groups, including the Russian minority,
beyond limits acceptable to them, Kazakh authorities jealously guarded the post
independence electoral process from independent individual and organized
participation. In spite o f this, the post-independence electoral system was still an
improvement on the previous one.
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In line with its cautious reform approach in which enlightened authoritarianism
is a stage in the transition from totalitarianism to a market economy and democracy
and economic reforms take precedence over political reforms, the Kazakh leadership
moderates pro-reform pressures and tries to keep the post-independence political
liberalization process within definite limits acceptable to it rather than to seek
complete depoliticization o f society. In fact, to seek complete depoliticization of
society is not a safe and feasible option for Kazakh authorities because it requires
excessive and indiscriminate repression which, in the presence o f a large, resourceful
Russian population and fragmented elite structure along ideological, ethnic and tribal
lines, entails a prohibitive cost. Thus, the safe option which they face and pursue is
how to keep the political liberalization process within acceptable limits. The result of
this pursuit is that both freedoms and restrictions characterize the post-independence
political scene in the republic. In other words, as a result o f an interplay between pro
reform pressures and cautious reform approach o f the Kazakh leadership, the overall
record o f Kazakhstan on political liberalization in the post-independence period is
mixed, earning it a place between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the political
liberalization scale.
How long is Kazakhstan likely to stay at this point on the political
liberalization scale? Is the republic likely to slide in either direction on the political
liberalization scale in the foreseeable future? What are the future prospects o f political
liberalization in the republic? Indeed, it is hard to predict with confidence the future
of the political liberalization process in countries like Kazakhstan which are passing
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through the unprecedented, monumental post-communist transition and rank low on
socioeconomic indicators commonly associated with political democracy. However,
broad, educated speculations about the future direction of the political liberalization
process are possible on the basis o f our theoretically informed analysis and certain
evident objective conditions.
Kazakh authorities have thus far postponed full scale democratization of their
society on various pretexts, including Asian mentality, economic recovery through a
transition to market-based relations, and inter-ethnic accord. If this is a genuine
assessment, it can be safely said that full scale democratization o f public life is a
distant prospect in Kazakhstan and that the Kazakh leadership is more likely to stay
the present course o f permitting political liberalization within definite limits acceptable
to it. In fact, both economic recovery and inter-ethnic accord are still illusive goals
for Kazakhstan. And, we have no persuasive reason to expect the so-called oriental
mentality to experience a suddent, fundamental pro-democratic change in the
foreseeable future.
However, we have other reasons to expect that full scale democratization of
public life is not on the horizon in the republic, but it will continue to experience
political liberalization within definite limits in the foreseeable future. There is no
indication that the incumbent leadership has developed any detailed blueprints for
launching an intensive and extensive democratization process in the near future. In
fact, quite the contrary. Nazarbayev has consolidated his personal power and built a
rigid institutional power structure around him. He is in no mood to decentralize it.
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Rather, he can be tempted to misuse it again to prolong his rule beyond the year
2000. If he does so, he is more likely to rely on institutional engineering and political
manipulation accompanied with limited repression rather than massive repression
which is really not a safe option for him in this context. In other words, even if he
chooses to perpetuate his personal rule, Kazakhstan will continue to experience some
sort o f political liberalization due to certain safeguards, including the large,
resourceful Russian minority and fragmented elite structure, against its backsliding
into a despotic state like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
The most serious threat to the present level o f political liberalization arises
from the breakout o f armed hostilities due to the intensification o f already sharp
subcultural differences in the republic. In particular, the armed resistance o f the
Russian minority for one reason or another can potentially lead to a complete
breakdown o f the ongoing political liberalization process at least for some period of
time, though it may deepen the democratization process in the long run if Kazakh
authorities found a negotiated settlement with the help o f Russian authorities. If the
past experience is o f any guide, Kazakh authorities are more likely to offer their
Russian population limited political concessions, including limited local autonomy and
access to national political processes, to preempt the rise of such armed resistance. In
other words, the continued presence of a large, resourceful Russian minority enjoying
the potential support o f Russian authorities is an effective safeguard against the rise of
an abject repressive regime in Kazakhstan. Hence, we expect the republic to continue
to experience some sort o f political liberalization in the foreseeable future. W hat
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further enhances this prospect is the fact that there is little or no chance of consensus
building among most elites o f different colors and ethnic origins on the need to roll
back the political liberalization process underway in the republic within definite
limits.
The preceding assertions by no means suggest that full scale democratization
of public life is out o f question for the foreseeable future. In fact, in order for
Kazakhstan to move out o f the present middle position between Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan and climb up on the political liberalization scale in the near future, it
requires certain favorable conditions. More specifically, the full scale democratization
process is more likely to begin in the republic under the three most propitious
conditions, in addition to the ones discussed above. First, the replacement o f the
incumbent cautious leadership with a more forward iooking, reform-oriented
leadership in Kazakhstan. Second, the replacement of the incumbent Russian
leadership by a democratically oriented leadership with a genuine commitment to
promote socioeconomic welfare and democratic rights o f the Russian population in the
former Soviet space. Third, an enduring alliance between political elites o f different
colors and ethnic origins, especially Kazakh and Russian, to build effective pressure
from below on Kazakh authorities to deepen the democratization process in the
country.
NOTES
1. Nazarbayev hired foreign experts to plan economic transition. Gorbachev and the
local party bosses in Kazakhstan expressed displeasure with him for hiring foreigners
to resolve domestic economic problems (Russian Press Digest, March 27, 1991).
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2. Wisdom was national-patriotic club o f reserve soldiers o f Russian origin. In a
meeting held in May and June 1988, the group issued a slogan to the masses
forbidding the marriage o f Russian people with foreigners and calling for the
expulsion o f Jewish and other immigrants to their historic homelands (BBC, January
14, 1989).
3. In October 1990, the republican parliament declared Kazakhstan a sovereign
republic. This declaration shifted control o f natural resources and economy o f the
republic from central to the republican authorities. The legislation provoked protests
in the Slav-dominated cities in the north (Pomfret 1995:79).
4. Nazarbayev later stated that Kolbin was "selected by the apparatus in the worst
tradition o f the stagnation period" as the central committee members tacitly voted for
him without asking any question (Tass, February 23, 1990).
5. Nazarbayev is described as a cautious, moderate reformist by many observers of
Kazakhstan (Khazanov 1995:148; The Washington Post, March 8, 1994:A14).
According to Olcott, he "is content to permit diversity of opinion and expression as
long as it does not interfere with the state's ability to fulfill its basic functions”
(Olcott 1995:220;
6. Nazarbayev forcefully called for an economic decentralization to reduce the
center’s direct economic control o f the republics (United Press International, June 22,
1989; Tass, August 25, 1989).
7. To the displeasure of Gorbachev and some local communists who described his
economic approach as radical, the Kazakh leader hired Western economists to help
him prepare for a Shift to a market economy (Russian Press Digest, March 27, 1991).
8. In one o f his statements, he made it clear that ”there will be no swift turn” due to
"our oriental ways’ (The Times, March 14, 1991). His prime minister, U.
Karamanov, cited the need for "iron-clad social guarantees." He also proudly
announced that his government was able to elaborate its own concept o f transition to a
market economy which took into account "ethnic and regional peculiarities" (Russian
Press Digest, June 13, 1990). The Kazakh deputy premier, Karatai Turysov, also
expressed similar views (Tass, October 9, 1990).
9. Close associates of Nazarbayev also made no secret of such views. While speaking
o f the need for strict discipline, they refer to the economic miracles o f South Korea
and Taiwan and relate them to the dictatorial regimes in those countries (BBC, July
18, 1991).
10. According to l|is opinion, a strong executive is necessary in order for his country
to make a sm ooth‘transition to a market economy because it has "no parliamentary
culture or seasoned multi-party system" (Agence France Presse, August 31, 1995).
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11. Warren Christopher, US Secretary o f State, called the referendum "a step
backward for Kazakhstan” (Los Angeles Times, April 30, 199S:A4).
12. Kunayev was addressing an election rally in Alma-Ata on February 11, 198S. In
his speech, he also paid rich tribute to Chernenko’s enormous experience, strength
and energy ( BBC, February 13, 1985).
13. The republican leadership was accused of a number o f lapses, including arbitrary
planning, inertia o f thinking, disrespect for public opinion, repression o f criticism, a
near total absence o f self-criticism, violation of the principles o f social justice,
promotion o f incompetent and corrupt personnel on the basis o f tribal and regional
affiliation, report-padding, and misappropriation of socialist property (Pravda, March
18, 1985; Current Digest o f the Soviet Press no. 11, 1985:3; Pravda, March 29.
1985; BBC, December 29, 1986).
14. In addition to his call for socioeconomic and cultural revitalization o f the country,
Gorbachev did speak of the need to deepen socialist democracy (Current Digest of
Soviet Press no. 8, 1986:11). However, at the initial stage o f his reform program, the
deepening of socialist democracy essentially meant freedom for the party cadres to
express their concerns and to support him in his effort to expose corrupt party leaders
and remove obstacles to the socioeconomic and cultural development of the country.
15. Religion could be a potential source o f autonomous societal organization in the
republic, but the Kunayev administration adopted a hostile and repressive policy
toward religion during this period. In fact, this policy was also very much in
accordance with the hostile approach o f the central authorities toward religion in the
Central Asian republics.
16. The central authorities blamed the Kazakh leadership for environmental
degradation. Whereas the republican press published articles on such problems as soil
erosion and held the previous central authorities responsible for them.
17. The central leadership sent Gyorgy P. Razumovsky, the secretary o f the CPSU
central committee for organizational and personnel questions, for this purpose
(Reuters, December 16, 1986; Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 51, 1987:1).
18. In fact, his removal was being expected since Gorbachev came to power. Many
observers expressed surprise when he was re-elected first secretary o f the republic
communist party in February 1986 (The Associated Press Dec. 16, 1986). Just one
day before his retirement, international press was predicting his removal (U.S. News
& World Report, December 15, 1986:45).
19. According to initial official reports several hundred but according to official
figures disclosed years later, almost 3,000 people participated in these riots which
lasted for two days (Los Angeles Times, February 19, 1987:10). According to
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Western sources, alm ost 10,000 people inarched on the republican communist party
headquarters (Guardian Weekly, December 28, 1986:7).
20. According to the report o f the parliamentary commission set up (years later) on
the demands o f people to reinvestigate the riots, almost 58 people died and two
hundred were hospitalized out o f 768 wounded. According to some sources, at least 7
policemen and 13 demonstrators died (The Guardian, December 28, 1986:7). In
addition, thousands o f people were arrested and some o f them were beaten at the
police stations (Russian Press Digest, September 2, 1990).
21. As a result o f this campaign, 83 out o f 99 people who were put on trial were
convicted and imprisoned; 707 people were arrested under administrative charges;
1164 cadres were expelled from the communist youth organization, Komsomol; and
266 students were expelled form educational institutions. In addition, scores of party
members were expelled and more than a thousand were admonished and reprimanded
(Russian Press Digest, September 2, 1990).
22. In 1987-88, when independent political activity was erupting in Russia and the
Baltic republics and their authorities were increasingly being challenged by the new
political forces, the Kazakh authorities were focused, in one way or another, on the
Alma-Ata riots and anti-corruption campaign and Kazakh activists were slowly
coming out o f the shock o f the riots and were in search o f less provocative causes and
less provocative methods to promote them. A small number o f people who dared to
engage in organized or unorganized political activities in one way or another adopted
a very low profile and avoided an open confrontation with the republic authorities
along the line of confrontation then underway in Russia and the Baltic republics.
23. Kazakhstanskaya pravda (February 8, 1989) accused the group o f communist
scientistic movement under the Politburo o f the CPSU Central Committee—in the city
of Temirtau in Karaganda oblast. It alleged that this group did not involve in an y
kind of scientific movement, rather it tried its best to protect and extol those members
of independent organizations who were deliberately conducting subversive work.
24. A Russian was replaced from a top post and a Kazakh was appointed in his place
(The New York Times, January 11, 1987: A8; Los Angeles Times, January 11,
1987:13). The press also reported that republican authorities would give useful jobs to
rioting students who were expelled from colleges (Reuters, January 11, 1987; The
New York Times, January 11, 1987:A8). In particular, Kolbin began to speak of the
need and introduce a number o f measures to promote Kazakh language and urge other
nationalities in the republic to learn it. In addition, he changed his earlier position of
holding the Kazakh nationalism solely responsible for the riots. He conceded that
"People o f various nationalities were among opponents o f perestroika who provoked
riots in 1986. So there are no grounds to talk about the nationalism o f the Kazakh
people" (BBC, June 24, 1988).
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25. In fact, Kolbin had thought that the rise o f independent sociopolitical initiatives in
the republic was a remote possibility (FBIS, December 9, 1988:69).
26. He expressed his aversion in his interview (FBIS Dec 9, 1988:68-74).
27. A host of autonomous sociopolitical formations that were active toward the end of
the Kolbin era included environmental groups such as Green Front, Initiative,
Ekologiya (Ecology) and Nevada Movement, peace groups such as the Kazakh Peace
Committee, socioeconomic groups such as Youth Housing Complex Movement (which
was involved in building houses for homeless), ethnic groups such as W isdom (a
Russian-oriented group), Zheltokstan (a Kazakh-oriented group), and political groups
such as the Alma-Ata People’s Front and Democratic Union (FBIS, December 9,
1988:68-74; BBC, December 24, 1988; January 14, 1989; Tass, February 7 and
March 10, 1989).
28. For instance, in 1987, a freelance journalist working with a magazine, Ara
(Bumblebee), was sent to jail for five days for a critical publication (BBC, February
3, 1987) and people like Daukenov, a serviceman and republican communist party
activist in Dzhambul, were taken under control for what the authorities called
unhealthy activities aimed at destroying social peace and inter-ethnic harmony. In the
case of Daukenov, he was arrested for his attem pt to hold a founding congress to set
up "Atameken (Fatherland) Society”—a political group which the authorities claimed
was being organized around a program dangerous to the welfare o f Kazakh society.
More specifically, what reportedly irked the authorities most was its program which
allegedly called for "the unification o f Kazakhs and their isolation from the other
people of the USSR, first and foremost in the sphere o f language” (FBIS December 9,
1988:72).
29. Kolbin used pressure and other manipulative tactics to keep inconvenient
candidates out o f the March 1989 election for the all-union parliament. The republican
authorities and press sought to discredit them and emphasized the need to protect the
masses from their anti-social, subversive platforms and actions (BBC, March 4,
1989).
30. Rebirth questioned the legality of the inclusion of the Urals area in Kazakhstan
and demanded to revoke all the decrees issued in this context (BBC September 29,
1990). Cossack Society demanded a referendum in eight norther regions o f the
republic on the question o f their accession to Russia (Official Kremlin International
News Broadcast, September 25, 1990).
31.For instance, National Democratic Party was critical o f the imperial policies o f the
center and rejoiced over the declaration o f sovereignty for republic—an unwelcome
development for an overwhelming majority o f the Russian nationality. Although
Yedinstvo was formed to promote inter-ethnic peace and harmony in the republic, its
opposition to the sovereignty declaration and its demands (such as recognition o f
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Russian language as a state language on equal footing with the Kazakh language
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, September 21, 1990) provoked
Kazakh protests and sullied its reputation as an inter-ethnic association among Kazakh
activists.
32. Kazakhstan also witnessed the rise o f a large number of apolitical groups which
on many occasions made potentially political demands. Human rights groups like
Sakharov Committee and Kazakhstan Committee, trade and labor unions like
W orkers’ Movement and Independent Union o f Miners, environmental groups like
Union for the Salvation of the Aral and Amu Darya, and historical and educational
society like Adiiet (Justice) can be included in this category o f apolitical groups.
33. According to an official source, autonomous groups held 40 rallies,
demonstrations, and protests in Alma-Ata from January through October 1990
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, October 18, 1990).
34. T he deputies asked Nazarbayev to drop the post o f first secretary o f the party
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, October 16, 1990).
35. For example, the official press published statements and views o f the leaders o f
Democratic Kazakhstan and Azat who lashed out at the republican authorities for their
respective reasons (Russian Press Digest, October 1, 1990; BBC, July 18, 1991).
36. The Kazakhstan’s Social Protection Coalition was reportedly made o f almost 250
political parties, civic and national movements, and religious organizations (Russian
Press Digest, January 23, 1993).
37. It was set up on May 24, 1997 at a round table meeting initiated by the Liberal
Movement o f Kazakhstan (BBC May 26, 1997).
38. People’s Front was created in late 1997. The members of this front include the
communist party, the Worker’s Movement, the Azat, the Lad, and others (Current
Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 52, 1998:17).
39. Kazakh authorities refused to reregister Yedinstvo because it called for making the
Russian an official language; suspended activities o f the Semirecheye Cossack Society
in November 1994 because o f its involvement in paramilitary activities and for its
efforts to promote ethnic intolerance (U .S. State Department, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1992 and 1994:816 and 860 respectively). The Cossacks
o f Petropavlovsk rejected the offer that their association would be registered if they
recognize the borders of the republic (CSCE, March 1994:6).
40. Nazarbayev has all along appealed for preserving social peace and sought to
convince opposition forces that politics o f rallies was harmful to national interest
during the transition period. As he did in the pre-independence, he proposed a year
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long moratorium on protest actions in the pre-independence period. Pro-government
formations demanded and accepted it but most opposition groups rejected it (U.S.
Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997:1143).
41. The local authorities in Shymkent and Zhambyl reportedly denied permits for
rallies because o f the "danger o f epidemics arising among large groups of people”
(U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1997:1142).
42. In June 1992, opposition parties, including unregistered ones, held a series of
unauthorized protest rallies which lasted for several days in front o f the parliament
building. In spite o f their threatening tone, Kazakh authorities took no punitive action
involving persecution o f the protesters (BBC, June 18, 1992).
43. One o f political dissidents to have received a longer sentence o f one year was
Made! Ismailov, the leader o f the ardent opposition group, the W orker’s Movement o f
Kazakhstan, for holding an unauthorized rally in support o f pensioners (BBC,
September 22, 1997).
44. For instance, Kazakh authorities suspended activities o f the local branch of the
Russian ethnonationalist group, LAD, in Ust-Mamenogorsk and began investigation o f
the Communist Party, threatened to suspend its activities and fined a number of its
local chapters for their sponsorship of unauthorized rallies held in support of the
Russian parliament’s vote to invalidate the 1991 decision to break up the former
Soviet Union. Both formations had to bring their chapters into compliance with the
law and acknowledge Kazakhstani sovereignty in order to renew their registration
(U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1996:994).
45. The arrest and sentence o f Gunkin became an inter-state issue between Russia and
Kazakhstan. After this and other incidents o f arrest o f a number o f other Cossacks,
Russia decided to deploy Cossack units on its borders with Kazakhstan. Kazakh
authorities dreaded the prospect of cooperation between these units and its Cossack
population and protested to Russian authorities over this action but of no avail.
46. For instance, in June 1992, Nazarbayev threatened to start criminal proceedings
against those participants in unauthorized rallies who insulted him and members of the
parliament (BBC, June 18, 1992). However, the threatened action was not taken.
47. Others who were persecuted include a university instructor in 1992-93 for
publishing the information that the president slapped a popular poet and politician,
Madel Ismailov, the leader o f the Worker’s Movement o f Kazakhstan, in 1997
(Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet Press, no. 52, 1998:17), and three youths for
writing anti-presidential slogans on the walls in the town o f Uralsk in 1997
(Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997:1142).
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48. For instance, a Cossack journalist, Boris Suprynuk, was convicted for inciting
inter-ethnic enmity, insulting a public prosecutor and using "bad language” during his
trial in 1995; and a prominent leader o f an ethnic Russian movement was arrested,
beaten during her detention, and put on a trial for insulting the public officials and
assault on the court representatives in 1996.
49. According to the press accounts, the demonstrators chanted the following slogans:
The "head o f bandits govern us," "Step down on your own," "Nazarbayev: You are
our Hitler" (Agence France Presse, December 8, 1996).
50. Given a high rating of Nazarbayev (Tass, November 22, 1991) and support of
major political parties, including the Socialist Party, the People’s Congress and Azat,
Kozhakhmetove was unlikely to win this election.
51. In June 1992, opposition parties held a series o f unauthorized rallies in front of
the parliament building for a number o f demands, including the ouster o f th e former
communists and seats for opposition parties in the national legislature (BBC, June 18
and 19, 1992).
52. Nazarbayev also blamed the national-radical elements for fanning inter-ethnic
tensions, suggested the parliament to ban activities o f unregistered associations, and
threatened to prosecute the protesters for insulting the president and the members of
the parliament (BBC, June 18 and 19, 1992; Russian Press Digest, June 2 2 , 1992;
Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 24, 1995:26).
53. Some deputies saw the self-dissolution o f the parliament as a "coup d ’etat"
masterminded by the president (CSCE, March 1994:4; Tne Reuters Library Report,
December 8 and 9, 1993). Some opposition groups like the Democratic Committee on
Human Rights criticized the president’s machinations to engineer the self-dissolution
of the parliament. They rather demanded his resignation ( Russian Press Digest,
October 2, 1993).
54. According to one press report, out o f 754 registered candidates, 169 w ere
directors of state enterprises, 101 member o f the government apparatus, 72 former
parliamentarians, and 53 heads of the local administration. After looking a t the
breakdown o f candidates, one Western observer remarked that these figures show us
in advance "what kind of parliament Kazakhstan is going to get" (Agence France
Presse, March 4 , 1994).
55. The observer team o f the Russian parliament complained about the treatm ent the
Russian-speaking population was receiving from the Kazakh government. I t went to
the extent of saying that the election was won before the vote was cast (Tass, March
11, 1994). Andronik Migranyan, a political adviser to Boris Yeltsin rem arked that
"There was evident discrimination... (and) this was another attempt to preserve the
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dominant position for the native Kazakhs over everybody else" (Agence France
Presse, March 10, 1994).
56. The local press also joined the international observers. Kazakhstanskaya pravda
and Sovety Kazakhstan in their March 10 issues wrote about such violations. The
former noted that "the violations are so varied that ju st listing them would create the
impression o f chaos" (CSCE, March 1994:12).
57. For instance, an ethnic Russian candidate was dropped from the electoral race
because her electoral program contain, in the eyes o f the authorities, provisions which
could incite "ethnic hatred" (U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1995:913).
58. The weekly newspaper, Economika Segodnya, was cited for not including in its
masthead all the information required by the government regulation. In addition, after
questioning its editor about an article which quoted an opposition leader criticizing the
president, Kazakh authorities warned him that one m ore citation would result in the
suspension o f its business license (U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1997:1140).
59. Independent institutions o f mass media which were banned, suspended temporarily
or sued under these charges include Khak (Truth, the Alash party’s press organ),
Kazakhskaya Pravda (Kazakh Truth, a Kazakh nationalist newspaper), Rabocheye
Delo (the Communist Party’s newspaper), Tvin (an independent television station),
Dozhivem do ponedelinka and Orda (the mouthpiece o f the Republican Party of
Kazakhstan). Khak was banned for spreading radical religious views in 1992 (BBC,
August 27, 1992); Kazakhskaya Pravda was temporarily shut down in April 1994
under the charges o f inciting ethnic tension (Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet Press,
No. 16, 1995:22); and Rabocheye Delo was closed down in June 1997, after Kazakh
authorities refused to re-register it because the newspaper had allegedly called for a
violent overthrow o f the social system—a claim the Communist Party contested and
unsuccessfully sued the authorities for their heavy-handedness (BBC, June 30, 1997).
60. Not to talk o f opposition publications, many independent newspapers and
journalists have criticized the new bicameral parliament as a "tame parliament in the
President’s pocket” (U.S. Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1996:993).
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CHAPTER 5
KYRGYZSTAN
FROM "OASIS OF DEMOCRACY" TO THE THRESHOLD
OF DICTATORSHIP?
INTRODUCTION
In the wake o f the August 1991 abortive putsch in Moscow, Askar Akayev,
the president o f Kyrgyzstan, one o f the IS Soviet republics, declared full
independence for his republic on August 31, 1991. Like other Soviet republics,
Kyrgyzstan was in the throes o f the center-sponsored economic and political reform
measures at the time o f the August 1991 coup and the subsequent formal breakup of
the Soviet Union in December 1991. However, unlike other Central Asian republics
which were governed by more or less politically unreformed communist elites,
Kyrgyzstan was ruled by a non-communist reformist president at the time of its
independence. Consequently, it surpassed them in dismantling the communist order
and in deepening political liberalization—an area in which it was well ahead o f them
at the time o f independence— in the post-independence period. As a result o f his
impressive democratic record in the early post-independence period, laudatory titles
such as "a true Jeffersonian democrat" (CSCE 1995:2) and "as an oasis o f democracy
in an authoritarian desert” (CSCE 1998:17) were awarded to Akayev and his republic
respectively.
Although by mid-1994 the political liberalization process which was making
impressive strides began to falter as Akayev launched a limited and selective
authoritarian offensive primarily against the opposition press and journalists, this
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authoritarian offensive did not degenerate into an abject repressive regime1 as has
been the case with Tajikistan (from late 1992 to mid-1997), Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan. In spite of several reversals which the political liberalization process
suffered down the road, Kyrgyzstan continued to surpass other Central Asian
republics in terms of political liberalization. One of the premises o f this study is that
the post-communist regime Akayev built in the post-independence period is the prime
example o f politically reformed regimes in Central Asia.
The impressive record o f Kyrgyzstan in the area of political liberalization is
intriguing because socioeconomic indicators commonly associated with it are
comparatively quite weak in that country. In this chapter, we intend to address this
intriguing question. We will examine our empirical evidence on political liberalization
and its correspondence with our theoretical expectations. Before we examine our
empirical data, it is important for us to first discuss the extent to which our three
independent variables, the Russian minority, elite structure, and political attitudes of
the leadership, hold in the republic. A concise discussion in this regard will be useful
for interpreting the empirical evidence and for assessing its correspondence with our
theoretical expectations.
In order to adequately appreciate the level of political liberalization Kyrgyzstan
achieved in the post-independence period, we will examine glasnost under both
Akayev and his predecessor, Absamat Masaliyev, in the pre-independence period. The
remainder o f the chapter will focus on various aspects of political liberalization in the
post-independence period. More specifically, the rise of political parties and social

259

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

movements, politics o f the electoral process, and freedom o f the independent mass
media will receive our special attention. The politics o f the authoritarian turn
beginning in mid-1994 will also be examined with the special focus on the
confrontation between the presidential leadership on the one hand and the opposition
print media and independent journalists on the other. Main findings o f this chapter
will be summarized in the conclusion.

A LARGE AND POLITICALLY ACTIVE RUSSIAN MINORITY
At the time o f independence, Kyrgyzstan housed almost one million ethnic
Russians who made up 21.5% of the population (see Table 1). The Russian minority
is mostly concentrated in the capital city, Bishkek, making up 55.8% of its population
(see Table 3). Although the titular ethnic group, Kyrgyz, made up 52% o f the total
population, it made up only 22.7% o f the capital city’s population in 1989 (see Tables
2 and 3; Huskey 1995:6; Heleniak 1997:370). A sizable number of ethnic Russians
also live on the most fertile and arable lands in southern Kyrgyzstan (Khazanov
1995:150). According to the 19% estimate, the size o f ethnic Russians shrank to 15%
and Kyrgyz increased their share of the total population to 59.9% (see Table 2).
Although the Russian minority has been increasingly shrinking in proportion to
the titular nationality primarily due to its out-migration since the 1980s,2 it continues
to be a very resourceful ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan. In addition to its large size, its
concentration in the urban areas, and occupation o f fertile lands, its technical and
professional skills and the official and private support it draws from its co-ethnics in
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Russia significantly contribute to the resourcefulness o f the Russian minority in the
republic.
Industry, medicine, and other important fields are mostly manned and managed
by ethnic Russians, and their out-migration is reportedly decimating these important
fields, accelerating the economic decline o f the republic (Olcott 1995a:219; 1997:
213; Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 17, 1993:12).3 This situation caused
serious concerns in the republican political leadership which has been offering its
Russian minority a number o f incentives to prevent the exodus o f a skilled labor force
(Huskey 1995:829; Heleniak 1997:372). The Russian governm ent’s concerns
regarding the welfare o f the Russian minority also account for such incentives.
Russian authorities have not only provided critical political support to ethnic Russians
by taking up their causes with Kyrgyz authorities at the bilateral level but have also
provide material aid to them.4 The presence of Russian troops on Kyrgyz soil further
underwrites the security o f the Russian minority in the republic.
The resourcefulness of the Russian minority resulting from both internal and
external factors is not without consequences. Its resourcefulness has induced its
members to set up sociopolitical organizations to pursue their interests, compete with
other social groups, including the titular nationality, in the republic, and make
demands on the state. A number o f ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan were among the
leading elements who answered the call o f the central reform-oriented forces to
advance the cause of perestroika in Kyrgyzstan (FBIS October 7, 1987:53-7; June 8,
1988:66-7; July 29, 1988:64-5). Gennadii Shipitko, the local correspondent of Izvestia
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and arch rival o f Masaliyev was one of such people. He also contested the March
1989 all-union parliamentary elections as an independent candidate and defeated his
communist competitor in the capital city.
O f course, Shipitko and three other independent candidates3 who defeated
their communist competitors owed their victory to the Russian residents Bishkek. The
electoral victory o f these independent candidates clearly signified the readiness and
willingness o f the Russian minority to defy the communist leadership in the republic.
In fact, ethnic Russians were among the pioneers who organized the first informal
group, Demos—a political discussion club formed in the capital city in spring 1987
(Huskey 1995:832). The subsequent organization o f informal political groups was also
facilitated by the active participation o f the Russian minority. For instance, its
members actively participated in the formation the Voter’s Club which played an
instrumental role in the victory of a sizable minority o f independent candidates in the
cities, including Bishkek, in the February 1990 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan.
The same independent candidates later played, in collaboration with the Voter’s Club
and other independent political formations, an important role in the defeat o f the
communist leadership in the October 1990 presidential elections and the victory of
Akayev, a non-party reformist candidate.
The Russian minority’s political activism did not end with the independence of
Kyrgyzstan. If anything, the Russian minority has become more alert due to the
transition policies o f the government in the post-independence period because most of
these policies are tailored to the interests o f the titular nationality. In order to promote
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its interests, it has set up many sociopolitical formations in the post-independence
period. Notable among them are the Slavic Fund, the Assembly o f the People o f
Kyrgyzstan, Soglasie (Accord), and Association o f Ethnic Russians. These Russianoriented formations advocate social equality and press for making the Russian the
second state language in Kyrgyzstan (CSCE 1995:6; 1998:16). Some o f these groups
have pooled their resources to publish their own newspapers, Soglasie, in Osh in
order to educate their own co-ethnics and influence public opinion and decision
making process in the republic. In short, the Russian minority continues to survive as
a resourceful ethnic group with a capacity to enormously increase the price o f its
repression in the post-independence period.

FRAGMENTED ELITE STRUCTURE IN KYRGYZSTAN
In the early days of glasnost, the republican communist leadership was in firm
control o f political life in Kyrgyzstan. The republican communists supported
Masaliyev’s efforts to circumvent the center-sponsored reform program. However,
this unity o f purpose did not last long. As the central authorities began to deepen their
political reform program, an increasing number o f republican communist elites
deserted their conservative leadership to join the central and republican reformoriented forces.
The first serious crack in the communist elite structure appeared on the eve of
the March 1989 all-union parliamentary elections. In fact, these elections exposed to
public view serious rifts and fault lines among the republican communist elites,
especially between the Russified urban and Central Asian rural areas. Some
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candidates like Akayev who owed their victory to the republican communist party
refused to follow its leadership. As a result, Masaiiyev failed, for the first time in the
history o f the republic, to lead a united delegation to the all-union parliament (Huskey
1995:821; 1997:250).
The February 1990 republican parliamentary elections further eroded the
communist base and elite structure in Kyrgyzstan. The communist leadership failed to
keep the republican communist elites in line and to reduce these elections into a
Soviet variety o f electoral contest with the party leadership in full control o f the
whole electoral process. As a consequence, the republican parliament saw the rise of
a very vocal group o f reformist deputies.6
Although the 1989 and 1990 elections clearly revealed widening rifts within
the communist elites themselves, the most serious fissure in the Kyrgyz elite structure
occurred in the wake o f the Osh incident, a series o f violent clashes between Uzbek
and Kyrgyz ethnic communities over a piece of land in Osh in June 1990. The
republican communist authorities not only failed to prevent the Osh incident but also
tried to blame the extremist, anti-state, and criminal forces, including the informal
groups, for the bloody incident. However, they found it hard to sell this explanation
outside as well as inside the communist party circles. A sizable number o f communist
parliamentarians were quite dissatisfied with the performance o f the republican
communist leadership in handling and more so with its explanation o f the incident. As
a result, in September 1990, a group o f 114 deputies announced its existence under
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the name o f "For Democratic Renewal and Civil Harmony in Kirghizia" in the
parliament.
In its political platform published in the local press, the group attacked the
communist leadership for its overall anti-reform approach as well as its poor handling
of the Osh incident. The group also promised "to develop its own point of view on
current public-political, social and economic processes through open debate, to
propose legislative initiatives and to draw up alternative laws, decisions and other
Supreme Soviet documents" (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 38, 1990:23).7
The formation o f such an independent reformist group in the parliament was
an unprecedented occurrence which further eroded the communist leadership position
and shook the communist elite structure to its foundation. In fact, the defection o f 114
deputies proved quite fateful. The disgruntled deputies played a critical role in the
failure o f Masaliyev to conduct and win the October 1990 presidential election in the
old Soviet style. Masaliyev had to face two other career communist leaders in this
election.8 The electoral contest between the three career communist leaders supported
by their respective supporters in the republican parliament was indicative o f a serious
rift among the communist elites. As victory eluded all the three candidates because
none of them received the required number o f votes to consummate his victory in the
presidential election, the hung parliament voted Akayev, a pro-reform member o f the
all-union parliament, into power.
The victory o f Akayev accelerated the disintegration of the communist elite
structure. After he assumed power, a sizable number o f communists joined his
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reformist team.9 This disintegrative process continued in the post-independence
period. The Kyrgyz communist party proved incapable o f bringing back its defected
members and regaining its internal unity once it was lost in 1989-90. In fact,
independence further eroded the internal integrity of the communist elite structure. A
number o f important communist leaders either became allies o f the incumbent
government or left the communist party to join other sociopolitical and ethnic-oriented
groups in the post-independence period. At times, important communist leaders
competed against each other in national elections.10
The post-independence political elites were divided not only along ideological
and ethnic lines but also along regional lines. According to M artha Olcott, elite
structure in the republic reflects the existence of three factions which correspond to
clan-based geographic divisions: Naryn, Talas, and Osh (Olcott 1993a:55).u This
division is not without consequences. According to Matveeva, political barons
representing these regions "put serious constraints on the extent o f presidential power”
(Matveeva 1999:28).12 In 1992, the election o f Bekmamat Osmonov as the chairman
of the Soviet Executive Committee o f a southern province, Jalalabad, against
Akayev’s will (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, March 10, 1992:5) is a case in
point. In fact, this election also reflected the growing defiance of southern elites.13
In the February 1995 parliamentary elections, southern elites and masses defeated
placemen from the north—an outcome which made it clear that southern elites were
no longer ready to accept the traditional dominance of northern elites in politics.
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The resistance o f southern elites in general and their defiance during the 1995
election in particular, division between elites o f the Russified urban and Central Asian
rural areas, and the split communist party clearly revealed that the post-independence
elite structure was anything but cohesive. The continued confrontation between the
executive and legislative branches of the government on a number o f issues, including
corruption, economic reforms, and constitutional matters, in the post-independence
period further supports this assertion.
The continued disintegration of elite structure in the post-independence period
was not without consequences. The communist party ceased to be a cohesive political
force capable o f halting altogether the political reform process in the republic,
although communists still occupy important positions in the government and can
potentially slow it dow n.14 In addition, networks o f patron-client relationship ceased
to be an asset o f a single political force, be it ruling group or opposition, in the post
independence period. In other words, more power was dispersed in Kyrgyz society in
the post-independence period than in the pre-independence period—a situation
expected to be conducive for political liberalization.

ASKAR AKAYEV: A REFORMIST POLITICAL LEADER
As compared to his successor, Masaliyev, who openly expressed his anti
reformist views (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no. 26, 1989:11 and no. 3, 1990:4),
Akayev presented himself as a leader with a reformist political outlook. The
communist party helped Akayev win his seat as a non-party candidate in the 1989
parliamentary elections. However, once in Moscow, he became active supporter o f
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the Gorbachev reform program. As compared to anti-reformist speeches o f Masaliyev,
Akayev’s speeches in the all-union parliament stressed the need to deepen political
reforms and emphasized the positive consequences o f democratization o f public life in
the country.13 Unlike Masaliyev who blamed democratization o f public life,
especially the informal groups, for negative phenomena like inter-ethnic tensions,
Akayev blamed the republican communist party and its leadership rather the centersponsored reform program for the slow pace of reform and other social problems,
including inter-ethnic bloody disputes, in the republic (Current Digest o f Soviet Press,
no. 25, 1990:14). His reformist views endeared him to Gorbachev and helped him
defeat the career communist candidates in the October 1990 presidential elections in
the republican parliament.
As a result o f their conflicting approaches toward political reform underway in
the country, both president Akayev and the republican communist leadership took
different sides on the eve of the August 1991 putsch in Moscow. The communist
leadership supported the coup whereas Akayev opposed it. He described the
supporters o f the coup as "political opportunists" who were willing to sacrifice their
own people for the sake of their "selfish political ambitions" (Current Digest o f Soviet
Press, no. 33, 1991:25).16 Unlike other Central Asian leaders, especially Karimov of
Uzbekistan, Akayev viewed the republican communist party as an obstacle rather than
an asset in the transformation o f communist order.17
In the post-independence period, Akayev’s reformist views remained
unchanged. He continued to see the plurality o f political views as a natural
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phenomenon in the development process.18 According to him, people must "form a
wide network o f autonomous and capable civic institutions independent of the state
authorities and political structures" (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 5,
1996:23)—a suggestion clearly meant to empower civil society vis-a-vis the formal
state structures. The opposition press and political parties are, according to his
opinion, important forces to keep the incumbent government on the right track
(Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 12, 1992:34). Addressing news media
executives o f the leading newspapers of the CIS who were attending a conference in
Bishkek in March 1992, he invited them to assist him in building a law-governed civil
society and in forming democratic values and ideas through their critical analysis of
his policies. However, he expects opposition press to perform its functions in a
civilized manner (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 12, 1992:34).19
Although Akayev emphasizes the importance o f order, he does not see political
stability and democratization o f public life as two competing goals. As compared to
Karimov who prioritizes economics over politics and consequently postpones political
reforms, Akayev sees both economic and political reform s as equally important goals
which can be pursued simultaneously. Likewise, he refers to the underdevelopment of
democratic culture o f his people,20 but does not see it as a justification for an
authoritarian regime. In fact, Akayev believes that such culture can be developed
through democratic practices like competitive national and local elections. Regretting
that candidates, voters, and election officials committed some excesses in the
February 199S parliamentary elections, he remarked that "All o f us in Kyrgyzstan are
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still beginners in democracy, and perhaps we still understand it with our heads, not
with our hearts. " However, he hoped that the next election would be truly
democratic, free, and competitive (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 9,
1995:15).
In view o f the above discussion about political outlooks of Masaliyev and
Akayev, we expect different outcomes concerning political reforms in the pre- and
post-independence periods. In other words, we expect Masaliyev to circumvent rather
than facilitate political liberalization in the pre-independence period, but we expect
Akayev to promote rather than sabotage political liberalization before and after
independence.

GLASNOST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: THE MASALIYEV ERA
Some Soviet republics experienced glasnost much earlier and more
significantly than others. Like other Central Asian republics, Kyrgyzstan also
witnessed its late arrival for a number o f reasons. The common reasons the Central
Asian republics shared for the late arrival o f glasnost have already been discussed in
the third chapter.21 Here, we shall confine our discussion to reasons specific to
Kyrgyzstan.
Specific circumstances responsible for the late introduction of glasnost are
related to the role o f the conservative leadership o f Absamat Masaliyev. In 1985,
Masaliyev replaced the longtime party boss, Turdiakun Usulbaliyev, as the First
Secretary o f the Kyrgyz communist party. He initially cooperated with the central
authorities in their anti-corruption campaign22 which was an important component o f
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the center-sponsored reform program. However, he soon found himself at odds with
the central authorities for a number of inter-related reasons, including his dislike for
glasnost. He chose very sensitive forums such as All-Union CPSU Conference, USSR
Supreme Soviet, and the press to express his utter dislike for the Gorbachev reform
program (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 26, 1989:11 and no. 3, 1990:4). A
leader so openly opposed to glasnost was unlikely to confine himself to simply
expressing his anti-reformist views. He could be expected to do more. As compared
to his little or no role in shaping the central reform politics,23 Masaliyev made
serious efforts to prevent the deepening of glasnost in his own republic, especially to
the extent it occurred in Russia and the Baltic republics. However, his anti-reform
efforts were only partially successful. As we shall discuss below, the pressure o f
central authorities, active political participation o f ethnic groups, and growing
fragmentation among the republican communist elites counter-balanced such efforts.
As part of its reform strategy, the central reformist leadership called upon the
mass media to promote the cause of restructuring. As already mentioned, a number o f
central newspapers tried to play the assigned role and exposed serious problems in
Kyrgyzstan. Masaliyev disliked their pro-reform crusade and master-minded a
counter-attack on them. However, he confined himself to a verbal counter-attack
because the central press and its local Russian correspondents enjoyed the protection
o f central authorities and the support of the Russian minority in the republic. As a
result, an independent source o f information in the form o f central newspapers
remained available to the masses in his republic.
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As compared to the central press, the republican mass media and its
representatives had to endure a different fate. In fact, the latter were under the direct
control o f the republican government. It provided them little freedom for independent
and critical coverage o f many deep-seated problems in the republic.34 A repressive
policy was pursued toward those journalists who were somewhat reluctant to toe the
official line. They were subjected to various coercive and punitive measures such as
character assassination, expulsion from the party, dismissal from service, and trial on
various charges.
The Kyrgyz leadership was no less hostile to the formation o f independent
sociopolitical groups and movements. However, as compared to its effective control
over the local mass media, it was less successful in curbing the rise o f independent
sociopolitical formations in its republic. Its hostile approach was able to delay, but
could not arrest altogether, the rise of such formations. A number o f discussion clubs
such as Demos, Soveremennik, and Pozistsia arose in 1987-88. The Russian minority
actively participated in the formation of these clubs. These clubs were allowed to
debate political issues, including the political future o f socialism.35
!n spite o f a narrow scope of their activities, the above pioneer groups were
indicative of the possible existence of independent associations outside the communist
fold. The message was not lost on various societal forces eager to partake in
socioeconomic and political processes in the republic. A number o f new informal
groups, initially loosely organized around economic, social, cultural, and ethnic
causes, began to rise and evade the controlling hand o f Kyrgyz authorities. Some
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main apolitical groups which arose and made an important contribution to the
expansion o f independent political space during the Masaliyev era are: Ekolog (an
environmental group), Ashar, Asaba, and Osh Aimagy (Kyrgyz-oriented groups), the
United Council o f Labor Collectives (a group o f Russian industrial workers created to
defend their interests), and Adolat (an Uzbek-oriented group). However the basic
apolitical character o f these groups, many o f them, especially those created to
promote interests o f particular ethnic communities, made demands of political nature
and became explicit political formations over time. Hence, the very existence of these
groups and their pursuit o f ostensibly non-political agendas significantly contributed to
the rise o f independent political activity during the Masaliyev era.
After the Kyrgyz authorities grudgingly conceded a space to independent
environmental, socioeconomic, and ethnic-oriented informal associations to operate in
the capital city, more explicit political groups were organized to test political waters.
These groups include the City Voter’s Club and Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan
(DMK). The former was organized in the capital city in August 1989. Although this
group had an inter-ethnic character, the Russian residents of the capital city actively
participated in its organization and activities. The republican communist leadership
experienced for the first time the real political clout o f this group in the 1990
republican and local legislative elections in the capita] city. This group humbled the
communist leadership with its instrumental role in securing the victory o f some
independent candidates over their communist competitors in these elections. The
second (but the most important) political group, DMK, was a merger of 24 small and
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large informal groups. It was created in May 1990 to consolidate divided independent
societal forces, coordinate their activities, and build effective pressure from below to
accelerate the democratization process in the republic.26
The democratization process received tremendous impetus from another
development, too. That is, a growing split in the republican elite structure, especially
in the wake o f the Osh conflict. This split effectively fhistrated Masaiiyev’s antireform efforts and ultimately cost him leadership position in the republic.
The Osh conflict claimed hundreds o f lives27 and greatly discredited the
republican leadership.28 As already mentioned, the republican communist authorities
tried to blame the anti-state forces, including the informal groups, for the bloody
incident. A sizable number o f communist parliamentarians as well as independent
sociopolitical forces refused to accept this explanation. They rather publicly blamed
the communist leadership. Even some local newspapers joined them in their criticism
of the communist leadership (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 25, 1990:15). More
importantly, the disgruntled deputies formed a reformist group in the parliament in
the wake o f the Osh incident. This group lashed out at the communist leadership for
mishandling the Osh conflict. The local press provided an extensive coverage to its
platform. The same group later played an instrumental role in fhistrating Masai iyev’s
attempt to run unopposed in the parliamentary election for president in October 1990,
and in his failure to secure the office in the two rounds of election.
In line with their overall manipulative anti-reform approach, the republican
authorities tried to manipulate, like other components of glasnost, the electoral
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process in order to preserve firm communist control in the republic. Although they
were able to secure an overwhelming victory in the March 1989 all-union and
February 1990 republican legislative elections because of their better material and
organizational resources and manipulation of the election rules, their successes proved
temporary. Their manipulation o f the electoral process failed to produce the intended
enduring results. In other words, in spite of all its manipulative efforts, the
communist conservative leadership failed to block the democratizing impact of the
centrally mandated competitive elections on the republican politics and its replacement
with a pro-reform political leadership in the republic.
The first competitive elections held under the central scrutiny were the March
1989 ali-union parliamentary elections. These elections proved a painful experience
for the republican leadership. In spite o f its effort to transform these elections into a
Soviet variety, contested elections took place in 34 out of 43 electoral districts—an
unprecedented event in the electoral history of the republic. In addition, four
independent candidates with the active support o f Russian voters were able to defeat
their communist competitors in the capital city. As already mentioned, the local
correspondent o f Izvestia and arch rival o f Masaliyev, Gennadii Shipitko, an ethnic
Russian, was among the successful independent candidates. As a result, the republican
leadership failed to send to the all-union parliament a united delegation with an
appropriate character reflecting various societal sections such as women, workers,
peasants, and minorities.
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The next competitive elections were held for republican and local legislative
bodies on February 25, 1990. In spite o f the fact that conservative leadership won an
overwhelming compliant majority, these elections also accelerated the political
liberalization process and eroded the communist base in the republic. A total o f 1032
candidates stood in the parliamentary elections. Only 86 out o f 350 seats were
uncontested, all in the rural areas. The three month long election campaign produced
lot of political heat and commotion. The communist leaders had to focus on many
troubling fronts during these elections, including protest rallies in the capital city.29
Still, more troublesome for the conservative leadership was the bold
participation o f informal groups such as the Russian-dominated Voter’s Club in the
elections and the consequent victory of a sizable number of independent candidates
over their communist competitors. The true value o f this victory became evident at
the opening session o f the new parliament on April 10, 1990, when independent
deputies voiced their opposition to the communist party and its practices and tried to
put up their own candidate against Masaliyev in the election for the chairman o f the
new parliament, threatening to end the established practice of unopposed election for
that office. The presence o f a solid bloc of opposition deputies clearly exposed serious
limitations on the capabilities o f the communist leadership to shape political arena to
its taste. In fact, over time its capabilities to control the political process in the
republic were weakened to the extent that it failed to secure a desirable outcome in
the October 1990 presidential election in the parliament.
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As already mentioned, in the wake of the Osh violent incident, a sizable group
o f communist deputies broke ranks with the leadership and entered into an alliance
with the independent deputies in the republican parliament. This alliance played a
critical role in the failure o f the conservative party leadership to conduct and win the
October 1990 presidential election in the old Soviet style. In fact, this alliance became
a formidable electoral force and a challenge for the communist leadership when the
Chairman of the Council o f Ministers, Apas Jumagulov, joined it and decided to
oppose Masaliyev in the presidential election. The defiance o f Jumagulov and the
central authorities’ endorsement o f competitive election ruled out any real possibility
o f the use of force against this alliance. In addition to Jumagulov, D. Amanbayev,
the first secretary o f the party committee in the Issyk-Kul province, was also a
contender. The electoral contest between the three career communist leaders
supported by their respective supporters in the republic parliament was indicative of a
serious rift among the communist elites. In other words, Masaliyev could no longer
command traditional communist loyalty of the communist elites. Thus, he had little
choice other than contesting the election.
In the first round o f election, victory eluded all the three candidates because no
one received the required 50 percent votes. In the second round o f voting, Masaliyev
and Jumagulov both received almost equal number of votes but each fell short of the
required number o f votes to consummate his electoral victory. As a result, in
compliance with the exclusionary clause their names were removed from the ballot,
and the parliament considered a new slate of six presidential candidates.
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The hung parliament and presence o f the picketers and hunger strikers outside
the parliament had created a crisis-like situation in the republic. The center seized this
moment and interfered in the electoral process producing unpropitious political
consequences for the conservative leadership. The central reformist team preferred
Akayev, a member in the all-union parliament and chairman o f the National Academy
of Sciences in Kyrgyzstan. More importantly, he was an ardent supporter o f
Gorbachev and his reform program. In addition, he had the support o f certain other
democratically oriented forces, including informal political groups such as DMK. In
the second round o f election, the republican parliament ended the electoral deadlock.
It voted Akayev into power—an auspicious decision for the political liberalization
process in the republic. In fact, this fateful development that some call "silk
revolution" (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 8, 1994:27-8) transferred the
power o f political decision-making from the party leadership to a reformist president
and ushered in a truly new political era remarkably conducive for greater political
liberalization in Kyrgyzstan.

GLASNOST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: THE AKAYEV ERA
As already mentioned, the republican communist authorities before Akayev
assumed power were opposed to the center-sponsored political reform measures.
However, in spite o f their sustained opposition, political liberalization continued to
progress in a slow but steady manner in Kyrgyzstan. A number o f factors, including
the central leadership’s continued support for political reform, disintegrating
communist elite structure, and willingness and readiness of Akayev to take actions
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conducive for political liberalization, rendered the communist opposition ineffective.
After Akayev took power, he enjoyed the support of both the central leadership and
Russian minority for his effort to accelerate the reform process in his republic. His
own support and encouragement became available to democratically oriented political
forces in their effort to challenge the dominance of the communist party.
In line with preferences o f his own, his local allies, and above all the central
authorities, Akayev began to introduce political and economic reforms through
presidential initiatives. The purpose o f such reform initiatives was to accelerate the
political liberalization process through building a strong support base for it. His
12-member presidential council was one such initiative which pioneered independent
participation in the authoritative political decision-making in the republic. This council
included Qazat Akhmatov, the co-chairman of the DMK (Haghayeghi, 1995:135). He
permitted political forces of different colors under the central law to organize and
operate without any fear of repression and systematic official obstacles. In fact,
registered and unregistered autonomous political groups were able to carry out their
activities without intimidation and repression under Akayev. A fter the republic
parliament finally sanctioned political pluralism in December 1990, one important
addition to the list of autonomous formations was the nationalist party, Erkin Kyrgyz,
in February 1991.
Likewise, Akayev pursued a benign press and media policy in line with the
August 1990 all-union law which guaranteed the press freedom. The law permitted
state bodies, public organizations, political parties, social movements, and individual
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citizens o f 18 years to found media outlets (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 25,
1990:16-17). As a result o f his faithful practice of this law, the press was made
accessible to opposition forces and journalists could freely write about sensitive and
controversial issues facing the republic without facing punitive reactions.
As an astute politician, Akayev tried to accelerate the political liberalization
process without engaging in a direct confrontation with the party apparatus. However,
because the party leadership was well aware of the grave consequences o f his reform
measures for the future o f the party, it began to openly oppose his reform initiatives.
The conservative communist deputies sought to block his reform initiatives on the one
hand and passed laws with potentially harmful effects on the political liberalization
process on the other. For instance, in spring 1990, a bill was passed in the parliament
which recognized the republic's territory as the exclusive property of ethnic Kyrgyz.
This bill had enormous potential for provoking inter-ethnic bloody conflict, hence
prejudicial for the fledgling political liberalization process in the republic.
In the wake o f a number o f encouraging developments such as Masaliyev’s
resignation as chairman o f the parliament, Akayev took many bold decisions to
overcome the communist opposition and advance the political liberalization process in
the republic. For instance, in January 1991, he replaced the conservative Cabinet o f
Ministers with a sm aller relatively young reformist Cabinet. He also used his
presidential veto power to kill the above bill which stipulated that the republic’s
territory exclusively belonged to ethnic Kyrgyz. In addition, he took other political
and economic measures which were certain to reduce the role and influence o f the
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communist party, providing more space to the fledgling autonomous political forces in
Kyrgyz society.
The above political trends constitute p an o f the evidence which clearly
indicates that in spite o f a systematic communist effon to undermine Akayev and his
reform program , political balance continued to shift over time in his favor. The
republican communist leadership made the most serious move to reverse this shift
during the August 1991 coup. After the coup leadership announced its takeover in
Moscow, the republican communist party announced its "full and unconditional
support" for it and discussed ways to remove Akayev from power. The commander of
the Turkistan M ilitary District, General Fuzhenko, was also poised to send his tanks
to support an action against Akayev (Russian Press Digest, August 23, 1991; Current
Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 34, 1991:47-8).
For his part, Akayev took all necessary precautionary and preemptive
measures against the looming threat o f a similar coup attempt in the republic. He
ordered the republic television to repeatedly broadcast every two hours Yeltsin’s
declaration in which the latter called upon the people to defeat the putsch (Bozdag,
1992:282; Haghayeghi, 1995:136). He also dismissed the chairman o f the republic’s
KGB who did not inform the former o f the communist plans in time (BBC, August
22, 1991), and ordered the troops o f the Interior Ministry to surround the headquarter
of the republican communist party central committee. In addition to these measures,
in his statement o f support for anti-coup forces, Akayev lashed out at the republican
communist party leadership for its support for the coup in the country. He viewed
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such support as an anti-democratic and unconstitutional act. More importantly, he
issued a presidential decree on departyization which effectively reduced the vanguard
party to a simply another public association in the republic. After the coup failed,
criminal proceedings were initiated against the First Secretary, Central Committee
secretaries and politburo members for helping those who carried out an
unconstitutional coup in the country (Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 33, 1991:25;
no. 34, 1991:47-8). In a move to further weaken the communist party, Akayev issued
a decree which banned the communist party and nationalized its property in the
republic.
Although Akayev's action o f banning the communist party is not in line with
his liberal thinking and it violates theoretical premises o f political liberalization, this
and his other actions such as departyization facilitated the political liberalization
process in the post-independence period. In fact, in the wake of these actions, the
communist party lost its open access to state resources, suffered more internal splits,
and was reduced to a mere another public association. As a result, the ability o f the
main anti-reform political force to obstruct the reform process underway in the
republic was greatly diminished, providing Akayev an unprecedented political latitude
to introduce more meaningful reform measures and deepen political liberalization in
the republic in the post-independence period. Thus, as we expected not only reformist
political outlook but also actions (though some o f them, including the ban on the
communist party, did not correspond to liberal thinking) of the leadership had a
positive impact on political liberalization during the Akayev era. In addition,
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disintegrating communist elite structure, and the support o f both the central leadership
and other democratically oriented forces, including the Russian minority, for
Akayev’s reform policies proved, as we expected, beneficial influences for political
liberalization in the republic.

POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA
The above chain o f actions and reactions which the August coup set in motion
conclusively shifted political balance in Akayev’s favor, further fragmented the
communist party, and eroded its dominance in society—a situation conducive for
political liberalization. After independence, Akayev proceeded in alliance with
democratically oriented forces, including the Russian minority, to accelerate the
implementation o f his political reform program. As already mentioned, his impressive
democratic conduct in the early post-independence period earned him international
praise. However, over time, the political liberalization process failed to maintain a
linear progress in the post-independence period. It rather suffered reversals in certain
areas down the road. In spite o f these reversals and aberrations, Kyrgyzstan continued
to surpass all other Central Asian republics in terms o f an overall progress in almost
all aspects o f political liberalization. The remaining chapter is devoted to the
discussion and explanation o f the progress Kyrgyzstan made as well as reversals it
experienced in various aspects o f political liberalization in the post-independence
period. More precisely, we shall focus on the rise o f autonomous sociopolitical
associations and the extent o f their access to the political process, the rise of
independent mass media and its relationship with the government, and the extent to
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which the electoral process is transparent and open to the opposition political forces in
Kyrgyzstan in the post-independence period.

THE RISE OF WEAK BUT INDEPENDENT SOCIOPOLITICAL
FORMATIONS
One o f the areas in which the post-independence political liberalization process
recorded sustained progress with few minor aberrations is the freedom o f political and
social forces to organize themselves, engage in independent political activity, and
pursue their stated programs. In fact, almost all the necessary parts for a multiparty
political system were already in place before independence. As mentioned earlier,
political pluralism was sanctioned in the central as well as republican law, and several
leading independent individuals and groups were directly or indirectly involved in
political activities before independence. However, the legal foundation for political
pluralism was truly put in place after Akayev became president and independent
sociopolitical groups had more freedom o f action under him than his predecessor.
After independence, in line with his favorable opinion about the plurality o f political
views, the legal foundation for political pluralism was further fortified, and Akayev
and his team made no sustained effort to circumvent rules in order to curtail the
freedom o f action of various political parties, social movements, and civil groups in
the republic. In fact, corresponding to his liberal outlook, Akayev took certain actions
which made it much easier for a host of political and social forces to organize,
receive official recognition, criticize the government and its policies, and participate
in sociopolitical processes in the republic in the post-independence period.
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One o f such decisions conducive for political liberalization was the decision of
Akayev not to join any political party in the post-independence era. Although he did
not join any political party, he drew support from many existing political parties and
social movements. In fact, a large number o f important former communist leaders
representing their respective concerns either formed or joined various sociopolitical
formations. These leaders and their sociopolitical formations have a common interest:
to resist their depoliticization. Therefore, the incumbent leadership has to pay a heavy
price to deactivate these elites and their associations. Also, it is difficult for Akayev
to unify so many important political elites with diverse interests under him—a unity
which could have tempted him to use authoritarian methods to deal with the small
number o f remaining political dissidents.
In addition, these leaders and formations have been supportive o f Akayev on
some important issues such as his confrontation with the communist party leadership
but have been critical of him on other relatively less important issues such as various
economic and political transition policies. In this situation, an outright repression o f
these elites and sociopolitical associations could have eroded his own support base and
weakened his position, especially vis-a-vis the unreformed communist party which
could still draw on its support base inside and outside the government to complicate
things for him . Although the reformed communists supported him and he patronized
their political parties, the conservative faction o f the communist party continued to
oppose him and had the potential to regroup itself and threaten his power position in
the republic. In fact, his informal shifting alliance with various sociopolitical
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formations served as a counterweight against the communist party, obviated the
reunion o f the splintered communist (and former communist) forces, and enabled him
to enhance his own leverage vis-a-vis other sociopolitical formations, including his
informal democratically-oriented and reformed communist allies. Thus, the presence
o f a variety o f sociopolitical formations posed no serious threat to his dominance in
national politics, rather it improved his political standing, legitimized his rule, and
confirmed his democratic credentials.
A number o f additional powerful constraints rendered the option of
indiscriminate repression of sociopolitical groups quite costly and, hence, less
attractive for Akayev. As already mentioned, members o f the Russian minority were
active in sociopolitical groups like Voter’s Club even before independence and later
joined different political parties and movements such as the DMK. After
independence, a number o f explicit Russian-oriented groups arose in large part in
reaction to the formation of Kyrgyz-oriented groups before and after independence.
The demands o f the Russian-speaking population and the titular nationality are often
at variance with each other. A number o f former communists o f both the Russian and
Kyrgyz origin also support their respective ethnic communities in pursuit of their
interests, further enhancing the significance o f the ethnic factor in national politics in
the republic. The looming threat o f a strong Russian reaction (including active
intervention) to safeguard the interests o f the Russian-speaking population continues to
discourage Akayev from using indiscriminate repression to achieve a thorough
political deactivation of various societal forces, including the Russian minority. Also,
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the use of repression to deactivate the Russian-speaking population would defeat
Akayev’s efforts to stop its migration out o f his republic through favorable policy
measures.
The selective and discriminate repression also became difficult to practice, and
the republican authorities have exercised restraint in such use o f repression. In fact,
the republican leadership can not afford to ban Kyrgyz sociopolitical groups but allow
sociopolitical groups o f the Russian-speaking population to function in the republic. If
it does, it would risk losing its nationalist credentials and vital support base among the
titular nationality. As a result o f the above factors, the republican authorities have so
far refrained from hindering the group formation (and dissolution) process and from
using sustained repressive measures to curtail the freedom of action o f various
sociopolitical groups in the republic. Thus, a host o f political parties and social
movements which were formed before independence continue to exist in one form or
another and a number o f new sociopolitical formations with diverse orientations and
programs continue to proliferate in the republic in the post-independence era.
Before we discuss these sociopolitical formations, their orientations, and the
freedom of action they enjoyed in the post-independence period, it is important to
record a number o f important observations about them. Firstly, although political and
social formations proliferated and operated with greater freedom after independence,
no one has been able to build a strong mass support base and become a strong force
capable of shaping the course o f politics in the republic. In fact, the existing political
parties and social movements are weakly developed in the republic and many o f them
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face a real danger o f marginalization in the national political life and a potential threat
of an outright political extinction.
Secondly, the sociopolitical group formation process lacks a predictable
character. In other words, it continues to remain fluid. As already mentioned, several
informal groups which initially advocated specific, overtly apolitical causes (such as
economic well-being, ethnonational and cultural revival, and environment protection)
later broadened their programs to include sensitive, explicitly political demands such
as sovereignty and independence for the republic and an end to the communist rule in
the pre-independence period. After independence, many o f them transformed
themselves into political parties and strove to achieve their respective political aims.
In addition, while some political and social groups continue to organize and may
coalesce into larger formations, others continue to fragment into several splinter
groups. The conglomerate groups such as DMK have been particularly vulnerable to
fragmentation due to many reasons, including personality clashes and ideological
differences among its leaders.
Thirdly, the existing political parties and social movements represent a wide
variety of ideological orientations and interests ranging from radical ethnonationalist
to communist to democratic. However, these orientations and interests are not fixed,
but are rather mutable as it shall become clear below. And, finally, almost all notable
parties and movements advocate some variant o f democracy.
A detailed discussion of all the existing independent political and social
formations and their orientations in Kyrgyzstan is outside the scope o f this study. For
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the purpose o f this inquiry, it will suffice to briefly discuss a representative sample o f
these sociopolitical formations, their orientations, and the freedom o f action they
enjoyed in the post-independence period.

ETHNIC-ORIENTED (DEMOCRATIC) PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS
These groups are primarily focused on promoting interests of specific ethnic
communities in Kyrgyzstan. Almost most sizable ethnic communities have formed
such parties and movements to advance their respective interests. O f course, the most
notable and active ethnic-oriented sociopolitical formations have been organized to
protect interests of the titular nationality, ethnic Kyrgyz. The Kyrgyz ethnonationalist
formations range from radical to moderate. One of the radical groups seeking to
promote interests of ethnic Kyrgyz is Asaba (Banner). It advocates a political program
with an exclusive focus on "the defense of the economic, social and political interests
o f the Kyrgyz people" (Hunter, 1996:50). Asaba has a strong anti-Russian bias. It
demands an authoritative action to reduce the presence o f non-Kyrgyz population in
the republic and strongly opposes privatization of state sector, especially land, and the
idea o f dual citizenship. It has asked the parliament more than once to pass legislative
measures in this regard( Haghayeghi, 1994:193; Chukin, 1994:171; CSCE, 1995:8).
In spite o f its overall political support for Akayev, the Asaba leadership has been
quite critical o f him and his team for their insensitivity to these demands and for
doing very little to improve the plight o f the most under-privileged ethnic group,
Kyrgyz, in the republic.
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The second ethnonationalist political group formed to advance interests of
ethnic Kyrgyz is Erkin (Free) Kyrgyzstan. However, it is relatively less radical than
Asaba. Erkin Kyrgyzstan, which was organized and registered in the
pre-independence period for Kyrgyz causes, continues to pursue them in the
post-independence period. Although it never lost sight o f its basic goal, it has shifted
its position back and forth. Like Asaba, Erkin first demanded the expulsion of
non-Kyrgyz from the republic; however, it later dropped this demand and shifted its
emphasis from "Kyrgyz interests only" to "Kyrgyz interests first" (Haghayeghi,
1994:193; 1995:117). It is one the few sociopolitical associations which publish their
own newspapers.
A number o f other Kyrgyz-oriented ethnonationalist formations, though
relatively less significant than Asaba and Erkin Kyrgyzstan, also exist in the republic.
Askar (Mutual Aid) is one such group which champions interests o f ethnic Kyrgyz in
the Osh region. The Kyrgyz Language Society and some local groups can also be
added to the list of such groups (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 25,
1992:10; Chukin, 1994:171).
The radical ethnonational demands of the Kyrgyz-oriented formations and
several other developments such as poor economic conditions in the republic, the
adoption o f Kyrgyz as a state language, and the declaration o f independence caused
multiple reactions among non-Kyrgyz ethnic communities. These reactions included
migration, especially of Russian and German minorities, and the formation of a

290

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

number o f non-Kyrgyz ethnonationalist groups to defend their interests in the
republic.
In addition to Uzbek-oriented groups like Adolat which was an important party
to the Osh conflict, several Russian-oriented formations have also arisen in
Kyrgyzstan. Notable among them are the Slavic Fund, the Assembly o f the People o f
Kyrgyzstan, Soglasie (Accord), and the Association o f Ethnic Russians. These
Russian-oriented formations advocate social equality and press for making the Russian
the second state language in the country (CSCE, 1995:6; 1998:16). The stated
programs o f these groups are o f cultural nature, but some such as Slavic Fund have
been politicized especially after independence and now contain radical forces. The
leadership has always emphasized the cultural nature o f the Slavic Fund, but the
radical forces in it openly express their determination to counter ethnonationalist
efforts o f the Kyrgyz-oriented groups in the country (Hunter, 1996:51; Bozdag,
1992:285-6).
The Russian-oriented groups have enjoyed the same degree o f freedom o f
action which has been available to the ethnonationalist groups of the titular nationality
in the country. Some o f these groups have pooled their resources to publish their own
newspaper, Soglasie, in Osh (CSCE, 1995:6), and have been able to disseminate their
programs and try to influence public opinion and decision making process in the
republic. In addition to the above Russian-oriented formations, the Society o f
Germans o f Kyrgyzstan, representing the interests o f the German minority in the
republic (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press no. 25, 1992:10), and a Cossack
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organization, representing Cossack interests, has also been founded in the post
independence period.
M ost o f these formations have been informal political allies o f Akayev in the
post-independence period. As a result, the use o f repression to curb them, to prevent
them from articulating their demands, and to prevent from occasionally criticizing his
government and policies would surely hurt his interest and weaken his position in
Kyrgyz politics. In fact, he rather tried to take certain measures, such as opening a
Slavic university in the capital city, to protect their interests even at the risk of
displeasing his own coethnics.

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS
A host o f political parties and social movements with a liberal democratic
outlook o f varying degrees exist side by side with the ethnic-oriented democratic
formations in Kyrgyzstan. Like the ethnonationalist democratic groups, the liberal
democratic formations differ in terms o f their social bases. In addition, they exhibit
differences on a host of broad as well as specific issues of post-communist economic
and political restructuring and social policies in the country. Like the ethnic-oriented
formations, the liberal democratic parties may support or oppose the government
policies depending on the nature o f issues involved. Some liberal parties are product
of the breakup process which ethnonationalist and liberal democratic parties alike have
been experiencing in the republic.
As already mentioned, the first most significant informal political group in
Kyrgyzstan before independence was the DMK with a liberal democratic charter,
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although it comprised liberal as well as ethnonationalist informal groups. The
temporary removal of the Kyrgyz communist party from the political arena in the
immediate post-independence period left the DMK as the most significant and
privileged political force in the country. However, it failed to build itself into a strong
political force. In fact, the breakup process which it began to witness within six
months after its formation continued in the post-independence period, greatly
undermining its potential to shape post-communist politics in the republic. After
several splits, the DMK under the leadership o f Jepar Jeksheev was registered as a
political party in July 1993. The party leadership has been quite critical o f several
economic policies o f the Akayev government. It has also opposed certain cultural and
educational policies such as opening o f a Slavic university in Bishkek (Current Digest
o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 41, 1992:8).
As an off-shoot o f the DMK, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) was
established and registered as a political party in March and September 1992
respectively. It claims to have come into existence "to fight against discrimination on
ethnic, social, and religious grounds” (Haghayeghi 1995:122). It also claims that it
would act as a constructive opposition, if not in power. The party takes a very liberal
stance on many sensitive issues including language and religion. However, it is an
advocate o f an egalitarian society and, like several other liberal as well as
ethnonationalist parties, opposes the introduction o f rapid economic reforms in the
country. Its estimated 3,000-membership and political and financial support comes
from labor, intellectuals, parliamentarians, and businessmen.
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The liberal members o f the Erkin Kyrgyzstan split from its radical members to
form a new political party called Ata Meken under the leadership of Kamila
Kenebayeva in September 1992. It is multi-ethnic in its composition. It was officially
registered in December 1992. Ata Meken reportedly came into existence with the
blessings o f Akayev (Huskey, 1997:263). The party leadership has often shown its
willingness to cooperate with the Akayev government. However, it has been critical
of it for certain monetary and economic policy measures including the introduction of
national currency and privatization of agricultural sector. Ata Meken offers a
Iiberal-centrist political alternative. It supports cultural and religious revival provided
it is done within the confines o f the reality o f a multiethnic and secular state
(Haghayeghi, 1995:121-2).
Unlike the above political parties and social movements which have been
organized mainly by various non-communist societal forces, the Social Democratic
Party formed and registered in July 1993 and December 1994 respectively offers a
political program which has been inspired by reform communism. The party calls for
introduction o f democratic socialist principles. It has been under a sharp attack o f its
counterparts for being a party o f "the present ruling nomenklatura" and a protege of
Akayev (Haghayeghi 1995:130).
A number o f less significant political parties and movements with
issue-oriented and narrow but still democratic platforms also exist in the country. The
list o f such registered formations include Agrarian party and Democratic Party of
Women o f Kyrgyzstan (Huskey 1997:262).
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THE COMMUNIST PARTY
As already mentioned, Akayev banned the Kyrgyz communist party in the
wake of the 1991 abortive coup. The party, however, reentered the political arena
after it held its founding congress in June 1992 and received official recognition in
September 1992. Its platform espouses restoration of the Soviet Union and Soviet-era
social rights. In addition, it is opposed to most economic reform measures underway
in the post-communist era in the republic. Like other political formations, it has been
allowed to participate in the post-independence electoral process.

HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
In conjunction with ethnonationalist, liberal democratic, and communist
political parties, a number of groups have been organized to monitor the human rights
situation in Kyrgyzstan in the post-independence period. In 1991, the Ministry o f
Justice registered one such group, the Human Rights Movement o f Kyrgyzstan
(HRMK). The focus o f its activities was on monitoring ethnic-based discrimination in
the workplace and excesses of the security forces in the country. Although in 1992
the Ministry of Justice turned down the request o f a human rights organization for
registration on the ground that another human rights organization was unnecessary,
this policy was subsequently reversed to register a number o f human rights
organizations, including Kyrgyz-American Bureau on Human Rights and Law
Protection. The Bureau was registered in December 1993. The aim o f this group is to
monitor human rights situation in the country and publicize it around the world. The
Bureau, in alliance with the independent newspaper, Delo No, has publicly exposed
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and criticized various constitutional violations and defended the alleged victims o f the
police excesses in the republic. These human rights organizations have so far
smoothly operated in the republic.
AN ASSESSM ENT
As already noted, all the existing political parties and social movements have
so far failed to deepen their roots in Kyrgyz society. An overall poor performance of
all the registered political parties and social movements in the 1995 parliamentary
election m ust suffice to illustrate the above point. In fact, the twelve political parties
and thirty social movements which contested the election failed to field their
candidates in all one hundred and five electoral districts. The electoral result was
more disappointing. Only 38 candidates with party affiliation won their seats as
compared to 67 unaffiliated candidates (Huskey, 1997:262-264).
However accurate the observation that sociopolitical formations are weakly
developed, their weakness can not be interpreted as a sorry state o f political
liberalization. The underdevelopment o f these formations may hinder democratic
consolidation. However, so far as political liberalization is concerned, it is the
freedom o f action available to political and social formations which defines its level in
society. Judged from this standpoint, Kyrgyzstan has more or less a sustained
impressive record in the post-independence period. With one important exception o f
the religious political formations which are prohibited in the May 1993 constitution, a
host o f other political and social forces have been free to establish independent
formations, disseminate their views, propose alternative reform programs, hold party
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and mass gatherings, publish newspapers, and participate in the electoral process in
the country. O f course, there have been few aberrations at certain times which will
be discussed at appropriate places below.
The constitutional right of association is generally respected in Kyrgyzstan.
The law requires all political and social formations to register. O f course, in addition
to bureaucratic mentality and bottlenecks, there are some complex legal requirements
which make the registration process somewhat tedious. As o f 1997, only a few cases
have been reported where registration o f certain formations was delayed. For
instance, a Cossack cultural and economic organization applied three times before it
was registered in 1993.30
Almost all the political and social formations which have so far sought
registration have been registered. As o f 1997, in addition to a number o f registered
human rights organizations, 17 political parties and more than 30 social movements
have been registered in Kyrgyzstan. The singular reported case where registration
was denied involved a Uighur organization. The organization was denied registration
in 199S because its stated mission included the establishment of an independent
Uighur state in northwest China (Huskey, 1997:261-3; State Department, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995 and 1997:919, 1157 respectively).
In addition to the freedom o f group formation, the existing political parties and
social formations, including human rights groups and labor unions, have been
generally free to conduct their other activities, too. As already mentioned, some o f
these formations, especially political parties, have openly and repeatedly criticized
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certain reform policies o f the government and have been able to propose alternative
reform programs within and outside the parliament.
The Akayev government has been at time sensitive and responsive to their
views. It has also been tolerant of the protest rallies these formations held in support
of their demands. The government has routinely issued permits political and social
formations require for holding public rallies and marches. Over the past six years
there have been numerous authorized and unauthorized rallies and demonstrations
across the country. The government has generally Tefrained from using force even
against the unauthorized rallies. As o f 1997, unlike Uzbekistan where the use o f force
against demonstrators has caused several deaths, there has been no report o f such
incidents in Kyrgyzstan.
In addition, the government has generally respected the law allowing political
and social formations to publish their own the newspapers. Hence, Kyrgyzstan has
newspapers like Erk and Soglasie published by political parties and social movements.
In fact, the primary cause for the failure of many aspiring political and social
formations to establish their own mass media institutions, especially newspapers,
appears to be the lack of financial resources rather than insuperable official
restrictions. For example, Asaba’s effort to establish its own newspaper have failed
due to a lack o f financial resources (Haghayeghi 1995:116).
O f course, since m id-1994 the press has been facing growing problems and
journalists have wound up in jail. A detailed discussion o f such essentially
media-related issues is conducted below. However, for our purpose here, it will
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suffice to note that these cases involved official vendetta against certain newspapers
and journalists who allegedly sullied the honor o f the president and other government
officials. In spite o f this, the law on protecting the honor and dignity o f the president
has not been overstretched to silence all kinds o f criticism o f Akayev and his policies
and to curtail the freedom o f political and social formations to propagandize their
alternative reform programs in the country. In fact, in spite of the potential threat o f
punitive measures under the law on protecting the reputation of the president, various
political leaders have been able to criticize various actions and policies o f Akayev
with impunity.
There have been no political prisoners under the above law or otherwise before
the December 1995 presidential election in Kyrgyzstan. Although prior to the 1995
presidential elections, journalists and human rights monitors have reported some
politically motivated prosecutions at the local level (State Department, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992:918), there is no evidence to attribute
such prosecutions to the Akayev government. The observation that political opposition
enjoyed freedom o f action is partially supported by the fact that while discussing
human rights situation for 1993, the Human Rights Watch did not include Kyrgyzstan
among the countries with a poor human rights record (Human Rights Watch, 1994).
This situation, however, changed when two campaign workers of an opposition
candidate, Medetkan Sherimkulov, were arrested in December 1995, in Issyk Kul
oblast for distributing campaign pamphlets allegedly slandering the president. In
February 1996, there was another arrest in Naryn on similar charges (State
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Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995 and 1996:918,
1001 respectively). Perhaps, more prominent case was the arrest o f Topchubek
Torgunaliev, chairman o f the Erkin Kyrgyzstan Party, and former rector of the
Bishkek Humanities University, and his assistant Timur Stamkulov on charges o f theft
o f state property, malfeasance and abuse o f power. The form er was arrested on
December 17, 19%, after he participated in a peaceful protest rally o f pensioners in
Bishkek. In January 1997, both were convicted and sent to jail to serve their
sentences (CSCE, 1998:25).
The above cases do indicate an unmistakable deterioration in the level o f
political liberalization from the previous years. Still, Kyrgyzstan does not qualify to
be lined up with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on the basis o f such aberrations.
Although these few cases tarnish the political liberalization record in the republic,
they pale to insignificance when compared to similar cases in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan. In fact, these cases by no means constitute an ample evidence of a
systematic official effort to silence organized political opposition and individual
political activists in the country. There are several instances some of which have been
cited above clearly show that political parties and their leaders critical of Akayev and
his policies have not always been subjected to official vendetta. Also, the above cases
involving the arrest and imprisonment of the campaign workers o f the opposition
presidential candidate must be seen as isolated incidents rather than part o f a sustained
government effort to completely close the electoral process to independent
sociopolitical formations. In fact, in spite of several problems, the post-independence

300

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

electoral process in Kyrgyzstan has been much more open to independent organized
participation than in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. This point is made quite clear in the
next section on the electoral process.
AN O PEN AND C O M PETITIV E NATIONAL E LEC TO R A L PR O C E SS?
The political right of citizens to choose their representatives and change their
government through election is codified in the May 1993 constitution o f Kyrgyzstan.
As o f 1997, two general presidential elections, one uncontested and the other
contested, one competitive parliamentary election, and a number o f competitive
by-elections for vacant seats in the parliament have been held in the country, in
addition to three national referenda. There have also been competitive local bodies
elections. However, our focus in this section will be on national elections and on their
openness to opposition participation.
The first national election which took place after independence was the general
uncontested presidential election held on October 13, 1991. As already mentioned,
Akayev was elected president in the October 1990 parliamentary election. After
independence he could serve out his remaining term as the parliament was poised to
do for itself. He instead decided to renew his political mandate and legitimacy through
a popular presidential election. In principle, the election was open to all qualified
candidates who could collect the required number o f voters’ signatures. There is no
report that the Akayev government prevented a registered opposition party from
fielding a candidate in the election. In fact, while the communist party whose
candidate could have made election a genuine electoral contest was banned and other
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significant sociopolitical formations chose to support his candidacy, it was unlikely
that Akayev whose popularity rating was very high in the country at the time would
have a real electoral competitor. The lack o f organizational and material resources
had made it extremely difficult for other potential individual candidates to run for
office. As a result, Akayev ran unopposed and won the election receiving more than
95 % o f the cast votes.
In January 1994, well before the expiry o f his five year term, Akayev held a
successful popular referendum to ascertain the popular support for his political and
economic reforms underway in the republic and whether he should serve his entire
term (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 5, 1994:23; CSCE, 1995:4). What
obliged Akayev to hold this confirmation referendum was a set o f interactive
circumstances which paved the way for the self-dissolution o f the parliament in
September 1994, a popular referendum on constitutional changes in October 1994,
and a competitive parliamentary election in February 1995. In view of their
importance, it is appropriate to briefly discuss these circumstances which led to the
February 1995 parliamentary elections.
A unique political situation prevailed in Kyrgyzstan until the self-dissolution o f
the communist-dominated parliament in September 1994. That is, an uneasy
coexistence between a communist-dominated conservative parliament and a
reform-oriented non-communist president. In spite o f what happened to the
communist party in the wake o f the 1991 putsch and its own conservative orientation,
the communist-dominated parliament chose not to block most o f the reform measures
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Akayev introduced after independence. However, the parliament rarely offered its
support in a slavish manner as has been the case in Uzbekistan. Rather, it continued
to exercise its constitutional authority which at times was at variance with the
executive reform preferences. Although Akayev occasionally made use o f decrees and
veto power to push some o f his reform initiatives and to overcome parliamentary
resistance, he refrained from launching a full scale effort to end the communist
dominance in the parliament or reduce the parliament to a mere rubber stamp as has
been the case in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. As a result, the uneasy coexistence
between the communist-dominated parliament and reform-oriented president survived
for almost two years without any serious direct confrontation between them.
However, the political distance between the two widened over time, culminating into
a fateful direct executive-legislative confrontation after both sides leveled corruption
charges and counter-charges against each other in 1993-94.
As the post-communist transition deepened in the republic, many scandals o f
widespread official corruption cropped up. One such scandal focused on awarding
gold mining rights to a Canadian firm, Cameco, without inviting competitive bids
from other interested firms. The parliament authorized an inquiry in this regard. The
communist as well as reform-oriented sections of the parliament began to openly
criticize the government of the prime minister, Tursunbek Chingishev, for its corrupt
practices. They also criticized the presidential leadership for its failed reform
measures as well as for its failure to curb official corruption.
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In response to this criticism and the mounting political crisis, Akayev initially
adopted a political and conciliatory approach. Even after the 1993-94 crisis worsened,
he relied on political manipulation rather than on the use o f force to deal with it. In
addition to his own pro-reform views and policies, a number o f other factors made
the use force to deal with the 1993-94 political crisis a less attractive option than
political manipulation.
In fact, the use o f force against those who spoke about official corruption
involved prohibitive costs. In order to completely silence his critics through coercive
methods, he needed a large scale repressive operation. The sheer large size o f his
important opponents (i.e., approximately half o f the parliam ent members, let alone
other political opposition leaders and activists), the resources (personal, party,
regional, and tribal) available to them, the uproar o f some o f his own (former) allies—
-reform-oriented political figures—against the growing official corruption in the
republic, and the presence of the Russian-speaking political activists surely increased
the cost o f a thorough political deactivation o f his opponents through repression.

In

other words, he needed not only to disband the parliament (or at least put away his
critics in it) but also to crack down on hundreds o f critics outside the parliament,
including his own allies and members of both Kyrgyz and Russian nationalities. The
use of force against even a small number o f his Russiam critics would have mocked
his actions he took and proposed to please Russian residents o f the republic in 1994
(Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no 24, 1994:13). Thus, not only his own
democratic orientation but also the potential costs o f such a large scale repressive

304

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

operation led him to choose political and procedural machinations rather than outright
repression to deal with his critics and the growing crisis in the republic.
In order to enhance his own political stature, Akayev announced on November
29, 1993, that he would hold a confirmation referendum on his presidency in January
1994. He also indirectly challenged the parliament to renew its popular mandate. He
rationalized his decision o f referendum and his challenge to the parliament to renew
its mandate by observing that Kyrgyzstan, like many other former Soviet republics,
was in political and economic crisis situation which required "all the branches of
power to strive to gain people's trust" (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 50,
1993:24). The parliament was least interested in his proposal. It had rather different
plans.
After a five-day heated debate in the second week of December 1993, the
parliament passed a vote o f no confidence against the prime minister. In addition to
passing a vote o f no confidence against the prime minister in December 1993, the
parliament called upon its chairman to empower the parliamentary commission to
uncover corrupt practices, especially in the privatization o f state assets. The chairman
empowered the commission to expose any violation o f law and corrupt practices
committed by parliamentarians, members o f the central government, and heads of the
local administration involved in the privatization process (Current Digest o f PostSoviet Press, no. 27, 1994:20).
In the subsequent months, a large number of reports of massive corruption
surfaced in the country. These reports implicated parliamentarians, leading executive
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officials, local administrators, and relatives o f state functionaries, including the wife
of Akayev and her brother. A torrent o f accusations and counter-accusations which
followed created an acrimonious political atmosphere in the country. The central as
well as local state functionaries refused to cooperate with the parliamentary
commission. The newspapers took sides, publishing articles for and against the
parliamentary investigation. The government newspapers carried article and letters o f
well-known individuals who asked the parliament to stop its "witch-hunt" because it
threatened to erode national unity with a potential danger o f turning the country into
another Tajikistan (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 27, 1994:20; no. 36,
1994:21). Above all, Akayev decided to abandon his conciliatory approach to the
parliament and joined the battle against it.
In June 1994, for the first time he publicly accused the parliament o f engaging
in "power struggle and political intrigues" (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no.
36, 1994:21). He charged that it was "stopping at nothing" in this struggle and was
undermining his reform program through its political machinations (CSCE, 1995:4).
He also charged that some members o f the parliament have "accumulated capital as
fast as possible while trying to deceive the electorate with empty demagoguery"
(CSCE, 1995:4). Although Akayev quickly moved against the parliament and took a
number o f steps to undermine the parliament and its constitutional role, here we will
focus on those moves which set the stage for the February 1995 parliamentary
election.
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In the midst o f accusations and counter-accusations o f corruption, in July
1994, a group o f deputies loyal to Akayev called upon the parliament to dissolve
itself. In addition, the speaker o f the parliament and the parliament-owned newspaper,
Svobodnye gory (Free Mountains), were accused o f conspiring to overthrow Akayev.
In addition to his reliance on his parliamentary support, as part o f his move against
the parliament, Akayev entered into an informal alliance with administrative heads o f
the six regions in Kyrgyzstan in order to improve his position against the parliament.
In connivance with the regional heads and a group o f deputies, Akayev was
able to engineer the self-dissolution of the parliament. The parliamentary session
slated for September 27, 1994, was expected to discuss findings o f the parliamentary
commission which was appointed to investigate cases o f official corruption. Akayev
and his allies preempted the session and, hence, its discussion o f the cases o f official
corruption. Before the parliament convened, over half of the deputies loyal to Akayev
refused to take part in the proceedings o f the forthcoming parliamentary session. This
deprived the parliament of a quorum it needed to carry out its legislative functions.
The 23-member Cabinet of Ministers resigned and issued a statement which asserted
that as a consequence o f the permanent boycott o f 165 deputies, the parliament has
ceased its legislative work. It also called upon the president to fulfill his constitutional
responsibilities to end the constitutional crisis in the country. Akayev accepted the
resignation o f the government. He also concurred with the majority o f deputies to
hold a new parliamentary election (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 36,
1994:21).
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Taking advantage of the absence o f the parliament, Akayev resorted to
questionable practices, including holding o f a national referendum in October 1994, to
alter the political institutional design o f the country according to his own
preferences.31 The constitutional amendments approved in the October 1994
referendum sanctioned a bi-cameral legislature. The bi-cameral legislature comprised
a 35-member lower house (Legislative Assembly) and a 70-member upper house
(Assembly o f People's Representatives).32 These measures drew criticism from
opposition quarters (CSCE, 1995:5).33 However, such critical voices failed to budge
Akayev from his plan. As scheduled, the election was held for a 105-seat bi-cameral
parliament in February 1995.
A detailed discussion of this election is outside the scope o f this
study. However, a discussion of an important issue directly relevant to the question of
political liberalization deserves our focus. That is, the government interference with
the electoral process. In this regard, we will focus on three aspects: a) openness of
elections to popular participation; b) campaign and voting; and c) electoral outcome.
Although an acrimonious political atmosphere preceded the parliamentary
election, there is no report to indicate that eligible individual opposition candidates or
registered sociopolitical formations were forcibly kept out o f the nomination and
registration process. Even critics who note irregularities in certain aspects o f the
electoral process refrain from questioning the openness o f this election to all eligible
candidates (Pryde, 1995:115-8; Huskey, 1997:259-265). In fact, it was the first
national election since independence which was truly multi-candidate and multi-party.
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The Central Election Commission registered 921 candidates, including those
who were being investigated for their involvement in financial corruption. An average
of 9 candidates competed for each o f the 105 seats. As already cited, 12 political
parties and 30 social movements with diverse orientations nominated their candidates
in the election. However, only 161 candidates were affiliated with parties. Labor
collectives and residents nominated more candidates than political parties and social
movements. There were also a sizable number o f self-nominated candidates. Although
19 nationalities were represented, the candidates o f the titular nationality
disproportionally outnumbered the candidates o f other nationalities. 870 candidates
were Kyrgyz, 60 Russians, 46 Uzbeks, and 10 Ukranians. Other ethnic communities
were represented in the single digit (CSCE, 1995:9).
As compared to the nomination and registration phase the openness and
fairness o f which are beyond doubt, the campaign and voting evoked mixed reactions
and assessments. On the one hand, we have official circles and most international
observers who maintain that in spite o f certain problems during the campaign and
voting, the election was generally free and fair. After noting a number o f problems
which marred the campaign and voting, a report o f Commission on Cooperation and
Security in Europe concludes that "unlike Turkmenistan, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan,
which permit no opposition parties or opposition press, Kyrgyzstan held multi-party,
multi-candidate contests. Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary election was much freer and
fairer than elections or referendums in these other newly independent states of Central
Asia" (CSCE, 1995:11). On the other hand, local critics and certain international
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analysts dismiss the above overall positive assessment as politically motivated which
both Akayev and his external admirers needed for a continued aid-based relationship.
They rather conclude that the election was far from being free and fair and that the
problems which occurred in the campaign and voting were so grave and widespread
as to warrant its cancellation (Pryde, 1995:115-118; Huskey, 1997:259-265).
At least, the two groups agree that irregularities occurred during the election,
although they differ on how grave and massive these problems were and the
conclusions they reach, including whether the election was generally free and fair and
whether the problems which occurred warranted the cancellation of the election. In
order for us to reach any conclusion with respect to our concern with political
liberalization, it is important to understand the nature of the reported irregularities and
how far they are imputable to the Akayev government.
There were reports o f pressure on and intimidation o f candidates. However, it
is important to note that rival candidates as well as local officials were the main
sources o f this pressure (Pryde, 1995:115). The local officials reportedly used a
number o f pressure tactics to lure rival candidates out o f the electoral races or to
harass them so that they were unable to effectively campaign. These pressure tactics
against the rival candidates include threats o f various sorts, denial of mandated
airtime, use o f official machinery (including mass media) in support o f the favored
candidates, and the dismissal of the relatives, trustees, and assistants o f the rival
candidates from their jobs (CSCE 1995:9; Huskey 1997:259-261). Besides local
officials, individual candidates were also involved in malpractices such as intimidation
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and bribing o f rival candidates, and the use of money and other deficit commodities
such as gasoline, food packets, flour, rice, shoes, etc., to buy votes. In this respect,
the candidates who were being investigated for their involvement in corruption and
were under the threat o f jail sentences outperformed others. Almost 30 percent o f the
new deputies were under legal scrutiny for their corrupt financial dealings (Pryde,
1995:115; Huskey, 1997:260-261; CSCE, 1995:9).
Like the campaign, the voting was also marred by numerous reported
violations. There were reports that the election officials ignored formal voting rules.
Some reports implicate them in acts o f favoritism, including the cancellation o f
elections. There were also numerous reports of older men voting for their wives and
families and o f ballot stuffing (Huskey, 1997:2610. At certain places, the election
commission officials allowed voters to cast ballots without proper documents o f
personal identification. One correspondent of a newspaper was able to vote nine times
for various candidates at one polling station. She stuffed into the ballot box a wad of
papers. The two local observers did not either notice her or did not object to what she
did (CSCE, 1995:10-11; State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1995:919). The victory o f the former prime m inister, Chingishev, and
defeat o f the former parliament speaker, Medektan Sherimkulov, were also imputed to
serious electoral malpractices. In the initial vote tabulation, Chingishev trailed his
main opponent. However, as a result o f reportedly mysterious appearance of several
thousand ballots for him, he was able to win his seat (Huskey, 1997:260). The
second-round defeat of Sherimkulov by a candidate favored by Akayev was reportedly
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a local sensation. The supporters o f Sherimkulov held a protest demonstration and
demanded a recount of votes. His defeat was blamed on officials in his election
district. In order to look into Sherimkulov’s charges of vote fraud in his election
district, Akayev appointed a 34-member independent public commission which was
later self-dissolved without reaching a conclusion (CSCE, 1995:11; Current Digest of
Post-Soviet Press, no. 9, 1995:15; Pryde, 1995:118).
It is hard to dispute the conclusion that irregularities occurred during the
campaign and voting. However, while such irregularities are highlighted, little effort
is made to show how far they are imputable to the central government and whether
they were part o f a coherent manipulative strategy Akayev and his team pursued to
produce a specific electoral outcome. In addition, no persuasive argument is presented
to adequately explain why most international monitors offered a positive assessment of
the 1995 parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan. The argument that the international
positive assessment was politically motivated because both Akayev and the aid donors
needed it for a continued aid-based relations is less than persuasive. It is a weak
argument because Kazakhstan, which was equally, if not more, admired in the West
and was in need o f aid, could not secure such assessment for the March 1994
parliamentary elections.
A sober look at the list o f the reported shortcomings makes it abundantly clear
that most cases were of individual and local nature with no plausible link with the
central government. Most cases o f irregularities in the campaign and voting appear to
be a handiwork o f local officials at various levels (especially the regional heads) and
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powerful individual candidates especially from what some call "new plutocracy"
comprised of directors of state enterprise and private businessmen (Huskey, 1997:260)
rather than the central government. Only few cases such as the defeat o f the former
speaker o f the parliament against a candidate supported by Akayev can arguably be
imputed to the central government. Still, such cases are far from being part of a
well-planned manipulative electoral strategy o f the central government to secure an
intended electoral outcome.
A closer look at the electoral outcome further substantiates the above assertion.
After two rounds o f election, 11 political parties were represented in the parliament.
Interestingly, only 38 out o f 105 deputies had party affiliation. The most successful
political party was the Social Democratic Party with 14 seats. None of the other
political party had more than four members in the parliament. 67 deputies were
unaffiliated, mostly executive officials and businessmen (Huskey, 1997:261-264).
If the electoral outcome embarrassed the political parties, it displeased
Akayev, too. His displeasure is confirmed even by those who have been critical o f the
way the election was conducted. They admit that few candidates supported by Akayev
could get elected (Pryde, 1995:115; Huskey, 1997:259). If we interpret the above
problems in the campaign and voting as part o f a concerted effort of Akayev to
produce intended results, then his failure to get his candidates elected must be
explained. However, such an explanation is still lacking. It becomes more paradoxical
when his failure is compared to the success o f the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents in
producing the intended electoral results without any difficulty.
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In fact. Akayev also had some other reasons to regret the electoral outcome.
A* a lre ad y

mentioned, one o f the main reasons for his direct confrontation with the

previous parliament was the rising official corruption. Akayev had been facing
e n o rm o u s

difficulties in combating official corruption. The electoral result

com pounded
e le c to ra l
th eir

his concern that many new deputies sought a parliamentary seat for immunity

prosecution on charges of corruption (CSCE, 1995:9). A parliament run by such

d e p u tie s
th at the
th e

victories, almost 30 percent of the new deputies were under investigation for

corrupt financial dealings. Akayev himself, among many other concerned voices,

v oiced
fro m

his difficulties in this regard. As already mentioned, before their

was hardly the parliament Akayev desired and anticipated. It was obvious
new parliament, like the old one, would be a reluctant partner o f Akayev in

transition process. Quite expectedly, it did not take Akayev and the new

parliament long to run into troubles with each other.
The reduced representation of women and non-Kyrgyz ethnic minorities in the
new parliament also bothered Akayev. In fact, the new parliament was
disproportionally dominated by members o f the titular nationality. This outcome was
hardly helpful in his effort to lure the Slavic population to stay in the country. What
further disappointed Akayev, and, due to its potentially far-reaching political
implications, was the victory of many local southern candidates over placemen from
the north o f the country. The victory o f many southern candidates signalled a clear
shift in the balance o f power in Kyrgyzstan. It showed that the traditional political
relationship between the southern and northern parts o f the republic was no more
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viable. In other words, it meant that the south would no longer leave to the
traditionally dominant north the responsibility of managing political and economic life
of the country.
In fact, from early on, the success o f many southern candidates reportedly
began to influence political decisions in Bishkek. Sources close to Akayev disclosed
that shortcomings and outcome o f the election alarmed him and he seriously
contemplated cancellation o f the election. The fear o f potential hostile reaction o f the
resourceful southern deputies reportedly prevented him from taking this radical
decision. It was feared that the southern deputies with their powerful interests at stake
and with ample weapons in hand were likely to foment an open conflict if the election
was annulled and their new privileges and parliamentary immunity withdrawn (Pryde,
1995:115-116). As our theoretical model expects and the case o f the southern deputies
demonstrates, although the split among the former nomenklatura cost it access to the
state resources, its continued access to personal, regional, and tribal sources of
support makes it harder for the government to use repression to depoliticize it. In
concrete terms, in addition to his own pro-reform orientation, the potential high cost
of a punitive action against the resourceful southern deputies discouraged Akayev not
only from blocking their electoral participation but also from canceling the election.
In spite o f his reportedly private negative assessment about the election,
Akayev did refrain from openly questioning the electoral outcome. He rather accepted
the electoral outcome and tried to rationalize his acceptance. In his expressed opinion,
there were some, not massive, violations which occurred in the election and imputed
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them to the under-development of democratic culture o f society. While he sounded
optimistic that the next parliamentary election would be truly democratic, competitive,
free and fair, he emphasized the need to change the current electoral law which
neither fit the "specific features o f Kyrgyzstan" nor the "mentality of its people"
(Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 9, 1995:15). What the preceding discussion
of the electoral outcome suggests is that the Akayev government's manipulation and
control o f the campaign and voting, if at all, were o f restricted nature and produced
limited desirable consequences.
In addition to the electoral result, there is another body of evidence which
clearly shows that the republic authorities have been greatly reluctant to interfere with
the electoral process. As already mentioned, the CEC had registered even those
candidates who were involved in financial corruption. The same candidates also spent
huge black money to win election. The Prosecutor General twice requested the CEC
to allow the form er to prosecute several candidates (former deputies and some
directors o f enterprises) suspected o f financial corruption (CSCE, 1995:9).34
Prosecution o f these candidates would have certainly affected the campaign and voting
and perhaps the electoral outcome would have been quite different. In spite o f the fact
that the government could round up several candidates and remove them out o f the
electoral race, it did not pressurize the government-dominated CEC into accepting the
government demand. The government appears to have tolerated participation o f
corrupt candidates in the election rather than provoke accusations o f intimidation of
opposition candidates and o f interference with the electoral process. It appears that
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the local officials especially the regional heads acted on their own, independent of the
preferences of the Akayev government. The result was a parliament which Akayev
had hardly wished and anticipated.
There is also evidence of serious government concern and effort to educate the
people about and conduct a free and fair election. In this regard, the government
broadcast public service announcements twice a day in Kyrgyz and Russian. A
number of international agencies helped the Kyrgyz government prepare such
announcements. In fact, parallel to the reports of irregularities, there were reports of
lawful electoral practices in the campaign and voting. If few candidates were refused
television airtime, there were hundreds o f electoral contestants, including opposition
candidates, who received their mandated airtime on government-controlled television
and radio. In addition, independent as well as government-owned newspapers
provided a considerable coverage to the campaign. They printed platforms of
candidates as well as instructions on how to vote in the election (CSCE, 1995:9). If
there were reports that at certain places election officials ignored or violated formal
electoral rules, there were also reports that they enforced such rules. At many places,
the election officials "staunchly refused to let people vote for others or to vote without
proper documents" (CSCE, 1995:10). After mentioning the election commission
officials’ lapses in observing the badly drafted election law, one British journalist who
witnessed the election (and has been critical of certain aspects o f the election)
concedes that "voting at many polling stations was nevertheless reasonably fair"
(Pryde, 1995:115).
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The above discussion highlights tw o important points. First, the Akayev
government did not make a concerted effort to control the campaign and voting in
order to produce a specific electoral outcome. The few irregularities which can
arguably be imputed to it were o f individual nature. Secondly, most irregularities
which occurred in the campaign and voting were the handiwork o f the regional heads
and powerful individuals rather than the Akayev government. These elements took
advantage o f the inaction o f the governm ent and absence o f any meaningful
government interference in the electoral process rather than government interference
in it. As a result, they were able to run the campaign the way they deemed fit.
Although the government inaction might be prejudicial to the interests o f a handful o f
individual candidates in the short run and to democratic consolidation in the long run,
it did provide considerable space and freedom to hundreds o f candidates in the 1995
parliamentary election.
In April 1995, it became quite clear that the new parliament was far being a
rubber stamp or a more pliable body than the previous parliament. Taking the lead
from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan where terms o f the incumbents
presidents w ere extended through Soviet-style national referenda, the Akayev loyalists
inside as well outside the parliament launched a campaign to do the same in
Kyrgyzstan. A signature campaign was organized for this purpose. However, the
majority o f the deputies voted down a resolution for such a referendum describing it
as unconstitutional (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 43, 1995:21). In
accordance with the parliamentary decision, Akayev organized and contested a multi-
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candidate presidential election in December 1995. If the parliament could not get its
way, nor could Akayev— a situation conducive for political liberalization. In other
words, both could not dictate terms to each other. And this case amply demonstrates
how a split elite structure in Kyrgyzstan promoted the cause o f political liberalization.
In fact, not only his own democratic outlook but also the refusal o f the members o f
the parliament to assume a totally pliant role forced Akayev to contest a competitive
presidential election in December 1995.
According to the election law, a presidential candidate needed 50,000
signatures, gathering a certain number from each of the six provinces o f the country.
Initially, the CEC registered six candidates including Akayev. Almost two weeks
before the election, three opposition candidates were deregistered after local
government officials successfully proved in the court irregularities in their lists of
signatures required for registration o f a presidential candidate. The disqualified
candidates along with their assistants staged a huger strike but it was o f no avail.
After the disqualification o f three candidates, Akayev had to compete with two more
candidates, Absamat Masaliyev o f the communist party and Medetkan Sherimkulov,
the former speaker o f the parliament and a former Central Committee Secretary.
Although the three o f the five opposition candidates were disqualified during
the last stage o f the presidential campaign, all the five electoral opponents o f Akayev
were free to campaign. There were no reports, except an isolated incident, that they
faced any serious hurdles from the government. All the five opposition candidates
were free to subject his market-oriented reforms to serious criticism. The isolated
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incident involving the government action against one o f the opposition candidates
occurred two days before the election. This incident involved the arrest o f two
campaign workers o f Sherimkulov for distributing pamphlets which allegedly
slandered the president. Likewise, except isolated instances o f fraud reported on
election day, the election was quite free and fair: Akayev was able to easily defeat his
two electoral competitors who were weak candidates partly due to the fact that both
relied on and divided up among themselves their communist supporters.
It is clear from the above discussion that Akayev avoided the use o f coercive
methods to close the electoral process to his critics and opponents (of course, with the
questionable exception of two presidential candidates). However, he did not pursue
the same open approach toward the opposition press and journalists in a consistent
manner in the post-independence period. The next section will deal with the degree
o f freedom which was available to the opposition press in the post-independence
period.

GOVERNMENT-PRESS RELATIONS: FROM HONEYMOON TO
CONFRONTATION
The press and media policy Akayev and his team pursued in the
post-independence period can be divided into two broad phases. The first phase began
with the independence and ended in m id-1994. The Akayev administration pursued a
considerably liberal press and media policy in the first phase. One can assert without
any doubt that especially the independent press was far more free in Kyrgyzstan than
in any other Central Asian republic during this period. The independent print media
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had relatively greater freedom to take root, debate sensitive issues, and publish
material even critical o f the government and its policies in Kyrgyzstan.
The liberal phase ended in mid-1994 to usher in the second phase with a
relatively restrictive press and media policy. The Akayev government curtailed the
freedom of independent newspapers and journalists. A host o f intimidating and
punitive measures sullied the impressive record o f political liberalization the
republican leadership was able to build in part due to its previous considerably liberal
policy toward the independent print media and its representatives. These punitive
measures include the closure of various opposition newspapers and persecution o f
journalists for their criticism of the leading executive officials.
Although the honeymoon period for the independent press ended in 1994, the
restrictive press and media policy Akayev and his team adopted in the second phase
was still the least restrictive in the entire region. A detailed discussion of the two
phases is attempted below in order to further clarify the above points and
observations.
As already mentioned, after he was elected president in October 1990, Akayev
pursued a benign press and media policy in line with an all-union law on the press
and media. The all-union law which came into effect on August 1, 1990, guaranteed
the press freedom. After independence, the all-union law continued to serve as the
basic legal framework to deal with the press, and Akayev continued his
pre-independence benign policy toward the national as well as international print
media. In July 1992, the republican parliament passed a new mass media law, almost
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a carbon copy o f the above all-union law. The July 1992 law guarantees freedom of
the mass media. It supports a journalist’s right to obtain and publish information
without prior approval or restraint. A journalist is also guaranteed the right to protect
his sources o f information. The law also requires that all institutions o f mass media
must register with the Ministry o f Justice and await the official approval before
engaging in any operation.
While basic guarantees for the press freedom are provided in the law, certain
restrictions are also codified in order to supposedly prevent the abuse o f the freedom
of the mass media. These restrictions deal with state secrets, forcible overthrow o f the
existing constitutional order, calls for war, violence, and intolerance toward various
social groups, and desecration of national values. The law also makes it impermissible
for the press to encroach on the privacy and honor and dignity o f individual citizens
and to publish false information. A similar clause on the protection o f honor o f the
president was considered but was dropped because Akayev was opposed to it (State
Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992 and 1993:821 and
943 respectively).
The July 1992 law, like above the all-union law, contained a number o f
provisions which could be stretched and exploited to restrict freedom o f the press and
media. For instance, the requirement that all media must seek and await official
recognition before beginning to operate could be used to curb the rise o f independent
print media. However, Akayev and his team eschewed such tactics during the first
phase. The Akayev government pursued a very liberal registration policy. There are
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no reports to indicate that the government refused to register a publication for
political reasons. As a result of a liberal registration policy, independent institutions
o f news media continued to rise in the republic.
In addition to the state-owned news media, fully independent mass media
institutions such as newspapers, magazines, television networks, and radio stations
have appeared in Kyrgyzstan in the post-independence period. These institutions o f
mass media have a host o f founders, including political parties, social movements,
professional groups, civil and cultural formations, and individual citizens. The
parliament also had its own newspaper, Svobodnye gory, which played the role o f
opposition before it was shut down in August 1994.
It is outside the scope of this study to discuss in detail each and every
independent newspaper which existed in the post-independence period. It will suffice
for our purpose to identify notable independent media outlets and briefly discuss the
freedom o f expression they enjoyed in the post-independence period.
In addition to Svobodnye gory, other notable independent and opposition
newspapers which have existed in the post-independence period include Vechemii
Bishkek, Res Publica, Delo No, Politika, Erk, Asaba, and Femida. Vechemii Bishkek
is an independent and the most professional newspaper with the largest circulation in
the country. Res publica and Asaba are the most impeccable representatives o f the
opposition press. Politika was founded and edited by a woman until it, like Svobodnye
gory, was closed down in August 1994. Politika was a supplement to Delo No, a
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Bishkek-based moderately opposition-oriented newspaper. Erk is the mouthpiece of
Erkin Kyrgyzstan, an ethnonationalist political party.
Like Erk which seeks to promote interests o f ethnic Kyrgyz, newspapers
representing interests o f other ethnic groups have also cropped up in the country. As
already mentioned, Soglasie and several other Slavic associations have founded their
own mouthpiece, Soglasie. Although the Osh city features independent and small
circulation Russian and Uzbek newspapers such as Mizon of Uzbeks and Devovoi Osh
(Business Osh) o f Russians, these newspapers have usually eschewed the role of
opposition. Osh also features independent, private television stations such as Osh TV
and Mizon TV. Mizon TV is an Uzbek-language station. Osh TV has wider audience.
It has its own facilities. As o f 1997, Osh TV was reportedly moving, though quite
slowly and cautiously, in the direction of featuring political commentaries (CSCE,
1995; 1-6; CSCE, 1998:16-26).
As already mentioned, Akayev generally respected the freedom of the press
even before the July 1992 law was passed. In fact, he wanted to have a close and
respectable relationship with the national as well as international press and media. It
became quite obvious shortly after independence that unlike other Central Asian
leaders, Akayev wanted more rather than less news coverage of the entire region of
Central Asia. He took personal initiatives to court the news media in this regard. In
March 1992, he organized a conference in Bishkek o f news media executives from the
leading newspapers o f the CIS and the representatives of the press services o f the
Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. In his address to the conference participants,
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Akayev pressed upon them to provide the region more newspaper space. He lamented
the information vacuum in Central Asian a t a time when values and ideas were
forming in the region. By way o f assuring the press and media that he would tolerate
even critical news coverage of his republic, Akayev asserted that he did not expect
everyone to agree with his democratic ways and ideas or his ways of creating a
law-governed society. He further noted that he needed not only allies in the press, but
also opponents who could be just as useful as allies because opponents forced him to
think better and act enthusiastically. However, he expected the opposition press to
perform its duties in a professional and civilized way (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet
Press, no. 12, 1992:34).
Whether the opposition print media lived up to his standards and expectations
or not, Akayev generally remained faithful to his views at least until m id-1994.
Although his government exercised influence over the state-owned media, the
independent and government newspapers have been generally free to print material
without prior government approval or restriction. The government press and media
avoided direct criticism of the executive leadership and were susceptible to
self-censorship. However, leaving aside self-censorship cases which are difficult to
document, there were no reports to indicate that the government imposed prior
restriction or censorship on the independent and state-owned news media.
Until m id-1994, journalists working for various newspapers across the country
were free from government pressure, intimidation, and threats. In August 1993, the
Ministry of Justice made an effort to curtail freedom o f the press and its
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representatives. The Ministry tried to initiate a screening process for press material in
order to stop publication o f classified information. The independent as well as
government newspapers lashed out at the move as an effort to reinstitute censorship.
In the absence o f Akayev, the Vice President quickly issued an executive decree to
reverse the initiative and to reaffirm the government’s commitment to the freedom o f
the press.
In fact, during the first three years o f independence, the press freely debated
several unsavory issues in ways critical o f the government and its policies. Inter- and
intra-ethnic disputes, nature and failure o f the transition policies, distribution o f
power, constitutional matters, official incompetence, mismanagement and corruption
were some o f these unsavory issues. Shortly after independence, press debates broke
out on a number of politically sensitive and potentially divisive issues. Let alone the
common heated debates on inter-ethnic issues, reports of intense intra-Kyrgyz disputes
were regularly published in the press. For instance, in early February 1992, two
popular newspapers raised a politically sensitive controversy over the preponderance
of the northerners over their southern coethnics in the state power structures (Current
Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 10, 1992:5). It was not a one time episode, rather the
press continued to cover it in the subsequent period (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet
Press, no. 43, 1992:24-25).
The republican leadership not only tolerated such politically sensitive debates
and other cases o f adverse news coverage o f the republic but it also defended authors
of these critical debates and commentaries and tried to present its own case to the
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press. For instance, in September 1993, in a statement of the government press
service, a local Russian journalist working for the Russian television network,
Ostankino, was accused of pejorative reporting about Kyrgyzstan. The statement
concluded that it was not lawful for a foreign journalist to insult the people o f his
temporary abode.
In fact, the journalist was born in Bishkek, lived in the republic for the past 30
years and was a Kyrgyz citizen of Russian origin. The local Russian-language
newspapers lashed out at the government press service statement. The press service
was criticized for portraying the journalist as a foreigner and for its clumsy effort to
suppress accurate presentation o f the negative side o f the life in the country. Above
all, Akayev publicly defended the journalist and criticized the press service officials
for their clumsiness. Although the press service defended its version but assured the
news media that the episode has no bearing on the news media as a whole (State
Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993:943). Likewise,
Akayev had a two-hour discussion with a Russian reporter o f a Moscow-based
newspaper in order to successfully dispel his skepticism he expressed in an article on
the future o f ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no.
22, 1994:23). In line with our theoretical expectation, these episodes clearly
demonstrate that the readiness and willingness o f the Russian-speaking population and
the local and foreign Russian-language press to defend their interests and the
sensitivity o f the republic leadership to their concerns exert a positive impact on
political liberalization in the republic in the post-independence period.
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In addition to ethnic issues, other questions were also freely and regularly
debated in the press. The independent press continued to publish criticism o f the
government and a host o f its policies in 1991 and 1992. Such criticism intensified in
1993. Political parties also sharpened their criticism o f the government. For example,
Asaba and Erkin Kyrgyzstan became more vocal in their attacks on the government.
In a conference o f democratic forces held at the initiative o f Akayev in March 1993,
Erkin Kyrgyzstan and Asaba presented an ultimatum and demanded the resignation o f
the prime minister, Tursunbek Chnigishev (Haghayeghi, 1995:118). Such attacks of
political parties were regularly published in the independent and opposition
newspapers. After all, Erkin Kyrgyzstan had its own newspaper, Erk, to publish its
criticism o f the government and its various actions.
The most acrimonious debate the national press covered since independence
was focused on official corruption. The central authorities were most vulnerable and
sensitive to accusations o f corruption. Politics and details o f such accusations have
been discussed in the previous section. Here, we will confine our focus to the role of
the press and government reaction.
In 1993, the opposition sharpened its criticism of the government for
widespread official corruption. The independent and opposition newspapers like Res
Publica, Politika, and Svbodnye gory played an active role in exposing and reporting
cases o f official corruption. The press and media were spared in the early responses
Akayev adopted to deal with the mounting political crisis. However, as the 1993-94
political crisis worsened, he connived with the regional heads to successfully weaken
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the parliament and included the press, too, on the list of problems to deal with. As
part o f his presidential responses to the political crisis, he reviewed his approach
toward the independent and opposition press and ushered in a moderately restrictive
phase o f his press and media policy in the summer of 1994.
In the wake o f the 1993-94 political crisis, Akayev began to use for the first
time the July 1992 law on the mass media to hold the press and journalists
accountable for what they wrote and published. In May 1994, in line with the law on
protecting state secrets, the Akayev government restricted the subjects journalists
could write about. In fact, the 1992 law was supplemented with other restrictive
decrees, orders, and laws. For instance, the 1993 Constitution has been amended to
make honor of the president inviolable.
In the wake o f the 1993-94 crisis, Akayev also, for the first time, began to
openly criticize the press for its continued irresponsible behavior. In fact, the press
accounts implicating him personally in the widespread official corruption were
prejudicial to his image as an upright, genuine democratic reformer. He was not
willing to let the opposition press publicly call him corrupt under the cover o f the
press freedom. He reversed his earlier position and set up a committee for the defense
o f his honor (Huskey, 1997:257-8). The committee was assigned with the
responsibility to ensure that no one used false information to sully the honor and
reputation o f the president.
As the executive-legislative confrontation intensified, the pro-Akayev deputies
accused in July 1994 the parliament speaker and the parliament-owned newspaper,
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Svobodnye gory, o f hatching conspiracies to overthrow the president. In August 1994,
Akayev himself lashed out at the newspaper for harboring communist sympathies, for
publishing anti-Semitic information, and for printing material critical of other states,
hence damaging Kyrgyzstan’s relation with them. The last objection referred to the
newspaper’s criticism on other Central Asian leaders. Akayev initiated legal action
against the newspaper and a Bishkek court shut down the newspaper in August 1994.
The editor o f Svobdonye gory offered, however, a different reason for the
government action against the newspaper. According to her, the newspaper had
received a report from the parliamentary investigative commission on official
corruption and was preparing to publish it, but the central authorities wanted to stop it
(CSCE, 1995:4-5).
On August 19, 1994, the same day the government impounded the
parliament-owned newspaper, Akayev issued a presidential decree sanctioning the
formation o f a council on activities of the mass media. The council was sanctioned
to "help journalists in their work and prevent the use o f the media from causing
political instability and upsetting interethnic accord and civic peace" (State
Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994:866). In effect, the
council sought to stop the publication of material critical of the authorities, especially
the president. In addition to the council, the authorities used the security apparatus,
the MNB, to contact the editors o f the opposition newspapers and journalists and
block news coverage critical o f the government and its policies (CSCE 1998:22-24).
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The

closure of Svobodnye gory and formation o f the presidential council on

the m a w m e d ia
num ber

preceded a series of anti-press actions in the subsequent period. A

of other opposition newspapers were closed down, and opposition journalists

were intimidated, threatened, beaten, tried, fined, banned from practicing journalism,
and

imprisoned on the charges of publishing false information and damaging the

honor

and reputation of the president and other high ranking officials. In addition to

Svobodnye

gory, Politika was closed down within less than a week after the closure

of the former for its criticism o f the president. The central and regional high ranking
officials readily followed the footsteps o f Akayev in their dealing with the opposition
press and journalists. For instance, the prime minister secured the closure o f Kriminal
in March 1997, for falsely implicating him in financial corruption, and in September
1997, the Osh local authorities sued an Uzbek-language newspaper, Mizon, for
publishing a false article about excesses and corruption o f the local police. The fate of
individual opposition journalists from opposition newspapers such as Res Publica and
Femida was no different. The editors and journalists from these newspapers were
beaten, fined, and imprisoned for slandering the president and other leading executive
officials (CSCE 1998:22-24; State Department. Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1995, 1996 and 1997:918-9, 1003, 1154 respectively).
The above discussion o f anti-press measures the Akayev government adopted
since m id-1994 offers three important points. Firstly, it is quite clear that the press
and journalists received a heavy-handed treatment from the central and local
authorities since m id-1994. Secondly, at times the press made indiscriminate personal
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accusations without proof and, as a result, rendered itself defenseless in law suits.
Thirdly, the opposition press and journalists proved resilient. In spite o f their
constant confrontation with the press since m id-1994, the central authorities have been
unable to silence the independent press and journalists. The opposition press never
ceased to publish reports critical of the president and government.
It is important to note that the press has been able to show resilience in large
pan due to the restraint the Akayev government exercised in its dealing with the
press. Although Akayev and other leading executive officials have shown readiness to
punish those who hurl personal accusations o f corruption on them without proof, they
refrained from suppressing and silencing all forms o f criticism and difference o f
opinion expressed in the media outlets. They have also avoided flushing out all the
independent newspapers. As of 1997, there were approximately 40 to 50 independent
newspapers and magazines in Kyrgyzstan (State Department. Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1997:1154).
Since m id-1994, a number o f independent opposition newspapers and
journalists have printed reports critical o f the local as well as central authorities and
suffered no punitive government reactions. In 1994, local newspapers reported stories
of local police excesses. The same year the Kyrgyz-Human Rights Bureau and an
independent newspaper, Delo No, joined hands to champion the cause of the reported
victims of police injustices (State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1994:865, 868). While the local authorities in Osh sued Mizon for its
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report on police corruption, Delo No was able to write on the same subject without
provoking official ire (CSCE, 1998:23-24).
In spite o f the effort o f the presidential council on the mass media to
discourage critical coverage o f the president in the press, independent newspapers like
Res Publica, an impeccable representative o f opposition newspapers, continued to
publish articles critical o f the President, the Government, and government policy
(State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995:919). Like
Res Publica, Asaba, in spite o f government warning, also continued to publish articles
critical o f the republic leadership. In September 1997, one issue o f Asaba featured
eight articles against Akayev. This fact serves as an ample proof that even impeccable
representative o f the opposition newspapers like Asaba were free to publish material
without prior censorship.
In October 1997, Vechemii Bishkek defended Dooronbek Sadyrabaev, a
deputy from Osh, when he ran into troubles with the government over his remarks
about the possible secession o f the southern regions due to unwise economic, political,
and cadre policies of the government. In his remarks, the deputy faulted the president,
too. The Prosecutor General warned the deputy that his remarks had "an
anti-constitutional character” because they threatened territorial integrity o f the
country. The deputy maintained that he warned the government o f possible secession,
rather than called for it. Vechernii Bishkek featured his defense on its front page,
concluding that his position sounded credible (CSCE, 1998:21). Even opposition
leaders partially confirm the above assertion regarding the freedom o f the press. For
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instance, while they criticize Akayev and his policies during their meetings with the
international visitors concerned with human rights situation and complain about the
lack o f a real independent television, many opposition parliamentarians concede that
there are few newspapers which can voice criticism o f the authorities. These things
are "unthinkable in Uzbekistan" (CSCE, 1998:18).

CONCLUSION
The way the political liberalization process unfolded in Kyrgyzstan in the preand post-independence period makes it clear that political orientation, actions, and
strategies o f the leader in power are o f important consequences for the transition
process in relatively less developed former communist polities. However, it also
becomes clear that although these factors may magnify or weaken the situational
stimuli, structural factors continue to exercise an independent influence on political
liberalization in such polities. This is true o f both the Masaliyev and Akayev eras in
Kyrgyzstan.
In spite o f his anti-reformist views and efforts, Masaliyev was only partially
successful in circumventing the implementation o f glasnost in Kyrgyzstan because the
pressure o f central authorities, active political participation of Russian minority, and
growing fragmentation among the republican communist elites increasingly neutralized
such efforts and weakened his control o f politics in the republic. Informal
sociopolitical groups arose and opposed the communist party, certain republican
newspapers and journalists engaged in independent and critical news coverage
especially after the Osh conflict in June 1991, a number o f independent candidates
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were able to participate and defeat their communist competitors in national and
republican parliamentary elections, and challenge the communist leadership during the
Masaliyev era. This situation ultimately cost him power position, brought Akayev into
power, and paved the way for greater political openness in the republic.
If Masaliyev sought to circumvent glasnost in line with his anti-reformist
views, Akayev sought to expand and deepen it after he became president in October
1990. The latter’s reformist orientation supplemented the existing factors favorable to
glasnost such as the central leadership’s support, active participation o f ethnic groups
such as Kyrgyz and Russian in the political process, and increasingly disintegrating
communist elite structure. Before independence, only under Akayev opposition groups
were for the first time able to function without fear of intimidation and repression. In
alliance with democratically-oriented local forces and with the blessings o f the central
authorities, but contrary to the wishes o f the republican communist leadership,
Akayev was able to accelerate the political liberalization process in his republic
through presidential initiatives. As a result o f his efforts, legal foundations for
political pluralism, and especially all the necessary parts o f a multi-party political
system, were put in place before independence.
Except the Soviet pressure for political reform, all other factors conducive for
political liberalization in the pre-independence remained more or less intact in the
post-independence period. In other words, Akayev’s reformist orientation, political
participation o f large, resourceful Russian minority, and fragmented elite structure
saw no significant change. Consequently, Akayev continued his reform agenda in the

335

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

post-independence period. As a result of his relatively liberal policy, a host of
independent political parties and social movements (ranging from ethnonationalist to
liberal democratic ones) with diverse orientations have been able to freely form,
operate, and participate in the political processes (including electoral process) in the
country in the post-independence. In fact, freedom of independent political and social
forces to organize themselves and pursue their expressed objectives is one o f the areas
in which Kyrgyzstan has recorded more or less sustained progress and other regional
countries have so far been unable to emulate it. As a result o f this freedom, a
genuinely independent, although weak, multiparty system has appeared in Kyrgyzstan
in the post-independence era. More or less similar degree o f freedom was available to
the independent mass media, at least in the immediate post-independence period.
The political liberalization process came under strains by mid-1994. It suffered
reversals in certain areas, especially the press freedom, in the wake o f the 1993-94
political crisis rooted in the executive-legislative branch confrontation on a number of
issues, including the widespread official corruption. The sources o f these reversals
include Akayev’s political strategies to deal with this confrontation and the
irresponsible behavior o f the mass media.
In spite o f these reversals in the political liberalization process since mid-1994,
Akayev exercised restraint in his dealing with his political opponents. The sources of
this restraint included his own liberal views, his concern to prevent migration o f
ethnic Russians for economic as well as political reasons, and fragmented elite
structure, especially the independent parliament and powerful individual political
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actors affiliated with various clans and regions. As a result, even after the limited
authoritarian offensive began in mid-1994, there were still vibrant independent mass
media institutions, journalists, and political parties in Kyrgyzstan— a fact which sets
that country apart from other Central Asian countries in terms o f an overall progress
in all aspects o f political liberalization.
Is the present level o f political liberalization likely to hold in the foreseeable
future? Will it evolve into the next stage of democratization, which the recent regime
transition literature expects to occur, on the road to consolidated democracy? Or will
it evolve into another viable political alternative based on the rule o f law? Or will it
degenerate into an abject repressive regime such as in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan?
It is hard to answer these questions with an element o f certainty for various reasons,
including the uncertain post-communist situation in Kyrgyzstan. However, a good deal
of information is available to help us broadly speculate about the future prospects of
political liberalization in that country.
O f course, the reformist leadership of Akayev is an important reason for the
lead Kyrgyzstan achieved over Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in almost all areas of
political liberalization in the post-independence period. There is no signs o f imminent
change in his political orientation and his political choices so far do not smack of
latent authoritarian tendencies. Also, if his past record is any guide, socioeconomic
crises o f ordinary proportion are unlikely to lead him to impose a violent authoritarian
order. Therefore, we can safely say that the political liberalization process is unlikely
to degenerate into an abject repressive regime under his remaining presidential term
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which is coming to an end in 2000. The Supreme Court has allowed him to run for a
third term because his 1991 election occurred prior to the adoption o f the current
constitution according to which an individual can become president for two terms
only. A number o f political forces are opposing this decision. If he runs for the
another term and decides to stay in power beyond 2000, he is more likely to resort to
political tactics rather than brutal force to deal with this opposition. In other words,
the political liberalization process is unlikely to suffer a serious setback so far as
Akayev remains content with the Supreme Court’s interpretation o f the constitution
and refrains from prolonging his rule beyond the third term.
If Akayev is replaced with a conservative leadership, the political liberalization
process in the republic can suffer setbacks in certain areas. However, chances o f the
rise o f an abject repressive regime are still minimal for two reasons. First, two
important factors conducive for political liberalization, the resourceful Russian
minority and powerful elites divided along ideological, ethnic, tribal, and regional
lines are likely to hold good in the foreseeable future. The conservative leadership
will find it extremely hard and risky to neutralize these two important favorable
factors. The Russian minority is unlikely to support the imposition o f a violent
authoritarian order for several reasons, including the fear o f provoking anti-Russian
feelings among politically active groups in the republic. The resourcefulness of the
Russian minority, including the support o f Russian troops based on the Kyrgyz soil,
will effectively protect it from excessive repression. Also, powerful elites are so
sharply divided that it will be very hard for a conservative leadership to unify them
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on the need for an abject repressive regime. Second, in spite o f representing a wide
variety o f ideological orientations and interests, almost all organized political forces
advocate some variant of democracy. All such forces are likely to resist the
imposition o f a violent authoritarian order, increasing the cost o f rolling back
whatever political liberalization is available to them. And it will be hard for any
leadership to perpetuate such an order without the support o f an organized political
force. Hence, Kyrgyzstan is unlikely to degenerate into an abject repressive regime in
the near future. In other words, its lead over Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in almost all
areas o f political liberalization is likely to hold in the foreseeable future.
NOTES
1. The primary target of the authoritarian offensive that began in m id-1994 was the
opposition press and journalists and the parliament. Although it later engulfed a small
number o f individual political activists, no political party was banned as has been the
case in Uzbekistan.
2. In 1996, the Russian minority made up only 15.6 % o f the population in
Kyrgyzstan (Heleniak 1997:371).
3. At the time o f independence, approximately three times more Russian-speakers
were employed in industry than members o f the titular ethnic group. The Russianspeakers also outnumber the titular ethnic group in the makeup o f the technological
elite. This is the reasons why some have described the flight o f non-titular population
as "brain drain” (Olcott 1997:213; Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 17,
1993:12).
4. For instance, the Commission for the Support of Compatriots, set up by the
Russian government to look after the interests of the Russian minority in the former
Soviet space, provided newsprint and computers and other equipment to the Slavic
Fund and Concord (Soglasie), two leading Russian-oriented sociopolitical associations
in Kyrgyzstan (Huskey 1998:270). In addition, Russia helped in setting up a KyrgyzRussian investment fund to convert enterprises in Kyrgyzstan that employ mainly
Russian-speakers into joint ventures (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, no. 8,
1994:27).
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5. Besides Shipitko, three more independent candidates succeeded in defeating their
communist competitors in these elections in the capital city. These three independent
candidates are Oleg Igumnov, a high school teacher, E. Akramov, a surgeon, and A.
Komarov, the director o f an environmental research institute (Huskey 1995:820).
6. The true value o f this group became evident once the new parliament opened its
first session on April 10, 1990. At the opening session o f the new parliament, a
number of reformist deputies voiced their opposition to the communist party and its
practices. Above all, these deputies tried to put up their own candidate against
Masaiiyev in the election for the chairman o f the new parliament. However, by a
majority vote, the communist deputies refused the independent candidate a slot on the
ballot.
7. The group also openly accused the party leadership and economic bureaucracy for
making a sustained effort "to foil all grass-roots political initiatives in the
development o f democratic process." The fact that the new republican parliament was
"becoming hostage to this practice” was lamented. The party leadership was criticized
for continuing the past practice of deciding "everything...at the level of the Party
committees, and not in completely objective and principled fashion" and for
disregarding the sovereignty o f the new, democratically elected republican parliament
by keeping actual policy process out o f its control. A special reference was made to
the fact that the parliament was denied an opportunity to express its views on the Osh
incident which literally rocked the whole republic (Current Digest of Soviet Press, no.
38, 1990:23).
8. Apas Jumagulov, the Chairman o f the Council o f Ministers, and D. Amanbayev,
the first secretary o f the party committee in the Issyk-Kul province, were the other
two presidential candidates.
9. The impact o f such defections was clearly felt on two occasions. First, on the eve
of the August 1991 coup, the republican communist party leadership which supported
the coup failed, despite its desire, to move against Akayev. Second, it failed to
prevent him from initiating legal proceedings against its members for supporting the
1991 coup and from banning its activities in the republic in the post-independence
period.
10. For instance, two out of three candidates who contested the December 1995
presidential elections were important communist leaders, Absamat Masaliyev, the
First Secretary o f the communist party, and Medetkan Sherimkulov, the former
speaker o f the parliament and a former Central Committee Secretary of the party.
11. A number o f important political leaders represent these geographic regions. For
instance, the longtime party boss Usubaliyev and president Akayev come from Naryn,
and Masaliyev represents Talas (Olcott 1993:55).
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12. Due to the shortcomings o f the 1995 parliamentary elections, Akayev reportedly
contemplated to annul the elections. However, the fear of potential hostile reaction o f
the resourceful southern candidates who succeeded in these elections reportedly
prevented him from taking such a radical step (Pryde 1995:115-6).
13. In early 1992, the republic’s press reported the protest of the southern political
elites over the preponderance of the northern elites in the state power structures
(Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 10, 1992:5; no. 43, 1992:24-5).
14. Khazanov is o f the view that the main problem Akayev is facing is his relations
with the former communists because they still occupy the dominant positions in the
government and administration and constitute the most serious political force in the
parliament. He believes that they "are able to sabotage any serious attempt at
reforms" (Khazanov 1995:148). It is true that the former communists are occupying
dominant position in the government, but they can not (and did not) put up an open
challenge to the political reform program.
15. In his speech on the introduction of presidential rule in the country, Akayev
supported this reform measure but at the same time expressed his apprehension that
excessive concentration o f power in the president’s hand could lead to an authoritarian
regime. He demanded to formulate more precisely and more clearly constitutional
guarantees that presidential power would not develop into authoritarian power
(Current Digest o f Soviet Press, no. 12, 1990:6).
16. According to Akayev, the people who carried out the coup and those who
supported it were motivated by their "desire to preserve the state power and
totalitarian regime that are slipping away from them" (Current Digest o f Soviet Press,
no. 33, 1991:25).
17. The fact that, in spite o f his liberal orientation, he banned the communist party in
the post-independence period partly supports this assertion.
18. In spite o f the fact that he suspected the commitment o f the communist party, the
most organized party in the republic, to democracy, he suggested to hold
parliamentary elections on the basis o f lists provided by political parties (Current
Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 42, 1992:7)— a measure bound to strengthen national
political parties, including the communist party, rather than individual local political
leaders.
19. Initially, Akayev was supporter o f maximum freedom of the press. He was
opposed to libel laws. Over time, as the opposition press began to put out information
implicating him and other officials without evidence, he supported the idea o f holding
such people responsible for their actions. As a result, he supported libel laws to
prosecute institutions o f mass media for putting out false information.
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20. Referring to the shortcomings of the 1995 parliamentary elections, Akayev
remarked that the current law on elections does not fit either the specific features of
Kyrgyzstan or the mentality o f its people (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no. 9,
1995:15).
21. These common reasons include: a) Gorbachev’s view o f Islam as a reactionary
force which could undermine his reform initiatives (Olcott 1990:375); b) a massive
anti corruption campaign in Central Asia; c) the Soviet authorities’ view o f the
Central Asian informal groups as accomplices o f the corrupt officials and sources of
growing anti-Soviet direction, ethnonational tensions, and violent conflicts in the
region (Critchlow 1991:146-7) and d) overcautious population.
22. The list of corrupt party members who were purged after Masaliyev took power
in 1985 included the second party secretary and two oblast secretaries, in addition to
several hundred other party and state functionaries (Haghayeghi, 1995:50).
23. Although the Gorbachev reform program was essentially beyond his independent
manipulation, Masaliyev sought to line up behind the anti-reformist forces active at
the center under the leadership of Yegor Ligachev to block it (BBC, September 12,
1989; Huskey 1995:818). When Ligachev visited Kyrgyzstan in September 1989, he
shared the concern with the republican communist leadership that certain mass media
were biased in their negative coverage o f the state o f affairs in the republic (BBC,
September 12, 1989). In addition, the First Deputy Chairman of the Kyrgyz Council
o f Ministers made an important revelation in August 1990 that the Kyrgyz leadership
permitted Lighachev and his emissaries to dictate the cadre policy in its republic
during this period (Huskey 1995:818).
24. As some representatives o f the local press confided to their colleagues in the
central newspapers, any serious material that debated important societal problems and
criticized the republic communist leaders even at the district level for one reason or
another was prevented from reaching the Kyrgyz masses. If a critical item ever
escaped official censors, an immediate effort was made to convince the public that it
was false (FBIS, July 29, 1988:61).
25. As these clubs sought to assume a more explicit and independent political profile
over time, their activities were curtailed (Haghayeghi 1995:108; Current Digest o f
Soviet Press, no. 2, 1989:18; Huskey 1995:832; 1997:250).
26. The DMK played an important role during the Osh conflict. After the communist
authorities failed to prevent the bloodshed, they enlisted the support o f the DMK. The
DMK leadership obliged the communist authorities but humbled them by organizing
rallies in the capital city and by making wide ranging demands, including the
independence o f the republic with a right to secede from the center, adoption o f a
multi-party democratic political system, and resignation o f the incumbent ruling elites
(Haghayeghi 1995:109).
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27. According to official statistics, which were conservative, 320 people were killed
in these violent clashes (Current Digest o f Post-Soviet Press, no 1, 1993:6).
28. In Osh, people raised banners in Uzbek language with the following slogan:
"There is no justice" (The Financial Times, July 20, 1990:2). The serious erosion o f
the communist leadership’s standing in society also became obvious when Masaliyev
failed, despite his repeated requests, but the opposition leader o f the DMK,
Tupchubek Turgunaliev, succeeded in dispersing a mass protest rally o f ethnic Kyrgyz
in front o f the communist party headquarters in the capital city.
29. Let alone their electoral competitors, they had to face at the peak o f the election
campaign several mass demonstrations of ethnic Kyrgyz in support o f their nationalist
demands, including the demand for an immediate implementation o f the new language
law in the republic. In order to pacify the demonstrators and prevent a law and order
situation, the communist authorities took a number o f steps including open forums
which were scenes o f heated debates between senior party and government officials on
the one hand and representatives o f demonstrators and informal groups on the other
(Huskey, 1995:822-6).
30. According to the official sources, the delay occurred due to the fact that a number
of clauses in its initial charter referred to it as a paramilitary formation. According to
the Cossack version, the authorities resisted registration on the pretext that the
Cossacks had no historical ties to the country (State Dept, Country Reports On
Human Rights Practices for 1993:944).
31. One o f such arbitrary and unconstitutional measures was his decision to sanction
the formation o f a constitutional assembly to revise the constitution. Another
questionable decision involved holding o f a national referendum on constitutional
amendments in October 1994.
32. The lower house is a permanent legislative body, whereas the upper house is
designed to hold scheduled sessions rather than on permanent basis to approve the
budget, presidential appointees and important laws.
33. For instance, the speaker o f the former parliament questioned the need for and the
wisdom behind a bi-cameral rather than a single chamber legislature in a unitary state
like Kyrgyzstan (CSCE, 1995:5).
34. In one instance, a candidate contested and won his seat while hiding from the
government (CSCE 1995:9).
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
CONCLUSIONS
After their independence in 1991, the Central Asian republics, experienced
several common political outcomes such as the dominance o f the executive,
secularism, and a high degree of statism—seemingly legacies o f their communist past.
The fact that the post-communist Central Asian republics share several common
socioeconomic, cultural, political, and historical features seem s to have led students o f
Central Asia to focus on these and other common political outcomes, envision more
or less similar trajectories of their political development, and overlook and/or
deemphasize political variance among them in the post-communist era. However
salient common political outcomes, they do not overshadow the fact that these
countries experienced significant variation in the area of political liberalization.
This study is clearly the product o f our concern w ith this gap and its adequate
theoretical explanation. In this study we tried to show that three Central Asian
countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, significantly vary in political
liberalization and provide an adequate theoretical explanation o f this variation. The
central question this study raised and tried to adequately answ er was: Why these
countries which share several common characteristics experienced significant variation
in political liberalization within few years o f their independence? We believe that this
study has succeeded in this endeavor.
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VARIANCE IN POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
This study has clearly illustrated that our thesis about differential rates o f
political openness in Central Asia has merit. In other words, the three Central Asian
countries can be located at different points on the political liberalization scale:
Kyrgyzstan leads the group in all aspects o f political liberalization, Kazakhstan
follows with some important achievements, and Uzbekistan is far behind either of
them with little or no progress in the post-communist political transition. Kyrgyzstan
needs to institutionalize many liberalized practices and put an end to few aberrations
in order to evolve into an enduring political alternative; Kazakhstan needs to
institutionalize some liberalized practices and liberalize many authoritarian practices;
and Uzbekistan is yet to introduce, let alone institutionalize, genuine political reforms
in society.
The Central Asian republics began to experience varying rate o f political
openness in the wake of the Gorbachev reform program in the pre-independence
period. The pre-independence variance in the rates of political openness among them
became more pronounced in the post-independence period. Kyrgyzstan represents a
case of relatively very high level o f political liberalization in Central Asia. By mid1994, the political liberalization process which was making steady progress began to
falter and suffered setbacks down the road after Akayev launched a limited
authoritarian offensive primarily against the opposition press and journalists. Still, this
authoritarian offensive did not degenerate into an abject repressive regime like the one
in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan continues to surpass other republics in term s o f an overall
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progress in almost all areas o f political liberalization. Barring few aberrations,
autonomous sociopolitical forces are free to organize themselves, receive official
recognition, disseminate their political views and visions through press conferences,
newspapers, and mass rallies, and participate in national elections. Although the
honeymoon period for the independent press ended in m id-1994 as some independent
newspapers were shut down and journalists were persecuted thereafter on charges of
sullying the honor o f the president, it faces the least restrictive policy in comparison
to the independent press in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan represents a moderate case which can be located approximately in
the middle between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the political liberalization scale.
After independence, it witnessed an overall improvement in the pre-independence
level o f political liberalization and sizable independent political space became
available to Kazakh society. The Kazakh opposition is largely spared o f the kind of
indiscriminate, brutal repression the Uzbek opposition is subjected to in the post
independence period. In Kazakhstan, autonomous sociopolitical formations appear and
disappear for various reasons. Many pre-independence autonomous social groups
evolved into explicitly political parties. Also, a number o f new autonomous political
formations and independent newspapers were allowed to arise and play the role of an
active opposition in the post-independence period. However, at the same time they
face serious restrictions, including denial o f registration and suspension. Also,
opposition forces are seldom allowed to hold rallies; opposition activists are in most
cases subjected to disguised and undisguised punitive measures for their role in

346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

unsanctioned rallies; and independent newspapers and journalists are at times
persecuted for sullying the honor of the president and for endangering inter-ethnic
peace and security o f the Kazakh state. In addition, although Kazakh authorities allow
limited independent individual and organized participation in the national political
process but they effectively preclude a real electoral contest between opposition and
government-backed candidates in the national elections. Although this record o f
political liberalization is modest in comparison to the one Kyrgyzstan achieved in the
post-independence period, it is certainly superior to that o f Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan represents a case of consciously arrested political liberalization—
one of the worst cases o f political liberalization in Central Asia. The basic pre
independence authoritarian orientation and character o f the Uzbek regime remains
unaltered in the post-independence period. Tactics aside, the Uzbek leadership, which
never ceases to extol virtues of gradual reformism in the transition from communism
to political pluralism, has so far made no genuine effort to liberalize its any
authoritarian practices in the post-communist era. Since m id-1992, there has been no
tolerated independent political space and activity in the republic. Uzbek leadership
uses widespread repression as part of its determined effort to thoroughly emasculate
and eliminate both individual and organized opposition voices in the republic and to
establish one o f most repressive and least reformed post-communist regimes in the
region— a regime which has all the democratic trappings but no content.
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RUSSIAN MINORITY AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
The central reform measures, including the prom otion o f local cultures, aimed
at socioeconomic and political revitalization of the country clearly politicized societal
forces, including the ethnic Russian minority and many members o f the republican
communist parties, along eth no national lines in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in
the pre-independence period. This conducive condition persistsin both the countries in
the post-independence period. The members of the ethnic Russian minority who were
active in sociopolitical groups before independence either joined different national
political parties or formed their own sociopolitical groups exclusively committed to
Russian causes in the post-independence period. The demands o f the Russian-speaking
population and titular nationalities in both the counties are often at variance with each
other—a factor which complicates not only the satisfaction o f such demands but also
the use of indiscriminate repression o f opposition forces in both Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan.
What further enhances the significance of the ethnic factor for political
liberalization in both the countries is the fact that a num ber of former communists of
Russian, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz origin support their respective ethnic communities in
pursuit of their interests. The demonstrated Russian material and political support to
the Russian minority in the two countries and the looming threat o f the Russian
military intervention to safeguard the interests of this minority potentially raises to a
prohibitive level the cost o f indiscriminate repression to thoroughly emasculate
independent political forces, including the Russian m inority, in them. Political
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concessions, including the permission to form sociopolitical and cultural associations,
the Kazakh and Kyrgyz authorities concede to the Russian minority for political and
economic reasons could not be denied to their titular nationalities for fear o f losing
nationalist credentials and a national support base—a prospect which would undercut
their manipulative tactics to deal with opposition forces, including the Russian
minority. As the authorities in both the countries avoid the option of thorough
repression o f societal forces, including the Russian minority, and allow them to set up
genuine independent sociopolitical formations, the fact that these formations would
take independent positions on various matters, publicize their political views, and
publicly criticize the authorities and their policies is a foregone conclusion. The safe
option then Kyrgyz and Kazakh authorities face and pursue is not how to completely
depoliticize opposition force but how to either convince them or coerce them through
selective repression to tone down their criticism and minimize their involvement in
undesirable political activities like protest rallies.
An indiscriminate policy of repression remains an ill-advised option for both
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, the selective use o f repression o f certain
activists o f the Russian minority in Kazakhstan with no such parallels in Kyrgyzstan
can be explained by the prevalence o f secessionist tendencies and demands among
some sections o f this minority. Such tendencies and demands unnerve the Kazakh
authorities and induce them to take limited risk o f selective repression o f certain
unwanted elements among the Russian minority by using the pretext of maintaining
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inter-ethnic harmony and protecting security and territorial integrity o f the Kazakh
state.
Uzbekistan, in contrast, inherited a proportionally small Russian minority—a
factor which impedes its politicization and induces it to leave its welfare to the
goodwill o f Uzbek authorities. The Russian minority is among the least politically
active ethnic group in Uzbekistan with no association o f its own working to promote
its interests. This fact works to the advantage of Uzbek authorities. They would have
paid a greater price to suppress the most resourceful ethnic minority in the country if
it had acted on its own to protect its interests in the post-independence period.
Another factor which benefits Uzbek authorities is the absence o f the official Russian
support to the Russian minority not only because o f its small size but also because o f
the close collaboration between Russia and Uzbekistan on certain important
geopolitical issues, including the civil war in Tajikistan and the threat of Islamic
fundamentalism. Thus, Uzbekistan remains devoid o f an important conducive
condition for political liberalization in the post-independence period.
Thus, one o f the important findings of this study is that the ethnic diversity,
which most scholars consider a negative influence in the post-communist transition
process, exerts a positive influence on political liberalization if one resourceful ethnic
group has a powerful state behind it and if such a group articulates its demands in
democratic terms and refrains from threatening the survival o f the country in which it
lives. Another important finding o f this study is that a powerful country with little or
no commitment to democratic promotion around the world can facilitate it for its own
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tactical reasons. Two important practical implications derive from these findings.
First, a number o f actors, including local political groups, international institutions,
and countries, interested in democratic promotion in Central Asia need to enlist
support o f the Russian government for their cause. Second, the democratic cause and,
hence, the political and civil rights of the Russian minority in Central Asia will be
served better if Russian authorities publicly and seriously adopt such cause and cease
to support the incumbent authoritarian rulers even if they promise to act as a bulwark
against the so-called Islamic and nationalist threats.

ELITE STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
The pressure o f the central reform measures, including the anti-corruption
drive and promotion o f local cultures, caused multiple division among republican
communist party elites in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in the pre-independence
period. This division persists in both the countries in the post-independence period
and continues to keep the authoritarian impulses o f their leaders in check and prevent
them from backsliding into abject repressive regimes. This division dispersed political
resources in society, eroded a cohesive organized support base for political elites in
power and for their repressive policies, strengthened political society in these
countries as numerous influential old communists joined various opposition formations
and, hence constituted a powerful constraint against abject repression in both the
countries in the post-independence period.
The republican communist parties as cohesive political groups lost their direct
control of the state in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in the post-independence. However,
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the old communists in their individual capacity still command formidable financial and
political resources with their continued access to key positions in the public sector and
their personal, regional, and tribal sources of support and, thus, remain an important
political force thereafter, complicating the option o f indiscriminate repression of
opposition forces in these countries. What makes them a formidable constraint against
indiscriminate repression is not only their continued access to internal resources but
also their ability to enlist external, especially Russian, support in their domestic
political struggle. This is another important finding o f this study. Unlike most other
cases of political liberalization where reform-oriented elites o f a ruling coalition relied
on their internal sources o f support in their bid to push for political reform, old
communist elites, both reformist and non-reformist, who remain outside the ruling
coalitions in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, make an effective use o f their external
sources of support to become a formidable political force, preventing the incumbent
regimes in these countries from lapsing into abject repressive regimes.
It is true that due to the constraints produced by the relatively large Russian
minority and fragmented elite structure both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan did not lapse
into abject repressive regimes along the lines in Uzbekistan. However, they
considerably differ in the level of political liberalization. Thus, the fact that both
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have a relatively large ethnic Russian minority and
fragmented elite structure but display considerable variation in the level o f political
liberalization warrants an explanation. The presence and demands o f secessionist
forces of Russian origin provides part of the explanation. As already mentioned, such
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forces unnerve Kazakh authorities and induce them to use selective repression against
certain unwanted elements under the pretext o f maintaining inter-ethnic harmony and
neutralizing threats to the security and territorial integrity o f the republic. However,
pan o f the explanation lies in the views o f political leadership about political
liberalization and is discussed further below under the section on political leadership.
As compared to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan which both inherited dispersed
elites structures, Uzbekistan inherited a remarkable elite unity which developed and
solidified during the Soviet period and was clearly demonstrated in the wake o f the
center-sponsored anti-corruption drive. Barring few instances o f small splits and
defections from the former republican communist party, including the short-lived
appearance o f a crack which was partly responsible for a short-lived period o f limited
political openness in the immediate post-independence period, the elite structure in
Uzbekistan remains intact. The intact elite structure preserved the organized support
base for the regime in power and its policies and prevented the dispersion o f political
resources in society, enabling the ruling elites to thoroughly emasculate its political
opponents without paying a high cost in the post-communist period.
It is true that the large Russian minority and fragmented elite structure act as
powerful constraints on the authoritarian impulses in the Central Asian republics, but
they have their own limitations. They account for the broad variance in the general
direction o f the political liberalization process in these countries, but they can not
adequately explain many specific puzzles, including aberrations in the political
liberalization process in a republic when the two structural explanatory variables
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remain constant and considerable variance in the levels o f political liberalization
between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan when both have a proportionally large Russian
minority and dispersed elite structures. The political orientations, strategic behavior,
and actions o f the Central Asian provide answer to these questions.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
The incorporation o f the political leadership variable in our theoretical model
is guided by both theoretical assumption and empirical evidence. In other words, the
decision to focus on political leadership is based on the theoretical assumption that
political leaders are not simply forced by impersonal influences into a pre-determined
direction but rather retain some degree of autonomy and mediate the impact o f such
influences on the political process. Therefore, political orientations o f political
leaders, the decisions and choices they make, and the preferences and strategies they
adopt for one reason or another are relevant to the study o f the political liberalization
process. Our detalied case studies provide empirical support to this theoretical
assertion.
In this study, we found that views o f the Central Asian political leaders about
political liberalization mediate the gross impact o f the structural constraints and
influence the political liberalization process in one way or another. In addition, we
found that their certain concrete actions (even though such actions do not correspond
to their general political orientation) produce a cumulative effect of one sort or
another on political liberalization in their countries.
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All the three countries experience a continuity in the political leaderships and
in their political orientations in the post-independence period. In addition, they also
witness a continuity in the impact of certain pre-independence decisions on political
liberalization. In other words, not only the views and actions o f the Central Asian
political leaders in the post-independence era but also those o f the pre-independence
period influence the variance in political openness in the post-independence period. In
addition to directly influencing political liberalization, the respective political
leadership o f these countries mediate the impact o f the Russian minority and elite
structure on political liberalization in the post-independence period.
In Kyrgyzstan, Akayev remains committed to political reforms and unlike the
Kazakh and Uzbek leaders does not use cultural traditions as a pretext to justify his
anti-democratic practices. He rather speaks o f his determination to transform his
republic into a Central Asian Switzeralnd, voicing optimism about its future political
and economic development. The limited authoritarian offensive he launched in mid1994 especially against the press and journalists was justified as an appropriate
response to false personal accusations rather than a response dictated by cultural
traditions and/or political stability. The informal alliance he forged with the
democratically-oriented forces before independence continued in one form or another
in the post-independence period. Although he did not join any autonomous political
formation in the post-independence period, he continues to draw support from many
to face challenges, including the communist challenge. His ban on the communist
party in the immediate post-independence period, although an anti-democratic action
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in nature, proved beneficial for political liberalization in the post-independence period
for two reasons. First, this situation split the party and provided non-communist
autonomous political forces an opportunity to improve their position in society.
Second, it continued to underscore Akayev’s continued need o f their support for his
reform program and to counter the looming communist and other political challenges.
In Kazakhstan, the pre-independence skepticism of the Kazakh leadership about
the impact o f political liberalization on Kazakh society continues in the post
independence period. It is rather reinforced in the post-independence period due to
sharp division o f Kazakh society along eth no national lines and the presence and
demands o f secessionist forces in the republic. The moderately negative view o f
Kazakh political leadership about political liberalization and the pretext o f secessionist
forces it used to selectively repress opposition activists explains the mixed record of
Kazakhstan in political liberalization and considerable variation in the levels of
political liberalization between Kyrgyzstan and that country.
Although Nazarbayev did not ban the communist party along the lines in
Kyrgyzstan, he took certain steps which produced more or less sim ilar beneficial
consequences for political liberalization. In the wake of the August 1991 coup, he quit
the republican communist party, issued a presidential decree banning the presence of
all political parties in state structures and forbidding people with formal party
affiliation to hold senior positions in the government, and publicly promised not to
join any political party himself. All these steps further eroded the position and unity
of the republican communist party, diminished its usefulness as an effective tool o f
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political control in the republic, and induced form er communists to jo in and organize
other sociopolitical formations.
Once Nazarbayev lost attraction in the communist party, he had little incentive
to use state pow er to try to rebuild a divided political organization as a strong base at
the cost o f other emerging autonomous political formations. An outright drive to
crush all opposition forces along the Uzbek lines involves a prohibitive cost and a risk
to undermine his own support base. Such drive requires repression o f individual
political leaders o f international repute and formations with considerable political clout
whose support he needs and receives on many critical issues, including the
presidential elections. And repression of Kazakh nationalist formations and the
absence o f their demands which are often at variance with demands o f the Russian
minority could potentially deprive him of the pretext he uses to convince the Russian
minority in the republic and the Russian authorities in Moscow that as compared to
other potential alternative nationalist leadership he is best suited to serve their
interests. The presence o f moderate Kazakh and nationalist formations provides him
with a leeway to repress his hardened political opponents among Kazakhs and
extremist and secessionist elements among Russians, while pointing to the existence o f
moderate groups as a manifestation his tolerance o f autonomous nationalist groups.
Thus, the freedom o f action for moderate political forces to organize themselves and
to engage in a number o f independent political activities and repression o f the
hardened and radical political opponents o f Kazakh authorities constitute two distinct
elements o f their political strategy in the post-independence period.
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In Uzbekistan, in the absence of two conducive conditions, the large size of
the Russian minority in proportion to the titular nationality and the fragmented elite
structure, the importance o f the political orientations, decisions, and preferences o f
the Uzbek leadership for political reform increases in the post-independence period.
Before independence, the Uzbek leadership was anything but reformist. Tactics aside,
after independence the leadership makes no secret o f its anti-reform orientation, its
negative view o f the impact o f glasnost and political liberalization, and its
determination to insulate Uzbek society from such an impact until appropriate
conditions are created for a smooth transition to democracy. Because the anti-reform
orientation o f the Uzbek leadership remains intact, Uzbek society continues to be a
victim of indiscriminate repression in the post-independence period and the Uzbek
leadership continues to justify such repression on various pretexts, including the
Uzbek cultural traditions, raising serious doubts about the likelihood o f introducing
genuine political reforms in the near future.

FUTURE OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA
This brings us to the question o f the future o f political liberalization in these
countries. O f course, it is hard to predict with certainty the future o f political
liberalization in countries which are in the transition phase and lack most propitious
socioeconomic conditions condcive to political democracy. However, on the basis o f
our preceding analysis and a good deal o f information available on certain evident
objective conditions in these republics, we can make broad, educated speculations
about the future o f political liberalization in them.
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As our analysis suggests, ethnic diversity can be of positive influence on
political liberalization under certain conditions. Thus, compatibility of high level of
political liberalization and multinational society is reassuring for all the three
countries. However, according to our analysis, only Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan
appear to fulfill the requirement under which this compatibility holds. In other
words, the continued presence of a large Russian minority in proportion to the titular
nationalities and the availability of Russian support to it in these two countries will
prevent their backsliding into abject repressive regimes. Hence, we expect these
countries to continue to experience some sort o f political liberalization in the
foreseeable future. W hat further improves the prospect of the political liberalization
process stay the course in these two countries is little or no chance of consensus
building among most elites on the need to roll back whatever political liberalization
exists in them.
The serious threat to the existing level o f political liberalization in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan arises from the breakout of armed hostilities, including civil wars,
due to intensification o f ethnic, tribal, and regional rivalries supported by political
elites, or in response to the continued, however limited, repression especially in
Kazakhstan. The armed resistance by the Russian minority in support of their
demands, including the secessionist demand, can potentially lead to a complete
breakdown of the ongoing political liberalization process in Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan is
spared of this eventuality but is susceptible to inter-ethnic, regional, and tribal armed
conflict. However, the threat of a civil war will continue to discourage the leaders o f
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these republics from imposing a violent authoritarian order along the lines in
Uzbekistan. In other words, they are more likely to continue to provide their societies
with some independent political space within definite limits.
in Kyrgyzstan, the reformist leadership is, to a great extent, the most
important reason for its consistent impressive lead over other Central Asian republic
in almost all areas o f political liberalization. O f course, we have no reason to expect a
sudden change in Akayev’s pro-reform orientation. Given his past record, we can
safely say that the political liberalization process can suffer some setbacks, but is
unlikely to degenerate into a despotic state like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan due to
socioeconomic and political crises o f ordinary proportion under his rule. Broad,
though still fragile, foundations o f a democratic order are in place in the republic;
howerver, there may be some ups and downs in the protracted process of
consolidation o f such foundations.
The deepening of political liberalization in Kazakhstan is another matter. The
Kazakh leadership has postponed it on various pretexts which all suggest that it is a
distant prospect there. There is a more important reason to reach this conclusion. In
fact, there is no indication that the incumbent leadership has made any preparation to
deepen political reforms in the near future. Nazarbayev is rather in no mood to
decentralize the centralized power structure he has built around him. He can be
tempted to misuse it again to prolong his rule. If he does so, the chances of full scale
democratization o f Kazakh society will be further reduced. In fact, the full scale
democratization process is more likely to begin in the republic under three most
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propitious conditions, in addition to the ones discussed above. First, the coming o f a
reform-oriented leadership into power in Kazakhstan. Second, a democratically
oriented Russian government committed to promoting democratic rights o f the Russian
population in the former Soviet space. Third, a broad consensus among political elites
o f different colors and ethnic origins on the need to build effective pressure from
below on Kazakh authoritie to deepen political reforms.
The Uzbek leadership has postponed political liberalization on various pretexts,
too. There is no indication that the incumbent leadership has developed any blueprints
to initiate the political liberalization process. In fact, Karimov has consolidated
personal power and is unlikely to dismantle the power structure and political machine
he took lot o f pains to build around himself. Because the incumbent leadership
appears ready to unleash excessive repression in the absence of constraints entailing
from a large Russian minority and fragmented elite structure, adequate pressure for
political liberalization is unlikely to develop from below in the foreseeable future. If
the political liberalization process is to begin under the incumbent leadership, the
most favorable condition for such a prospect would be the rise o f a powerful
challenger to it from within the ruling alliance accompanied by a split in the hitherto
cohesive elite structure along regional and tribal lines. If this happens, Karimov will
face the following two likely options: a) to initiate political liberalization, enlist
support o f the excluded and marginalized societal forces in order to improve his
position vis-a-vis the splintered groups, and to accommodate the latter in the newly
created independent political space; or b) to use excessive repression to neutralize the
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challenge and risk a civil war along regional and tribal lines. Such a challenge is by
no means on the horizon; however, it is more likely to develop if the incumbent
president decides to perpetuate his rule with no end in sight for ambitious political,
regional and clan leaders. More likely but less dramatic scenario is the leadership
change. In other words, a genuine movement toward political liberalization will have
to await the departure o f the incumbent leadership. The best hope is that after the
incumbent leadership leaves office, the political machine built around it is likely to
weaken and certain reformist elements in the power structure (or tribal and regional
groups within the ruling alliance) may demand more independent political space for
themselves and hence prove catalyst for the relaxation o f excessive political control in
the country.
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APPENDIX
FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1 Location of Central Asian Countries on Political
Liberalization Scale
Independent Variables

Dependent Variable
(Political Liberalization)
High
| Moderate |
Low

Ethnic Composition
Large Russian Minority
Small Russian Minority

Kyrgyzstan

Kazakhstan*
Uzebkistan

Elite Structure
Elite Coherence
Elite Fragmentation

Uzebkistan
Kyrgyzstan

Kazakhstan

Political Leadership
Pro-Reform
Kyrgyzstan
Cautious
Kazakhstan
Anti-Reform
Uzebkistan
*The explanation of the mixed record of Kazakhstan lies in the cautious attitude of
Kazakh leadership toward liberalization and its impact on Kazakh state and society. A
fuller explanation of this phemonenon is provided in chapter 2 and 4.
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Table 1 Russian population in the Soviet republics,
by 1989 (in thousands of persons)
Russians
I Percent |
Republic
| Total population |
3305.0
52.0
1.6
Armenia
7021.0
392.0
5.6
Azerbaidjan
10152.0
1342.0
13.2
Belorussia
30.3
1565.0
475.0
Estonia
5401.0
341.0
6.3
Georgia
37.8
Kazakhstan
16463.0
6228.0
4258.0
21.5
917.0
Kirgizia
2667.0
34.0
906.0
Latvia
3675.0
9.4
Lithuania
344.0
4335.0
13.0
562.0
Moldavia
119865.0
81.5
Russian Federation
147000.0
5093.0
388.0
7.6
Tadjikistan
3523.0
Turkmenistan
334.0
9.5
51452.0
Ukraine
11356.0
22.1
19810.0
1652.0
8.3
Uzbekistan
Source: Anatoly M. Khazanov, Alter the USSR: Ethnicity.
Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (Madison: The University of Wisconsin
Press. 1995), p.247.
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Table 2

Change in Russian and Titular Nationalities in Central
Asia 1989-1996 (Percent)

Country
1989
1996
Change %
1989
Kyrgyzstan
1996
Change %
1989
Tajikistan
1996
Change %

Kazakhstan

Russians Kazakhs Kyrgyz Tajiks Turkmen Uzbeks
39.5
37.8
47.0
33.9
•9.8
19.1
21.4
52.0
15.6
59.9
22.0
-22.8
7.6
62.1
3.4
68.1
26.3
-48.9

1989
9.5
100.0
1996
6.6
100.0
Change %
-16.8
19.2
1989
Uzbekistan
8.3
1996
5.6
Change %
-22.6
Source: Tim Heleniak, T h e Changing Nationality Composition of the Central
Asian and Transcaucasian States," Post-Soviet Geography and
Economics 38: 6(June 1997), pp.369-375.
Turkmenistan
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71.0
76.6
24.5

Table 3

Percentage of ethnic groups in the capitals of the
Central Asian states (in percent)

ITashkent [Alma-Ata (Almaty) IFrunze (Bishkek) IDushanbe lAshghabad |
Uzbeks
44.2
10.6
Kazakhs
22.5
Tadjiks
38.3
Turkmen
50.8
Kyrgyz
22.7
Tatars
6.3
Russians
34.0
59.1
55.8
32.8
32.4
Ukrainians
4.1
5.5
Armenians_______________________________________ 4.6
Source: Anatoly M. Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity. Nationalism, and Politics in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (Madison: The University of Wisconsin
Press. 1995), p.247.
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Table 4

Structure of Gross Domestic Product and Work Force
(in percent)

[Indicator
[Country
Uzbekistan Share of GDP

iSector
|
Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Services
Share of work force Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Services

19921
34.8
26.1
10.4
29.8
43.5
13.9
7.2
35.4

19931
29.9
26.1
9.3
36.5
44.6
14.8
6.7
34.9

19941
36.2
24.0
9.6
38.3
44.3
13.1
6.4
32.2

1995|
32.3
17.9
7.6
39.8
43.7
13.6
6.6
36.1

1996|
26.1
19.7
8.2
44.3
43.5
13.6
6.6
36.3

Kazakhstan

Share of GDP

Agriculture
industry
Construction
Services
Share of work force Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Services

23.4
25.9
10.0
36.0
24.4
20.5
10.3
45.8

16.1
31.3
7.8
37.5
25.4
20.3
10.1
45.2

14.8
28.2
10.5
45.2
21.5
18.8
9.0
46.8

12.8
29.0
10.8
45.4
22.0
18.2
7.3
53.0

12.6
24.6
6.4
56.2
21.5a
16.6
5.6
55.8

Kyrgystan

Share of GDP

Agriculture
39.0
40.0
40.9
43.7
49.5
Industry
33.0
25.7
30.9
16.8
12.7
Construction
4.1
5.6
7.1
3.5
5.6
Services
23.9
28.8
32.4
34.7
32.2
Share of work force Agriculture
38.2
39.0
42.0
42.0
49.2
Industry
16.3
16.1
14.7
14.6
12.0
Construction
6.2
5.3
4.7
4.7
3.9
Services
39.3
39.6
38.7
38.6
34.9
Source: Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov, "Broader Parameters: Development in the
Twentieth Century," in Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov (eds.), Central Asia:
The Challenges of Independence (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp.72-3.
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Table 5
| Country

Indebtedness of Central Asian States to Russia for
Interstate Credits (billions of dollars)
|

At the end of 1994

|

At the end of 1997

|

Kazakhstan
1402
1684
422
Uzbekistan
557
188
Tajikistan
296
242
186
Turkmenistan
147
Kyrgyzstan
150
2401
Total
2873
Source: Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov, "Between Two
Gravitational Poles: Russia and China," in Boris Rumer and
Stanislav Zhukov (eds.), Central Asia: The Challenges of
Independence (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p.155.
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Table 6 Social and Economic Characteristics of Central Asian
Population
GNP
millions $ billions
1996
1996

GNP per capita Literacy
$ billions
1996

Urban
Population

60.0%
98.0%
16.0
22.2
1350.0
Kazakhstan
39.0%
97.0%
5.0
25.0
550.0
Kyrgyz Republic
39.1%
2.0
99.0%
5.0
Tajikistan
340.0
100.0%
45.4%
4.3
5.0
940.0
Turkmenistan
97.0%
41.0%
23.5
23.0
1010.0
Uzbekistan
Source: Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 1997 (Pittsburg:
Superintendent of Document, Bank, 1998); Cenral Intelligence Agency.
The World Fact Book 1994 (Washington, D.C.: CIA Office of Public and
Agency Infromation, 1994); Stanislav Zhukov, "Economic Development in
the States of Central Asia," in Boris Rumer (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996),
p.131.
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Table 7 Freedom House Rating of Central Asian Countries on
Political and Civil Rights Index
Country
]
Kazakhstan
Kyrgystan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Scale:
1 -7
Source: Freedom

1992 ! 1993 | 1994 I 1995 | 1996 I 1997 |
5.0
5.0
5.5
4.5
5.5
5.5
3.0
4.0
4.0
4.5
3.5
4.0
5.5
7.0
5.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
6.5
7.0
5.5
7.0
7.0
7.0
5.5
6.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
6.5
Free
Party Free
Not Free
1 -2.5
3 - 5.5
5 .5 -7
House, Freedom Review. 1992,1993,1994, 1995,1996, 1997
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Ave.
5.2
3.8
6.4
6.7
6.5

|

Table 8 Freedom House Rating of CIS Countries on Political and Civil
Rights Index
ICountry

I 1»»2 I 1993 || 1994 I 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | Ave. |

4.0
3.5
4.5
5.0
3.5
3.5
4.0
Armenia
6.0
6.0
6.0
5.5
5.6
Azerbaijan
5.0
5.0
6.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
4.5
4.0
5.0
Belarus
2.5
2.5
1.5
2.3
3.0
2.5
2.0
Estonia
4.8
5.5
4.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
5.0
Georgia
5.0
Kazakhstan
4.5
5.0
5.5
5.5
5.2
5.5
Kyrgystan
4.5
3.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
3.8
4.0
2.5
3.0
3.0
2.5
2.0
2.5
Latvia
2.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
Lithuania
2.5
2.0
1.5
2.0
4.5
5.0
5.0
3.5
4.3
Moldova
4.0
4.0
3.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.4
Russia
Tajikistan
50
7.0
5.5
7.0
7.0
7.0
6.4
5.5
7.0
6.7
Turkmenistan
6.5
7.0
7.0
7.0
3.0
4.0
6.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.9
Ukraine
5.5
Uzbekistan
6.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
6.5
6.5
Scale:
Free
Not Free
Party Free
3 - 5.5
1 -7
1 -2.5
5 .5 -7
Source: Freedom House, Freedom Review. 1992,1993,1994,1995,1996,1997
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Table 9 Freedom House Rating of East European
Countries on Political and Civil Rights Index
I 19901 19911 19921 1993| 19941 19951 1996| 19971
| Country
3.5
3.5
6.5
3.0
7.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
Albania
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
5.0
Bosnia
3.5
2.0
2.0
2.5
2.0
7.0
2.5
2.5
Bulgaria
4.0
4.0
4.5
4.0
4.0
Crotia
2.0
1.5
1.5
6.0
2.0
2.0
1.5
1.5
Czech R.
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
Finland
2.0
1.5
1.5
3.5
2.0
2.0
1.5
1.5
Hungary
3.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
Macedonia
3.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.5
1.5
Poland
5.5
3.5
7.0
4.0
4.0
3.5
Romania
5.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
3.5
Slovakia
3.0
1.5
1.5
Slovenia
2.0
1.5
1.5
Free
Party Free Not Free
Scale:
3 - 5.5
1 - 7 1 -2 .5
5 .5 -7
Source: Freedom House, Freedom At Issue (January-February 1990):18-19;
Freedom House, Freedom Review January-February,
1991,1992,1993, 1994,1995.1996, 1997
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Table 10 Public Opinion on Best Political System of Kazakhstan

Western democracy

Communism
3%

Anything that brings
order
62%

Source: Nancy Lubin, "Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: The Views
of the Led,” in Timothy J. Cotton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in
Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder Westview Press, 1995), p. 219.
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Table 11 Public Opinion on Best Political System of Uzbekistan

Wbstcm
democracy

11.5%

Islamic state
10 . 0 %

Capitalism

Anything that
brings order

3.6%

50.4%

Socialism
11 .8 %

Communism
2.6 %

Don't know

No
2.2%

7.9%

Source: Nancy Lubin, "Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: The Views
of the Led,” in Timothy J. Cotton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in
Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder Westview Press, 1995), p. 220.
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Chakwal district, Pakistan. H e was the fourth child o f his parents, Hafiz Lai Khan and Sat
Bharai who raised his three brothers and three sisters. Islam grew up in a rural
environment and attended village schools before his eldest brother, Muhammad Altaf, who
was then a captain in the Pakistan army, shifted him to the Jhelum city for education
purposes in 1969. After his university education, he served in various research and
teaching institutions in Islamabad. In August-September 1985, he also visited the United
States as a student tourist, hi July 1989, he married Farhat S. Raja. His first daughter,
Izza, was bom on May 9, 1990. Inaash, the second daughter, was bom on May 13, 1991.
In January 1993, Islam travelled to the United States for his Ph.D. program. His wife and
two daughters later joined him in August 1994. His third daughter, Haneen, was bom in
Baton Rouge, on November 27, 1996. Islam and his family left the United States in July
1999 to live in Islamabad where he took up a teaching position.

391

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate:

Muhaimad Islam

Major Field:

Political Science

Title o f Diaaertation :

Political Liberalization in Post-Cannunist
Central Asia: A Comparative Study

ifmsor

luate

itaool

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

7

.

O ,

Date off Kraeination:

Junta 7 r 1QQQ

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

